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'Happy Isles' or 'I-bpi Isles' (the Pijjn English version) .is the tourism 
industry's tag for the Solomon Islands. After almost thirty years of 
associatioJl with the Solomon Islands, I have enough faith in the basic 
good sense of the people to believe that the title is still correct and that 
the crisis that beset the islands during 1998-2D03 will pass. 
\Nriting this book has not been easy, not least because the action it 
describes is still unfolding. Although I am conscious that words can do 
damage to the delicate process of rehabilitation that is taking place, so 
too can lack of information. This chronological account is intended to be 
part of the healing process. \Nhlle Solomon Islanders lived through 
events day-by-day, leaders and policy planners need to be able to put 
events into the perspective of the quarter-century since Independence in 
1978. My connection to the Solomon Islands goes back to 1974 when I 
began research in the Australian Solomon Islands community. My first 
visit to the Solomon Islands was in 1976, and since then I have visited 
many times, and spent more than a year of my life there, adopted into a 
prominent Malaitan family. I have always followed contemporary events 
in the islands, even through my academic interests have usually been 
much rnore historical. 
One of the problems with attempting to describe the modern 
Solomon Islands is the lack of national sentiments and the 
predominance of regional loyalties above those of the nation. However, 
appreciation of history is probably more pronounced than in \Nestern 
societies. Genealogical and cultural history is central to all Solomon 
Islanders because historical knowledge of one's relationship to extended 
families and ancestral attachments to land is crucial to life. In the 
1970s, I was astonished by the retention of detailed knowledge of the 
past, whether it was genealogies, talk of heroic ancestors and mythical 
figures, knowledge of the labour trade to Queensland and Fiji (which 
was my major focus), or the history of government on their island. My 
Malaitan family is not unique; their knowledge of history was typical of 
the generation which formed the bridge between the pre-contact and 
early Protectorate days and the modern Christian nation. 
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The history of the events since 1978, particularly over the last six 
years, is just as important a part of Solomons' culture as the earlier years. 
Understanding the turmoil of these recent years is essential for nation­
building. Future generations will want to know what happened when 
their nation was torn apart by dissent and violence. This book is based 
on newspaper accounts that I have collected over years, but mainly on 
sources gathered off the internet, supplemented by visits, discussions 
and my own knowledge of the Solomon Islands. It is my contribution to 
recording the recent history of the nation. Initially, I thought being 
based in Brisbane, without regular access to the local newspapers, would 
make it difficult to obtain sufficient sources. This proved untrue: 
modern media no longer consist of radio, television and newspapers 
bought over the counter. During the years of the low-intensity civil war 
and turmoil in the Solomon Islands, the electronic media became 
powerful and comprehensive. The Solornon Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation (SIBC) provides its news bulletins online, as do most major 
overseas newspapers, and press releases from government departments 
are also easy to access on the internet. Far from being starved of sources, 
I have collected an almost unmanageable amount. 
Solomon Islanders liVing overseas also watched with great concern as 
their nation convulsed. In mid 1999, they began an email chat line 
called Iu-MI-Nao, run at first OLlt of USP in Fiji by Zeloti Hoala, and 
then transferred to New Zealand for the long term under webmaster 
Paul Roughan. This has been supplemented more recently by the 
www.lifhaus.com site which provides an abundance of links to other 
sources of information about Solomon Islands. Students, diplomats and 
a variety of Solomon Islanders liVing overseas, as well as academics and 
others with interests In the islands participated in the Iu-Mi-Nao site. 
They debated reports of day-to-day occurrences and Issues ranging from 
media freedom to the possibility of reforming the nation as states in a 
federation. The network provided current information from SIBC news 
transcripts, Radio Australia and other news reports online, as well as 
texts of the various peace agreements. It also allowed individuals with a 
common heritage or interest, spread around the globe from Giza and 
Honiara to New York and Copenhagen, to feel they were able to play 
their part in the nation, even at a distance. Iu··Mi-Nao also provided a 
useful source of corrective information. The 'coconut radio' (gossip) has 
often been hard at work during the conflict, spreading misinforrnaUon 
or half-truths, some of which have been re-packaged as authentic news 
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by overseas reporters. Official sources are often silent or too cryptic to be 
clear on important matters. Comments aired on the Iu-Mi··Nao network 
provided useful correctives, and helped me avoid recording fiction or 
exaggeration as fact. 
In my reading of the Iu-Mi-Nao network I have come to admire the 
minds and actions of many of its participants. While this book is totally 
my own in terms of content and analysis, I wish to acknowledge the 
discussions that I have been privileged to read. Some individual 
contributors were more prolific and analytic then others, and although 
have not quoted directly from any contribution unless it was public 
access material, I read everything and owe a huge debt to many 
members of the group. Particular thanks are due to Angiki Angikinui 
Tau'aso, Don Angikiamo, Duran Angiki, Don Angikiamo, Geoff 
Muduioa, Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, Peter Kenilorea Jr., Geoffrey Kaka, 
John Moffat Fugui, Geoff Muduioa, John Naitoro, John Roughan, Paul 
Roughan, .loses Sanga, Warren Tereqoroa, Julian Treadaway, Matthew 
Wale, and John Waki. 
1;m:isius Tara Kabutaulaka has been outstanding in his contribution 
to debate on his nation. Born in Haimarao, Guadalcanal, Kabutaulaka is 
a former lecturer in history and politics at the University of the South 
Pacific in Fiji. He holds a doctorate in politics and international relations 
from the Australian National University in Canberra and is currently a 
Fellow in the Pacific Islands Development Program at the East-West 
Center in Honolulu. His insightful contributions at all levels have 
included both objective academic analysis and sometimes partisan 
politics that express loyalty to his horne island. Kabutaulaka exudes a 
passion that I admire. Another Solomon Island scholar of respect is John 
Naitoro from 'Are'Are, Malaita, a senior public servant turned academic 
who remained dispassionate and caring for his nation while under great 
stress. His thoughtful Masters and doctoral theses on paths for 
development in the Solomon Islands and his contributions to the Iu­
Mi-Nao network and other diaiogues aiways have been appreciated. I 
also wish to record my thanks to John Roughan, a resident of Solomon 
Islands since 1958, a leading citizen and founder of and advisor to the 
Soiomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), for his support and his 
constant fight to achieve sociai justice in his nation. He also read a draft 
Df the manuscript and provided useful comments. Mary-LOUise 
C)'Callaghan also deserves thanks for her consistentiy high quality 
reports in the press. I have taken the unusual step of acknowledging all 
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named journalists, not just the newspapers in which they publish, in 
the belief that their contributions are significant. Terry Brown, Bishop of 
Malaita in the Church of Melanesia, provided information on religion 
affiliations anc! gave me access to his reports and correspondence, which 
provided me with a Malaitan perspective I lacked. He also kindly 
provided detailed comments on an early copy of the manuscript. Thanks 
are also due to Max Quanchi of the Queensland University of 
'Technology, who gave me access to his extensive conection of Pacific 
periodicals back to the 1970s, without which my task would have been 
much more difficult. He provided excellent criticism of the manuscript. 
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uncleI' study. Finally, I wish to thank my adopted Malaitan family. 
Without their friendship since 1976, and that of the Australian end of 
the descent group, I would never have gained the insight to be able to 
write this book, nor the determination to complete the task. I have not 
named them, to ensure that no blame rests on their shoulders, but I 
dedicate the book to them; particularly to the family patriarch, to my 
brothers in the next generation; and to the younger generations whom 
hope wilJ never again find the need to join the Eagles. 
I would also like to acknowledge the support of the History 
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analysis and criticisms, which inevitably involve individuals who may 
well read this book. For the most part they have been good people, 
caught up in problems that were not of their making and were too large 
and embedded within the fabric of the nation to be easily solved. There 
is no easy 'Solomons' way out of this and I have told it as I see it. I have 
faith that the 'Hapi Isles' will return to their former happy state, but 
never again wiU there be the same innocence about the needs of good 
governance. 
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An overview of the
 
Solomon Islands crisis
 
The Solomon Islands lies in the Pacific Ocean, directly across from 
Australia, neighbouring eastern Papua New Guinea and northern 
Vanuatu. Consisting of a double chain of islands, stretching across 
1,500 kilometres of ocean, it lies on the 'ring of fire'-the point where 
the Indo-Australian and Pacific geological plates meet. Its land area 
covers 28,000 square kUometers across six large islands-Cholseul, New 
Georgia, Santa Isabel, Malaita, Guadalcanal, San Cristobal-and 900 
smaller islands and atolls. The major islands reach substantial altitudes 
and are endowed with rainforests, beaches, mangroves and lagoons. 
Most are quite rugged, with only Guadalcanal eXhibiting substantial 
areas of flat land. The modern nation ends in the north at the Shortland 
Islands, near Bougainville, now part of Papua New Guinea. Its southern 
extreme reaches the Santa Cruz Group and three Polynesian outliers, 
only 160 kilometres from northern Vanuatu. 
In 1942, the Japanese built an airbase on the relatively flat terrain of 
Guadalcanal. And after the Second World War, the British moved the 
capital from Tulagi, in the nearby Nggela Group, to Honiara, on 
Guadalcanal's northeast coast, occupying much of the infrastructure left 
behind by the Japanese and Americans. 
***** 
An aerial view from a plane approaching Guadalcanal shows off a 
rugged mountain range, jumbled ridges, kunai grass and several coconut 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
plantations surrounding Honiara. Elsewhere, one can see Iron Bottom 
Sound, the site of a major Second World War sea battle, and the central 
volcano in neighbouring Savo Island. Most of Guadaicanal consists of 
rugged mountains, but the capital, IIoniara-home to some 50,000 
people--is located in a rain shadow on the island's only substantial plains. 
Henderson airfield lies on the coast, 10 kilometres east of the centre 
of Honiara. Coming to the city from the airport, the road swings over 
the Lunga River past the Seventh Day Adventist Betikama School, 
before it joins a new double-lane highway that runs past King George 
VI School, the Ranadi commercial and industrial zone, and the several 
campuses of the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education and the 
University of the South Pacific (USP). The outskirts of the old colonial 
town begin at Chinatown on the banks of the Mantaniko Eiver, 
opposite the National Referral Hospital (still often known as 'Numba 
g'). Across from the river on the left: lie the Anglican and Catholic 
cathedrals, St Barnabas and Holy Cross, with the United Church 
headquarters and the produce market a little further down on the ocean 
side. A long strip of stores, offices and a casino occupy the le1'l: hand side 
of the road, with new hotels and guesthouses on the ridge above. The 
fllilin retail centre and government buildings are spread over a couple of 
streets and occupy a few high rises and shopfronts lining five or six 
streets. The parliament sits atop a hill overlooking the main town, while 
the museum, central police station, the post office, the comt and the 
older office buildings, inc..1uding the prime minister's office, are dose by. 
Pmt facilities are spread aiong this central section, including the busy 
wharves for inter--isiand and international shipping. An the substantial 
urban developments lie dose to the shore of Iron Bottom Sound. The 
old Government l-Iouse, the Solomon Kitano Mendana Hotel and the 
Yacht Club dominate the prime beach area, and the very centre 0]' the 
town comprises banks, artefact shops, the Solomon Airlines office and 
the closest thing Honiara has to a department store-Acor Bookshop, a 
historical curiosity that does not sell books. Further west out of town are 
Rove, site of the police headquarters, the prison and the botanical 
gardens; and White Eiver, a pleasant suburb full of Maiaitans and 
iKiribati. 
Honiara town stretches along a few kilometres of Guadaicanai coast 
with a mixture of housing strung along bitumen and gravel roads that 
do not extend far inland. Although I{oniara is the capital city of 
Solomon Islands, it is more akin to a slow-moving colonial town. Cars 
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and people amble slowly along its streets. Pedestrians dodge the red 
stains of chewed betel nut that spatter the otherwise drab and irregular 
pavement in front of Chinese-owned shops. Everyone seems to know 
each other, and long-term inhabitants are well recognised. Locating 
residents is usually a straightforward task, answered by information 
about where they work, and whether they were seen at the market in the 
morning, or in Chinatown, or perhaps downtown later in t.he day. 
'The town drifts inland for a few kilometres in a few places, through a 
series of valleys and around bare hills. The rich live on t he hills with 
wonderful views whilst the poor me concentrated in the valley areas 
further from the coast. The outer suburbs resemble urban versions of 
outer-island villages, where houses are made of a mixture of traditional 
and modern materials. A fleet of mini-buses running on regular routes 
provides the main mode of transport, supplemented by often­
dilapidated taxis, Cars only began to flood into Honiara in the 1990s as 
second-hand import.s from Asia. Many people still depend on walking to 
get around, often over quite long distances, 
The prime minister's official residence Is located on Langakiki Ridge 
overlooking Iron Bottom Sound, just five minutes drive from his office 
near the beach. 
A British protectorate from 1893, and an independent nation from 
1978, the Solomon Islands were beset by a low-intensity civil war from 
1998 onwards, centred mainly on GuadalcanaL The upheaval included 
the removal of a legitimate government In 2000 and led to the 
intervention of an Australian-led regional assistance mission supported 
by ail members of the Pacific Islands Forum in July 2003. While the 
events that occurred were of concern to the whole nation, they largely 
involved only two islands, GuadalcanaJ and Malaita. This book begins 
with the two crucial events and continues with a recounting of the six 
tempestuous years. 
The coup: twenty-six days that shook a nation, June 
2000 
In 2000, it was rumoured that Prirne Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu 
had sent for Cuban mercenaries to prop up his government, and in fact 
he had discussed this possibility preViously. Whatever the reality, the 
editor of the Solomolls !,'tJice beHeved this was the final factor that caused 
the coup. Ulufa'alu knew that his government was in a perilous position 
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by April 2000, when he wrote to Australian Prime Minister John 
Howilrd requesting a three-month commitment. of Australian police 
personnel as part of a 50-person multinational group to work alongside 
Solomon Islands police to maintain law and order. 1·loward tolel 
Australia's parliament that the 'problem is a longstanding ethnic one', 
with deep-seated causes, and was not simply a security issue. 
No count.ry outside of the Solomons can control the situation. We can simply 
try to influence it. In the old days they could use gunboat diplomacy. 'rhat 
doesn't apply today, lfwe were to send in troops, we may end up simply being 
the meat in the sandwich (Howard 2(00), 
The Australian government seerns to have misjudged the seriousness 
of tlw situation. Although there had been some multinational talks, and 
a team from Foreign Affairs and the Australian Federal Police were 
dispatched to I·loniara in early June 2000 to monitor the situation, 
nothing more was done. Some months later, journalists claimed that an 
agreement had been reached for the Commonwealth Multinational 
Police Assistance Group, already instaJled in the country. to become 
armed peacekeepers, but this never eventuated (Smith and Ricketts 
2000; SIBC, 2 October 2000). 
No one will ever know for sure whether Manasseh Sogavare had prior 
knowledge of the coup that eventuaJly placed him into power as prime 
minister later in June 2000. Solomon Islanders fJrst heard about it 
through cryptic Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) radio 
broadcasts throughout the morning of Monday 5 June 2000, as banks 
and businesses cont~cted their staff through radio 'service messages' 
adVising them not to come to work. In rloni~ra, news of the coup pass(~d 
around by word-of-mouth. Final confirmation carne when Andrew 
Nori ...... ·a lawyer, formcr parliamentarian, and spokesman for the Mal~ita 
E~g1c: Force (MEF)-8nnotlnced on national radio that two MEF groups 
had c~rried out operations at 4.00am to captUl'e the main police armoury 
at Rove in West Honiara before visiting nearby prisons, armouries, and 
all of Honiara's police stations to collect more weapons. Within one 
hour, they had managed to gain control of aln1Dst all the high-powered 
weapons in the country.l At Mhokona Bay, three Australian-funded 
patrol boats were captured and strIpped of their weapons. 
When Prime MInister Ulufa'alu woke at 5.00am, he found himself 
under house arrest, along with his persona.! secUl'.ity officers, who had 
been disarmed. The governor-general, Father Sir John Ini Lapli, was also 
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placed under police guard, and both leaders' cars were confiscated. 
Roadblucks were set up, including one on the road to the airfield. 
Rogue police officers and the MEF members seized the SIRC, poHce 
stations and the government TeJekom Center. They cut alI international 
phone communications, but some emails containing information about 
the coup were able to get out to overseas recipients early in the morning 
before the email system too was shut down. Honiara's mayor, Roland 
Fugui, went to the SLBC studios to broadcast a message asking the 
population to remain calm and stay at horne. 
Andrew Nod styled himself as a 'mediator', holding talks with the 
Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners at the Australian 
High Commission, and reportr:dly also with those countries' prime 
ministers, on behalf of the J\!IEF. On SLBC radio, he annuunced that a 
Jetter demanding the resignation of Ulufa'alu within 48 hours had been 
sent earlier that morning. UJufa' alu responded quickly and caBed a 
Cabinet meeting. Nori had also written to acting Commonwealth 
Special Envoy Ade Aclefuye, In the Solomon Islands to mediate between 
the Guada1canal and Malaita militant groups, to expla.in the coup. 
Adefuye attended Nori's press conference and told him that the 
Commonwealth and the international community insisted on 
maintaining democracy and constitutionality. Nod's response was to 
insist that the coup was not a coup, but a joint operiltion between police 
and the MEF---under his supervision-to restore security to Honiara, 
and thilt the executive, legislative ilnd judicial arms of the government 
were still intact. There was no intention to install an alternative prime 
minister, he added, and any such change would be unconstitutional. 
Nori also reiterated that the actiun had four aims: to reinstate law and 
order in Honiara and Guadalcanill; to restore confidence in the process 
of government; to accelerate the peace negotiations; and to prevent totill 
dls.integration the nation. Nor! continued 
In this exercise, I will require the co-operation and understanding of our 
existing legal and constitutional organs of the state to make appropriate decisions. 
This is l1ecessary because the incident was not a police or civilian coup d'etat. 
The executive, legislative andjudicial arms ofthe state remain intact. 
My task will be to mecliate. consult ,md Hai.se between the leaders of the joint 
0plmltlon and t.he relevant. legally establlshecl bodies with the view of bringing 
about. changes and putting in place me,lsures aimed at accelerating our return 
trip 10 peace, securiLY and social harmony (7iJe Australian, 7June 2000). 
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The Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)---a Guaclalcanal militant 
group formed in 1998 to advance their island's rights-·-was outraged by 
the coup, but they had been out-manoeuvred. Their press statement 
stressed the unconstitutional nature of the coup, which 'holds to ransom 
the parliamentary democracy that our country ildheres to' (Bohal1l~ 
2000b) . 
The media was qUick to portray the action as a de {acto coup. All 
movement: was restricted by a curfew between 7.00pm and 5.00arn, still 
in force in early August 2000, along with a total ban on liquor. The 
IFM responded to the coup by engaging in a skirrnish with MEF forces 
at Burns Creek, east of Honiara (SIBC, 6 June 2000). On Wednesday 7 
June a 55mm calibre cannon on the LaLa········one of the three patrol 
boat.s····-was used to attack the IFM militants on the shoreline at Lunga 
neilr Henderson airfield. By Thursday 8 June, the situation lwd escillated 
into a full-scille war ilS MEF militants concentrated around Alligator 
Creek in anticipation of a major offensive into the Foxwood area. Nori 
urged everyone to remain calm. Initially, the only groups able to 
communicate with both militias were the Anglican Melanesiiln 
Brotherhood and the Red Cross. The Brothers had gone into the 
fighting zone under unbiased auspices; they chewed betel nut and 
shared food with both sides and were able to move between the warring 
parties with their 'black cross' flag on their vehicles. There was, however, 
some evidence thilt a few of the Brothers were sympathetic to the MEF 
against what they saw as the 'heilthen' Moro--influenced IFM. Red Cross 
officials also tried to ascertain the extent of the conflict, travelling as far 
as Mbalasuna to investigate, but found no deaths. Nori stated that there 
hild been heavy causalities, and exaggemted overseas media reports 
suggested that up to a hundred had died, but other reports suggested a 
number less than ten (SIBe, 8 June 2000). 
On TLlesday morning, 6 June, the day after the coup, life in Honiara 
was relatively normal, despite the night curfew. The banks and shops 
did not reopen until Wednesday, and the British, Australian and New 
Zealand High Commissions began radio announcements of the possible 
evacuation of their citizens. Militants were sUll visible on the streets, but 
were confined to strategic locations around Honiara. In particular. areas 
such as Kongulai in the hills above White River, were heavily guarded to 
protect the water supply from rumoured IFM attempts to add cyanide. 
The electricity supply, often intermittent in Honiara anyway, was not 
restored until evening. Looking very strained, the prime minister afl'ived 
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[or the 2.00pm Cabinet meeting, accompanied by two heavily armed 
MEF guards. The meeting was postponed until 5.00prn---that is, until 
enough ministers would brave the streets of I·Ioniara to make a quorum. 
The joint police/MEF operation had taken over the Guadalcanal 
Provincial j·Ieadquarters building as its base. The police were divided 
into four groups 
those who remained faithful and neutral were marginalised and had 
no weapons 
those who joirH~d the joint operation and controlled the remaining 
police weapons 
those who did not join the MEF or the joint operation, but were 
sympathetic to their cause 
those Guadalcanal police who sided with the IFM, and pmvided 
them with guns and protection. 
The majority, by far, chose to join the joint operation. 
Nori urged the prime minister to recall parliament and [ace debate 
on a no-confidence motIon, but unreaJist.ically promtsed that the stolen 
weapons would be returned every evening to the various armouries. 
Chrtstian leaders in the Solomon Islands called on the militants to 
return the nation to democratic rule, and the Council of 'Trade Unions 
called for a foreign-armed military presence to keep peace. Alice Pollard, 
Vtce President o[ the National Council of Women, also spoke out, 
asking both sides to lay down their arms (Smith and Ricketts 2000; 
SIBC, 6, 10 and 13 June 2000; Radio Australia, 5 June 2000; Solomon 
Islands Christian Association, 8 June 2000; Treadaway 2000a). 
By Wednesday 7 June, condemnations were floodtng in from 
overseas. Two rather rattled members of a development committee from 
the European Parliament reported that their chartered plane had corne 
under fin~ as it took off from Henderson airfield for Port Moresby. The 
report soon circulated in Europe, a.1though some local sources doubted 
Its accuracy. Former F\jl Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, acting as the 
chief Commonwealth negotiator between the warring parties, believed a 
coup was imminent and cited intelligence that 'had lwen received by 
the police and the Prime Minister's office that a coup was In the 
making' (The Allflra]jan, 9 June 2000), An eight-nation Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Group met in London to discuss the Solomon Islands 
coup. as well as the coup that had occulTed in FIji a few weeks earlier. 
The government of India expressed its concern at what it viewed as a 
'copy-cat' coup to that In Ftji. New Zealand's Foreign Minister said that 
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both Fiji and the Solomon Islands could be suspended from the 
Commonwealth, and expressed his concern that the nation was close to 
a civil war. John Hayes, a senior New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officiaJ who was in Honiara when the coup occurred, met with 
Nori and Deputy Prime Minister Sir Baddeley Devesi. 
The Australian government, advised by its High Commission that 
the crisis was dire, followed developments with mounting concern; they 
must have known that. by ignoring Ulufa'alu's pleas, they had missed 
the opportunity to prevent. the situation. Prime Minister Howard met 
with South Pacific Forum leaders in Tc)kyo for t.he funeral of a former 
Japanese Prime Minister. PNG Prime Minist.er Sir Mekere Morauta 
described Ulufil'alu as a 'fundamentally honest prime minister 
challenging a corrupt political cuit.ure' (Garran and O'Callaghan 2000a; 
O'Callaghan 2000h). Prime Minist.er John Howard, no doubt 
influenced by his nation's experiences in the Bougainville rebellion, 
refused to consider sending in Australian troops or police to restore 
order and stated that it was 'not in our interests to put unarmed 
Australian police in the frontline and at an unacceptable risk, 
particularly without an exit strategy' (The Australian, 7 June 2(00). 
Opposition Leader Kim BeaZley was quick to remind him that he had 
sent peacekeepers into East Timor in similar circumst.ances. Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer was prepared to travel to Honiara to help 
resolve tensions, but ruled out the option of immediate intervention. By 
Thursday 8 June, a New Zealand naval frigate was on stand-by just 
outside Solomon Islands territorial waters, ready to evacuate Australian 
and New Zealand citizens. Although Australian officiil1S denied it, 
HMAS Tobruk was reportedly being made ready for similar duties. The 
tension in Guadalcanal was so great that when three Taiwanese naval 
ships arrived at Honiara on a routine visit. to unload relief donations for 
the Red Cross senne residents thought that t.hey were part of an 
organised international intervention force. Savenaca 'l'uivaga, 
Commander of the unarmed Fijian and Vanuatu police peacekeepers, 
announced that they had no further role and were withdrawing (New 
Zealand Herald, 6 June 2000; SIBC, 8 June 2000; Radio Australia. 8 
.June 20(0). 
*'**** 
On the day of the take-over, the IFM issued a press statement and 
the following day produced an issue of its occasiona.1 newsletter hatabll 
Tlwllli. It described the coup as a scheme masterminded by Andrew 
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Nori to bankroll the MEF'~ implemented by Malaitan businessmen Alex 
Bartlett and Roland Tirno, aided and abetted by rogue elements of the 
police force. Nori was said to have revealed his take-over plan during a 
Malaita Conference in Auld earlier in the year. The IFM depicted the 
coup as a 'copy-cat' operation following the lead of the Fiji coup, rather 
disingenuously claimed to be committed to resolution of the 
'Guadalcanal crisis' and the peace process, and stated that the MEF was 
holding the whole nation to ransom by overpowering the government 
process. It added fuel to the coup fire by claiming that. Nori's plan was, 
'after seizing power, to set up t.C)fI "Care Centers" around GuadalcanaI. 
All Guadalcanal people will then be instructed to go and live in the 
"Care Centers" and those who refuse will be killed by the MEF since 
they will be treated as rebels' (lsataba ];wali, VoU, No.9, 6 June 2000). 
Former prime minister and then Guadalcanal Premier, Ezekiel Alebua, 
called for international assistance, stating that a11 the provinces should 
support democracy, and adVised the Prime Minister not to resign. 2 
Overseas journalists tried to understand what had happened and 
scurried about trying the put together biographical details on Amlrew 
Nor!. Wil:h Henderson airfield closed, journalists 'island hopped' their 
way from Bougainville to Gizo, Munda and down to Honiara to be in 
town for the recall of parliament (Skehan 2000c; SIBC, 11 June 2000). 
The first to arrive were an ABC film crew, along with reporters from 
Australian Associated Press and the Sydney Jvforning He/aid. The overseas 
media took the line that it was a 'copy-cat' coup follOWing Fiji, and 
naively invoked tbe 'domino theory', using phrases such as 'arc of 
instability' and 'Balkanisation'. They suggested that Papua New Guinea 
would be the next to fall (Garran and O'Callaghan 2000a; Sheridan 
2000; Wright and Charlton 2000). 
The 47-year-old Nod was consicJered the man of the moment. Born 
in Waisisi in west 'Are'are, Malaita, he was the scm of a .leader of Maasina 
Rum, the Malaitan protest movement in the 1940s and early 1950s. 
Brought up as a Catholic, but now a Seventh Day Adventist, he was 
formally educated at King George VI School in Honiara, and went on to 
complete a law degree at t.he University of Papua New Guinea. He later 
worked for the government as Senior Crown Counsel In 1980·-81, 
before becoming the first Solomon Islander to set up a private law finn, 
First elected to parliament in the 1985 by-elections, he served as 
Minister for Horne Affairs and Provincial Government in 198G-89. 
Most notably, cJuring the terms of Prime Ministers Kenilorea and 
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Alebua, Nori headed a committee to review the role of provincial 
governments, which recommended abolition of the system set up under 
the Pmvincial Govemment Act 1981, to be replaced with a more 
decentralised structure based around an upgrading of the Area Councils. 
Although a Constitutional Review Committee reviewed the provincial 
system in 1987, there was not enough parLiamentary support to have 
Nod's reforms passed into law (Solomon News, 20 March, 1 September 
1989; Nori 1997; Naitoro 1993:156). He contested the 1989 electio!lS 
,1S leader of the Nationalist Front for Progress Party, and became Leader 
of the Opposition between September 1989 and 1992. Under the Hilly 
government, he held the finance portfolio from June 1993 to September 
1994, but was forced to resign in the face of accusalions that he had 
deposited some S$1.18 million into an Australian bank account at the 
time that the old Government House was sold to hotel developers. 
Subsequent investigations found that, although Nori had represented 
the company at the same time as he was Minister for Finance, he had 
correctly declared the amount earned by his legal company. As a result, 
the Leadership Code Commission exonerated him of any wrong-doing. 
With his name cleared, Nori re-entered parliament in 1997 but lost his 
seat at the general election in August that year. He returned to private 
life as a leading lawyer and did not re-enter politics until early 2000 as a 
staunch supporter of the MEF (Solomon 5'tar, 12 October 1994; Nori 
2002c; Angiki 2002b). 
***** 
The first statement from the Prime Minister was issued on Thursday 8 
June. The circumstances were unusual: Malaitan militants had removed 
a Malaitan prime minister. The MEF saw Ulufa'alu as sympathetic to 
Guadalcanal through his landholdings and businesses. He was from 
Langa Langa Lagoon, which is perceived as being marginal to other 
Malaitans, particularly the bush people and those from the north, not 
least because its people--like those of Guadalcanal and unlike the rest of 
Malaita-are predominantly Catholic. The people of Langa Langa and 
Lau Lagoons are descendants of 'gypsy' Malaitans, who were displaced 
from the mainland several generations ago and built their new homes on 
artificial islands they constructed in shallow lagoons. Thmughout tbe 
colonia] period the Langa Langa people, partly because they are situated 
just south of Auk!, which became the government headquarters, were 
the first to be incorporated into the Protectorate government's labour 
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and police force. They were seen as advantaged and like the Lau people 
on the east coast, outsiders, rather than mainstream Malaitans. 
In his statement, Ulufa'alu said that it was 'literally a coup and that 
he and his family feared for the.ir lives' (SIBC, 8 June 2000). Ignoring 
the ultimatum to resign within forty-eight hours, he decided to await 
the meeting of parliament on Thursday 15 June. Despite his insistence 
that he was not intimidated, Ulufa'alu told a radio reporter that he had 
been held at gunpoint the night before and told to change his views on 
resignation. Prime Minister since mid 1997, Ulufa' alu certainly failed to 
handle the worsening situaUon up until the coup, but his coolness and 
bravery during the first week caused the MEF's plans to fill I apart when 
they failed to force his resignation (Pereira 2000). 
On the morning of 'Thursday 8 June HMAS 7bbruk arrived in 
Honiara ready to take on board up to 800 people. The Australian High 
Commission had decided that the circumstances of the next week were 
too uncertain and that Australian nationals should be evacuated. 
l-Ienderson airfield remained closed and incidents had occurred in which 
Australians had been threatened, particularly at the Gold Ridge mine. 
Estimates suggested that there were 700 Australians and 3,400 other 
foreigners in the Solomon Islands at the Ume. By nightfall, 250 
Australians and other foreign TliIUonals were aboard HMAS Th/)ruk. 
ready to leave for Calms. The ship finally left on Sunday 11 June, 
carrying 480 people of various nationalities, the mcljority of whom were 
women and children. 3 
Australia had also readied I-IMAS /'vfanoora in Townsville, an 
amphibious landing vessel carrying a company of riflemen, along with 
members of the Special Air Service, numerous armoured vehicles, and 
three Black Hawk helicopters to assist in any further evacuation. The 
ship arrived on the edge of Solomon Islands waters on Monday 12 June. 
The previous day, a further 40 Australians had been evacuated on an 
Australian military Hercules aircraft carrying Foreign Minister Alexander 
Dowllcr, who had come to help negotiatc thc volatile situation. At the 
time, the Australian High Commission obViously thought it was acting 
Wisely, but in rCtrospec! the whole evacuation was iJll over-reaction and 
its effect severely crippled the foreign business community in Honiara 
for many months afterwards. The evacuation removed a stabilising 
international presence that had held both militant groups back from a11­
out attack. Further, the removal of the secretariats of various NGOs 
based ill Honiara, spread the crisis nationwide as teachers, water supply 
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workers, conUIluIlity development officers and legal officers were 
suddenly withdrawn from peaceful communities all over the country 
(Garran and O'Callaghan 2000a: McPhedran 2000a, 2000b: Meade 
2000a) . 
New Zealand readied aircraft to assist evacuation of their nationals, 
90 of whom left the following weekend on a RNZAF Boeing 737, with 
Foreign Minister Phil GotT, who had been in the Solomon Islands to 
assess the situation. The New Zealand frigate IA Alana stood close by, 
awaiting further developments. The nation's biggest hotel and favouriLe 
watering-hole, the Japanese-owned Solomon Kitano Mendana, situated 
on the beach in central Honiara, was forced to close because Japanese 
nationals were amongst those evacuated. The American Peace Corps also 
suspended its operations, relocating 64 volunteers and all of its staff. 
The evacuations aroused sadness among Solomon Islanders, many whom 
rushed to reassure foreigners that there was nothing to be afraid of. 
However, Ramos II!. the main ship on the route between Honiara 
and Auld, the capital of Malaita, was working overtime, crowded with 
fleeing Malaitans, and other shipioads of Solomon Islanders al.so 
returned to their home provinces. Many businesses were boarded up 
and closed (SIBC, 8, 11, 13, 27 June 2000: New Zealand Herald. 11 
June 2000: Wright 2000b).'! 
On Friday 9 June, Speaker of the House, Paul Tovua, confirmed that 
the Opposition had signalled a motion of no-confidence in the 
government [iJ[' the planned Thursday 15 June meeting of parliament. 
Tlw next day, Honiara appeared normal, although minus most of its 
expatriate population. The markets were open but minimally stocked, 
and soccer games proceeded as usual at Lawson Tama oval. There were 
no new clashes and the rFM leaders signed a fourteen-day truce, 
although the MEF did not reciprocate. The IFM promised not to invade 
I-Toniara and residents began to congratulate the piH'amilitary/MEF 
operation f01' restoring a level of security that had not existecl all year. 
Shop break-ins ancl 'night shopping' (breaking into privaLe hornes) had 
ceased. OLher reports, however, suggested that intimidation was active, 
cars were being commandeered and the lull was fraught with tension. 
Ominous stories began to circulate or MEF men visiting an industrial 
metal supplier in Honiara to obtain a 'donation' of heavy steel plate to 
sheath a stolen bulJdozcr in order to create a makeshift tank. Although 
they were initially refused access to the steel plate, the company 
acqUiesced when Andrew Nori became involved in the negotiations. III 
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another ominous sign, the Australian diplomatic housing compound, 
then still under construction, was looted (Skehan 2000d; Sydney 
Morning HcmJrf, 12 June 2000). 
The United Nations signalled that it thought the crises in FUi and the 
Solomon Islands could best be dealt with by regional neighbours, but 
Australia and New Zealand made quite clear that they were not about to 
send in the substantial peacekeeping force for which Prime Minister 
Ulufa'alu had pleaded. On Sunday 11 June, a Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group arrived, including the Foreign Ministers of Botswana, 
Australia and New Zealand, along with a senior Malaysian official. The 
group met with the governor~general and the prime minister, Minister 
[or Foreign Affairs Patteson Oti, Leader of the Opposition Mmmaseh 
Sogavare, a group from the Malalta Conference, MEF spokesman 
Andrew Nori, and Guadillcanill Premier Ezekiel Alebuil. They SilW a 
quiet I Ioniafil with the heilvUy armed parilmilitary figures not visible 
because the MEF had by now agreed to a truce (Yayil 2000; Radio 
AustraHa, 9 June 2000; Rouglwn 2000f; SIBC, 10 June 2000; Goff 
2000b). However, intimidation continued, Long~time resident, Catholic 
Father Norman Arkwright wrote to the Apostolic Nuncio that 
[o]n Sunday two businessmen, John Caro and Bobo Dhke were taken for 
perslmsive questioning to the office of the opposition where [Charles] 
Dausabea, Sogavare, Nori and [SamIAlasia (secretary ofthe opposition party) 
thorough.ly discouraged them from a,'>50ciating with Ulufa'alu in their attemplS 
to isolate him and force his resignation. Eagles threatened to take theIr 
vehicles-as I"hey have already st.olen many others belonging to peopie like 
[Vict.or] Ngele MP (South Guadalcanal) and Sir John Muria.,. [the] Chief 
.I ust.1ce (a Guada1canal man) (Arkwright 20(0). 
Two other islands were thrown into crisis during the lead-up to the 
vote of no~confidence, In early .June, a sign had been erected in Giza 
rnilrket in Western Province, and notices were distributed giving the 200 
Malaitans living there 21 days to leave, Then, early on Monday 12 June, 
40 men from southern Bougainville in Papua New Guinea armed with 
M-16 assault rilles landed at 'Taro, the capit.al of Choiseul (Lauru) 
Province, and Gizo, capital of Western Province. 'The men, thought to 
be linked with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BI~.A), looted the 
police Field Force armoury in Choiseul before moving on to Gizo, where 
they shot a Malaitan man, The Bougainville force announced their 
intention to protect their close kin in the northwestern islands frorn the 
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ME~ in repayment for many years of gifts of weapons, food and 
medicine during the Bougainville rebellion. Acting Police Commander 
john Homelo made an urgent plea for Australian assistance, explaining 
he had no police to dispatch to Giza as most of his men had joined the 
MEF. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army's General Secretary, 
Robinson Asotau, denied any direct involvement in the raids, but said 
that BRA commanders, Ishmael Toroama and Thomas "IarH, had been 
sent to Gizo to investigate. Luckily, the invasion force from Bougainville 
backed ofT at the request of the locals, dampening the seriousness of the 
situation. Had they not departed, their presence could have led the PNC 
defence force to imervene and perhaps jeopardised the Bougainville 
peace process, in which an agreement had just been signed on the future 
structure of an autonomous governmem (Daley and Skehan 2000: Post­
Couriel; 12 june 2000; SIBC, 13 june 2000; The National/OINA Hius, 
13 June 2000; BBC World Servicc News, 11 June 2(00) . 
.lust beforc the vote of no-confidencc, Solomon Islands' women 
leadcrs began once more to speak out. As early as june 1999, women 
had organised themselves into a Reconciliation and Peace Committee, 
and attempted to reign in Commonwealth negotiator Sitiveni Rabuka 
from making ill-considered statements. Women were also involved in 
early peace negotiations, but their voices werc not wrlcomed by 
Solomon Island male leaders, who were notoriously rnisogynous in 
political matters. Andrew N ori had been one of the offenders, but this 
time the MEF spokesman praised the women and said that he would 
arrangc for groups to visit the militants. He admitted that the nation 
had made a mistake in not involving women in the peace negotiations, 
and perhaps felt that reminding the militants of thcir mothers, aunts 
and s.isters might well make them more wilJing to negotiate peace. On 
Saturday 10 june, Catholic women at Kakabona organised a marke1 
around a MEF checkpoint. Women also met with the MEF forces at 
White River settlement and at other posts around Honiara presenting 
the militants with food and begging them not to use violence. Similar 
visits were planned for IFM posts. The Catholic Daughters of Mary 
Immaculate Sisters brought women out from town with rice, kerosene, 
11 0 ur, biscuits and mixed goods to harter for local vegetables and l'ruit:. 
The I-Ioniara Women for Peace group prepared food for the MEF and 
IFM militilnts, paid for out of their own pockets and eventually with 
small subsidies from I-Ioniara business houses. Stories emerged of men 
from both sides in the conflict .leaVing their bunkers and meeting 
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together with the brave women, hugging and crying, honestly showing 
[ear of the con11ict in which they were enmeshed, The women met with 
the Commonwealth envoy, Ade Adefuye, and protested that they had 
not been incl uded in any of the recent negotiations, Several groups' 
leaders continued to call for peace, including Alice Pollard, Vice­
President of the National Women's Council, along with leaders from the 
Women of Solomon Islands for Peace, Reconciliation, Good Governance 
and Democracy, Catholic Archbishop Adrian Smith called ['or Christians 
to go to the parliament on Thursday to witness the vote (SIBC, 13, 15, 
21 June 2000; Arkwright 2000; Roughan 2000g), 
When a nalional radio network has to assure its listeners that their 
prime minister is 'alive and well', as SIBC did on Tuesday 13 June, hut 
has vacated the official residence and remains under guard by the VIP 
Protection Unit and the police force, one can be sure that there is 
trouble, In fact, Ulufa'alu's wife and children had been secretly removed 
to his home at Langa Langa, Malaita, on Sunday on board Saalia, 
despite the MEF searching the ship for them, 
Two New Zealand aircraft flew out more than 140 Japanese, 
Australian, New Zealand, Asian, British and Peruvian expatriates to 
Tc)wnsville, HMNZS 'Ie !vIana and HMAS MarlOora were in Honiara, 
but only to supervise the evacuation, not to maintain law and order. 
Most of the high commissions and embassies contacted their citizens in 
all proVinces, requesting they proceed to Honiara for immediate 
evacuation, leaVing only a few hundred foreigners on the islands. The 
nation's provincial premiers met in Honiara on Monday 12 June, and 
called for the coming parliamentary debate to be conducted free of 
interference from the militants. Governor-General Sir John Ini Lapli met 
with MEF Jeaders to ensure that the 50 parliamentarians w(~re not 
prevented from attending the session, He considered moving the 
parliamentary session to Buala in Isabel Province or Lata in Temotu 
Province, but in the end accepted MEF assurances that they would 
allow parliamentarians to meet without being harassed (SIBC, 13 June 
2000). Honiara was now almost. totally a Malaitan enclave patrolled by 
MEF militants eqUipped with the high-powered weapons looted frum 
government annouries, 
While the economy dived deeper than anyone previously thought 
possible~two-thirds of the staff of the Education Department was sent 
on unpaid leave and SIBC reduced its services~intense lobbying and 
intimidation of politicians continued, When Stephen Tonafalea, 
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Member for West Kwara'ae, resigned from the Solomon Islands Alliance 
for Change (SIAC) just before the parliamentary vote, he became the 
sixth person in a few days to cross to the Opposition, Those that had 
crossed the floor included Member for East Guadaicanal Johnson Koli, 
Minister for Indigenous Business Development David Holisvi, long­
serving Member for East Malaita Alfred Maetia, ShortJands MP Albert 
Laore and Member for South Guadalcanal Victor Ngele. The prime 
minister and governor-general were still without cars, and their personal 
guards without weapons. Chief Justice Sir john Muria. Deputy Prime 
Minister Sir Baddeley Devesi and Director of Public Prosecution Francis 
Mwanesalua also had their cars taken away. 
On tile morning of Wednesday 14 June, SIBC announced that Prime 
Minister Ulufa' alu had tendered his resignation to the governor-general 
during the previous night and simultaneously become caretaker prime 
minister until a new government could be appointed. Ulufa' alu called 
for all stolen weapons and government property to be surrendered 
within a fortnight so that the police could regain control over law and 
order, and also called for the IFM to withdraw several kilometres from 
Honiara. In bis press conference, Ulufa' alu expressed regret that 
Australia had failed to respond to his government's requests for law 
enforcement assistance over the previous seven months, and disrnissed 
the rorthcoming vote as 'a sheer mockery of democracy' (Meade 2000b; 
SIBC, 13 June 2000). 
Choosing the next prime minister was not easy, as most 
parliamentarians already hac! political commitments, and there were 
seemingly no suitable candidates. Thrice-serving Prime Minister Solomon 
Mamaloni was deac!. the nation's first Prime Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea 
had left politics, and Ezekiel Alebua was now the Premier of GuadalcanaL 
No Malaitan or Guadalcanal politician. or indeed anyone closely aUied 
to Ulufa'alu, would be successful in the circumstances. which ru.led out 
Malaitans Steve Aumanu, Fred Fono and Alfred Sasako. Foreign Minister 
Patteson Oti, from small TlmlOtu Province, was not a suitable candidate, 
particularly as the governor-general was also from Temotu. 
Manasseh Sogavare, Memher for North Choiseul, emerged as the most 
likeiy candidate and was cleady the MEF's preference. Having served as 
Ulufa'a]u's Finance Minister until he was sacked early in 1998. he was !lOW 
Leader of the Opposition. However, he was closely associated with Charles 
Dausabea, Malaitan Member for East Honiara, who had a history of 
dubious business dealings and was associated with Nori and the MEr. 
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Another possibility was Reverend Lesley Boseto, a retired Methodist 
Bishop and Member for South Choiseul since 1997; but, despite his 
image as a non-corrupt straight-shooter, Boseto did not boast the ski1ls 
necessary to lead a united group. Sam Alasia, ambitious secretary of the 
main opposition party, undertook the planning of the election with the 
hope of securing a senior post in the office of the next prime minister. 
When nominations closed on Monday 26 June, the three candidates 
were Sogavare, Boseto and, a little surprisingly, Francis Billy Hilly, who 
had been prime minister in 1993-···94. Boseto and Sogavare were from 
Choiseul, and Hilly was from Western Province (Kabutalliaka 2000c; 
SIBC, 27 June 2000). 
***** 
More and more people continued to stream out of Honiara as both 
government and private enterprises laid off workers, most of whom 
returned to their own islands for safety and subsistence. This 
exacerbated the conditions for theft and intimidation, and made MEF 
forces even less answerable to their leaders. A new scheme had been 
introduced wllPreby merchants were asked to honour requisition forms 
presented by the MEF for food and suppIJes, but with very little chance 
of ever being compensated. And, in a bizarre twist, the MEF released 78 
inmates of Honiara's Corrective Institution, including murderers on life 
sentences, because 20 IFM prisoners had already escaped. The IFM 
prisoners had been released Thursday 15 June by magistrate's order, but 
MEF militants forced them back into prison. On their escape, the MEF 
said that the rele,lse of the others was 'only fair' (The Australian, 20 June 
2000; Courier-Mail, 20 June 2000). John Roughan described what he 
called the second 'creeping coup' after the first bloodless de facto coup: 
... the second one has effectively destroyed the national economy. 
Central Hospital has lost more than a quarter ofiLs expert doctors, about 40% 
of its beds, normally 82% occupied, are currently used, and many of its 
l1ursing sta ff are now on unpaid leave in the provinces. Government offices 
offer only a skeleton staff.i 11 many ministries ... 
But It is the. private sector that has experienced the economic coup the worst. 
Major business enterprises ofGoid Ridge, SIPes oil palms, logging industry (a 
example of lll ..wind blowing some good), tourist industry, hotels, diving shops 
and other spin offs have completc1y closed down oj' al'e in shrinking mode 
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daily. 'These enterprises had, until recently, employed thousands and will take 
months if not years \0 corne on stream once again (Roughan 2000h). 
The Australian navy's HMAS lobruk bl'came useful as a neutral 
rneeting place. Andrew Nori and IFM leader l-!l'nry Tobani organisl'd a 
conference on the 70bruk between the MEF and IFM to discuss a 
ceasefire, but the MEF refused to attend. Malaita was represented at the 
meeting only by Premier David Oeta (Courier-IVfail, 22 june 2000). The 
MEF cited the huild up of IFM forces at Marau and Alligator Creek, 
stating that they would only meet with the four main IFM leaders-­
Harold Keke, Andrew Te'e, joseph Sangu and Ceorge Grey. In joint 
statements after the larger meeting on the J()bruk the next d,ly, chaired 
by church leaders, Oeta and Guadalcanal Premier Alebua urged the 
militants to meet 'as soon as possible in order to bring about an early 
ceasefire to ongoing hostilities and agree on the framework for a peace 
settlement agreement' (Courier-Mail, 23 June 2000; The Australian, 23 
.June 2(00). 
In the lead-up to the election, vote-buying was Widespread and 
involved cash payments, fibreglass boats, outboard motors, and cabinet 
positions. On the day of the election, when government parliamentarians 
arrived at IIenderson airfield they were threatened at gunpoint. As a 
result, when parliament finaJly met on Wednesday 28 june, more than 
half the parliamentarians refused to attend. leaving only Ulufa'alu and 
Albert Loare on the government benches. 'The Western, Choiseul, 
'Temotu and Guadalcanal Provinces had all discussed forcing the issue of 
statehood by revoking the Provincial COVelJ1fl1ent Act. MPs feared for 
their safety and were rightly upset that former MP Nori and militant 
thugs were able to dictate the democratic process. The governor"general 
explained that no quorum was needed because it was not an oJTicial 
s.ittillg of the House, merely one to elect a new prime minister. In 
desperation, he suggested that the parJiaml'nt would meet again on 
Friday 30 june, aboard the J()bruk, which was anchored off the coast. 
MEF forces again threatened parliamentarians on chartered flights from 
Cizo, Munda and Kira Kira", On the day of the vote, floatIng gently on 
311 Australian transport. ship, Manasseh Sogavare became the sixth prime 
minister of the Solomon Islands, securing 23 votes to Reverend Boseto\ 
2L Francis Billy Hilly received no votes (SIBC, 23, 28, 29, 30 JUlie 
2000: Radio Aust.ralia, 29 June 2(00). 
***** 
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The justifications for the 'civilian coup' are all self-serving. John 
r~oughan, one of the most outspoken of the nation's citizens, looked 
back at the coup after twelve months, stating that 
laj hfmdful of leaders, some ('Iect.ed, most, however, seJf-flppointed staged a 
coup which in fact destroyed the nation. Contrary 1.0 the full, public-relations 
campaign that continues to this day, llw overthrow of the Solomons ejected 
govr.rnment. by the barrel of the gun was indeed a coup. It was not simply a 
Joint Operations of national security personnel and Malaita Eagles which Mr. 
Nori, a leading spokesperson of the overthrow of the legitiInat.e government, 
insists upon calling it, Plainly the ilIeWll action of a few iJfmed men constituted 
a coup. Ti'ying 1.0 hide 11 lis reality with another kind of fancy new name fails to 
capt.ure the severe effects it has had on the country, nation wide, 
The public face of Honiara's Civili~n Coup was 10 'save' Honiara from t.he 
Isatabu fighters who were supposed to invade the city, to ensure that 
compensation claims be paid to those who lost possessions in the social unrest 
of 1~J()9 and 2ClOCl and, finally, to avenge the 20,000+ displaced driven out by 
Guadalcanal's Isatabu M.ilitants, The secret fmd more important face of the 
coup, however, was to install a new government into power. The Coup Masters 
installed through the barrel of a gun a government that would be more easily 
persuaded to follow orders and on that would benefit the coup leaders and 
the.!r followers first. and foremost, If the coup incidentally helped ordinary 
v.iI I,lge people that was tolemble but it wasn't the coup plotters' major aim. The 
main reason for staging the Honiara coup was to help a few gain at the expense 
or the many, 
But perhaps the coup could turn out to be a bll'ssing in disguise in the long 
run, For the past 23 years, since independence in 1978, Solomon's citizens had 
looked to ]-Ioniara and central government t.o be 'Our Father', This is no longer 
the case. '['he movement away Ii'om the Provincial system under a Central 
Governml'nt towfll'lls some sort of State System has now become unstoppable, 
'rhe blessing that could happen to the nation is the villagers now realizing that 
their lives depend more upon themselves, their own work with their own 
resources, than anything that t.he Cenuf' could give them, The coup may be 
the final lesson which the nation is now painfully learning: peoples' lives ,lH:' 
more in their own hands them in the hands of an 'educaU'd' elite who willingly 
sacrif.iced the whole nation for their own deep, greedy pockets. It has become a 
tough painful lesson to learn but I think people are beginning to learn it 
(Rougll'1l'l2001h) . 
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Australian-led intervention: The Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands, 2003 
Between June 2000 and July 2003 the Solomon Islands suffered a 
complete breakdown of its national political and economic system, 
arguably changing the nature of society forever, notwithstanding the filct 
that the majority of the population lives in rural areas, where Ufe 
continues much as before. Two prime ministers. Sogavilre and Kemakeza. 
tried but failed to refloilt the 'ship of state', prompting Australia to lead 
a n~gional intervention force, for reasons outlined in Chapter Sever), 
Planned during the proceeding months, the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) began on 24 .July 2003. 
In June, Australia and New Zealand had sent a fact-finding mission 
to Honiara, and Duwner had sent a submission to the Australian 
National Security Committee, before discussing the matter with his 
New Zealand counterpart, Phil Goff, who had taken similar steps in his 
country. On 25 June, Australia and New Zealand decided to send in 
troops for what was described as a regional assistance mission. The 
mission went ahead on the conditions that a j()ITnal request be 
accompanied with bipartisan support from Solomon Islands' parliament 
ancl, further, that the Pacific Islands Forum supported the initiative. On 
30 June, Australia convened a meeting in Sydney of Pacific Islands 
foreign ministers, and received support for a multinational task force to 
take control of Solomon Islands, at an estimated cost of 'two to three 
hundred million' in the first year (Huward 2003b). The remaining 
countries signed up their support at the August Pacific Islands Forum, 
well after the RAMSI intervention. France offered help but was 
pointedly refused, although Japan and France were courted to share thl' 
financial burden of the operation (l~)st·Courje[, 3, 4·6 July 2003; The 
Australian, 4 .July 2003; The National, 4-6 July 2003; I-Ioward 2003a; 
DFAT 2003). 
After the Solomon Islands had celebrat.ed the 25th anniversary of its 
Independence on 7 July 2003, the parliament held lengthy debat.es over 
the merits of the intervention plan, and unanimous support for the 
intervention was reached on 11 July, only two weeks before the troops 
were clue to lanel. Legislation was passed on the 17 July to protect and 
authorise the presence of foreign police, military and other personnel. s 
Two days earlier, on 15 July, a bemused Prime Minister Kemakeza had 
tried to put on a brave face when he told his people 
20 
Overview 
[i] LwilllJe sl.range at first to see as many foreigners wearing uniforms, driving 
army or poiice vehicles around town or flying overhead in their 
heiicoptcrs ... But the m~jority ofSolomon Islanders, who iive peaceFul, law­
abiding iives, have no need to Fear (Keith-Heid 2003b:24). 
Kemakeza was uneasy abollt his own future. When he first took office 
in December 2001, his stated objective was to get the militia forces to 
hanel .in all their weapons within the first 100 days. Later, he admitted 
to teJling the Malaita militants to keep control of their weapons rather 
than handing them in; and Cuale militants, Joseph Sangu and Harold 
Keke, claimed he had told them to hold onto their weapons, Kemakeza 
also faced allegations over corruption and hiring ex-militants as his 
private security force (O'CaVaghan 2003j; The National, 6 August 
2003; Post.. CouriCl', 6 August 2003; SIBC, 23 July 2003). Nevertheless, 
the Prime Minister told his people that 
[tl he lime For thorough investigmJons of criminal activities will come. If 
investigations Find me guilty of crimes, then 1will lace rhe law the same as any 
other man or woman In the Solomon Islands. If any of my Cabinet, or any 
Member of Pariiament or any civil servant or any member of society no matter 
how rich or poor, is Investigated and c!J,Jrged with a crime, they will Face the 
Full force oFthe law (Field 2003:24). 
For security reasons, Prime Minister Sir Allan Kernakeza, left Honiara 
on 23 .July for a stay on the HMAS ManoOI'c7 until the RAMSI force 
arrived. His wife and children had left for Aust.ralia the previous day, On 
24 .JUly all schools in Honiara remained closed and residents waited 
expectantly, Just after seven o'clock in the morning the first Royal 
Australian Air Force C .. 130 Hercules transport plane touched down at 
Henderson airport and soldiers took up defensive positions around the 
plane; the.ir only visible 'enemy' the media who snapped bappHy away. 
Nick Wamer, the special coordinator of RAMSI (the civilian head of the 
mission), arrived on a chartered Qantas flight welcomed by a pollce 
guard of honour. Twelve more flights followed throughout the day, 
carrying logistical equipment, soldiers and police, M.id-morning, local 
children sat on Red (Langaoona) Beach (made famous during the 
Second World War and restored to memory by the 1999 Hollywood 
movie Thin Red Line), watching as the HMAS ManooTa spewed forth 
landing vehicles and troops and the media contingent grabbed photos. 
A more mundane Jand.ing at the main wharf in Honiara would have 
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been much easier but not as photogenic. Late in the day, the air and sea 
mission had landed a small army, which grew to 2,200 members within 
the week. The army consisted mainly of soldiers and police from 
Australia, New Zealand and other member countries of the Pacific 
Islands Forum. Extra naval ships arrived and delivered helicopters that 
patrolied the air above the dusty capitai city (Phillips and Scholz 2003; 
The National, 25~27 July 2003; Field 2003; SIBC, 23 July 20(3). The 
I<.AMSI Operation HelpuJ11 Fren (help our friends) had begun. 
Australia provided RAMSI with 1,500 defence personnel, 155 
Federal Police and 80 members of the Australian Protective Services, 
along with a small number of departmental officials from the Treasury, 
the Departrnent of Foreign Affairs and Irade, the Australian Agency for 
International Deveiopment (AusAID) , the Attorney-General's 
Department, and the Department of Finance and Administration. Police 
and troops from New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu 
proVided the main support, and smaller contributions carne from Tonga, 
Samoa, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Nauru and Kiribati. New Zealand sent 
ZOO troops and police; Papua New Guinea, 90; Vanuatu, 50; and Samoa 
offered 40 but only provided 15 (POSf-C."ourier, 30 June, 9, 11~13, 24, 
31 July 2003; TJle National, 11-13 July, 1, 4 August 2003). Command 
of the 'Task Force was given to Australian Lieutenant Colonel John 
Frewen, then Commander of the 2nd Battalion, I<.oyal Australian 
I<egiment. The Special Coordinator, Nick Warner, previously Australia's 
High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea was eminently suitable. He 
had coordinated Australia's involvement in the sign.ing of the 
Bougainville Peace Accord, and had recently been appointed 
Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism. Ben McDevitt was sworn in as 
Deputy Commissioner for Police, to support Commissioner Morrell 
(Howard 2003a). 
The involvement of Australian personnel represented Australia's 
biggest military operation in the Sout h Pacific since the Second World 
War. Operation HelpuJ11 Fren was presented to the world as a Pacific 
Islands Forum project at the request of the Solomon Islands' prime 
minister and the Solomon Islands parliament. In reality, it was largely 
an Australian operation, with m,ljor assistance from New Zealand. It is 
true that Kemakeza wrote to John I Iowarcl on 22 April Z003, when he 
provided a frank assessment of the fallure of the Solomon Islands' 
government to restore law anel order, and requested a meeting with 
Howard to arrange multinational assistance. Then, on 5 June 2003, he 
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flew to Canberra on a RAAF VIP jet accompanied by Foreign Minister 
Chan, Police Minister Taneko, Police Commissioner Morrell and Paul 
Tovua, Chairman of the NalionaI Peace Council, for meetings with 
IJoward and Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (SISC, 4 
June 2003). 
In late July, I received a phone can in Brisbane from an excited 
Malaitan fr'iend in Honiara s,lying that the welcomed Australian 
invasion' had begun, but he hoped thilt the soldiers would respect 
kaslom and keep their hands otT the women. 
Wilmer set up his headquarters at Iron Bottom Sound Hotel and 
began to liaise with the Solomon Islands government, seeking to 
establish a partnership. His first press conference was held jointly with 
the prime minister. The troops and police soon started working to root 
out weapons and restore law and order, to the relief of the general 
public. Sir Allan Kemakeza announced another 21-day amnesty for 
weapons to be surrendered, after which anyone with weapons would 
receive a 10-year jilil sentence. The Australian force brought unmanned 
UAVs (small drone aircraft) ready to film and photograph Harold Keke's 
Weathercoast base, and troops were determined to capture him. Jimmy 
Easta Lusibaea, the most feared of all the militants, along with Moses 
Su'u and Simon Mani, the leading ex-MEF MalaJtan gang leaders, had 
fled bilCk to Malaita. After meeting with Warner on 30 July, they 
announced they would surrender and hand over all weapons in a public 
ceremony at Auki on 15 August. Keke, from his Weathercoast 
stronghold, negotiated his surrender though parliamentarian Yuldo Sato. 
I'Ie met with Warner on 8August and was taken into custody five days 
later. Just before his surrender, Papua New Guinea newspaper reports 
stated that he had been sighted on Bougainville and had requested last­
ditch assistance of weapons and men from BRA leader Francis Ona. 
Warner and Keke both denied these reports, and when the PNG Pos/­
COUlie/s office in Buka was ransacked soon afterwards, militant 
BougainviIIians joined in. The pos/-CoUlier subsequently admitted the 
reports were incorrect and closed their Buka office. Both the Guale and 
Malaitan militants claimed they were not criminals and pointed to those 
still in the government and the public service as the real criminals 
(McPhedran 200%; Quanchi 2003; O'Callaghan 2003k, 20031, 2003m; 
Kone 2003a, 2003b; Makaa 2003; Post-Courier. 11 August 2003). 
* * * * 
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During an extraordinary twenty-six days in June 2000, the 
democraticaiiy elected governmeIlt was removed at gunpoint. The prime 
minister was forced to resign, even though parliamentary processes had 
been used to elect his successor. The arrival of the equaiiy extraordinary 
Australian-led intervention force in July 2003 was v.ital in restoring law 
and order, and beginning a process of rehabilitation for the nation. This 
book analyses the reasons behind the Solomons de facto coup of 2000 
and the RAMSI intervention of 2003. 
Presuming that the government runs its fuii term, the next election is 
due early in 2006. Guadalcanal and Malaita have undergone an 
enormous political, economic and social convulsion over the last six 
years, and the whole political fabric of the nation has been torn, perhaps 
beyond restoration of the entity that was created in 1978. A new and 
different Solomon Islands might emerge from the mess, but only time 
wifl tell. This book explains the background to why this occurred. 
Notes 
In 2003, some MEr membersjustified the raid on the armouries as necessary to forestall 
a similar plan by tI", Bougai.nville Revolutionary Army lhal would have provided 
weapons to the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) (Sasako 2003a). 
[FM press statement, 5 June 2000; Ifalabu 7bvuli, GJune 2000; SIRC, 7 June 2000; 
ABC. 7 Jurw 2000. 
Australia initially tried to recover costs, in a tOlally different way than tbey bad dea]t 
with 'rimor evacuees: tbey asked A$71.7 per adult, A$480 per child and A$72 per baby, 
or evawees risked losing their passports. Australian diplomats in Honiara initially told 
evacuees that they would be left on the beach if they did not pay, but Acting Defence 
Minister John Moore had to back down and scrap the fee when Australia was accused of 
holding refugees to ransom (C)'Callaghan and Garl'an 2000; Wright 2(00). 
Also Duran Angiki's news report on Radio Australia, 10 June 2000. 
'rhe Facilitation of International Assistance 8i11 2003 (Post-ClJw:ieI; 10 July 2003; The 
Australian, 10, 11 July 2003; SIBC, 17 March 2(03). 
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Government, politics and 
civil society, 1893-2000 
The crisis that developed between 1998 and 2003 had long antecedents 
which can be traced back to the colonial years when the Solomon 
Islands was a Britisll protectorate, and through the period since 1978 
when the islands became an independent nation. At its most basic level, 
the civil war that developed involved a dispute between the populations 
of two neighbouring islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita, but it would be 
wrong to suggest that ethnic differences alone were responsible for the 
crisis. This chapter examines the development of modern government 
since 1893 and the accompanying growth of civil society, up to the time 
of the coup in June 2000. 
The people 
Humans first arrived in the Solomon Islands Archipelago around 30,000 
years ago, when there was one large island which stretched from Buka to 
Nggela, with other similar large islands to the south. The people 
migrated into the area as outposts of the settlement of New Guinea and 
adapted to life in their resource-rich island world. When the last Ice Age 
endecl and seas levels rose around 10,000 years ago, the large islands 
were broken up, their spines forming the centers for the present islands 
and the people began to separate into the similar but individually 
distinct island cultures that exist today. Three to four thousand years 
ago another migration arrived-'Austronesians' out of Southeast Asia via 
northern New Guinea, who intermixed with the earlier inhabitants and 
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genetically have become the dominant cultural groups today. There have 
also been rnore recent back-migrations of other Austronesians frotH 
further south, whom we know as Polynesians. Today there are 87 
distinct languages and a large number of dialects. English is the official 
language, but the other Jjngua franca is Pijhl (Pidgin) English spoken by 
the majority of the population (Keesing 1988: Jourdan 1985). 
The district boundaries that existed during the years of the British 
Protectorate. were partly developed out uf administrative expediency but 
alsu divided the Solomon Group into geographic and cultural units 
based on the large islands and smaller island groups. Since independence 
in 1978, there has been some modification and regrouping of the main 
administrative divisions, although they largely remain the same, based 
on the main centres of population and distinct island groups.! 
The greatest national asset of the Solomon Islands is its people, buth 
in their usually happy dispositions which led to the deserved tagging of 
their nation as the 'Happy Isles',2 and in pure numbers, which were 
estimated to be over 432,000 in 2001, and by 2004 had exceeded 
500.000. Until the 1950s, the annual growth rate was around one per 
cent, after which the level of population increase began to escalate. The 
current annual rate of population increase is 2.8 per cent and has been 
as high as 3.7 per cent in recent decades, the second highest in the 
Pacific, exceeded only by the Marshall Islands, and amongst the highest 
in the world (Commonwealth of Australia 1989: 12; UNDP 2002:8). 
The 1970s saw a rapid upward movement in population, from 160,000 
people in 1970 to close to 200,000 at independence, steadily rising to 
285,000 in 1986 and 328,723 in 1991. The 1996 census never took 
place, but that year the population was estimated to be 367,400 (Keith­
Reid 1998d; Bennett 2000:327). A national census was taken in Hl99. 
with the financiai help of the European Union (EU) , although the very 
difficult data col1ecting circumstances suggest inaccUl'acies. The 
population was estimated to be 409,042 with 112,114 (27 per cent) 
under twenty years of age. Life expectancy in the 1980s was 57 years, 
and had increased to 67 years at the time of the 1999 census. About 94 
per cent are Melanesians, foul' pel' cent are Polynesians and the 
remainder irnmigrantMicronesians, Chinese and Europeans. Although 
trimmed t;ack during the cr.isis years, Honiara's population was recorded 
as 49,107 in 1999. 'The real population of Honiara and environs before 
the crisis may have been as high as 70,000, and is probably now around 
50,000. The three most populous provinces, Western, Guadalcanal and 
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Malaita. were home to 62,739, 60,275 and 122,620 people 
respectively. The other provinces trailed well behind the big three: 
Maklra-U]awa, 31,006; Central Islands, 21,577; Isabel, 20,421; 
Choiseul, 20,008; Temotu, 18,912; and isolated Rennell and Bellona 
Islands Province, the smallest at 2,377 (Statistics Office 1999:16····18, 
38-50) .3 
The culture: kastom, war, peace and compensation 
The most fundamental social group in the Solomon Islands is the 
extended family. Originally the family was responsible for subsistence, 
wealth, social stability and relations with the ancestors and the 
environment. In its modern form, the family has extended to business 
dealings and intersects with local, provincial and national political 
alliances. The extended kinship group is the clan (or laen in Pijln) , which 
covers a wider geographic area and includes a collection of groups bound 
together by a clear order of descent from real and mythical ancestors. 
rMlntoks', literally 'one talks', refers to speakers of the Same language. The 
word is used loosely to refer to non-kin with whom one has shared social 
origins and obligations. Family, Jaen and wantok loyalties ext.end into 
urban areas to various degrees and often become overwhelming when 
obligations to feed and house people outstrip cash resources. 
Culture and t.radition are described with one word, kastom, a Pijin 
derivative of 'custom', but with an often antagonistic relationship to 
what colonial governments socially engineered as the 'customs' of the 
people. Kastom 'refers to ideologies and activities framed in terms of 
empowering traditions and practices, at various levels of inclusiveness, 
both within communities and as a stance toward outside entities'.1 The 
concept of kastol71 has been influential in many parts of Melanesia for 
more t.han fifty years and is distinguished from modern inst.itutions such 
as the government, churches and business. It is a living, changing 
cultural mechanism that varies island··by-island, district"by,·district, and 
has incorporated many modern influences, but there are enough nation 
and region"wide similarities for kastom to be a distinct indigenous 
cultural development. It is also very abst.ract. and appeals because of the 
diverse construction that can be applied to it. by both t.he most modern 
'educated' and 'sophisticated' citizens of Melanesia, and the 'grassroots' 
(traditional rural) people living in isolated mountain villages. Kastom has 
been the symbol of cultural autonomy, and of resistance to cultural, 
economic, or religious subjugation. 
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Social harmony is important to Soiomon Isianders. In her study of 
morality and violence in the islands, Jolene Stritecky describes social 
harmony as 
... maintained at the collective level when individuals master the value of
 
humility...
 
Solomon Islanders speak highly of persons who show humility, patience. and a 
controlled temper. They respond favorably to those whose demeanor is 
circumspect and deferent. POlite behavior demands that people make reg uest.s 
of one another in a stylistically npologet.ic way t.hat.leaves the addressee with 
apparent. options, minimizes imposition, and maximizes the interlocutor's 
dependence on the addressee for help. Solomon Islanders avoid confront.at.ion 
and express anXiety abolit social interactions that are likely to result in cross 
words, hurt feelings. or f~mbarrassment. They are able to mobilise many forms 
of evasive social action in order to circumvent discordant interactions, 
'This is not to argue that Solomon Islanders never find themsPlves in 
content.ious situations .. ,Anyone who publicly loses his or her temper will draw 
a crowd and subsequent sharne.,. They recognise that violence, conflict, and 
selfishness exist, but view them as unwelcome deviatioIls from ideal cornrDlHlity 
re1ntions, which are chnracterised by interpersonal respect. cooperation, and 
generosity .. , (Stritecky 2001 :64--65). 
In times of aggression, confrontation and war in Solomon Islands' 
societies, kastom protocols lead the combatants to be more careful wit.h 
their words than in times of peace. Statements are often circumlocutory 
but firm, and words are always carefully chosen, tempered by a 
realisation that the future of the whole community may depend on 
negotiations. Arajkwao (the Widely-used Malaitan term for Europeans) 
are notoriously blunt and come from a dJfferent intellectual tradit.ion. 
Arajlcwao who live in the Solomon Islands learn that being combative 
and brash is seldom the best way to proceed and may well be absolutely 
counterproduct.ive. As Sinclair Dinnen notes in his introduction t.o A 
Kjnd of !l.1endjng: restoraUvejustke jn the Padflc Mands, 
Iw jhereas Western law treats the individual as a homogenous and isolated unit, 
a person's status, gender, kinship affiliations and relationships were integral to 
the determination of his or her rights and obligations in respect. ofothers in 
Pacific Island societies. Disput.es were defined and addressed witJlin an 
elaborate complex of kinship. status and social relations .. ,Notions of reciprocity 
and equivalence were crucial to the redress 0[' wrungs, as they were to other 
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aspects of social and economic life, Such approaches typically entailed a strong 
element of bargaining and compromise, in contrast to 'win-or-Iose' adjudication 
under Western common law. Resolutions ofinter-group conflict were the 
outcome of protracted negotiations and were subject to re-negotiation when 
circumstances changed (Dinnen et al. 2003:8), 
Not only can cleals be renegotiated, but Western concepts of time are 
also very different. Solomons tiTTle is not an exact commodity measured 
by a clock. Being on time is foreign to most Solomon Islanders, and 
often the next hour or day wil1 do just as well as the one for which an 
appointmenl. was made. A number of times during the civil war, peace 
negotiations were delayed by days, and even weeks, This is not a sign of 
inefficiency or avoidance; it merely indicates that some matters are 
better not rushed, Sometimes it is wiser not to discuss sensitive issues, 
and instead show by future behaviour that you will not support an 
issue, Solomon Islanders who have adopted modern ways are aware of 
what the Western and international world expects, but they also know 
that villagers will react differently when faced with difficult issues. 
Values and styles of negotiation in Pacific Islands' cultures are quite 
different from those of the Western or Asian world, For example, often, 
when bargaining occurs, the oqject is not to obtain the best possible 
deal but to preserve relationships, In importanl. property transactions, 
the seller will often reduce the price so as not to offend the buyer, and 
the buyer will offer a higher price so as not to offend the seller. Status 
and power is important, and is best summed up in the pan-Oceanic 
word mana, which describes the invisible aura of an individual, family, 
conununity or material object. Although the modern elite have 
accumulated wealth in Western terms, traditionally wealth is 
distributed, not hoarded, and the initial accumulator gains power 
through giving, not hoarding, Ancestral spirits remain as powerful as 
Christianity in directing how people will behave. An insult, deUberate 
or otherWise, may cause harm to a relationship, particularly if it involves 
ancestors. To maintain good relationships between all people is 
important, but this does not mean that all actions are intended to re­
establish social eqUilibrium, Actions can quite deliberately cause change 
and realignments. 
Compensation for wrongs is expected and normal, and there is a 
fundamental contradiction or tension between socially positive and 
socially destructive behaviour. Both can be viewed positively, for example 
when one steals something tl"om another group on behalf of one's own, 
29 
H~ppy Isles in Crisis 
The same destructive act can be seen negatively or positively depending 
on one's socia] position, Traditionally, compensation payments were 
made between groups, using items of wealth, from pigs to shell and 
feather valuables, Exchange of these items reestablished equilibrium in 
society after smne slight, perhaps swearing at humans or ancestors or at a 
pig destined to be sacrificed, or because of injury or death, On Malaita, 
although ancestral curses and oaths can be legitimate, swearing can also 
be a rn,~jor offence which requires compensation payments to restore 
social equilibrium, Without adequate compensation the culprit could be 
kilJed, Compensation payments seldom go to one person and are widely 
redistributed among the victim's relatives, They are usually negotiated 
after the aggrieved parties have met, discussed their grievances and 
decided on a fair level of compensation, 
Compensation interactions are often intended to bring about 
changed alignments and to gain prestige at others' expense, Sometimes 
this occurs under armed duress, and threat of violence is usual1y ilTlplicit 
in serious claims, Often compensation is intended to bring about 
change, not to re-establish equilibrium, Contemporary compensation 
claims no longer just involve local groups, Demands now include 
payments from governments, corporations and foreign individuals, As 
David Akin shows in his analysis of compensation claims by the Kwaio 
of Malaita, claimants often employ compensation to 'address broader 
aspects of their relationships with targeted groups' (Akin 1999:37),5 
Civil society 
'Civil society' is a modern term in Solomon Islands and refers to a 
variety of non-government institutions that supplement and work 
alongSide formal government processes: churches, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), women's and youth's groups, sports and socia! 
groups, trade unions, clubs and vil1age organisations, The foundations of 
modern civil society rest with the Christian denominations, A large 
majority of Solomon Islanders identify themselves as Christian and 
churches therefore form the backbone of civil society, Christian 
denominations first arrived in Solomon Islands in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century, and have ever since provided many of the socia] 
services that governments prOVide in other countries, 
In the 1990s, 95 per cent of Solomon Islanders identified themselves 
as Christians: 34 per cent belonged to the Church of Melanesia 
(Anglican), 19 per cent were Roman Catholics, 17 per cent belonged to 
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the South Sea Evangelical Church (SSEC) , 11 per cent were United 
Church (formerly Methodist), and 10 per cent were Seventh Day 
Adventists (SOA). The Baha'i faith was established in Honiara, and has 
in recent y(~ars gained rnany adherents in southern Malaita. A few 
Solomon Islanders have become Muslims. 
A degree of syncretic teachings and behaviour is accepted by some 
denominations to varying degrees, and most individuals still hold to 
customary beliefs that join pre-Christian beliefs to Christian doctrines. 
However, the church teachings largely equate Christian beliefs with 
accepting development and modern Western ideals, Whole villages often 
adhere to one denomination, and in some districts one denomination is 
totally dominant. For instance, the United Church predominates in the 
north of the Solo/llon Islands (in Western and Choiseul Provinces), and 
Anglicans are particularly strong in Isabel and Temotu Provinces. 
Guadakanal is largely Roman Catholic. There are Catholic villages all 
around the island, with the old mission headquarters at Visale on the 
west coast. 
Both Guadakanal and Malaita still have followers of traditional 
religions. On Malaita, these people are found particularly in the Kwaio 
and 'Are'are language areas, and there are still isolated pagan villages in 
Fataleka, Baegu, Kwara' ae and other areas. On Guadalcanal, the Moro 
Movement on the southeast side of the Weathercoast dates back to the 
1950s and 1960s, formed by ex-Roman Catholics who returned to what 
they believe are customary ways, wh.ich included ancestor worship and 
eschewing Western technology.6 
Church membership is often reflected in election results. As 'Tarcisius 
T1ra Kabutaulaka points out, because of the preponderance of Kwara' ae 
Malaitans in the East Honiara constituency, the candidates with the 
best chance of winning will be from Kwara'ae and probably members of 
the SSEC church; although SDA adherent John Maetia Kaliuae, of 
Kwara'ae and Fataleka origins, did win the seat in the 1980s. 1 
The churches are often far more important in the lives of individuals, 
both rural and urban, than the government. They pl'Ovide many of the 
basic health and education services. In 1967, the major Christian 
denominations formed the Solornon Islands' Christian Association, a 
consultative body which seeks ways of extending Christian servlce to the 
people. Church leaders hold influential positions in local communities. 
Churches are active in rural and vocational training, and also operate 
mC\jor hospitals and urban and rural clinics, Churches are also involved 
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in community projects. The United Church began a timber-harvesting 
project in 1994, to givl' villagers an alternative to the large logging 
companies, and the Christian FeHowship Church is involved in an 
extensive replanting project in New Georgia (UNDP 2002:46-58; 
Makirn 2002). 
When Solomon Islands moved towards independence and the 
introduction of democratic processes, an essential part of the arrival of 
modern governance was education. Formal education is not compulsory 
and there are still a significant number of children who do not attend 
school or receive little schooling. Only 14,000 children receive early 
childhood education. There was a substantial increase in children who 
attended grades one to six during the 1990s: enrolments increased at 
around seven per cent in 1990- 93, and four pel' cent in 1994- 97, then 
declined during the troubles of 19S)8- 2004 as many schools were closed 
for long periods and staff went unpaid. In 1999, 78 per cent of boys 
ancl 75 per cent of girls attended primary school. In 1998- 99, 14 per 
cent of the secondary school age group attended the 90 secondary 
schools operating in the Solomon Islands (9 national, J 6 provincial and 
65 community high schools). As has occurred in other areas of the 
Pacific, community high schools provide three years education, with 
many schools now extended to cover grades J 1 and 12. Provincial 
secondary schools, which originally offered mainly vocational and 
tE)chnical subjects, an~ being extended to offer academic subjects, similar 
to national high schools. 
King George VI School in Honiara is the only government school 
that has offered a full matriculation for decades. Other senior schools are 
church-owned and run: Selwyn College (Church of Melanesia), St. 
Joseph's Tenaru (Roman Catholic), Su'u (SSEC) , Goldie College (United 
Church), and Betikarna and Kukundu (SDA). The University of the 
South Pacific (USP) has had a campus in Honaira since the 1970s, and 
it has grown substantially over the years. USP uses flexible delivery 
techniques, including paper-based materials, satellite communications 
and now the internet, along with local tutors and lecturers. Established 
in 1985, the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education (SICHE) is 
the main proVider of post-secondary education, with its certificate, 
diploma and degree programs. Bachelor degrees in Business and 
Education began in 1997 and 1999 respectively, but were postponed 
because of the civil war. There are also 41 vocational training centres, all 
operated by church authorities, and 13 village-based centres and four 
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village-based education programs. Non-formal education covers 
community development. adult literacy and youth education. largely 
designed to promote community empowerment. Much of the education 
syst~rn faltered in 1998 and has not fully recovered (UNDP 2002 :46-­
68: AusAID 1998). 
As a result of the slow progress in universal education, many citizens 
have only a rudimentary knowledge of the democratic process. At 
election time, even though voting includes all adults, at national, 
provincial or local levels, citizens vote mainly for members of their 
extended families or for politicians who beguile them with presents and 
promises. A small elite controls the nation and although national 
political leaders rise and fall at each election, a core of leadership 
positions (SUCh as Speaker of the Parliament, Ombudsman and the 
governor-generalship) have been rotated between a small group, always 
male. Little allegiance to political ideology exists, other than to kastom 
and Christianity. All political parties are vehicles to power that can be 
deserted when a better offer is made. National politics in post­
independence Solomon Islands has been remarkably pragmatic. and 
although the newer politicians are better educated, in the 1970s and 
1980s. leaders were ill-prepared to cope with the complexities of 
governing a nation that at best was characterised by central authority 
which artificially united a diverse and expanding population. 
Civil society has been augmented in recent decades by non­
government organisations (NGOs) and these can be divided into three 
groups. The first were established during the colonial years: the 
Christian denominations and church--based community groups, the Red 
Cross, Foundation for Peoples of the South Pacific, the Boy Scout and 
Girl Guide Movements, trade unions and traditionally-based 
associations such as 'Are'are Maasina, Makira Farmers' Association, and 
the Christian Fellowship Church which had a substantial economic 
base,1i These organisations were involved in social development and 
emergency aid during natural disasters. but their approach was still 
closely tied to central government controL The second group of NGOs 
appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, targeting development of community 
projects, often beyond the direct inf1uence of politicians or public 
servants. Trade union leaders also became inf1uential in negotiations 
surrounding work conditions and broader national issues. Beginning in 
the 1980s, the third group included some international NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) (Kalgovas 
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2000), but also indigenous organisations, such as the Solomon Islands 
Development Trust (SlOT), SolTrust and Ium! Tugeta Holdings. The 
largest, SlOT, was founded in 1982, and designed to empower local 
people, not just enhance resource transfers from the Western 
industdalised world to the developing Solornon Islands. A local 
umbrella organisation, the Development Services Exchange (DSE) , 
represents more than 50 NCOs working in diverse areas from literacy to 
family planning, health and forest rehabilitation (Roughan 1994; 
Kabutaulaka 1998:45-53). 
The activities of the churches and NCOs provide an alternative 
platform for development and social change to that of the government. 
There have always been tensions between national and provincial 
governments ancI civil society organisations, particularly when churches 
and other NCOs have taken leadership roles that were seen to challenge 
political leaders or made decisions deemed contrary to government 
cIevelopment priorities. The civil war and its aftermath have enabled the 
churches and NCOs slowly to forge an important role for themselves in 
national rehabilitation planning, Some international aid donors have 
channelled aid only through the NGOs and totally bypassed the 
corrupt, inefficient government processes. 
Government during the Protectorate period, 
1893-1978 
Politics is not new to Solomon Islands villagers. Over thousands of years
 
they developed speCialist leaders in war, worship and community affairs.
 
Egalitarian 'Bigmen', who based their authority on consensus,
 
controlled through their ability to convince and cajole rather than order.
 
Men who aspire to be Bigmen accumulate wealth, which they distribute
 
to their extended family and to others outside their immediate clan,
 
creating a network of allegiances and obligations. In the Solomon
 
J Islands, power and prestige come from distribution of wealth. There are 
also hereditary chiefly societies even within groups"categorised as 
Melanesian, and particularly where Polynesian int1uences are strongest; 
here whole communities follow the chief's decisions, In the colonial 
period the government appointed district l-feadmen, and in the 1970s 
added elected Paramount Chiefs to the system. Village··level politics is a 
refined art, played out within extended families and across linguistic 
groups. It involves generations of knowledge of power relationships and 
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is very different from the Westminster system that has evolved in the 
Islands from the 1960s and 1970s, Modern politicians utilise both the 
,	 
Bigman and chiefly systems, accepting many of the same obligations to 
distribute wealth, which can be both personal assets or government 
funds. Politicians are also often the children or grandchildren of 
colonial-era Headmen or church leaders, and use their pos1l:ions as 
descendants of the colonial elite to bolster their modern power. Solornon 
Islands national and provincial politics is always rumbustious and often 
personal, mixing together the new and old styles.91 
The British Solomon Islands Protectorate, created in 1893 and 
governed from 'Tulagi in the Nggela (Florida) Group from 1897, was 
ruled by successive resident commissioners and their teams of district 
officers, all answerable to the Western Pacific High Commissioner, based 
in FUi, and ultimately to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
London. In 1952, when the posts of Governor of Fiji and Western 
Pacific r---ligh Commissioner were separated, the headquarters of the 
Western Pacific High Commission (WPHC) was transferred to Honiara, 
the post-war capital of the Solomon Islands. From 1952 to 1978, the 
High Commissioner was also Governor of the Solomon Islands. WPHC 
duties declined as Fiji and 'Tonga became independent in 1970, Pitcairn 
was transferred to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in New 
Zealand, the Gilbert and Elice Islands Colony was removed from the 
jurisdiction in 1972, the New Hebrides followed in 1973, and the 
Solomon Islimds became int.ernally self-governing in 1976. Wit.h all its 
territories gone, the WPHC finally ended on 11 July 1978 (Western 
Pacific High Comrnission 2002:vii). 
The root.s of the civl! war and political disturbances of the 1990s, 
and the coup that removed Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu in 
June 2000, date back to the 1940s and 1950s when Malaitans worked 
for the US army around Honiara, then stayed on. Poor planning by the 
British, who were intent on developing a plantation economy, and then 
' from the 1960s wanted a quic!( exit strat.egy from the Solomon Islands, 
meant that most infrastructure development occurred in the Western 
Solomons and on Guadalcanal. Very little development occurred on 
II	 Malaita, always the most populous island. The result was an exodus of 
U Malaitans to Guadalcanal. 
Before the 1950s, the Resident Commissioner in Tulagi was the 
virtual absolute ruler of the Protectorate, assisted by his Advisory 
Council, with the High Commissioner far off in Fiji. To most villagers, 
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though, their district officer was 'the government' (Cavman) and his 
word was law. The first island to have its own governing council was 
Malaita after the turmoil of Maasina Ruru, an anti-colonial protest 
movement which operated from 1944 to 1952 and disrupted the post­
war plans of the British. Government in many areas, and almost all of 
Malaita, was brought to a near complete halt for years. A new 
administrative structure was introduced under the 1953 Native 
Administration Regulation which encompassed consolidation of district 
administration, local councils and native courts. Between 1953 and 
1963, 24 councils were established throughout the Protectorate, with 
revenues largely raised from local taxation in the form of a head tax 
levied on adults, stimulating cash crop production, particularly of copra, 
A Local Government Act in 1963 macle the 18 local regional councils and 
the Honiara Town Council elective. Councils operated schools, hospitals 
and health clinics, built roads and water supplies (Premdas and Steeves 
UJ84:2(32) . 
On 18 October 1960, a new Order in Council created a constitution 
with two levels of advisory government, an eight··member Executive 
Council (With two indigenous members) and the 21-member Legislative 
Council (With six indigenous members). Universal adult suffrage was 
also introduced for the Legislative Council in 1960. Direct elections for 
eight of the 10 unofficial members of the Legislative Council began in 
.1965, only in Honiara. The remainder of the seats were decided 
through electoral colleges of local government councilors, or were 
nominated by the government, usually the directors of government 
departments. The membership of the Legislative Council was increased 
to 29 in 1967, and elections were held for the 14 elected members, 
based on universal adult suffrage in 13 constituencies, with an electoral 
college used in the Eastern Outer Islands (Saernala 1982, 1983: Russell 
1970). 
The first political parties emerged in this period. In 1965, Eric 
Lawson, expatriate Member for Honiara, and Mariano Kelesi, the 
Member for North Malaita, founded the short-lived Democratic Party, 
which rnanaged to get one candidate into the Legislative Council, a 
woman, LiJi Ogatini. 10 The Solornon Islands United National Party was 
founded in 1968 by Bill Ramsey, expatriate Member for Honiara, and 
David Kausimae, Member for South Malaita. ll Sam Alasia's onalysis 
Isuggests that indigenous members of these early political parties generally lacked an understanding of Westminster concepts. Expatriate 
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domination of the parties, lack of encouragement from the Protectorate 
government, and the alienation of Western-educated Solomon Islanders, 
particularly public servants, who were prevented from direct 
involvement in politics, also stymied their growth (Pacific Mands 
Monthly, April 1974; Alasia 1997:5). 
The political party concept lay dormant until 1973, although 
Mariano Kelesi, Peter Salaka and David Kausimae raised the issue of the 
need for parties in the Legislative Council. Another development arrived 
in 1970, when a new constitution introduced a committee system of 
government. First mooted in 1968, the new parliament, called the 
Governing Council, had 17 elected members, three ex-officio and six 
publlc service members, and five committees including elected 
councillors and public servants, each committee responsible for a clutch 
of departments, The High Commissioner was chairman with reserve 
powers (Russell 1970; Paia 1975). Breaking with Westminster 
traditions, the intention was to encourage a team effort from the 
indigenous members, rather than have them form into a government 
and an opposition group. The new system did not find favour with the 
members of the council. A young Member from Makira, Solomon 
Mamaloni, was an ardent critic and succeeded in persuading his 
colleagues to rE,ject the new government structure in 1. 971. They opted 
for direct ministerial responsibility, endorsed in 1972. A progression of 
six three-year Development Plans moved the Protectorate towards self-­
government with its own currency, a National Provident Fund. and a 
restructured civil service,12 
Although it seems not to have been totally clear to some members of 
the Protectorate administration, particularly those who had worked in 
Britain's African colonies, by the early 1970s self-government was 
looming and indigenous national political power was becoming reaL In 
the election year of 1973, two more parties emerged: Solomon 
Mamaloni's People's Progress Party (PPP) and Benedict Kinika's United 
Solomon Islands Party Association (USIPA). Many leading members of 
the latter had been active in the Civil Service Association, As neither 
party gained a majority in the house, the balance of power was held by 
an independent group led by the 'dapper and charming' Willie Betu 
from Isabel Island. 13 These new leaders were all in their late twenUes or 
early thirties, with a unique opportunity to shape their emerging nation. 
Decolonisation of the Pacific Islands began in Western Samoa in 
1962 and Nauru in 1. 968. Educated Solomon Islanders were very aware 
37 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
that Fiji had been independent since 1970 and that their neighbour 
Papua New Guinea achieved self-government in 1972 and independence 
in 1975. By the 1970s, Britain was very expedenced at shedding 
colonies and knew that the fast-track was better for Britain than a slow 
evolutionary path that could lead to tensions. Late in 1973, members of 
the Governing Council voluntarily formed a one-party government. The 
USIPA, which mainly represented the newer (non-Governing Council) 
members, disbanded itself as a major party in preparation for the new 
one-varty government, but this move soon fell apart, with no consensus 
reached. In August 1974, the government was restructured, with 
Western Pacific High Commissioner Donald Luddington remaining as 
governor, and the dlief secretary as the deputy governor. The Governing 
Council became the Legislative Assembly, with Fred Osife10 as 
chairman. 14 Solomon Marnaloni became the first Chief Minister when 
members of his PPP plus some independents formed the first 
government (Pacific .lsJandS' Monthly, January 1974, March 1974, 
September 1974). The Honiara correspondent of the Pacific IslandS' 
Mon/hly accurately described Mama10ni as 'the 31-year-old firebrand of 
the last council, who is both humble and vain, penetrating and yet 
blind ... [and] an engaging personality' (Pacific Islands Month~y, 
September 1973:8). He dominated the political process for better or 
worse until his death in 2000. 
Internal self-government, 1976-78 
Chief Minister Mamaloni, 1974-75 
In the 1970s, Solomon Islands was governed by young capable men, all 
on a steep learning curve. Many of them remained in politics for decades 
and sorne have been intimately involved .in the crisis years, J998- 2003. 
The man who was probably the most important of all died suddenly in 
2000. Solomon Suna'one Mamaloni (nick-named 'Solo'), born in 
January 1943 in Rumahui village on Makira, was educated at Church of 
Melanesia primary schools and at King George VI School before 
completing his secondary education at Ie Aute Maori College in Hawkes 
Bay, New Zealand, from 1964 to 1966. When he returned to the . 
Solomon Islands in 1966, Mamaloni became clerk to the Legislative 
CounCil. Elected as a Member for the Eastern Inner Islands (now 
Makira-Ulawa Province) on the Governing Council in 1970, he became 
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Chairman of the Local Government Committee. He was re-elected to 
the Governing Council in 1973. and in August, after six secret ballots, 
became the first Chief Minister of the Solomon Islands. Mamaloni 
eclipsed early contenders Benedict Kinika and Gideon Zoleveka, and 36 
year old Malaitan, Philip Solodia Funifaka. The new Chief Minister 
emerged as a brilliant orator and a leader game to take risks. Initially he 
worked with a five-man Council of Ministers, l!j and began to tackle the 
many probJems'-particularly what Mamaloni called the "Three Ds" 
(equal distribution of wealth, decentralisation and decolonisation). plus 
the need for land and education reform, better communications systems, 
localisation, and to establish amicable relations with Papua New Guinea 
(Pacific Islands lvlonth{y, December 1974, February 1975, March 1975, 
July 1975, November 1990; Paia 1975). In October he co-opted 
Funifaka into his Cabinet, without consulting his colleagues, exhibiting 
an independence that would come to typify his appro<lch. Mamaloni's 
initial tenure was short-lived when he and his ministers resigned briefly 
in November 1975, accused of corruption in the 'Mint Affair'.w Re­
elected, Marnaloni enlarged his Cabinet17 and led the negotiations for a 
timetable for quick independence. 
While he was chief minister, Mamaloni faced strikes from students 
and stevedores, and a violent one from two big trade unions. The 
Solomon Islands General Workers' Union (later, Solomon Islands 
National Union of Workers), led by its General-Secretary Bartholomew 
Ulufa'<llu, and the Government Non-Established Workers' Union were 
able to mobilise workers in the young n<ltion. Ulufa'<llu introduced 
overseas industrial dispute tactics and chose to go to jail rather than pay 
his fine. Clearly he was beginning to build a political power base, The 
sarne Ulufa'alu became prime minister from June 1997 until June 2000, 
when he was removed from power by a coup (PacifJc Islands Monthfy, 
December 1975, January 1976, February 1976; Bennett 1987:321-22; 
Alasia 1997:7; lrlandr Business, February 2000; PacifJc Islandr Monthly, 
October 1975, December 1975, March 1976, April 1976). 
Chief Minister Kenilorea, 1976-78 
Another long-lasting political figure was Peter Kenilorea. The Solomon 
Islands became internally self-governing on 2 January 1976, and, 
fittingly, Sir Colin Allan returned in October as their last Governor. 18 
BritaIn insisted on a 1976 election to legitImise the transfer of power, 
the result of which was th<lt a new member, a former senior public 
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servant from south Malaita, Kenilorea, became Chief Minister of a 
minority government (after seven ballots), There were 177 candidates 
for the 38 seats. The 1976 elections cleaned out many of the original 
group of politicians and only two members of the new Cabinet had 
previous executive experience, Those who lost their seats included fonner 
Maasina Ruru leader Fifi't, Betu, Kikolo, Kinika, Thuruvoda, and Ausutu 
(Fifi'i 1989),19 Two new political parties contested the elections, The 
Nationalist (later'the National Democratic) Party (NADEPA) was the 
political arm of the Solomon Islands General Workers' Union, and the 
Melanesian Action Party (which was never formally constituted as a party), 
Eventually, the United Democratic Action Group formed, based around 
Kenilorea and members who had accepted portfolios. The Coalition 
C)pposition Group (COP) headed by Ulufa'alu, including Marnaloni and 
Francis Talasasa Aqorau, became the Opposition (Saemala 1982:72-73). 
Born on 23 May 1943, Kenilorea left the islands at age nineteen for 
five years in New Zealand where he completed senior school before 
entering Ardmore Teachers College, from which he graduated with a 
diploma in 1966, He returned to Auki to tei/ch at King George VI 
School, at that time the only government high school on the islands. In 
1970 he moved to the public service as part of the localisation process, 
and became an Assistant Secretary, and then Secretary, in the 
Department of Finance. In 1974 he transferred to the position of 
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Secretary to the Chief Minister, 
and then in 1975 he was appointed District Commissioner for the 
Eastern District and finally for his home island, While still a school 
teacher, Kenilorea began to develop political ambitions, and became 
president of the Civil Servants' Association, an organisation that 
provided the basis for the later United Solomon Islands Party. His first 
venture into national politics was a failed atlempt to gain the Honiara 
seat in the 1973 Legislative Assembly elections, Three years later he 
successfully won the Malaitan 'Are'are seat, his horne electorate (Young 
1978c: Fortune 2000: Solomon News, 20 March 1989, PaciRe Islands 
Monthly, February 1992). 
There were rnany aspirants for the position of chief minister, which 
everyone knew would soon transform into the post of prime minister, 
Kl'nilol't>a, and Mamaloni, who was returned as Member for West 
Makira in 1976, were obvious candidates, So were two others·~···trade 
union leader Ulufa' alll from central Malaita and Aqorau, the tlrst 
Solomon Islander with a university degree, who had been president of 
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the \tv'estern CounciL Able to act as powerbroker in the battle for the 
position of Chief Minister, Ulufa'all.l became Leader of the Opposition 
(Bennett 1987:322··23: Alasia 1997:7: Padfjc Islands Monthly, August 
1976), 
The newly self-governing Solomon Islands operated politically in a 
very 'Melanesian way', with a weak party system, experiments with one­
party government and an emphasis on individual leaders whose charisma 
could gather followers, The syst~m was inherently unstable. When 
Aqorau died suddenly on 26 December 1976, the 'coconut radio' 
(rumours) suggested that he had been poisoned, and that the 'Malaita 
mafia' would deal similarly with all prominent non-Malaitan politicians. 
After Mamaloni failed to become the nation's leader, he resigned in 
January 1977 and concentrated on his business interests as managing 
director of Patosha Company. Strong support in Makira enabled his re­
election in 1980, The followers of Mamaloni and the late Aquorau 
deserted COG and formed the Independent Group. Another party-the 
Solomon Islands Rural Party, later renamed the Solomon Islands Rural 
Alliance Party·······was founded by Malaitan politicians David Kausimae 
and Faneta Sira. 
Chief tvJinister Kenilorea battled on and negotiated several major 
issues with the British. One was the future rights of non-indigenous 
peoples such as the Chinese who had first entered the islands as 
tradesmen in the 19.1 Os and now controlled many commercial activities 
(Laracy .1974), and iKiribati (Gilbert Islanders) who had been resettled 
in the Solomon Islands between .1955 and 1971 after famines in the 
Line Islands atolls. Financial aspects of Britain's .£18 million severance 
grant, which had initially been offered as a loan, were discussed, as was 
the date for independence. He failed to negotiate other crucial issues 
successfully, which would haunt future governments. These included 
questions of alienated land, decentralisation and the possibility of 
establishing more autonomy at a provincial level (BalJard 1975), more 
inclusion of traditional leaders in the government process, and the 
border between the Shortland Islands and Bougainville, Demands by 
the Kwaio people to be compensated for the crimes of a punitive 1927 
government expedition in their area remained unresolved (Akin 1999). 
Attempts were made to sort out some of the problems; for example, 
decentralisatioll was examined by a Special Committee on Provincial 
Government chaired by an Opposition backbencher David Kausimae. 
The committee was bipartisan and the investigations were comprehensive, 
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but the final report was not handed down until after independence, 
much to the distress of Western Province, which had hoped for rnore 
autonomy (Premdas and Steeves 1984 :43-··47). The Opposition thought 
that these issues should have been on the agenda of the independence 
talks in London in November 1976 (Alasia 1997:7-·8).1.0 
The independent nation of the Solomon Islands 
The Solomon Islands have seen a series of governments since Independence, 
few of which have served full terms. The lack of an ideological base to 
the political party system means that parties are useful vehicles on the 
road to power; but if one breaks down, or if a better vehicle is passing, 
quick change is normal. This is further encouraged since electors vote for 
individuals rather than parties. In parliament, votes of no-·conficlence are 
regular occurrences. Seven prime ministers and eleven governments over 
the last quarter century, and an inefficient and now quite corrupt system 
of governance means that policy implementation has been inconsistent. 
The economy was mismanaged during the 1980s and 1990s, and since 
civil war broke out on Guaclalcanal in 1998, the treasury has been 
virtually empty except for money supplied by aid clonors. 
Table 2.1 Solomon Islands prime ministers and governors-general 
since independence 
Year elected 
1978 (July) 
1980 (August) 
1981 (September) 
1984 (October) 
1986 (December) 
1989 (Mar"ch) 
1993 (June) 
1994 (November) 
1997 (June) 
2000 (June) 
200 I (December") 
Year appointed 
1978 (July) 
1988 (July) 
1994 (July) 
1999 (July) 
2004 (July) 
Prime Minister 
Peter Keni lorea 
Peter Kenilor-ea 
Solomon Mamaloni 
Sir Peter Kenilorea 
Ezekiel Alebua 
Solomon Mamaloni 
Fr·ancis Billy Hilly 
Solomon Mamaloni 
Bartholomew Ulafa'alu 
Manasseh Sogavare 
Sir Allan Kemakeza 
Governor-Gener-a! 
Baddeley Devesi (since 1980 Sir Baddeley) 
Sir Geor"ge Lepping 
Si r Moses Pitakaka 
Sit- John In; Lapli 
Nathaniel Waena 
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The first Kenilorea government, 1978-80 
Solomon Islanders were ill prepared for independence when it came on 
7 July 1978 (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1978), Britain divested 
itself of the archipelago with unseemly haste on a timetable that had 
more to do with British convenience than good management. There 
were a dozen or so university graduates and perhaps 10,000-15,000 
Solomon Islanders who had enough grasp of intermitional politics to 
understand t.he meaning of sovereignty (Bennett 2002 :7). The new 
nation kept the British monarch as head of state, represented in the 
country by a Governor-General appointed every five years on the 
recommendation of the Parliament. Prince Richard of Gloucester and 
the Duchess of Gloucester represented the Queen at the independence 
ceremony. Peter Kenilorea made the transition from chief rni nister to 
prime minister, and Sir Baddeley Devesi, former Permanent Secretary for 
Utilities and Public Works, became governor-general. In the late colonial 
years there were seven provinces: Western, Ysabel, Central, Guadalcanal, 
Malaita, Makira and Ulawa, and Temotu. These became provinces under 
the 1978 Constitution and received further autonomy under the 
ProvhlcJal Government Act 1981. Choiseul (Laura) later separated from 
Western Province in 1992, and Rennell and Bellona separated from 
Central Islands Province in 1996, 
Western Province threatened prior to independence to break away 
because of inequitable resource allocation by the central government and 
fear of domination by the islands with the largest populations, 
particularly Malaita and Guadalcanal. For several months, Western 
Province refused to raise the new flag (Prerndas et al. 1984: Gina 
2003: 189·99). The issues involved were similar to those that would 
emerge on Guadancanal from 1998 to 2000 and were a rehearsal of 
arguments in favour of a looser federation of Solomon stat.es. The 
Western region's people felt a strong sense of identify because their skins 
were blacker than other Solomon Islanders, they used Roviana as a 
lingua franca, and they had unity through membership of similar 
Christian denominat.ions. They felt. financially short.changed (statistics 
do not bear t.his out.) and politically alienated, and they suspected that. 
l:he new nation would be cent.red on Malait.a and Guadalcanal. Their 
angst. was also fuelled by t.he long-t.erm discont.ent. among their close 
ethnic kin in neighbouring North Solomons Province, who had similarly 
feared incorporat.ion int.o Papua New Guinea in 1975. Kenilorea gave 
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way a little, In terms of some financial and land transfers, and placed 
Western Province people into key parliamentary and public service 
positions, but stood firm in opposing greater regional autonomy 
(Bennett 1987 :327-30; Prerndas et al. 1984: Young 1978a, 1978b). 
Tensions worsened after the publication of a poem, 'Ode to the West 
Wind' in a local newspaper in June 1978. It was written by a Malaitan 
public servant and contained insulting ethnic slurs. 21 In response, the 
government paid financial compensation to the people of the Western 
Solomons. In retrospect, this was the beginning of a cycle of 
government-funded compensation payments which got totally out: of 
hand in the late 1990s and 2000s.\ 
Kenilorea ruled precariously in the 38-mernber House but was able 
to carry the nation through its shaky transition years. He was assisted by 
his capable executive officer Francis Bugotu~Permanent Secretary of 
Education until 1975~who became the Secretary to the Chief Minister 
and the Council of Ministers,22 Many issues which faced the first post-· 
independence government had carried over from the self-government 
years, Transport and communications needed to be improved, and the 
export economy had to be built up. The provinces wanted more 
autonomy within the unitary national structure; and Solomon Islands 
had to establish a place in the Pacific as a nation. The economic future 
was rosy and the country looked forward to self-sufficiency based on 
canned fish and rice production, an advantage not enjoyed by 
neighbouring Papua New Guinea, Copra prices were high, the oil palm 
plantcltions on the Guadalcanal plains were expanding, and the logging 
sector was moving ahead. The nation was served by regional airlines Air 
Niugini, Air Pacific and Air Nauru, while Solalr operated most of the 
domestic flights. The only real economic failure of the 1970s was the 
cattle inclustry, in which a herd of 24,000 had been established between 
1971 and 1977 but failed to thrive. The sma]]-holding system spread 
through the islands proved not to be commercially viable and plans for a 
cannery were shelved (Pac/fie lsJandr Monthly, May 1979, July 1975). 
The second l<enilorea government, 1980-81 
Political parties emerged more strongly at the 1980 general election. 
Kenilorea entered parliament as an independent, but soon saw the need 
to form a political power base. He launched the Solomon Islands United 
Party (SIUP). Late in 1979, veteran politician David Kausirnae formed a 
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coalition between his Rural Alliance Party and Mama1oni's People's 
Progress Party, known as the People's Alliance Party, Ulufa'alu rernained 
leader of the National Democratic Party, but was damaged by his role in 
the award of tax-free 5$14,000 terminal grants to MPs and mernbers of 
the 1Ioniara 'Town CounciL The 38 seats were contested by 244 
candidates--more than 50 of whom were public servants-and two­
thirds of the old parliamentarians lost their seats. Kausirnae, joint leader 
of PAp, lost, as did Willie Betu, leader of the large group of Independents, 
and John 5aunana, former Minister for Education and 'Training. 
Kenilorea's group won 16 seats and was able to form a government, 
allied with Francis Billy Hilly as deputy prime minister, who represented 
the Independents. Mamaloni became Leader of the OpposiUon. 23 
Now more experienced, the government tackled issues such as 
industrial relations. This issue became more volatile after 2,000 
rnarchers converged on the prime minister's office in May to demand 
that the 5$35 minimum wage be tripled to 5$100 per week. As a 
consequence of the industrial unrest, the government lost one of the two 
Honiara seats in a by-election, when close Kenilorea assocIate Francis 
Saernala came second to Gordon Billy Gatu of the union-backed 
National Democratic Party (Padf'ic Iflands Monthly, June 1981, July 
1981). The exchange rate was regulated as a normal tool of economic 
policy. The currency was devalued by six per cent, in a bid to boost 
export earnings, and selective import duties were increased. The new 
exchange rate provided approximate parity with the Australian dollar (in 
2004, five Solomon dollars equalled one Australian do]]ar.)24 Legislation 
increased the size of the Cabinet from 12 to 14 members. Kenilorea said 
it was done for extra efficiency. The Opposition charged it was to 
expedite the buying of seats. The government also asked 5aemala, 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, to report on the viability of ministeriaJ 
staff appointments from outside the public service-more in line with 
the policies in neighbouring Australia and Papua New Guinea (PacifIc 
lrlands A1oTlthly, August 1981). 
Mamaloni had worked constantly to destabilise the government, and 
he lobbied hard while Kenilorea was away at a South Pacific Forum 
meeting in Vanuatu. The Opposition won an August vote of 110­
confidence. 20 to 17, after luring the Independent Group away from the 
government side. Ulufa' alu initially also contested the leadership, but after 
negotiations he settled for the Finance portfolio in Mamaloni's first post 
1978 government (Hegarty 1983; Pacific Islands Monthly, October 1981). 
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The first Mamaloni government, 1981-84 
MarnaJoni was much more decisive than KeniJorea, and for the first time 
the nation had a clear agenda for change. With Ulufa'alu as Finance 
Minister, the new government also provided proper fiscal management 
for the first tim.e. A Provincial Govemment Act, which allowed for greater 
regional autonomy and created five provincial ministries to enhance 
direct liaison between the provinces and the national government, was 
introduced. Under the Act, each province had an elected Provincial 
Assembly, led by a premier with provincial ministers, along with an 
elected speaker. Area Councils were responsible for slllall regions within 
each province, working in consultation wit.h the provincial governrnenL 
The provinces were linked to the national government through 
provincial secretaries and supporting staff seconded from the national 
public service. 'The government also began to emphasise foreign affairs, 
with Francis Bugotu as Permanent Secretary anel Ezekiel Alebua as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Cabinet grew to 15, enabling largesse 
to be distributed among lllore MPs, thus holding the numbers. 25 New 
aid clonors such as the Soviet Union were pursued, while China and 
Taiwan were played off against each other, much to the alarm of the 
region. 26 
The government also had a wieleI' progressive agenda. Discussion of 
changes needed to turn the country into a republic with a federation of 
provinces re-emerged on the agenda. Horne Affairs responsibilities were 
mooted t.o be devolved to the provinces, coordinated by a Ministry of 
National Development. The government suggested the introduction of a 
MelaneSian Alliance between Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands on matters of trade, civil aviation and culture. This 
came to fruition only symbolically in the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
at the South Pacific Forum, Mamaloni also had ideas about expanding 
defence and naval forces, and plans were made for a national airline and 
for the conversion of the government monetary authority into a Central 
Bank. A national lottery was also suggested (Paci11c Islands Monthly, 
January 1982) Y 
By the time of the 1984 election, however, Mamaloni's government 
had lost some credibility, with three mqjor counts against it: the 
Malaitan 'Kwaio Fadanga' boycott of the 1981 election: a week-long 
strike by the Solomon Islands Public Employees Union in September 
1984: and large numbers of changes to the ministry. The 1980 
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publication of Dghtning Meets the VVest Wind: the Malaita Massaae, by 
anthropologist Roger Keesing and historian Peter Corris, put the 1927 
massacre back in the Hews and revived long-held resentment between 
north Malaitans who had been involved in the punitive expedition and 
the Kwaio (Keesing and Corris 1980; Keesing 1990; Akin 1999). 
Keesing was barred from visiting Malaita by Premier Stephen Tonafalea 
and the book was banned from the Solomon Islands. Looked at in the 
perspective of the recent crisis, this incident is an example of how deep 
and long cultural memories run in the Solomon Islands. The 1927 
massacre of a government party and the subsequent disgraceful punitive 
expedition still cause rancour almost 75 years later. The issues at stake in 
1927--trw political and cultural auton01~1Y of the Kwaio and taxation 
by the government without any clear local benefit (Keesing 1983)18. ­
still resonated in the 1980s and were the root cause of the crisis of 
1998- 2003. Does the government act on behalf of the people, does it 
properly distribute resources, and does it respect the traditional cultures 
of the nation's peoples? 
Unionism grew at a steady pace in the early 1980s. .loses Tuhanuku, 
the forceful young Secretary-General of the Solomon Islands National 
Union of Workers (founded by Ulufa'alu in 1975) claimed his 
organisation had a membership of 10,000. out of a national paid 
workforce of 16,000 (Pacific islands Monthly. April 1982). 
Mamaloni's erratic style caused criticism, and by June 1983, six of 
the original 14 ministers had resigned or been sacked. GrOWing 
disenchantment with Mamaloni's attitudes towards development was 
also apparent, and there were questions about the close relations 
between ministers, investors and speculators. In mid EJ82, Ezekiel 
Alebua, who had resigned from the ministry, tried to bring down 
Mamaloni with a vote of no-confidence. Marnaloni, however, still held 
20 votes, the same number as when elected prime minister, and did not 
even bother to use his own vote (Larmour 1983). 
The third Kenilorea government, 1984--86 
Leader of the Opposition from 1981 to 1984, and knighted in 1982 
(RlcifJc Islands Monthly. February 1982), Kenilorea became prime minister 
again at the 1984 general election and rernained in the post until 1986, 
after which he stayed on as deputy prime minister until 1988. The party 
system was growing stronger. Two hundred and thirty candidates and 
three parties contested the 38 seats· ..· the United Party, the People's 
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Alliance Party (PAP), and a new party, the Solomone Ago Sagefanua (SAS) 
led by a small group of reformist public servants, Nineteen members 
were 'replaced, and the NADEPA was reduced to one seat. Ulufa'alu lost 
his East Honiara electorate to another Malaitan, John Maetia Kaliuae, 
Neither major party gained a majority, but KeniJorea managed to hold 
21 seats in a coalition with the SAS and Independents, while Mamaloni 
gained control of only 13 seats. In the vote for Prime Minister, three 
members deliberately invalidated their vote, one of whom, it was 
claimed, was David Kausimae, father of the House, The KW(lio Fadanga, 
having declared t.heir area of Malaita an independent nation two years 
earlier, continued to disrupt the elections in East Kwaio. Tensions were 
so high that the Seventh Day Adventist hospital at Ato'ifi in e(lst Kwaio 
was temporarily evacuated (Pacific hlandr Monthly, November 1984), 
Kenilorea abolished the five provincial places in the Cabinet but kept. 
his executive at 14, He scrapped plans for a local brewery,29 and 
Mamaloni's plan for a republic expired, Eventually, the government: 
succumbed to the Kwaio boycott, and paid a small amount in 
compensation to Paramount Chief Folofou, 
Several scandals also marred the government. Minister for 
Agriculture, Sethuel Kelly, leader of the United Party's coalition partner 
SAS, was sacked for his involvement in non-procedural sales of 
government-owned houses. In May 1986, Kenilorea faced his own 
Politic(II storm in the wake of Cyclone Namu, which left 90,000 people 
homeless in central Solomons. He was forced to resign as prime minister 
in December that year after a scandal over his misappropriation of 
cyclone relief funds and a government ship to aid his home village 
(Pacific Islandr Monthly, July 1986, July 1988), John Roughan dates the 
'obvious decay in the state's close involvement with the majority of its 
citizens' to around this time (Roughan 2000c), 
By the end of the Kenilorea-Alebua government in 1989, the 
Solomon Islands had left behind the independence decade and entered a 
new age in which politicians served themselves, not the people. 
The Alebua government. 1986-89 
Kenilorea survived as deputy prime minister and Foreign Minister under 
his old deputy, Ezel\iel Alebua who headed the government through to 
the 1989 election (Alasia 1997: .solomon News, 20 March 1989), 
Alebua was born in 1947 at Avu Avu, Guadalcanal, son of a Government 
Headman on the Weatbercoast. 30 He was educated at a local primary 
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school and the leading Catholic high school, St Joseph's Tenaru, and 
later in 1974 he attended administrative and management courses at the 
University of the South Pacific in Suva. 1·1e subsequently returned to 
work as clerk for various provincial assemblies, the last in his horne 
province. Elected to parliament in 1980, he became Minister for 
Il'oreign Affairs and International Trade in the first Mama10ni 
government, and deputy prime minister and Minister for Agriculture in 
the following Kenilorea government. 
Control of the parliament always rested on a coalition of small 
parties. Alebua's coalition included his own United Party, the twelve­
month-old National Front for Progress, a few members of the SAS and 
some Independents. Nevertheless, he never had a majority of more than 
one or two members. 
Alebua was well aware of the dissatisfaction within his home 
province, which housed the urban sprawl of Honiara that extended onto 
customary lands, and the rice and oil palm plantations on Guadalcana1 
plains. While prime minister, he did little to stem the discontent, which 
quietly smouldered and would return to haunt him while he was 
Premier of Guadalcanal and a political spokesman for the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Alebua inherited a balanced economy riding high, In 1985, imports 
were S$64.4 million and exports were S$68 million, fuelled by growth 
in fishing, logging and copra (PacilYc Islands' Jvfonthly, March 1988). His 
government was the last to serve under the model developed in the final 
years of the Protectorate. A harbinger of change, the demise of Levers 
Pacific Timbers (the last incarnation of Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd), 
which ceased operations in north New Georgia and Ko1ombanagra at 
the end of 1987, marked the financial end of the colonia] era. Depressed 
world commodity prices began to retard the economy. By the end of his 
prime ministership, high prices for rare tropical hardwoods encouraged 
newly arrived Asian logging companies to begin a destructive but 
lucrative 'growth' industry (Pacific Islands Monthly, January 1987). 
Cyclone Namu and a subsequent cyc:lone destroyed the Guadalcana1 
rice harvest and a great deal of the nation's infrastructme, which was 
rebuilt slowly. Much of the S$176 million in the 1987 national budget 
ear-marked for development planning was diverted to cyclone 
rehabilitation. The floating dollar slowly began to sink against the 
Australian and US dollars in the face of international price and interest 
rate changes. Sluggish commodity prices did not help. Gold prospecting 
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to establish a large-scale mine on Guadalcanal was in full sWing in the 
mid 1980s (Pacific lrlandr Monthly, November 1989), By 1989, Alebua 
faced a deficit of around S$20 million, ilnd while he allowed pay 
increases for many sectors of the workforce, his government tried to 
reduce the size of the public service and put a break on government 
spending, Finance Minister George Kejoa shepherded a frugal S$ 228 
rnilUon budget through parliament in November 1989, intended to 
reduce the detkit, which left no scope for pork-barrelling to support the 
next election (Keith-Reid 1989), 
The second Mamaloni government, 1989-93 
Five political parties contested the February 1989 elecl:ions-·······-the United 
Party, PAP (now of'1:en called the Alliance Party), the Liberal Party (the 
old NADEPA), the Nationalist Front for Progress Party led by lawyer 
Andrew Nori, and the Labour Party led by Joses TIJhanuku, 'The SAS 
had become defunct. Ulufa'aiu had undergone a complete make-over 
since his radical socialist student days in Papua New Guinea, Now 
president of the Chamber of Commerce, leader of the newly-emerged 
Farmers' Association········-with branches established in all provinces since it 
began in August 1988~--and leader of the Liberals, he had joined the 
mainstream. 'The NADEPA had steadily declined, and the party won 
only three seats in 1980 and one in 1984, 'The new 'left' party was the 
Labour Party, forrned in July 1998 by the Solomon Islands 'Trade Union 
Congress, an effective organisaUon supported by a large section of the 
public service and public employees' unions, as well as the nation's 
teachers' and nurses' unions (Keith-Reid 1989). 
On 29 March 1989, Solomon Mamaloni once more became prime 
minister, His PAP won 21 seats, the first time that one party had been 
able to govern without coalition partners, Eventually, the government 
held 23 seats in the 38-seat House, After a contest between Andrew Nori, 
Sir Peter Kenilorea and Francis Saemala, Nori emerged in September as 
the new Leader of the Opposition, Saemala was a senior public servant 
who had entered Parliament as the member for Centrai Malaita, which 
included Auki and Langa Langa Lagoon, In 1990, he toyed with 
rejoining the public service. then finally opted to stay in parliament. in 
steadfast effective opposition to Marnaloni (Prerndas and Steeves 1995). 
Marnaloni's desire to make the Solomon Islands a republic was back 
on the agenda, but he needed a two-thirds majority of the parliament to 
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change the constitution, which he never managed to achieve, and he had 
more important problems with which to contend (The Age, 20 March 
1989; ,~'ydney Morning Herald, 29 March 1989). The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) warned the government that structural 
a(~justment and financial restraint was needed, as did the Central Bank, 
but Mamaloni ran the nation's economy based on revenues earned from 
the over-exploitation of logging. Initially, Mamaloni announced his 
intention to halt whoie-Iog exports before 1989 ended, but with 11 of 
his 15 Cabinet ministers and himself connected with the timber 
industry, this seemed unlikely and indeed log exports intensified 
(Bennett 2000:34 I; .solomon Star, 31 March 1989). Another policy 
with long-term consequences was the renewal of Marnaloni's earlier 
plans to devolve power to the provinces. 
'Ethnic tension' became the short-hand catch-cry to describe the 
events on Guadalcanal from 1998, even though the cIrcumstances were 
much more complex. A smaller rehearsal for subsequent events had 
occurred in 1989 when long-term animosities flared between the 
Polynesian inhabitants of Rennell and Bellona Islands and the people of 
Malaita. When Solomon Islanders describe the tensions between these 
groups they often use a cat/dog simile: there is just no way that the two 
argurnentaUve and pugnacious groups will ever get along. In October 
1989, 3,000 Malaitans, mainly youths and young men, insulted by 
scurrilous words written on the walls of the main market, went on the 
rampage in l-Ioniara, pursuing all and any Rennell and Bellona people. 
Neither police nor government authorities ever investigated exactly what 
the words were or who wrote them, but they were enough to ignite 
long-held grievances. Over several days, shops were ransacked and 
people were beaten-up and hospitalised. The police managed to contain 
the dot, using tear-gas and all available men. Malaitan leaders in Auki 
met to discuss sending reinforcements to trounce the Polynesians. In the 
end, there were 45 arrests, the national government paid Malaita 
Province S$200,OOO in compensation payments, and one prominent 
Malaitan ex-cabinet member-John Maetia Kaliuae-spent two months 
in jail fo!' his troubles when he atternpted conciliation (blands BusineH, 
December 1989). Angering Malaitans was not wise, as the normally 
much more peaceful Guale were to find out a decade later. 
By 1990 the government's concern over the sinking national 
economy was apparent and it fell out with its own Central Bank. 
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Commodity prices declined, particularly for copra, which provided 9,2 
per cellt of exports, ranking behind timber and fish. Cocoa also fared 
badly. As a consequence, export duties were reduced on copra, crude 
coconut oil, cocoa, fish, palm oil and palm kernel. The Central Bank 
advised further devaluation of the currency and a reduction in the 
overall budget, both of which the government refused to contemplate, 
in the belief that it could trade its way out of the downturn by 1995­
96. New taxes were introduced on luxuries such as hotel 
accommodation, clubs and overseas telephone calls (Bromby 1990), 
Foreign policy was not always Mamaloni's strong suit. Since 1989, 
tensions had escalated between the Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea over the Bougainvi11e crisis and border-crossings into the 
Solomons Islands by PNG Defence Force personnel. After diplomatic 
protests, Mamaloni cut off all government-to-government 
communications, and refused to speak to, or return phone calls from, 
Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu. His justification was that he anticipated 
that Namaliu would lose power, which did eventually occur but not 
until June 1992. Mamaloni, well known for his dislike of overseas travel, 
refused to attend the 1990 South Pacific Forum meeting in Vanuatu, 
sending his deputy, Danny Philip, and Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister 
Sir Baddeley Devesi in his stead, Yet in July 1992, when PNG's new 
Prime Minister Paias Wingti stopped off at Honiara on his way to the 
Forum meeting, Mamaloni greeted him like a brother and accompanied 
him on the flight to Port Vila (Islands Business, September 1990; PacifYc 
Islands Monthly, September 1992; Islands Business, April 1992). 
One feature of this government, with long-term consequences, was 
the introduction in 1992 of a special discretionary fund for members of 
parliament, distributed at the will of the prime minister, and 
supposedly based on needs, but invariably based on loyalty to 
Mamaloni, This fund provided S$100,000 for each parliamentarian in 
March 1993, to be used at their discretion to develop small-scale 
projects in their electorates (Premdas and Steeves 1995:44), Another 
innovation was the politicisation of the public service. In September 
1990, Mama[oni, aided by the accurate public perception that the 
public service was bloated and inefficient, threatened to move 
permanent secretaries from tenured t.o contract positions, and to allow 
direct provincial recruiting of public servants (Islands BusinelJ, June 
1989) , 
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In really blunt language, the whole government is untidy, disrespectful and has 
lost the sense of proper direction ...This situation is afIecting national 
consciousness very badly and our leaders arE' losing the sense of responsibilit.y to 
the nalionaillag, sovereignty and the masses (l>Jands BIlSJness, May 1989:30), 
There can be no doubt that the efficiency of the public service had 
declined significantly since independence. A report by the Public 
Accounts Committee in 1990, revealed that the breakdown in public 
finance accounting began in 1979 and by 1985 all control had been 
lost. Officials seemed immune to the blandishments of the Auditor­
General, and no longer bothered to justify expenditure. Many operated 
private businesses from their government offices. Mamaloni cut the 
public service by 17 per cent in 1992 and by a further seven per cent in 
1993, although many of the posts cut only existed on paper, and thus 
no significant saving resulted (Premdas and Steeves 1995:37; Pacific 
IsJandsMontlzly, September 1990). 
Despite what had promised to be the most stable governrnent since 
independence, Mamaloni publicly battled over policy with the 
president of his party, David Kausimae. The structure of the governnwnt 
crumbled and the wily Mamaloni blamed everyone but himself. Faced 
with Kausimae's calls for his resignation, and disloyalty amongst his 
Cabinet rninisters, Mamaloni declared a new government of National 
Unity in 1990, sacked five ministers and replaced them from the 
Opposition. He declared himself prime minister independent of any 
political party. The nation was stunned, political parties were torn apart 
and the Opposition was decimated, but with 15 ministers and the 
support of 12 backbenchers, Marnaloni had gained control of 27 of the 
47 seats in the parliament. In terms of its numbers and personnel, this 
was the strongest Solomon Islands government to date, Former 
Governor-General Sir Baddeley Devesi becarne the new deputy prime 
minister and Minister for Home Affairs. Former Prime Minister Ezekiel 
Alebua took over the Ministry for Natural Resources, and former Prime 
Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea headed foreign affairs until he left 
parliament to be DirN:tor of the Forum Fisheries AgencyY The final 
part of the master-stroke was to get Bartholomew Ulufa' alu to resign his 
seat for a well-paid two-year contract job as a consultant with the Prime 
Minister's Office. Francis Saemala chose to continue in parliament rather 
than return to his previous post as a permanent secretary, lured by 
prornises f!'Om Andrew Nori, who had become Leader of the Opposition 
(Islands Business, November 1990), 
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Corruption, fraud and large-scale mismanagement began to surface, 
False diplomatic passport.s were issued, and a Korean businessman was 
alleged t.o have arranged to poison a convict who had murdered a 
Honiara man (Islands Business, August 1991, November 1991), Finance 
Minister Christopher Columbus Abe and new member of parliament 
Alex Bartlett, who described themselves as representatives of the Central 
Bank, signed a US$250 million loan document with Rome-based 
ESCA, without. the knowledge of the bank, Abe also negotiated a 
US$I,OOO million loan with a Middle Eastern financial organisation, 
with a US$I,8 million fee to be paid to the broker by the government, 
The government backed-out when the deal became public knowledge, 
Even Mamaloni was in personal financial trouble, sued by a Brisbane 
finance group for US$II, 500 allegedly owed by a fibreglass company of 
which he was director, The Central Bank and the IMF took a very dim 
view of the unsustainable development practices of the Marnaloni 
government, and the unions gained ground, haVing fought. for, and 
received, a 16 pel' cent pay increase (Islandf Business, November 1990, 
June Hl91: Pacific Islands MonthlY, March 1992), 
The only good news was the expected arrival of 3,000 US veterans to 
mark t.he fiftieth anniversary of the landings on Guadalcanal as their 
cash would sustain t.he economy for a few weeks (hlandf Business, March 
1992), 
The Francis Billy Hilly government, 1993-94 
The next national election occurred on 26 May 1993, when 280 
candidates cont.est.ed the 47 seat.s, One Cabinet minist.er, Ben Gale, lost 
his, along wit.h six other MPs, a much lower proport.ion t.han in earlier 
elections, The secret vote for prime minister occurred on 18 June, 
Members of t.he old government agreed to unIte as t.he Group for 
Nat.ional Unit.y and Reconciliat.ion (GNUR), which won 21 seats­
three short of a majority,32 Mamaloni bluffed, claimed that his GNUR 
controlled 24 seats, and planned to woo parliamentarians by expanding 
his Cabinet from 15 to 18, He also announced that the MPs 
Discretionary Fund would increase from S$100,000 to S$400,OOO. The 
smaller parties formed a National Coalition Partnership and out of t.his 
group Francis Billy Hilly emerged as the new prime minister, backed by 
24 members, including one GNUR member who had defected (Alasia 
1997:11; PacffYc Islands Month!y, July 1993), Hilly's multiparty 
coalition won the day, just. 
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Francis Billy Hilly remained in office until October 1994 with a 
precarious one-seat m(~jority. Given the mess he inherited, his survival 
for two years does him great credit. 1-·Ie was born in Ranongga, Western 
Province in 1947 and educated at King George VI School and the 
University of the South Pacific, became District Officer in Kira Kira 
1974- 75, and for a short time in 1976 was manager of the British 
Trading Company in Gizo. Member for Ranongga in the Legislative 
Assembly, he became Minister for IIome Affairs in July 1976, and was 
later deputy prime minister until he resigned in 1978 (Solomon News 
Drum, 23 June 1978), At that point he chose a quieter life, operated a 
small retail shop, and exported edible copra to Bangladesh. He also took 
on consultancies for overseas investors, and acted as an advisor on local 
project administration. Hilly re-entcored parliament in 1993 as 
representative of Ranongga and Simbo, and soon found himself thrust 
forward as the new leader (Islands Bus}ness, July 1993), I-{i11y's Cabinet 
included some powerful and competent ministers: Francis Saemala 
(former leading public servant and diplomat) as deputy prime minister 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Honiara lawyer Andrew Nori as Finance 
Minister; trade unionist and ex-Leader of the Opposition loses 
Tuhanuku as Minister for Commerce, Employment and Trade; former 
Prirne Minister Ezekiel Alebua as Minister 1'01' Natural Resources; and 
Michael Maeliau as Minister for I-lome Affairs. 33 
When Hilly took over, Islands Business evoked the image of an ill­
captained Solomons ship-of-state sailing too close to the wind, but little 
did the magazine know what lay ahead in the late 1990s, 
A change ofwind , an unfriendly current and engine break-down, and the 
Solornon's ship ofstate would have Cl'ashed on to reef, there to lie battered until 
someone else chose, on their terms to salvage it Uuly 1993: 14). 
T'he Central Bank was more matter-of-fact in its warning: 'Sustained 
growth is seriously weakened by expenditure-driven fiscal imbalance, 
lack of coherence in policymaking, and the politicisation of resource 
management' (lsjand~ Bus}ness, July 1993: 14). Perhaps the currents were 
already too strong to halt the corning catastrophe. 
I-lilly was a genuinely reformist Prime Minister, but he was naive and 
had little chance of success, Saemala immediately set out to normalise 
relations with Papua New Guinea, strained because of the Bougainville 
rebellion, 'rhen the Hilly government put the brakes on the speeding 
logging industry, which united the loggers and their political cronies 
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against the government. Plans for increased local processing, lower 
quotas and more ecologically friendly logging practices were announced, 
even though they would lead to huge losses in government revenue. The 
foreign loggers changed tactics to back the local processing compan ies. 
Hilly also tackled corruption with a focus on land, housing and vehicle 
abuses by Honiara politicians and public servants. But in other ways his 
government was just as corrupt and poorly managed as those of his 
predecessors. The special discretionary funds were regularised into a 
S$200,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) given to each 
parliamentarian. The Fund took no account of the population of the 
particular electorate (for example, the small Rennell-Bellona electorate 
received the same amount as a Honiara seat), and, as had occurred with 
similar grants given to Papua New Guinea's parliamentarians, abuse of 
the CDF was rampant and the fund was not fairly distributed. The 
CDFs were deployed as hanel-outs to buy allegiance, leaving politicians 
beholden to the prime minister (Kezuzu 1994; Alasia 1997:12). In 
1994, lIilly's Finance Minister, Andrew Nori, was forced to resign 
under allegations of corruption that involved the huge sum of S$1.18 
million in an Australian bank account. In an ironic twist, the first 
Honiara casino license was approved by the Reverend Michael MaeUau, 
leader of the Christian Leadership and Fellowship Group (Solomon Star, 
12 October 1994; Pacific ]'Jands Monthly, September 1993). 
In August 1994, urged by Sam Alasia, Opposition Leader Mamaloni 
formalised his GNUR group into a political party: the Solomon Islands 
National Unity, Reconciliation and Progressive Party (SINURPP). 
AJlegations abounded that logging companies had bribed several of 
Hilly's Cabinet ministers to cross the floor. I-lilly, faced with the 
resignation of some of his ministers in September 1994, tried to rule 
with a minority government until the November budget session of 
parliament, but was sacked by I:he Governor-General, Sir Moses 
Pitakaka, on 13 October. Hilly refused to leave office, sparking a bizarre 
constitutional crisis, during which Hilly was given until 18 October to 
agree. In the meantime, he was recognised as head of a caretaker 
government. Hilly's Attorney-General filed a case with the Court of 
Appeal, claiming that the governor-general had exceeded his powers. On 
24 October, Sir Moses appointed Leader of the Opposition Solomon 
Mamaloni as caretaker prime minister. The situation grew still more 
complex when the High Court ruled in favour of ('-filly and his minority 
government, and Mamaloni was challenged by Danny Philip for the 
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position of Leader of the Opposition. When nominations for the post of 
prime minister closed in late October, both MamaJoni and Philip had 
nominated, as had former Governor-General Sir Baddeley Devesi. The 
High Court allowed Hilly to stay on .in his post until removed on the 
floor of the House. When parliament sat for one day··-··the first day it 
had sat for n.ine months-Hilly resigned and was not re-nominated. 
Mamaloni regained the prime rn.in.istership for the third time, again 
with a single-party government.:l4 
The Third Mamaloni government, 1994--97 
Mamaloni was the loggers' friend and they welcomed his return. lIe 
announced that. his government.'s program was the 'maximum utilisation 
of the country's natural resources'. Unfortunately, this meant 
maximising round-log exports at a totally unsustainable rate, with 
inadequate finanCial returns for the nat.ion. There was an increase in tax 
exemptions that were ost.ensibly for local companies, but many of which 
were simply fronts for Asian companies. In 1996, Finance Minister 
Christopher Columbus Abe admit.ted that a logging company owned by 
Mamaloni had been granted a 100 per cent tax exemption on log 
export.s (l~land~ BusjI1e.f.~, September 1996). During the 1990s, Ric 
lIouenipwela (usually shortened to IIou), Governor of t.he Centra] 
Bank, became one of the most prominent voices of sanity in the nation. 
A Malaitan, born in 1958, Hou had cornpleted his education in finance 
and accounting educat.ion in Papua New GUinea and Australia. His 
pll'as for better fiscal management were widely ignored. 
Government has been spending much more lImn it earns. The task of bringing 
government expendit.ure down under some sort of contra] has been the most. 
dilJicult. thing for successive govermnents since trw 1980s to address (Waqa 
1995:36). 
By the end of 1995 the effective rate of log t.axation was little over two-thirds 
of the anhounced rate. This is the same as saying that. for every two ships thilt 
leave Solomon Islands paying the full ratp of eXjJurt duties, another full 
shipment went tax free. 35 
The Mamaloni government responded by threatening to set up a 
tribunal to investigate Hou and his deputy John Kaitu because they 
refused to service government treasury bills. Historian Judith Bennett: 
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provided a chilling description of government financial policy in 1994­
95, giving some idea of the frustrations the Central Bank faced. 
The 1995 budget of $360.4 million was the most expansionary ever. with a 
deficit of $78. 7 million. Yet government services declined and unbudgeted 
iterns absorbed expenditure. By mid··year, the Finance Minister directed t.he 
Central Bank to extend the legal borroWing ceiling from 30 per cent to 40 per 
cent. of the average ordinary revenue. From July 1994 to June 1995, the 
government had borrowed so heavily by means of government bonds and 
treasury bills t.hat. the Cent.ral Bank announced it would no longer pay allY 
interest on these. as the government had no funds, Throughout. the Bank 
advised reduced public spending logging sustainability, and t.he abolition of tax 
remissions to 'lowl' logging companies (Bennett 2000:346). 
At the South Pacific Forum meeting in Brisbane in 1994, Australia 
negotiated a 'debt-for-nature swap' to preserve the Marovo Lagoon area 
from logging. The Hilly government lost power before the agreement 
could be activated, however, and the new Mamaloni government 
reneged on the deal. Late in December of 1995, Australia cut off a 
A$2.2 million per year aiel program because of the lack of logging 
controls---the first reduction to an Australian aid package to the South 
Pacific since the 1987 Fiji coups. Probably aU this achieved was 
dismantling of the Timber Control Unit, the only regulatory body that 
had any chance of policing logging, without which the loggers were free 
to do as they pleased (Courier-Mail, 29 December 1995: Callick 1996). 
Always an advocate of decentralisation, Mamaloni introduced a new 
Provincial Government ActW.96 to supersede the 1981 Act. This would 
have drawn Area Councils closer into the provincial parliaments, but the 
Act was challenged in the High Court and never implemented. At the 
same time, Solomon Islands politicians outside of the government 
sounded alarm bells. Michael Maina and Alfred Sasako proVided a grim 
picture of the economy in September- October 1997, claiming that 
5$108 million had been lost because of tax remissions and estimating 
the naUonal debt at S$700 million (US$200 million). Repayments of 
loans for the extension of the Henderson airport runway were US$500,000 
in arrears and those for the Honiara road system upgrade were US$2 
million behind. The National Bank of the Solomon Islands (part-owned 
by the Bank of Hawaii) took the government to court for unpaid principal 
and interest arrears for treasury bills and bonds from the central bank. 
In addition, the government. owed Solomon Telekom S$3 million, 
59 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
leading the company to bar all non-essential calls from government phones. 
Government funding of essential health and education services was also 
in serious disarray (Seke 1997: Solomon Star, 22 October 1997). 
Political instability and corruption continued. In 1995, three 
Cabinet ministers (Luialamo, Abe and Supa) were accused in the 
Solomon Star of receiving S$7 million in bribes from a foreign timber 
company. Chan Wing Ltd, a local company owned by the Chan family 
(best known as the owners of Honiara Hotel), received a remission on 
imported beer for two years in exchange for providing S$20 million to 
rebuild Rove Prison. The deal would have netted Chan Wing a S$6 
million profit, but as reports suggest they never completed the task, 
their profit was even higher (Bennett 2000:354). Political manoeuvers 
continued. Several ministers were reported at various times for drunken, 
threatening behaviour. Finance Minister Abe disgraced himself by 
resorting to threatening behaviour on a flight to lloniara, and Attorney­
General Reginald Teutao was hospitalised for surgery after a domestic 
disturbance (Islands Business, March 1995). Danny Philip was sacked as 
Deputy Prime Minister and replaced by Francis Saemala, and another 
six ministers were dismissed in September 1996. Then Mamaloni made 
himself Finance Minister in mid 1996, ostensibly to make it easier for 
him to head an investigation into an estimated S$10 miHion siphoned 
from government funds by corrupt government officers, including the 
Accountant-General. This led to the suspension of 34 public servants 
indefinitely on half-pay and confiscation of their properties, and helped 
divert attention away from the crumbling government. Another 
misappropriation scandal broke in 1997 when some ministers and 
senior public servants were accused of taking S$l,3 million from a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs fund. No one was convicted and only a few 
public servants were suspended or shifted to other positions. Early in 
J.997, Mamaloni broke away from his own Solomon Islands Unity Party 
group, and ruled once more as an independent prime minister, 
supported by members of parliament in return for Cabinet posts and 
other lucrative government posts (Bennett 2000:357: Kabutaulaka 
1999c:444; Solomon ,Star, 2 November 1994; Islands Business, March 
J.995, June 1996, September 1997). 
The Central Bank stood firm against the Mamaloni government's 
attempts to borrow in excess of established limits, and against 
government threats to change the legislation under which the bank 
operated and to investigate its leaders. In many ways, Ric 1-10u and his 
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deputy John I<aitu became the de facto Solomon Islands Opposition, the 
only strong voice of reason and restraint. Even Mamaloni seemed worried 
by the impending bankruptcy of his nation. He banned overseas travel 
by his ministers and their staff, temporarily closed down the Constituency 
Development Funds and revoked some of the tax and logging remissions. 
Most bizarrely, Mamaloni sent a detachment of police to dig in search of 
gold bars rumoured to have been hidden by the Japanese during the 
Second World War. Mamaloni's government also suggested selling 
passports to 5,000 Hong Kong Chinese as a source of funds, but public 
opinion forced them to back off. In the meantime the economy was kept 
afloat month-by-month by massive log exports. The only prospect for 
econornic relief on the way was the plan for the Gold Ridge mine to 
become an alternative source of Treasury funds. A plan to phase out 
round··log exports was once more on the agenda with cessation targeted 
for the end of 1999 (Kabutaulaka 1996; Islands BushJess, June 1996). 
Always unpredictable, always a political survivor, in his final term as 
Prime Minister Mamaloni behaved irresponsibly at horne and on the 
international stage. He had alienated most of the nation's aid donors and 
behaved incompetently at the 1995 CHOGM meeting in Auckland 
(Field 1995). Yet, to Solomon Islanders 'Solo' remained the most 
approachable of all the prime ministers, and a true man of the people. 
When he died suddenly in January 2000, there was national 
lamentation, even from his political enemies. Everyone recognised that 
he had been an articulate nationalist. 
The Ulufa'alu government, 1997--2000 
Solomon Islands' governments seldom serve their full four-year terms, 
and over time fewer and fewer politicians retained real allegiance to 
political ideologies or parties. In the Solomon Star of 28 October 1994, 
'Inspired Psalmist' suggested that most of the parliamentarians belonged 
to the TFSP (Tarzan's Forever SWinging Party), distinguished by their 
remarkable ability to change sides qUickly. 
It was clear that the forces gathered against Bartholomew Ulufa'alu 
were even more substantial than those that undermined the 1993- 94 
lIiIly government. By the time he became prime minister in August 
1997, Ulufa' alu had served a long apprenticeship, but was nevertheless 
inexperienced and inherited many disasters created by others. 
Ulufa'alu was born in 1944, in a Catholic village in Langa Langa 
Lagoon, Malaita, and was educated at Aruligo Secondary School. He 
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went on to earn a Bachelor of Economics degree from the new University 
of Papua New Guinea in Port Moresby in the late 1960s. In Port 
Moresby he showed political acumen as President of the Students' 
UnioJl, and studied socialism and economic planning·······two themes that 
have marked much of his political career. Because he was involved in 
forming his nation's first important trade union in 1975, Ulufa'alu was 
blocked from the public service by the colonial government, whidl 
viewed him as a communist. He entered Parliament in 1976, and 
formed the Nationalist (later the National Democratic) Party 
(NADEPA), which gained seven of the 38 seats in the 1976 national 
election. lIe was Leader of the Opposition for two years leading up to 
independence, and he became Minister for Finance in the Mamaloni 
government of 1981- 84. Remembered as an excellent Finance Minister, 
this was of no account to his electors. Ulufa'alu failed to win back his 
seat in 1984 and spent the next few years involved in various business 
ventures of little success. He returned to parliament in 1989, only to 
resign his East IIoniara seat in 1990 to join the Prime Minister's Office 
in order to establish a pooi of local business and development advisers to 
replace expatriate consultants. But Mamaloni claimed the new scheme 
was too expensive and abolished it, and Ulufa' aiu became a private 
consultant and low-profile businessman. He still did some work for the 
government, and on his own initiative set up the Solomon Island 
Farmers' Association, a successful national farmers' co..operative. In the 
1993 elections he stood unsuccessfully for parliament, when, at 
Marnaloni's urging he ran against arch-political enemy Francis Saemala 
in a bitter and heated contest for the Central Malaita seat. In 1996, he 
formed the Liberal Party, which became his political come-back vehicle 
in 1997. Ulufa'alu's long career could be interpreted as principled and 
motivated by high ideals, or incompetent and under the influence of 
Mamaloni, depending on one's point of view (lsJandl' Business, September 
1997:39: Premdas and Steeves 1995:47: O'Callaghan 2000d). 
With 199,000 people registered to vote, the 1997 election attracted 
335 candidates for the 50 seats in the newly-expanded parliament. 
Many of the candidates were dissatisfied former public servants who 
worried about the chaotic path down which Marnaloni was taking the 
country. The Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), reported 
'Widespread disillusionment with the political leadership', 'high-level 
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corruption, public service fraud, gross mismanagement of government 
services and wild overspending. This by a government which over recent 
months had its cheques bounced by local commercial banks and for 
which meeting the public service payroll was a daily challenge' (l5Jand5 
Buslne.55, September 1997:39). The groundswell of discontent against 
the Mamaloni government was unmistakable, but in the end Ulufa'alu's 
mC\jority in the new parliament was slim, even though half of the sitting 
members were voted out and two wealthy businessmen of Asian descent 
became members. The new government took office with a one-seat 
TTlqjority and narrowly survived three consecutive motions of no­
confidence-the last defeated only by a hung parliament. Under 
parliamentary standing orders, the Opposition could not bring another 
vote until the third sitting of the House, due to occur in June 2000 
(Office of the Prime Minister 2000). 
* * * * * 
Between 1970 and 1997, Solomon Islands developed a style of 
government in which a few key men dominated political leadership. 
There was no loyalty to political ideologies or parties, and politicians 
were instead wooed by ruling coalitions offering allocations of funds and 
positions of power. Politicians were far more beholden to their extended 
families than to their wider electorates. There had been Httle 
decentralisation of government processes, and tension built up between 
the regions and the central government. Issues such as inequities In 
infrastructure development, over'-exploitation of resources and lack of 
compensation to Guadalcanal for hosting the capital city and the 
nation's major development pr()jects were about to dominate the 
political scene. There was a groWing feeHng that independence had not 
realised earHer hopes of creating a truly indigenous style of government. 
One final point needs to be made. It would be wrong to depict the 
events of 1998·· 2000, or the coup of June 2000 and the subsequent 
events that led to the 2003 RAMSI intervention, as a nationwide 
catastrophe. While the events 01' 1998- 2003 affected the entire nation 
because government finances collapsed and the central government 
ceased to govern except in name, the principal events were concentrated 
on Guadalcanal and Malaita. 
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Notes 
Bennett (2000:5-35) gives a neat overview of the Solomon Islands environment. Sec 
also Moore (2003: 1·56) anel Spriggs (1997) for a wider regional overview of Melanesian 
prehistory back 40,000 years. 
Hapiln Pijin English. 
This census was carried out in very trying circumstances. Eventu"lly, actively supported 
by the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), a thorough census was made of Guadalcanal 
PrOVince, but in Honiara and on Malaita the influx of refugees made accuracy 
impossible, and as tensions built up again in mid 2000, the personal security of staff in 
I'[oniara, changing staff, and diminishing transport ['acilities made final checking difficult. 
Definition taken from the draft of the Introduction to David Akin's forthcoming book 
IV/alaitan Kastom: The LiVing Histmy a/an Ideology. 
I am indebted to David Akin for his advice on this section, 
Partly based on infom13tion proVided by Bishop 'l(~rry Brown, Auld, Malaita, email, 22 
September 2003. 
Kabutaulaka (1998) provides an excellent introduction to civil society in the Solomon 
Islands. See also ']'ippett (1967); Whiteman (1983); Laracy (HJ76); I{illiard (][178); 
O'Bril'n (1995): Griffiths (IfJ77). 
'The first trade unions were formed by the ['rotectorate's l...abolJr Depart.ment. 'rhe 
British Solomon Islands General Workl~rs' Union was registered In 1961 and had a 
subslanlial membership by 1963, when it was split into the BriLlsh Solomon [slands 
BUilding and General Workers' Union, and the British Solomon Islands Plantation and 
Farmers' Association. Peter Salaka began the British Solomon Islands Gcncral Workl~rs' 
Union in I 971, hut it achieved nothing and had it.s registration cancelled in 1974. 'Three 
other unions were created in 1974-75, which had no full-time officers: the Solomon 
Islands Public Servants' Association; the Government Non.. Established Workers' Union; 
and the Guadalcanal Plains General VVorkers' Uniun, The first long-term indigenous­
initiated trade union was Ihe Solomon Islands Gl~neral Workers' Union, later known as 
the Solomon Islands National Union of Workers, which was registered In IS July 1975 
(Tuhanuku 1983; Paia 1983, Paia 1981; Naitoro 1993:133--35; Tuza 19'77). 
Classic ethnographic studies of Solomon Islands societies are Ivens (1927); IJogbin 
(1939): Hvieling (1996); Monberg (1991). 
1n	 Mariano Kelesi was horn in 1932, and attended Village school at Uruuru and St Joseph's 
Primary School in Tenaru. Fmm .1954 to 1956 he worked as a customs clearance clerk 
for BreckwDrld and Co. in Honiara. DUring 1~J56---5 7 he attender! a fisheries course 
sponsored by tile UN Food and AgricUlture Organisation (FAD) ami the South Pacific 
Commission in Noumea. In l[158 he returned to Malaita as a Fisheries Officer 1m the 
Disl riet. and was !'irst elected to the Malalta Council in .1958, lIe became President of 
the CouJlcil in 1960 and was appointed a Mcmber of the Legislative Council. When 
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elections began in 1965, Kelesi was elected as Legislative Council Member for North 
MalaitiJ. From 1970 to Hl80 he held a number of portfo.lios (Home Affairs, Education, 
Works and Public Utililies) and in 1977 was part of the delegalion to the Independence 
Constitutional Conference in London. He lost his seat at the 1980 national election. In 
1972 he began 1.>1<'1' Hardware with two partners, which is now a substantial company 
with branches in Honiara ami Malaita, and a sheet metal shop in Ranadi, Honiara. He 
has served on various boards (Public Service Commission, Central Bank of the Solomon 
Islands, Ports AuthorHy, '[,)urist Authority, Home Finance Corporation, St Vincent de 
Paul SDciety). and was knighted in 1992 (Gray 1999; Bennett 1987:318), 
II	 David Kausuimac was bDrn in 1930. I·Ie joined the public service in the 1950s and then 
began work for the Malaila Council in 1958, In 1965, he became one of the firsL eiecled 
Solomon Islands Members of the Legislative Council (1965··69), the Governing Council 
(1970··73), the Legislative Assembly (1974 .. 78) and Lhe National Parliament (1978 
80). He was also involved in V<lrious 'Are'are business ventures, most impDrtamly the 
'Are'are Maasina Company Ltd and the Waipana Sawmill Company Ltd, in tile 1960s 
andl970s. He was knighted for his services Lo the nation (Nailoro 1993:13:1-37). 
12 'The Sixth Plan was for 197173 (PadfYc Islands Monthly, February 1970, May 1973; 
Bennett 1987:320.... 25: Saemala 1983:3-·1). 
I J Quotation from Pacific islands Monthly (October 1D7 4:6); see also RJcific lllanrl> MomMy 
(May 1973, June 1973, September Hl73). 
14 Born on 15 OCLober 1928 near A'anangali village in east Bacgu·u. Malaila, Osifelo was 
the SOli of a Police Station Sergeant who later became District Headman and Court 
President In East Baegu'u. With only a basic education he began work as a messenger for 
the administration at Auki, and was quickly promoted to Assistant Clerical Officer and 
Assistant Administrative Officer by District Commissioner 'I'lIT] Russell, who admired 
his dedication and hard work. He went on Lo become a long-Lerm senior public servant. 
and ilL Independence in 1978 Osifdo was chairman of the Public Service Board. When 
the Governing Council became the Legislative Assembly it was not possible under Lhe 
Constil:lltion for him to continue in both positions. In 1977, he was the fjrst Solomon 
Islander to be knightl'c!. He died on 2G March 20Dl (Osifelo 1985:50,5054; Hussell 
2003:101-.. 2; SIBC. 26 March 20(1). 
I G Willie Betu, David K,lusimae, 52-year old Dr Gideon Zoleveke from Choiscul, New 
Zealand-born Father Peter Thompson and 28-year old Stephen Cheka (PadfJe Islands 
Monthly, October 1974). 
IG 'I'he 'tVlint Affair' occurred when Mamaloni failed to consult his Council of Ministers 
over the signing of an agreement 1'0 mint commemorative coins (5f)loTJIoJl Nlus, 20 
March 1989). 
17	 'I'he new Cabinet included Marnaloni as chief minister, Willie Betu (I1inance), Ashley 
Wickham (Works & Public Utilities), Benedict Kinika (Education & Cultural AITairs), 
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Or Francis Kikolo (Health &. Welfare), David Thuguvoda (Natural Resources), 
Pulepada Ghemu (Foreign'If'ade, [ndustry &. Labour), and Jeriel Ausuta (Agriculture &. 
Lands) (Pacif1c hlands Monthly, January 197G), 
1k	 Colin II, Allan was an administrative officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
(BSIP) from 1945 to 1959, after which he tTlowd to the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) as 
11igh Commissioner and to the Seychelles as Goveltlor. 
19	 The Cabinet consisted of KeniJorea as Chief Minister, Pulepacla Ghemu (Foreign Affairs, 
11'ade &. Labour), Mariano Kelesi (Education &. Cultural Affairs), Benedict Kinika 
(Finance), J. Tepaika (Works and Public Utilities), Francis Billy Ililly (I--lome Affairs), 
D, Ho'ota (Heillth &. Wei fa ce), and Sethuel Kelly (Agriculture & L,ilnd) (Chick 1983: 
Padf1c lrlandf Monthly, September 197G), 
20	 In il similar pre-independence situation, Papua New Guinea negotiilted a treaty with 
Australia over the 'Torres Strait borde... '['he Kwaio massacre is well described in Keesing 
and Corris (1980), 
21	 Solomon News Drum (16 June 1978): Lettecs to the Editor by Levi Laka and Edward 
Arnold Daga Solomon, Solomon Nelifls Drum (23 June 1978), 
22	 Born in 1937 on Guadalcanal, Bogotu was educated at Pawa Secondary School. I..Ie 
wodled as a teacher for many yems, and also as inspectcll' of schools for the Church of 
Melanesia, before entering thc pUblic servicc and t.raining as a diplomat, His post­
graduate t.eaching eli ploma from Edinburgh University aIllI MA in linguistics from 
Lancaster Uniwcsit.y made him t.he best ..cducated Solomon Islander of his day, He was 
Imer appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs and intmduccd the concept of a roving 
ambassacloc, accred.ited to VJashington, London, Canberra, Wellington, Ottawa, Bonn, 
Stockholm and the European Economic Communit.y, all at. t.he onc Limc, Bugotu also 
became Secretary-Ceneral of the South Pacific Commission (Sitai 1983; PacilJc lflandl' 
Mmt1JIy, February 1977, May 1985), 
1:1	 'The Cabinet consistcd of Peter Kenilocca as Pdme Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Ministec for Police, Francis Billy I lilly as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
for Health &. Medical Services, Benedict Kinika (liinance), Paul TeJVlJa (Natural 
Resources), M, Bonunga (lI'ansport &. Communications), E, Haihiru (Works &. 
Utilities), Pulepada Ghemu (Trade, Industry & Labour), C, Beti (Education &. 'Tl'aining), 
P. Kapini (Horne Affairs), Dennis Lulei (Youth &. Cultural Affairs), Ashlcy Wickham
 
(Law &. Infonnation), and Waet.a Ben (Agricult.ure &. Lands) (Atkin 1980; Premdas and
 
Steeves 1983; Padflc Aland!' Mmthly, September' 1980; 'se}lomon'star, :3 JUly 1998),
 
Less I:han two years earlier I:he cucrency had been revalucd by 5 per cent. (Paciflc Islami!'
 
Monthly, July I98]),
 
1 c, 'The new Cabinet consisted of Solomon Mamaloni as Prime Minister, Kamilio 'Iekc as 
Deputy Prime Minister and MiniSl:ec for Home Affairs &. National Development, 
Ulufa'alll (Finance), Paul Kcyallmi (Police & Justice), Petec Salaka (Land, Enecgy & 
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Natural Resources), George Suri (Health & Medical Services), Ezekiel Alebua (Foreign 
Affairs & International '[J-ade), Jvlichael Evo (i<:ducation & Ti-aining), John Ngina 
Cli-ansporl"., Communications & Government Utilities), George Talasasa (Employment, 
Youth & Social Development), Geotlrey Beti (Western Province), Waeta E3en 
(Guadalcanal), Adrian Bata (Malaita), Richard I-Jarper (Central Islands & IsabeI), and 
Ataban lI'opa (Makula (Makira) and Temotu) (Pacific Islands MOlithly, November 1981), 
26	 The Republic of China had diplomatic relations with [''(ji, I<iribati, Papua New Guinea, 
Western Samoa and Vanuatu, In 1983, Mamaloni and his F(}['eign Minister Dennis Lulei 
were holding taJks wit.h the Tniwan at the same time nS his Finnnce Minister Ulufa'nlu 
was holding talks in BeUing (Pacific lilands Monthly, May 1983, January 1984, June 
1985), 
21	 Also, Interv.iew with Solomon Mamaloni, Islands BusllJesJ', June 1989:29, 
2K	 See aJso Akin (1993) and MacLaren (2[)()0) for a wider historical background, 
19 The Solomon Breweries Ltd eventually completed their plant at Ranadi in 1991 (Pacilic 
Is!and5' MOlJth!y, May 1991), 
:JO Obituary of Dominiko Alebua, MBE, Solomon Star (3 December 1997): Kabutaulaka 
(2002h), 
31	 Kenilorea continued in this position until .I.9fl4, 
32	 This success was against. PAE the Nationalist Front. for Progress Part.y, Saemala's new 
Nationalist Action Party of the Solomon Islands, the L.iberal Part.y, the Christ.ian 
Lec1dership and Fellowship Group, ,md the Independents, 
:LJ	 The Cabinet was Francis Billy I'lilly as Prime Minist.er, Saemala as Deputy Prime 
Minsiter and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ezekiel Alebua (Natural Resources), Andrew 
Nori (Finance), Edward Hunuehu ('Ti'ansport., Works & Utilities), George Kejoa 
(Development Planning), .loses Tuhanuku (Commerce, Employment & Trade), Eric Seri 
(Provincial Government & Rural Development), Rev, Jvlichael Maeliau (Home Amlirs), 
Francis Orodani (Agriculture & Lands), Dennis Lulei (Education & Training), Allan 
Paul (Culture, Sports & Tourism), Jackson Piasi (Justice), Alpha Kimata (Posts & 
Communications), and Nathaniel Waena (Health &. Medical SerVices) (Honimae 1993: 
Islands BUJ'iness,July 1993), 
31 See 'l'iffany (l993a, 1993b): So!omon Star (12, 19, 21, 26, 28 October 1994): So!omo!1 
u,.ice (.1.4,21 Octoher 1994), 
:3;	 Central Bank of Solomon Islands, 1905, Central Bank Annual Report, 1995, Central 
Bank of Solomon Islands, Honlara:41, quoted in Bennett (2000:347), 
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Fish, oil palm, timber 
and gold 
The economy, 19705-19905 
The Solomon Islands is the second largest Pacinc Island nation in terms of 
land area and population. Its climate is wet tropical, with most of the 
country typically receiving 3,000··-3,500 mm of rain a year, and scnne areas 
considerably more. The islands experience destructive cyclones, such as 
Namu in 1986, as well as earthquakes and volcanic activity. 
It is one of the poorest nations in the Pacific with per capita GDP 
estimated at US$541 in 2002. Even though the national economy has 
expanded since independence in 1978, economic perforrnanc:e and 
economic: growth has been disappointing and has not kept pace with 
population growth or inflation. Over eleven years, 1991-2002, GDP 
grew at an average of 1.7 per cent per annum, peaking between 1990··· 
95, when annual GDP growth averaged 5.3 per cent on the back of 
unsustainable whole-log exports. In 1992, for instance, GDP grew 8.2 
per cent, one of the highest rates in the Pacific, but this was achieved 
almost totally by excessive exploitation of the nation's forests. After 
1995, GDP began to fall as world commodity prices fell and the Asian 
financial crisis weakened the international economic climate. When 
social and political troubles overwhelmed the nation, this decline 
developed into uncontrollable freefall in the early 2000s (UNDP 2002; 
Grynberg 1994; Australian Government 2004:5-18). The government 
dominates the economy and is the largest provider of t(mnal wage 
employment, but the economy is desperately reliant on a limited range 
of exports and thus very dependent on world commodity prices. Until 
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the 1990s, primary product exporting industries formed about '10 per 
cent of GOP, and nearly 20 per cent was subsistence food production. 
Whole logs and tuna were the mEljor export items of the 1980s and 1990s, 
joined briefly by gold in the mid 1990s. Tourism earnings were minimal. 
Solomon Islands has consistently been on the verge of bankruptcy for 
the last ten years. In the early 19905, foreign exchange reserves often fell 
to just enough to cover a few weeks' imports. But signs that the national 
economy was really falling apart emerged early in the new century: the 
contribution to GOP by fisheries fell by 42.4 per cent, mining by 51.4 
per cent, construction by 31.5 per cent and agriculture by 25.2 per 
cent. Electricity and water fell by 32 per cent, transport and 
communication by 20 per cent and manufacturing by 19.8 per cent. 
The SolOTnon Islands by this time ranked 118th out of 173 countries in 
the world on the UNDP's Human Development Index, one of only two 
Pacific Islands nations to be grouped in the lowest human development 
category (Tahu 2002). j 
The consequences of economic collapse have been tempered 
somewhat by the fact that some 84 per cent of the population live in 
rural areas, and most of them are self-sufficient (UNDP 2002; Post­
Courier, 11 November 2003). The basic economic unit is the family 
household, which predominantly engages in subsistence production of 
agricultural crops, more often than not on communally-owned land. 2 
Sweet potato and cassava are the basic crops, supplemented by yarn, 
taro, and pana, as well as banana, sugar cane and betel nut. Livestock 
consists of pigs and poultry, with cattle a recent introduction. Fish and 
shellfish are also an important food item in most households. As a 
consequence, the population is sheltered to some extent from the 
nation's economic and political disarray-hunger is not prevalent 
despite the country's extreme poverty. There are, of course, also severe 
inequalities between the household incomes of those living in urban and 
rural areas. Incornes in Honiara, for example, are nearly four times those 
found in rural areas, but the difference between provincial urban centres 
and adjacent rural areas is not as extreme. 
Sorne changes in economic activity have nonetheless been 
unavoidable. Population pressures, combined with the concentration of 
people on the coast and in the larger villages, means that shifting 
cultivation is now on a two or three year cycle instead of the 10-15 year 
sustainable fallow cycle. The size of tuber crops, such as sweet potato, 
has fallen, and some crops, such as dry taro, will not grow on the coast. 
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'Together, these factors have reduced overall food supply. Falling garden 
production has alsD made people wary of losing their land to other forms 
of development. Barter was once commonplace, but has more recently 
been supplanted by cash exchanges at weekly or bi-weekly markets in 
rural areas, and daily markets in urban areas. 
The Solomon Islands have a young population. Nearly half of all 
Solomon Islanders are younger than 15 years old; the population is thus 
largely unskilled and potentially volatile (Bennett 1987:332; UNDP 
2000:9). The workforce in 1986 was estimated to be 137,400, of which 
24,000 (17.5 per cent) were in formal paid employment, and most of 
the rest (82.5 per cent) in subsistence activities or the informal sector, 
although they were also involved in producing smallholder agricultural 
products such as copra, cocoa, turmeric and chillies (Tahu 2002:41· 
45). As population increases have outstripped pl'Oduction, 
unemployrnent has increased, as have inequalities between rural and 
urban areas. Formal employment increased slowly, from 26,100 in 1990 
to 34,000 in 1998, with the bulk of the growth in the manufacturing, 
forestry, fisheries, wholesale and retail sectors. 
'fhe unemployment problem was exacerbated when the public service 
was slashed in 1998-99 and again in 2000 when the evacuation of most 
of the expatriate cornrnunity forced many businesses to close. The troubles 
on Guadalcanal pushed the economy into even deeper crisis. Around 
1,800 jobs were lost when Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd (SIPL) 
closed in mid 1999, and a further 2,200 when Gold Ridge Mining Ltd 
and Solomon 'raiyo Ltd closed in mid 2000. Later in 2000, 800 public 
servants were sent on unpaid leave, but many were reinstated early in 
20()]. At the end of 2000, the Central Bank estimated that nearly 
8,000 employees had lost their jobs that year, nearly all on Guadalcanal, 
through redundancies or because they were sent on unpaid leave. 
The national government has contributed to the economic chaos by 
ignoring sound advice from the Central Bank, international financial 
bodies and aid donors. The government funded its operations through 
unsustainable logging and failed to invest the money in long-term 
national economic development. The national budget was nearly always 
in deficit, forcing the government to borrow from commercial banks. 
Intlation and lack of control over expenditure meant that actual 
expenditure often far exceeded budgeted levels. In a January 1997 article 
in Islands' Business, journalist Robert Keith-Reid provided an assessment 
of the economy under Prime Minister Solomon MarnalonL 
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Years of wild overspending and borrowing by the government keeps its treasury 
nearly empty; government cheques, even small ones, often bounce. Current 
finance lllinjst(~r Edmund Andresen admitted rece] ltly that finances were 
parlous. ··!"tle Solomons is under constant World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Asian Development Bank and donO!' pressure to clean up its act and halt 
the ravages of commercial rainforest stands by Asian loggers. The government 
says it will ban log exports but without these, which are at an unsustainable 
level, it would be completely broke despite transfer pricing and other frauds by 
foreign loggers. Despite many government failings, the Solomons business 
community does well. The technique is to pretend the government doesn't 
exist. .. Fish and log exports would bring the country far greater revenue if 
government politicians were more honest, CO!'ruption runs deep and the 
promotion of gambUng threatens to become a national social and economic 
disaster (Keith-Reid 1997a:28). 
In 1993, a Ministry for Development and Planning was established 
to centralise management and development strategies as well as 
minimise duplication of efforts among various national departments and 
the provincial governments. While all national governments since 
independence had support.ed to some ext.ent the devolution of power to 
the provincial level, provincial-level governance has left little to be 
desired ..-Ulustrated perhaps by the fact that provincial government 
accounts have not been audited since 1986. Furthermore, scandalous 
national tax exemptions have been handed to political cronies, 
supposedly to protect and promote local companies. 
Another important factor in the overall economy was aid from 
International donors. Between 1978 and 1997, the Solomon Islands 
reportedly received S$2.9 billion in foreign aid from various sources 
(Bennett 2000:360), and this was increasingly 'tied' as donors tried to 
ensure it was spent properly. The government has been unimpressed by 
this trend, however, seeing it as an assertion of foreign control over 
Solomon Islands' national interests. Foreign aid donors, who had despaired 
over their dealings with previous government.s, offered technical and 
advisory support to Uluaf' alu's 1997·..·2000 government to try to 
resuscitate the economy. Australia increased its aid by 20 per cent, to 
S$33.6 million, and New Zealand rnade S$14 million available for 
1998~99, including $5648,000 directly for policy and structural reforms. 
The April 1998 national budget was the first balanced budget since 
independence in 1978, and plans were announced to clear the 5$75 
million interest arrears on the national debt by 1999 (Keith-Reid 1998b). 
71 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
The foundations of the economy 
Copra and cocoa 
The Solomons' colonial economy was founded on smoke-dried copra 
production, and at independence in 1978 copra accounted for one­
quarter of the new nation's export earnings, Smallholders were the 
predominant producers, contributing almost sixty per cent of all 
Solomon Islands copra, After 1978, small indigenous coconut 
plantations were consolidated, plantation lands were bought back from 
foreign owners, and the lease arrangements were changed to abolish the 
rather preposterous 999-year colonial leases. By the 1990s, the coconut 
palm plantations, once the mainstay of the plantation economy and 
many villages' cash-economies, rernained picturesque but were no longer 
profitable. From an annual output that once exceeded 40,000 tonnes of 
copra, the export figure had sunk by 1996 to 22,000 tonnes, brought 
low by cyclone damage, poor shipping serv.ices and low world prices. 
The government, through its Commodity Export Marketing 
Authority, planned to end copra exports in 1999, phase out low quality 
smoke··dried copra, and set up local milling, Milling began in 1989, 
with small mills initially established in Western, Makira and Temotu 
Provinces, and in 1997 around 5,400 tonnes of mil1ed copra were 
produced. Although there was criticism that milling would be better if 
it were more centralised and large-scale, the nature of the industry, with 
half of the output coming from smallholders, meant that it was a 
'grassroots' concern. Some experts suggested that the Solomons could 
once more ride high on its coconut plantations, and that copra output 
could be lifted to 100,000 tonnes. 
Cocoa has been another important form of agricultural production. 
Although a very small-scale operation by world standards, over many 
years the agricultural field officers encouraged villagers to plant coma, 
with the result that 80 per cent of production in the 1990s carne from 
srnal1-hoJders. Cocoa output peaked at 4,615 tonnes in 1991, fell to 
2,464 tonnes in 1994, and recovered in 1997 to 3,907 tonnes. Even 
though cocoa prices were well clown 011 historical levels through most of 
the 1990s, the industry still generated substantial profits (Keith·Reid 
1998c). 
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Rice and exotic products 
Commercial wet rice growing was first introduced on Guadalcanal plains 
by an Australian company, Guadalc:anal Plains Ltd, in 1965, 'T'he 
operation was taken over by a US company, .Mindoro International 
Corp, in 1974, but they sold out to Hawaiian Agronomics 
(International), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hawaii-based 
multinational C, Brewer and Co Ltd, in 1975, In 1978, 406 hectares 
were under cultlvation, producing enough rice to satisfy the domestic 
market as well as some export demand, Brewers Solomons Agriculture 
Ltd became a joint··venture, with 45 per cent owned by the governrnent, 
Brewers wou nd up their Solomon Islands operations in 1982, 'T'he 
remainder or the rice industry was devastated by Cyclone Namu in 
1986 and did not recover until Taiwan targeted aid at the sector in the 
1990s, 'Twenty small rice mills were established in the provinces, 
supplied by small farmers, but these floundered during the civil war 
when there was not enough technical support (Pacif]c Islands Jvlo11thly, 
April 1975, March 1976, January 1979, September 1990; SIBC, 3 
April 2001), 
Although not significant financial/y, many exotic Solomon Islands 
products, from indoor aquarium items to colourful parrots, hornbills, 
lizards and even dolphins, have also found their way, legally and 
illegally, onto world marl<:ets, Birds in particular were stripped out of the 
Solomons at an alarming rate. 3 
Palm oil 
Substantial coconut plantations were established on Guadalc:anal plains 
early in the twentieth century, In 1971, Solomon Islands Plantation Ltd 
(SIPL) was established on an initial 1. ,478 hectares on the plains, 
between the Ngalimbiu and Metapona Rivers, and became known as 
CDC I as the company was a partnership between the Solomon Islands 
government, local landowners and the British-based Commonwealth 
Development Corporation.4 A plant nursery was established and, in one 
of the most successful economic ventures ever in the Solomons, some 
400,000 palms had been planted by 1978. Indigenous landowners held 
only (wo per cent of the company, compared to the CDC's 68 per cent 
and the national government's 30 per cent share, Landowners also 
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received S$100 per hectare every year as rent and S$500 per hectare as a 
premium. The GuadalcanaJ Provincial Government had no financial 
interest in or direct benefit from this miljor agricultural industry. 
By the time the six estates closed in mid 1999 they covered 6,000 
hectares, with another 1,000 hectares still under negotiation as part of 
the longer-term goal of 10,000 hectares by 2003. Oil production 
varied~20,000 tonnes in 1985, 12,000 tonnes in 1987, and 31,000 
tonnes in 1993--but the export value of the oil and the kernel averaged 
S$60-70 million during the 1990s. SIPL contributed around twenty 
per cent of the nation'~ GDP at this time (Pacific blandsMonthly, 
November 1973: Solomon Islands Plantation Ltd 1978; Keith-Reid 
1998c: Kabutaulaka 2000). 
A large proportion of the SIPL workers carne from Malaita, which has 
twice the population of Guada1canal even if we exclude the 30,000 
Malaitans living on Guadalcanal and elsewhere in Solomon Islands. 
Malaitans have a long-standing reputation for being hard, albeit 
sometimes obstreperous, workers. They were a crucial part of the labour 
force on Queensland and Fijian plantations during the 1870s~1910s 
and also formed the backbone of workforces on Solomon Islands copra 
plantations throughout the twentieth century (Carris 1973: Moore 
1985: Fraze'r 1990). The British developed a local plantation economy 
based mainly in the Western Solomon Islands, largely u~ing Malaitan 
labour and also relying on taxal:ion revenue generated from 1'lwir wages, 
but did little to develop Malaita itself. Since independence, 
governments have not questioned the British blueprint: Malaita, stU] 
underdeveloped, remains a huge labour reserve for industries on other 
islands. Over the last fifty years, this labour has been drawn to 
neighbouring GuadaJcanal by the opportunities provided by the oil 
palm plantations, ]-Ioniara, and more recently the Gold Ridge mine. 
The huge area under oil palms, accommodation for 1,200 ernployeps 
and a wider community of about 15,000, some of whom had purchased 
surrounding pockets of land for agricultural use, mean that large areas of 
Guadalcanal's best agricultural land have progressively been alienated 
from customary owners, albeit by government-planned acquisition. Oil 
palm production involves palm nurseries, planting out the' palms, 
maintenance, pollination, harvest and milling, and provides mostly 
semi-skilled employment. The proportion of Malaitans on the SIPL 
plantations increased in the 1990s. Families and dependants of SPIL 
took to supplementing household incomes by establishtng vegetable 
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gardens and raising poultry for sale in I··loniara. Because of the 
preponderance of Malaitans, their customs dominated the social Life of 
ali migrant groups on the plantation, as well as affecting the lives of the 
local Guale (the people of Guadalcanal). SIPL settlers were on the whole 
good citizens-Christians who valued life in stable communities. On 
SIPL-CDC stages 1-·6, local politics was more likely to involve 
workplace and labour issues than the kin-based concerns that 
predominate in most rural electorates. 
When Gold Ridge mine arranged leases at a higher level of return, 
resentment swelled up amongst the traditional owners of the SIPL lanel, 
because they thought they should receive the same level of compensation. 
As part of government privatisation plans, the LTlufa' alu government 
announced in early 1999 that they would reduce their share in SIPL from 
30 to 10 per cent, and that CDC's share would rise from 68 per cent to 
80 per cent, earning S$19 million for the national treasury. Guadalcanal 
Province objected, and demanded that the national government give some 
shares to the province, but the need for money was too great and the 
request was refused, Ten per cent of the government's shares were 
supposed to be sold to Solomon Islanders in a scheme managed by the 
Investment Corporation of the Solomon Islands, the government's new 
investment agency. This restructuring of the share portfolio did not 
occur and the actual landowners continued to hold only two per cent of 
the shares. Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd suspended its operations on 
12 June 1999 and totalIy dosed on 29 May 2000.5 
Logging 
Logging seemed the ideal industry to ease the financial difficulties faced 
by the bankrupt Solomons governrnent. The Solomon Islands had 
abundant untouched native hardwood forests held by communal 
landowners who demanded little financial return for their use. Profits 
were high and increased at such a rate that logging companies were able 
to bribe any difficult landowners, politicians or public servants who 
objected to the often ilIegal or barely legal exploitation of forests. 
Bridging finance offered by international bodies like the IMF and the 
World Bank to stop the pillage did not reach the right people. 
Politicians and public servants became accustomed to being bribed for 
logging permits and turned a blind eye to excessive exploitation without 
regeneration. (i Many rural Solomon Islanders have only one major 
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asset-their trees-but they continue to invite logging companies to fei! 
the forests despite bad experiences in the past, largely because they feel 
that they have no other option. l·Iow else can they pay the ever-higher 
school fees for their large families? Future environmental damage, 
weighed against the future of their children now, comes a poor second. 
That said, the timber export industry is not new to the Solomon 
Islands. It began in the early twentieth century with a substantial 
timber company established at Vanikoro Island in the 1920s, After 
World War Two, timber was exported from Vanikoro until the 1960s, 
from Lever's lands at Tenaru on Guadalcanal, and from Kolombangara 
Island in the Western District, plus a few smaller mills. The demand for 
tropical hardwoods expanded from the 1950s, propelling the 
exploitation of Solomon Islands forests through the mid 1960s, so that 
at independence whole log exports formed a major part of the nation's 
finances. Nevertheless, the acceleration that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s was of another order. 7 The value of log exports increased 
substantially from 1989 onwards as world prices increased, reaching a 
peak of US$386 per cubic metre in 1993. Asian loggers, no longer able 
to obtain whole logs from Asian forests, moved into Papua New Guinea 
and the Solomon Islands in a frenzy of exploitation. The volume of logs 
exported from the Solomon Islands increased to 624,000 cubic metres 
in 1994, and 850,000 cubic metres in 1995, The value of timber 
exports skyrocketed from S$60 million in 1990 to S$349 million in 
1996. 'The consequences were predictable by the mid 1990s, the 
Solomon Islands' government depended on logging for 20 per cent of its 
revenue and 50 per cent of its export earnings. 
Inappropriate logging practices were not monitored by the 
government, which was unable to police even the basic log count on 
which taxation was based. As a result, rnany of the logging companies 
were easily able to defraud both the government and landowners of 
rniUions of dollars. In 1993, the Hilly Government moved to phase out 
whole log exports and promised to encourage domestic processing. 
Many experts felt this was not an efficient option, and suggested that 
the only sensible path was to raise Jogging duties, a step the government 
took in 1994 (Ueteri-Taasi 1995: Grynberg 1994: Pacif1c hlands 
Man/NY, March 1994: Manels Bwines.\', July 1993). Not surprisingly, the 
foreign Jogging companies lobbied strongly against the move, and when 
Mamaloni returned to power in October 1994 he promptly reversed the 
increase. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the landowners themselves 
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did not receive any substantial benefits and. despite their direct 
negotiations with the logging companies. gained only a small fraction of 
the value of the timber resources exported. The process reached its 
lowest ebb when plans, ultimately unsuccessful. were hatched to resettle 
the RennelJ Island people against their will to make way for a Malaysian 
clear-felling operation (Pacific Islands lvlonthly. July 1995). 
In despair over the lack of control over logging, Australia cut its aid 
to the Solomon Islands by A$2.2 million in December 1995 (Islands 
BW1J]('SS. February 1996). In 1997, the Forestry Department's Timber 
Control Unit estimated the Solomons had a total land area of 2,800,000 
hectares, of which 2,201,300 hectares (78.6 per cent) was forest. 
Around half of this was too steep for commercial use. 435,500 hectares 
were protected and 248,100 inaccessible, leaving only 279,000 hectares 
available for commercial forestry. Logging on this land, 80 per cent of 
which was customary-owned, was three times the sustainable rate and, 
had it continued unabated. would have cleared all commercially 
exploitable forest in the Solomon Islands by 2010. Reforestation did not 
take place at the necessary rate and many areas suffered erosion frorn lack 
of planned regeneration (Keith-Reid 1997c). The Solomons was lucky 
that a downturn in the Asian economy during 1997 cut back the 
voracious market for cheap Solomons' logs, but this also meant that 
nation's GDP, more than half of which came from logging, fell by 1.5 
per cent in 1997 and 5 per cent in 1998. At the same time, the 
Vlufa' alu government lowered the annual log production target to 
around 100.000 cubic metres, half the levels of 1995 and 1996. and 
again promised to accelerate localisation of the industry. 
In the April 1998 parliamentary budget debates, llilda Kari, 
Minister for Forests. EnVironment and Conservation, announced plans 
to review all logging licences, for both local and foreign companies. The 
decision may have been too little too late: regeneration of the cleared 
forests will take 40 years, but planned reforestation seldom occurs, and 
plantation forestry is limited. At the same time, the cutback in logging 
cast thousands of Solomon Islanders into unemployment. The only 
bright lights are on Kolombangara Island, where KOlombangara Forest 
Plantation Ltd has planted 15,000 hectares of forest in collaboration 
with the CDC for future harvest. and in north New Georgia in the area 
dominated by the Christian Fellowship Church (Keith-Reid 1998c, 
1999a; Dauvergne and Kabutaulaka 1998; Dauvergne 1997). Foreign 
loggers almost always promise more to local landowners than they ever 
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receive in compensation, which has now-on consequences on customary 
lands, As Peter Dauvergne and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (1998: 12) 
have noted 
.. .loggers have generally created far more damage than landowners expect. 
They have polluted rivers and streams, destroyed sacred areas and irreversibly 
damaged forest ecosystems (which in turn has destroyed crucial food sources). 
As a result of these broken promises and unscrupulous corporate tactics, many 
landowners have fe.lt betrayed or cheated, both by corporations and landowner 
representatives, and have retaliated by threatening to take logging companies to 
court. 
Logging also exacerbates disputes between landowners, which have 
long been endemic in the Solomon Islands. To simplify customary 
ownership, key landowners in descent groups are nominated as the 
custodians of royalty and compensation payments, but leaders 
frequently do not distribute the money fairly, causing resentment in 
extended families. Protection of tambu (sacred) sites is high on local 
people's agenda, but loggers do not always comply with customary 
restrictions. Significant sites that cannot be disturbed are supposed to be 
surveyed before any logging operation begins, and villagers know that they 
can invoke the government's pledge to protect such sites as a 'weapon' 
against loggers. When damage occurs, however, the landowners do not 
always succeed in dealing with the loggers, who try to buy them off, and 
authorities are often slow to act. Logging also causes significant erosion, 
whidl if exacerbated by a cyclone, as occurred with Cyclone Namu in 
1986, can leave hectares of raw red earth slowly leaching away. Logging 
promises a quick way for landowners to get money but the social and 
environmental consequences are often dire. In her discussion of various 
logging licenses applied for on the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal in the 
1980s and 1990s, Judith Bennett (2000:312) paints a clear picture of 
the possible consequences, 
The 'weather' coast is extremely precipitous with a slope so great that, even 
where no recent human disturbance has occurred, great landslips scar the hills, 
evidence of the heavy rainfall and eruthquake activity. Once logged, the topsoil 
ofthis region, about one third of the island, would simply slide offinto the 
deep sea and with it the 1as1 Mauri people's subsistence. 
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Fishing 
The luxuriant marine resources of the Solomon Islands also are one of its 
most beautiful natural features. The hundreds of islands and thousands 
of fringing reefs and lagoons are vital both to domestic food supplies and 
export income. Fish constitutes a large part of Solomon Islanders' 
traditional diet, and the nation is estimated to consume at least 13,000 
tonnes each year drawn from subsistence fishing (Islands Business, 
February 2(03). Fifty per cent of the world's tuna catch comes from the 
South Pacific, and tuna stocks are one of the Solomon Islands' most 
important assets. Sustainable development of the fish reserve and 
regional fishing agreements are thus crucial for future development. 
Starting from a 4,711 tonne initial catch in 1971, the Solomons' 
commercial tuna fishery has become the largest domestic tuna industry 
in the Southwest Pacific. During the 1970s, after the declaration of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Pacific nations laid 
claim to around 30 million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean as 
part of their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones. In 1978, the 
Solomon Islands claimed under this convention 1.3 million square 
kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone. The Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) , established by the South Pacific Forum8 in 1979, has 16 member 
nations and a secretariat, based .in Ironiara, that provides technical 
advisory services. In 1984, after a series of incursions by boats illegally 
fishing in their waters and Papua New Guinea's seizure of a US boat in 
1982, the Solomon Islands made world news when .it seized a US purse­
se.ine fishing boat, Jeanette Diana, worth US$3 million (Pacific Islands 
Monthly, October 1984: Kengalu 1988). After long petulant 
negotiations, the United States, fearing that Russian fishing boats would 
take over, agreed i.l1 ] 987 to recognise the 200-mile exclusive economic 
zones of Pacifk nations, and signed the Multilateral Treaty of Fishing. 
'The FFA has negotiated two other important agreements: the 1989 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the 
South Pacific, and the 1993 'Treaty on Cooperation in Surveillance and 
Law Enforcement in the South Pacific. While the treaties allowed the 
United States almost unrestricted access, Pacific maritime sovereignty 
was acknowledged, nations received fees, and a fisheries development 
fund was established (lflandr Business, October 1998).9 
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Leaving aside nineteenth century whaling around the archipelago 
before the Protectorate was established (Bennett 1987:24--33, 350--55), 
the modern commercial fishing industry really began with negotiations 
in 1971-72. A joint fishing venture began between the govern.ment and 
a Japanese company, forming Solomon Taiyo Ltd in 1973, with a 
cannery at Tulagi, the pre-war capital in the Nggela Group, The Japanese 
wanted to catch and freeze skipjack and yellow fin tuna for export to 
canneries in American Samoa, Puerto Rico and the US mainland, and to 
can them for the local market, They were also seeking fish for smoking, a 
style (arabuhl'j) valued highly by the Japanese consumers, Exclusive 
fishing rights were negotiated over the fish-rich 'slot' bet\,,"'een the two 
chains of islands, and exports began in J 974. A second cannery was 
proposed for Noro on New Georgia Island in Western Province, which 
had been used as a second fishing port since the mid 1970s, 
Development proceeded and Noro totally replaced Tulagi as the base for 
the Solomon Taiyo cannery. Initially the joint venture was split 25---75, 
but this was altered gradually through the late 1970s and early 1980s 
so that 51 per cent was owned by the national government and 49 per 
cent by Maruha Corporation (formerly 'Taiyo Gyogyo) of Japan, which 
managed the operation, Originally around twenty boats, owned by 
Okinawan fishers and 'chartered' to the company, operated out of Noro 
using the pole-and-line method, and manned by Solomon Islander and 
Okinawan fishermen. Solomon Taiyo purchased the aging boats over 
several years in the mid 1990s, and Okinawans dwindled to a minority 
among the crews. Some boats were totally localised, 
Another joint venture built small bait-catching and pole·-and·-Iine 
tuna-fishing boats at Sasape in the Nggela Group from 1978 onwards 
(Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1980), but the larger and more expenSive 
imported purse-seine vessels brought: in bigger catches, The tuna was 
either exported smoked and frozen or canned for the domestic market, 
The govemment intended that eventually Solomon Taiyo Ltd would be 
totally locally owned and established the National Fisheries 
Development Ltd (NDF) as a joint venture with the company for this 
purpose, The two cornpanies operated several pole"·ancl-line, long·-lining 
and purse-seiners together for several years before the partnership ended 
(Bennett 1987:333-41; Pacific lslands Monthly, June 1974; Island\' 
Busine.I;\" September 1998). 
The government sold NDF's ailing tuna fleet in 1990 to i1 Canadian 
company, British Columbia Packers Ltd, which managed to run the 
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ships at a profit. They in turn resold the company in 1997 to 
TriContinental of Singapore, a subsidiary of the US TriContinental 
company and Solomon Taiyo, trading as 'lri-Marine International. In 
1998, the company considered building a new cannery on Malaita, but 
the civil tensions put an end to the plan. Through the early 1990s, the 
government issued excessive fishing quotas, leading the industry to peak 
in 1995, when 56,135 tonnes of frozen, canned and smoked fish were 
exported. Although the country received about US$25 million each year 
in wages for 2,200 local workers during the 1990s, Solomon Taiyo Ltd 
never made a profit. As a consequence, the government commissioned a 
report, completed in 1995, from the Forum Fisheries Agency 
investigating the company's financial dealings. The report found no 
evidence of transfer pricing, and Japanese government tax audits as well 
as a South Pacific Project Facility check also found no evidence of wrong­
doing. Kate Barclay, who has researched t.he Solomons' fishing industry. 
suggests that Maruha remained involved because there was profit. 
through duties and t.axes accrued to the Solomon Islands government, 
and commissions for management services (Barclay 2(01). It suited the 
Japanese government moreover to have friends among the Pacific 
governments to ensure support of its internationally unpopular whaling 
program and also to allow ships carrying plutonium to pass through the 
Pacific. The benefit to the Maruha company was indirect, and consisted 
of increased access to Japanese government aid for the cornpany's other 
operations around the world--by 1993, fishing only generated about 
five per cent of the company's profits. Although loan obligations are 
hard to untangle, the Noro operation was at best a break-even enterprise. 
The advantage to Maruha was thus mainly from prestige and good 
relations with the Japanese government, rather than direct financial 
benefits (Barclay 2001; Barclay and Wakabayashi Yoshikazu 2000). 
The government also issued licences, many illegal, to 30 fishing 
companies, most of which were foreign-owned and almost all of which 
were connected to local politicians, allowing them to take 572,500 tonnes 
of tuna. For instance, in 1996, Taiwanese company Ting Hong Oceanic 
Enterprises Ltd had about 60 fishing boats and a floating factory ship 
operating in Solomon waters, based on a 1994 licence which only 
allowed a limited catch of s3.5himi-·grade tuna. The original arrangement 
specified 70 per cent local employment. and a land-based Factory,1O 
In 1997, when Ulufa' alu became prime minister, the Fisheries 
Division of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries was 
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reorganised, and a new Fisheries Act passed, reducing the tuna-fishing 
quota by 75 per cent to 120,000 tonnes. Ulufa'alu's government set out 
to introduce a tuna management plan that indigenised the fishing 
section of the industry and separated it from processing and marketing. 
The move was intended to encourage Solomon Islanders to lease vessels 
and gain technical skills, with cooperation from the Japanese and 
Taiwanese governments (Gray 1997). Under this privatisation policy, 
Ulufa' alu's government also wanted to sell the nation's holdings in 
Solomon Taiyo, but the Japanese parent company opposed the move, 
and it was anyway quite unlikely a buyer could have been found for 
such all unprofitable company. Even so, the 1998 commercial catch···· 
94,129 tonnes worth an estimated S$S203 million (US$40.6 
rnillion)"was significant and, together with the decline in logging. 
made fisheries the nation's largest export industry once again. When the 
civil tensions erupted, Maruha withdrew from the joint project and the 
Solomon Islands government was left with 100 per cent ownership of a 
new company, Soltai Fishing and Processing Co. Ltd. After the Noro 
people and Western Province complained to the national governrnent, 
45 per cent ownership in the new company was transferred to the 
province, and this was further increased to 49 per cent in early 2001 
(Keith-Reid 1997b; Mercier and Hamel 1997; Robinson 2000; SIBC, 
2 January 2001). 
'I'IH' Solomon Islands' 'domestic' fleet in 1998 consisted of '26 pole 
and line vessels, 40 single purse-seiners, one group seining operation, 
and 40 longliners. The 'foreign' fleet included 18 longliners, 31 poie 
and line, and about 35 US purse-seiners fishing uncleI' a multilateral 
treaty' (Robinson 2000:14; see also Cartwright 1999). The government 
used a tracking device on aii licensed vesseis in Solomon Isiands' waters, 
which aiiowed authorities to distinguish between licensed vessels and 
illegal fishing vessels. After the reforms, and because of poor fishing 
results in the mid 1990s, many of the purse-seiner ships, mainly those 
from Korea and Japan, sailed away into more lucrative waters. 
Other smaiier fishing markets deveioped in the 1990s. For instance, 
anoth(~r Japanese company, Solssa Fisheries, began to harvest sashimi for 
the Japanese market, as weii as lobsters and aquarium supplies. In 
Honiara. Soigreen Fishing Ltd, a joint venture between Sanwa Trading 
Co. Ltd of Japan and a locai businessman was filling its 4.000-tonne 
export quota using up to ten Chinese longliners, and exporting up to 14 
tonnes of sashimi three times a week via Brisbane to Japan. Smaller 
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ventures were also begun, such as Solomon Islands Marine Exports in 
1994, which teamed up with villagers to supply exotic rnaritime 
products, such as coral fish, prawns, starfish, blacklip oysters, clams, sea 
anemones CllHj coral fragments for aquarium hobbyists in the United 
States, Europe, Hong Kong and Japan. Lobsters were also exported to 
Australia, and giant clams, driven close to extinction by Asian poachers, 
began to be farmed through aquaculture. One recent venture, the export 
of live dolphins for a marine zoo caused outrage early in 2004 and is 
unlikely to be attempted again (Keith-Reid 1997b, 1998c: Mercier and 
Hamel 1997: hlands Business, May 1990).11 
Mining 
T,'1o things stand out in relation to the mineral wealth of the Solomon 
Islands. The first is the islands' long tenure as an oqject of European 
avarice, and the second is that state policy on the ownership of minerals 
is at odds with indigenous concepts of land tenure. In the sixteenth 
century, Spanish explorer Mendafia was searching for the source of King 
Solomons' gold when he came upon the islands that he named after the 
biblical monarch. During the nineteenth century, mineral exploration 
continued around New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, with 
substantial alluvial finds in the Louisiade Archipelago off east New 
Guinea in the 1880s. Geologists first visited Guadalcanal in 1896, just 
as the Protectorate began, and again in the 1920s, which established 
Guadalc:anal as a possible source of gold. Copra planters ['ound gold in 
the Tenanl and Kornbito rivers in the 1930s, around the time that New 
Guinea's Wau-Bulolo fields were being opened, but not enough to 
attract miners. In the late 1930s, the Western Pacific High Commission 
tried to encourage Australian politician and mining magnate E.T. 
'rheodore to invest in a Guadalcanal mine: though he was interested 
enough to visit the island, he ultimately did not get involved. Local 
villagers began at this time to pan for gold and established permanent 
villages around the alluvial sites, and a gold industry developed centred 
on Honiara. It has been estimated that 30,000··60,000 grams of gold 
were panned at Gold Ridge by local people every year over the decades 
before the mine began (Islands Business, May 1995). 
In the lead-up to independence, the Protectorate government once 
more attempted to attract a mining company, leasing the Gold Ridge 
prospect to CRA Exploration Ltd in 1974. Open-cut mining was 
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thought to be economically feasible, although the samples never 
indicated large deposits, but capital was again not forthcolning and 
hopes evaporated as the 1970s progressed, More prospecting occurred in 
the early 1980s, with the lease reissued to Amoco Minerals, which in 
turn established Cyprus Minerals Solomon Ltd in 1985, The next year 
Cyprus entered a joint venture with the US-based Arimco NL Ltd, 
which bought the remaining Cyprus shares in 1989, During all of this 
the local villagers waited expectantly but never really accepted the 
concept of Crown Land and mining rights that alienated them from the 
minerals under their land, By May 1990, Arimco had lodged an 
application for a Special Mining Lease and contracted an economic 
assessment and an Environmental Impact Study by RTZ, which 
concluded that Gold Ridge was marginally viable. The company was 
unable to consolidate finances and in 1992 sold out to Green Equity, 
who in turn were unable to find investors to share their risk and 
consequently withdrew. The Solomons government then tendered the 
Special Prospecting License to Crusader, a Brisbane-based company 
operating as Saracen Minerals Ltd, which later sold out to another 
Brisbane company, Ross Mining NL Ltd (lfland5 Business, May 1995). 
These convoluted company manoeuvres probably inflated local villagers' 
impression of the potentia] wealth involved, and they carne to suspect 
that the government was not working in their best interest, 
In 1990, with the future of Gold Ridge in mind, the government 
passed the Mhws and MInerals Act, In debates on the BilJ, the rights of 
kin groups to control minerals on their lands were discussed, leading the 
government to something of a dilemma, Although the rights of 
customary landowners had always been acknowledged, the government 
knew it had to proVide security for investors, The Act states that the 
mineral resources belong to 'the people of the Solornon Islands', which 
infers all of the people, not just those on the land on which the minerals 
are located, Surface rights were acknowledged as being owned by the 
customary landowners, and the state carries the duty to ensure 
landowners are equitably compensated for mineral exploitation on their 
lands, Negotiation and distribution of royalties was made easier by an 
Amendment Act in 1996, which allowed the government to establish a 
separate account to hold the royalties, 
T\"Io different concepts of ownership of land were always at issue, that 
of the state and the mining company, and that of the traditional 
landowners. Villagers do not distinguish between ownership of the 
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surface of land and what is underneath the land. Although Ross Mining 
was reasonable in the compensation and royalties that it paid, the 
custodians of these monies typically did not distribute them fairly or 
even use them wisely. At the same time, locals, who were trying to 
resume their former small-scale alluvial mining, were severely 
disgruntled at being forbidden from land leased to Ross Mining. 
The Gold Ridge mi.ne was developed between 1994 and 1998 at a 
cost of A$64.5 million. a small amount by international standards. '1'he 
Special Mining Lease was granted on 12 March 1997, and during 
August ..Septernber of that year the Gold Ridge workforce of around 300 
began to clear the site using huge machines on a 24-hour shift. By June 
J 998, the mine had produced 45,487 ounces of gold. General Manager 
Eugene Illescu told the SoloIllon Star that the yield from the mine would 
be relatively low grade at 1.6 grams of gold per one tonne of rock, but 
the company hoped to be able to extract 100,000 ounces per year, and 
produce one million ounces over the projected ten-year life of the mine 
(Solomon Star, 8 October 1997) .. 
Compared wilJl PNG mines such as Panguna, Ok Tedi or Lihir, GolcJ 
Ridge was small and marginal, and the Australian mining company 
involved lacked international experience. Ross Mining's Solomons 
project was its first overseas venture, but the company was concerned to 
be responsible environmentally and to deve lop good relations with the 
landowners. Mining experience over recent decades in Papua New 
Guinea has increaSingly shown the need to balance the needs of local 
people, and those of the provincial and national government, against 
profit-rnaking by the mining company. The disaster in BougainvU!e, 
where the Panguna mine WilS closed in 1989, was a lesson for all Pacific 
nations and mining companies in what can go wrong when negotiations 
do not include the best interests of the customary landowners, or the 
national government claims too large a proportion of the royalties for 
national rather than regional development. Commercial operations at 
Gold Ridge. which had largely been negotiated during the term of the 
Mamaloni government, began just when the Ulufa'alu government took 
over. Marnaloni had relied on over-exploitation of timber resources to 
finance his increasingly debt-ridden government, and he saw Gold 
Ridge as his personal political, and the nation's economic, salvation. The 
100,000 ounces of gold expected to be produced every yem during the 
project's first decade was roughly equivalent to 30 per cent of the 
nation's gross national product (Pacific News Bulletin, May 1997). 
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Nonetheless, despite being Mamaloni's false deliverance, the mine was 
also intimately tied to the tussle to remove his successor, Ulufa' alu. The 
mining company, well aware of the instability in the nation's leadership, 
was unwilling to give credit to either leader in case there was a political 
reversal. 
In 1996, work began on the Lunga reset:t:lement of around 150 
families displaced by the mine, at a cost of S$6 million the largest forced 
movement of any group of Solomon Islanders to accommodate economic 
development. Meanwhile, villagers who lived along Metapona River 
began to worry about future environmental damage from the mine, 
based on knowledge of cyanide poisoning in similar situations in Papua 
New GUinea, An independent Environmental Impact Study (EIS) 
supported their fears, and questions W(ere raised about the official EIS 
when parliament debated the 1996 amendment to the Mines and 
Minerals Act (1990), prompting the Minister for Energy, Mines and 
Minerals David Vouza to claim the study would be released in 
December of that year. 'Two landowners' associations were established: 
the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association; and the Metapona 
Downstream Association (also known as the Guadalcanal Plains 
Landowners Association), headed by community leader David 
Thuguvoda, which aimed to guard the interests of the people 
downstream of the mine. Their fear was that, although not directly 
affected by the mine, they would suffer repercussions from any accidents 
involVing the mine tailings dam. There were also calls to renegotiate the 
whole mining agreement because the royalties to landowners were too 
low. By April 1997, landowners around the mine and all the 
Guadalcanal plains had warned Ross Mining that they might face 
'another Bougainville' if the disputed compensation agreement was not 
renegotiated. Provincial Minister for Lands and Mines John Laefan 
wrote to Prime Minister Mamaloni, and stated his 'opposition to the 
Gold Ridge project proceeding in its present form'. Paramount Chief 
Willie Rani from the Rausere clan, the descent group most afTected by 
the mine, wrote to Ross Mining shareholders to warn them that 'We are 
NOT going to give up our land without a fight' (AustJ'afjan Financial 
Review, 9 April 1997). Despite support fronl the Guadalcanal Province, 
however, cases filed against Ross Mining in the High Court wen' not 
successful (Pacillc News Bulletin, May 1997). 
FolloWing the pattern established with BlIPs' Ok Tedi mine in Papua 
New Guinea, discontented landowners supported by Australian lawyers 
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(Slater & Gordon) took litigation action in March 1997 against Ross 
Mining in the High Court of the Solomon Islands, arguing that 
insufficient compensation had been paid for land acquired (Pacif1c News 
Bulletin, May 1997). Two landowners' representatives, Roni and 
Thuguvoda were linked with a Brisbane mining entrepreneur, Dennis 
Reinhardt,12 who planned to build and control a new hydroelectric 
scheme for Honiara and the mine. Ross Mining said that Reinhardt 
and/or his lawyer Nicholas Styant Brown had flown Roni and 
Thuguvoda to Australia for consultations in February and March 1997. 
Thuguvoda and other complainants had also spent June..·July 1997, and 
January-February 1998 in Brisbane. Reinhardt had threatened to 
'embark upon lengthy and internecine litigation' unless Ross Mining 
cooperated with the consortium building the hydropower station. Ross 
Mining alleged that Reinhardt and his associates were using the 
landowners as a bargaining chip in their negotiations, a claim with 
which Chief Justice Muria readily agreed (Keith-Reid 1999c). The 
Mamaloni government banned Reinhardt from the Solomons (although 
he was later allowed to return), and Roni and Thuguvoda were replaced 
by Samuel Saki and Alfred Maeke as spokesmen for the landowners. In 
October 1997, Roni and Thuguvoda withdrew from legal action against 
Ross Mining. Subsequently, I~oni was welcomed back as a member of 
the Gold Ridge Landowners' Council, Ross Mining made a payment of 
S$75,OOO to Thuguvoda and bought a S$80,OOO home for Roni, and 
gave him a S$400 jJer week job as advisor, Not placated, Roni and 
Thuguvoda had renewed their legal challenge, once rnore under the 
wing of Slater & Gordon, prompting Ross Mining to again claim thai 
Slater & Gordon had conspired with Reinhardt to stop completion of 
the Gold Ridge mine (Solorrum Star, 15 November 1997, 10 December 
1997: Pacific Irland5' Monthly, March 1999). 
In May 1997, the deposed chairman of the Electricity Authority ill 
Honiara, Gordon Billy Gatu, contested the validity of the newly 
constituted Authority's board, which with the support of Mamaloni had 
allowed I~oss Mining to generate its own electricity instead of using the 
Honiara supply. Mamaloni had allowed this, against the wishes of the 
Authority, on the grounds that Honiara's power supply was too 
unreliable for the mine's needs (Pacific NeVlzr Bulletin, May 1997). The 
first case against Gold Ridge was thrown out of court in late 1998. and 
the second was ultimately unsuccessful with damages and costs awarded 
in 1999 against Slater & Gordon and Reinhard1:. J3 John Nattoro, whose 
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doctoral thesis centres on an analysis of the Gold Ridge project, 
concluded the cases were motivated by the perception of economic 
deprivation of kin groups who misunderstood the relative scale of the 
mining ihfrastructure compared with their meager physical resources. 
Although a great deal of care had been taken in setting up community 
consultation mechanisms, once more the scope of the mining project 
and the clash of cultural values ended in discontent among landowners, 
whose concept of land rights was very different from that of the 
Solomons government and the company (Naitoro 2003:Chapter 6). 
Nonetheless, there is potential for other mining ventures in the 
islands. In the mid 1990s other companies were prospecting in south 
and central Guadalcanal and on Vanguna Island in Marovo Lagoon, and 
other mineral resources have also been uncovered: nickel on Isabel 
Island, significant bauxite reserves on Rennell and Waghina Islands, 
phosphates on Bellona Island, and possibly industrial micro-diamonds 
in central Malaita. But after the closure of the Gold Ridge mine, future 
investors will be wary.14 
Tourism 
The 'Hapi Isles' has one of the smallest hospitality industries in the 
South Pacific. Despite renowned features such as World HPfitage-listed 
MarcNo Lagoon in Western Province, great natural beauty, and friendly 
people, the Solomon Islands has never attempted to attract international 
tourists with large resort development in the manner of Vanuatu, Fiji and 
New Caledonia (Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
1989:25-26). War relics have brought. a small now of US and Japanese 
tourists, and divers have been attracted to the sunken ships and beauties 
of the coral reefs, but there was little attempt to develop tourism until 
the Alebua government in the 1980s, when the decision was rnade to 
encourage small-scale ecologically sound tourist development. 
At the larger end of the market, Anuhu, a newly opened tourist resort 
was destroyed by fire in May 1988 after disagreements wit.h loca] 
landholders. The original lease, signed in 1983, was contested in the 
courts and found to be valid, but the resort never reopened (FJandl' 
Business, April 1996). In 1989, a Japanese company purchased 80 per 
cent of t.he government's lOO per cent holding in the 101-room 
Mendana hotel in the center of Honiara. In the same year, the official 
Governor's residence from Protectorate days, a grand house on the beach 
next to t.he Menclana, was sold to Korean and Japanese interests for 
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US$2 million. After public outcry, the government repurchased it in 
.1994 for US$3 million and turned it into an art gallery while further 
tourist development of the site was negotiated (Islands Business, October 
1994) .1:i During the 1980s and 1990s the Solomon Islands received on 
average 10,000··12,000 visitors""mainly from Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States-and by the early 1990s earned about S$11 0 
million ['rom them, each year. Facilities were far below the standards of 
FUi, Vanuatu or New Caledonia (Tourism Advisory Mission .1985: 
Tourist Council of the South Pacific 1990).16 
The main airline flying into the Solomons is the national carrier, 
Solomon Airlines, which operates 'Twin Otters and Islanders on domestic 
flights and a Boeing 737 leased from Qantas for flights to Australia and 
other island nations. Overseas destinations reachable from Honiara have 
varied over the years, depending on Qantas, Air Niugini, Air Nauru, Air 
Vanuatu and Air Pacific schedules. Generally, the routes have included 
Brisbane as the main exit gateway, and Port Moresby, Port Vila, Nandi, 
Auckland and Cairns. 
Solomon Airlines was originally owned by Denis Buchanan under the 
name Solair, but his 51 per cent stake was bought out by the 
governrnent in .1987. Control over the airline passed to the Investment 
Corporation of the Solomon Islands, under the control of the Minister 
of Finance, but the undercapitalised airline staggered along with a small 
domestic fleet until it took delivery in mid 1990 of a leased Boeing 737· 
400 (Padf1c Islands Monthly, May 1990, July .1994). It consistently 
made losses until 1995, when it suddenly began to make a profit and 
fell into an expansionist mood. 
l'Ienderson airport was upgraded with Japanese aid funds, and a 
company which owned two hotels, in Honiara and Gi2O, and one in 
Port Moresby, planned to introduce tWice-weekly direct flights from 
Cairns to Gizo. Gi2O. with its slow charm and picturesque Chinatown. 
and its access to the astounding reefs and lagoons of Western Province. 
was set for a tourism bonanza. Guadalcanal also had some small tourist 
resorts. such as 'Tambea and Vulelua near Honiara. and the more 
luxurious Tavanipupu on the Weathercoast, and other small lodges and 
ecotourism resorts were well-established in Western Province. Scuba­
diving, sports-fishing ventures and eco-tourism flourished, with links 
from Honiura hotels to Gizo and small resorts in the western islands. 
Other small local ventures, such as those at Yandina and on Mangalonga 
Island in the Nggela Group, have continued to operate. Before the 
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ethnic and poiitical disturbances, air transport and tourist potential was 
in the best condition it had been in years (Gravelle 1995; lflanc!f 
Business, November 1997, January 1995, August 1995: Pacif'ic 
Magazine, April 2001, October 2001). 
***** 
The natural resources of the Solomon Islands are adequate for a nation of 
500,000 people, but only if stable, sensible governance practices are 
restored and notice is taken of the people's traditional understanding of, 
and rights to, resource ownership. The Solomon Islands will never be a 
rich nation, but with donor aid and sensible use of natural resources, plus 
balanced infrastructure development and growth of agriculture, maritime 
industry and perhaps small-scale mining, the nation can prosper. The 
crisis that beset the Solomon Islands principally related to inequitable 
economic and political development, not to ethnic tensions or separatist 
insurgency. As Judith Bennett (2002:1) suggests, the British bequeathed 
political structures 't.hat. have not sat well on the Melanesian foundation'. 
Yet Solomon Islander politicians have in t.he years since independence 
done no more than tinker with them, because they had given such men 
a degree of personal power in the disposal of resources. The economy has 
been mismanaged dreadfully, causing severe economic devastat.ion and 
social dislocation. Economic downturn was a subst.antial factor in the 
violence of 1998-2003. It must., however, be viewed alongside political 
ineptitude, corrupt.ion and manipulation, and the long-term consequences 
of unequal development on Malait.a and Guadalcanal. Malait.ans were 
forced into work as migrant labourers because opportunit.ies were not 
developed for them t.o work with the resources of their own island. 
Poorly t.hought out. dist.ribution of rents and profits, t.o the actual 
landowners and the GuadaJcanaJ provincial government, eventually lit a 
fuse that. led t.o the explosion that was t.he Isat.abu Freedom Movement.. 
Malaitans retaliated, based on frustration and cultural expectations, but 
embedded in t.heir anger were t.he long-term economic inequit.ies that 
had forced them to move to Guadalc:anal in t.he first place. 
Notes 
Even before the civil wm, the Solornon Islands was ranked with Guinea. Burundi,
 
Senegal and Bangladesh (World Bank 2000:13-14).
 
The overwhelming majority of land is communal.ly owned. with only nine per cenl
 
owned by the state and four per cent under individual title.
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7,500 birds were exported during 1997, to collectors in South Africa, Japan, China, the 
United States, the Nethedands and Britain. The trade has endangered the future of 
some species (Keith -F\cid I 998a). 
Strictiy speaking, the correct acronym is SIPL, but locals call the plantations CDC. 
'T"hcre were also prospects of other private ventures, with a Malaysian logg.ing company 
investigating leasing land on Yanguna Island in Western Province. F\eports in 1998-99 
suggested that they were proposing to clear G,OOO hectares and were already planting 
palms, with government connivance but without a govl~rnment Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) (Islands Business, January 1999; Keith-F\eid 1998c, 1999b; Cornelius 
1999a; Solomon Islands Plantation Limited 1999; Pacific islands ManlNy, Septemher 
1999; SIBC, 1 June 2000), 
Tl) give one example, in 1993 when Joses luhanuku, Minister for Commerce, 
Employment & Trade, ordered the deportation of a logger who offered him S$10,000 in 
anticipation of his support for a particular company, his enemies said he was insulted 
that the amount was so small (Bennett 2000:310). 
See Bennell: (2002) and Kabutaulaka (2001b), which are the only (ktailed studies of 
Solomon Islands' forests. 
Now re-named the Pacific Islands Forum, and often just called the Pacific Forum. 
See also, the Forum Fisheries Association website at http://www.ffa.intl. 
10	 Alnlost none of the quat;:) was ever used (Keith·"FzeJd lD9G; lflands BUJiness, Sept.ernber 
1998), 
11 I am indebted to Dr Katel:larclay of the Univers.ity of Technoiogy, Sydney, for helping 
revise this section. 
11	 Dennis Reinhardt, ajournalist in the 1970.1, became a mining entrepreneur, and was 
connected to two companies, Augold on the Queensland mainland and Gold Copper 
Exploration in Torres SLrait, which ended with a A$3 milLion dollar environmental 
clean-up bm in 'Turres Strait that was footed by the taxpayer. He became an adviser to 
the Wingti govemment in Papua New Guinea over the Mount Kare goidmine, when the 
government litigated successfully against CHA, to the advantage of Eeinhardt's company 
Ramsgate, which took over the mine. When Wingti lost power, Eclnhardt was banned 
from Papua New Guinea, reappearing in the Solomon Islands as chief executive of 
Brisbane-based IVlerthyr Holdings Ltd, part of a consortium to build a hydroelectric 
system for H:oniara and the Gold Ridge mine, and to replace aging generators in 
Honiara (Cornelius 1999b; Keith-F\eld 1999c; see also Ryan 19(2). 
13	 F\oni v Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Limited, SBHC, Civil Case No. 60 of 1997; Saki 
v Ross Mining (Solornon [slands) Limited, SI3I-IC G1; Civil Case No. 1G9 of H197 (1 
June 1999). 
14	 See Bennett (1987:333); IJlandJBlJJineJ:r(May 1995); Keith-I~eid (1998c); STIlC (25 
May 2000); Palific hlands Manthfy (April 199G, Septernber H) 77 , September 1978), 
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IS	 Andrew Nori, Finance Minister when the house was repurchased in 1991, claimed that 
the repurchase was at the same price for which the house had been sold: according to 
Nod, the price difference was due to a drop in the exchange rate, His 1994 figure is 
US$3.5 million (Nori 2002c). 
I (l	 See also Haden (1 ~88): Padfic .lSJand~ /v1C)flt:h{y, March 1988; lsianr!s' BUSj,lNiS, ()ctobr::r 
1989; Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1991; PacJflc1,lanrl, A1onlhly,]une 1991: l>lands 
Business, March 1992. 
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Liberating Guadalcanal 
The Isatabu Freedom Movement and 
Malaitan refugees, 1998-2000 
Ethnic discontent 
The US forces 'liberated' Guadalcanal from the Japanese in 1942, taking 
control of the Japanese· built airfield that is now Henderson 
International Airport. 'rhe US and Japanese memorials in modern 
Honiara stand testament to this terrible time, which has most recently 
been recaptured by Hollywood in the 1999 film Thin Red Line. But, 
just as no one thought to consult the people or the government of the 
Protectorate in the 1940s when a massive alien war was fought in the 
archipelago, when Guadalcanal was again liberated in 1998, this time 
by its own people, the other citizens of the Solomon Islands were again 
not consulted. This chapter concentrates on the deliberate moves by the 
Guadalcanal provincial government and the Guale militant groups to 
force 20,000 fellow c:itizens--mainly Malaitans-to leave the island. It 
is also a story of conflicting claims for compensation from both sides 
against the national government. 
The events on Guadalc:anat are often described as 'ethnic tension'. 
They were always much more than this. They involve social, economic 
and political issues with origins in the cotonial era and embedded deep 
within the social, cultural and demographic structure of the 
archipelago;1 issues that have been neglected by successive governments 
sInce independence in 1978. The rapid growth of Honiara as the new 
capital city, and the migration of Solomon Islanders away from their 
home islands in search of work and better social and educational 
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facilities for their families, accompanied by unemployment and under­
employment, and consequent strains on the extended family and wantok 
system, were all at play in what occurred. In the 1970s, Malaitans made 
up 30 per cent of the national population. Scarce employment 
opportunities on Malaita led to large-scale migration from the island, 
such that around half of Honiara's population is now Malaitan, many of 
whom were born there and lack strong roots to their horne island. The 
SIPL oil-palm plantations' workforce consisted of a similar proportion of 
Malaitans. 
The majority of the Solomon Islands' population is still illiterate or 
semi-literate. Written forms of communication are largely undeveloped. 
The print media is basically all in English, because the various attempts 
at introducing Pijfn English newspapers have failed. There is no 
domestic television service' and, although medium-wave and short-wave 
radio remains an excellent means to communicate information to rural 
areas, the FM stations that began in the 1990s only reach urban areas. 
Talkback radio provides a form of popular interaction, but has only 
really worked in urban areas and has never reached out to involve the 
entire community. When the media have reached out to the villages, 
they have merely exposed disenchanted people to a glamorous urban 
lirestyle they cannot hope to attain. 
On Guadalcanal, land was at the base of the contlict. Substantial 
areas on Guadalcanal had been alienated by large-scale commercial land 
purchases and small-scale individual purchases in accordance with the 
laws of the modern state. The problem has been that there is no concept 
within traditional land-tenure systems for freeholding land, so, no matter 
how 'legal' the land alienation, the original landowners still see the land 
as 'theirs' and resent other people profiting from it:. Customary landowners 
also have never accepted a definition of land ownership that excludes the 
mineral resources in the ground. Differing inheritance traditions present 
a further difficulty. On Guaclalcanal, inheritance is matriLineal but the 
Malaitan settlers in Guadalcanal maintain a traditional patrilineal bias 
in their inheritance system. Where the different groups have 
intermarried, the pattern is especially cornplex·····"a Malait.an man 
married to a Guale woman, for example, could inherit land from both 
sides. Similar to government responses to urban growth in other Pacific 
islands, governments did not safeguard customary land ownership on 
land alienated for urban areas, and in their scramble for quick economic 
growth overlooked issues surrounding ownership of resource 
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developments in rural areas. The benefits from large economic projects 
went mainly to the national government and the commercial sponsors, 
not the provincial or local governments, or the customary landowners. 
Twenty years after independence, the nation was still a colonial 
formation, its citizens lacking national consciousness and reverting to 
wantok, regional and extended family loyalties for support in times of 
stress. No government since independence has dealt with what was an 
obvious and growing socially complex problem. So, although the people 
kept waiting for their 'white' government to indigenise, it never did­
there were, as Bennett (2002: 1) points out, too rnany advantages for the 
political elite in the inherited British system, giving them no incentive 
to institute change. The government communicated in English and 
made litt.le or no effort to ensure its messages were understood in Pijln 
English or vernacular languages. Parliamentarians often represented little 
more than their immediate laen (clan) and did not act on behalf of their 
formal electorates. In the last 10 years, local government through Area 
Councils has functioned poorly, spasmodically, or not at all, and has not 
linked well to the provincial governments, let alone the national 
government. Villagers gained little benefit from being part of the nation, 
and there was no incentive in most Villages for youths to stay at home 
and heip develop their own people at the 'grassroots' level. The concept 
of a centralised unitary nation was thrust on the Solomon Islands, with 
little thought that a federation of semi-autonomous islands and regions 
might have been a better struct.ure. At the time of independence, issues 
of regionalism and break-away movements in the Western Solomons 
were swept qUickly under the mat, and never confronted or discussed. 
Post-independence governments have no mechanisms to monitor public 
opinion and have not listened to the few increasingly frustrated ppople 
who managed to gain an audience. Using violence to make the 
government listen was a desperate last resort that renected exasperation 
with self-seeking politicians and criminal elpments who placed personal 
profit before national or civic responsibility. 
The memory of successful colonial era resistancp movements was also 
crucial in the consciousness of those who chose to subvert law and order. 
These social movements combined rational proto-nationalist movements 
with millenarian thinking denigrated by the British as misguided or 
irrational, but frequently expressed legitimate popular dissatisfaction with 
the colonial government's policies and interference in people's lives. They 
included the Fallows 'Chair and Rule' Movement in Nggela and Isabel 
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(1930s) and the Maasina I~uru Movement (1944-52), whose non­
violent anti-colonial protests disturbed··,"·and in the case of Maasina Ruru, 
for several years halted-the government process in Malaita, and spread to 
the Marau-Hauba area of Guadalcanal, Nggela, Makira and other parts of 
the Solomons (Laracy 1983; Keesing 1978a, 1978b: Burt 1994:171201), 
One of Maasina Ruru's leaders was Andrew Nori's father, and, 
although .it has Uttle bearing on his role in the current conflict, which is 
hard-headed and calculated, the symbolism of Nori's ancestory was not 
lost on other Solomon Islanders, The 'back to custom' movement that 
emerged in the Suta area of GuadaJc:anal in the 19305 and 1940s, and 
the Mora Movement, which emerged in mid 1950s and became 
prominent in subsequent decades, has played a part. in the current. crisis, 
For instance, Chief Pelise Moro's influence can be seen in the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement.'s revival of kastom as a form of resistance, The Mora 
Movement, based around charismatic Weathercoast3 leader Pelise Mow, 
emphasised the revival of kastom as a response to problems with central 
government and frustration over lack of development, whether colonial 
or post-colonial, While kastom is a dynamic force, it. is often portrayed as 
an idyllic pre-colonial way of life, rather than an amalgam of changes to 
lifestyles over the last hundred or so years (Keesing 1982a, 1982b), On 
a more practical level, Moro Movement. mernbers also formed a kabani 
(company) to develop coconut plantations and buy equipment such as 
outboard motors, Community action against. unwanted developments 
has a long history of success in the Solomons (Devenport and Coker 
1967: Coker-O'Connor 1973); Solomon Islanders have, for example, 
commonly shut down logging ventures using grassroots intimidation 
and sabotage tactics, T'hey know from experience how easy it is to 
disrupt modern economic development by guerrilla tactics, 
Two ethnic factors influenced the way Solomon Islanders thought at 
this time: the Bougainville rebellion, which had simmered for years but 
began in earnest in 1989, and earlier civil unrest in Honiara, Around 
9,000 Bougainvilleans ned into the Solomon Islands after 1989, some 
remaining with kinfolk along the northern border but many living for 
extended periods on Guadalcanal. Most shared Eoman Catholicism with 
the local population of Guadalcanal, and their stories of battling the 
mining giant anel their national government, and of their expulsion of 
the 'Redskins' .... ':.. migrants from the PNG mainland, particularly the 
Highlands-were important influences on the Guale militants (May and 
Spriggs 1990; Spriggs and Denoon 1992), Nonetheless, the leader of 
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the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), Sam Kauona, assured the 
Solomon Islands Prime Minister in 1999 that no members of his army had 
been sent to aid the Guadalcanal militants (Solomon Star, 28 June 1999). 
Honiara and Gizo had also seen several earlier instances of ethnic 
tensions and rioting. In 1978, for instance, ill··feelings had broken out 
into violence between Western Province people and Malaitans in Gizo, 
In 1989, Malaitans retaliated violently against Rennell and Bellona 
people in Honiara, and in 1996 also broke into fighting with Reef 
Islanders because of swearing in Honiara market. There have also been 
numerous other island-to-island clashes over the years. 
In February 2000, the Ulufa'alu government raised the issue of 
ethnic tension, blaming the Opposition for encouraging the 
development of the Isatabu Freedom Movement. Ulufa'alu said in a 
press release that 
[t1 he EthnicTension was set in motion on Guadalcanal at a point: in time when 
the Opposition, which was basically a remnant of the Marnaloni Government, 
was at its lowest in public opinion. By October 18, 1998 only three w()eks aft.N 
the last vote of no confidence, the militants that had banded together as the 
GuadalcanaJ I<evolutionary Army, GI<A, had already established themselves in 
strategic locations on Northern Guadalcanal armed to immediately conduct 't he 
mission' (Office ofthe Prime Minister 2000), 
The Ulufa'alu Government. 1997-2000: a national 
agenda under seige 
Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, a hard-working man on a 
mission of national reform, came to power on a one-seat majority in the 
1997 parliament as head of the Alliance for Change, a coalition of six 
political parties and a group of independent members. The bureaucracy 
he inherited was bloated, inet1kient and corrupt. Islandf Business (july 
1998) reported that, when Ulufa'alu took over, the government owed 
around S$1,004 million (about US$251 miJlion), of which S$800 
million was in local and foreign debts, and that the government had 
broken its own law by falling S$33 million behind in its contributions 
to the National Provident Fund. It also owed S$33 million overdue to 
local creditors and another S$75 mi.llion to foreign creditors (Keith-Reid 
1998e).1 Despite these parlous finances, Mamaloni had in the last 
months of his government given away S$96 million in tax remissions for 
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logging operations and other companies associated with his National 
Unity and Reconciliation Party (Keith-Reid 1998e). 
Ulufa'alu immediately set out to clean up the mess by redefining the 
role of government in the economy. In his first major statement after 
becorning prime minister, Ulufa'alu signalled in November 1997 that 
his government would hold itself responsible for preserving rights 
guaranteed in the constitution, and law and order, but that rnuch of the 
basic infrastructure of education, health, transport and communications, 
markets and financlal services should be prOVided by the churches and 
the private sector (Solomon Star, 21 November 1997: Kabutaulaka 
1999c:445). lIe told Iflands Business that 
[ilfwe can look at these institutions and do some rationalisation to make them 
more effective and bring about economies of scale in terms oftheir operations. 
we will be able to address this problem (Gray 1997). 
Ulufa' alu first recluced duplication of government services, then 
moved to privatise government bodies, induding its mC1ior holdings in 
Solomon Telekom, Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd, and the nation's 
National Provident Fund, to encourage the private sector, which 
controlled only 40 per cent of the economy. 
I-Ie quickly reduced the number of separate ministries, but the 
number of junior and senior ministers appointed meant that the 
proportion of the House beholden to the prime minister remained 
unchanged. His ministry was at least competent: Sir Baddeley Devesi 
became deputy anc! Minister of Transport, Works and Utilities; Fred 
Fono became Minister for Development and Planning: ]aphet Waipora 
Minister for Provincial Government; Patteson Oti Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade; Rev. Lesley Boseto Minister for Home Affairs; and 
Alfred Sasako Minister of State assisting the Prime Minister-the 'spin 
doctor' for the new government. Sasako, a Kwaio Malaitan, had for 
many years worked for overseas news organisations in Papua New 
Guinea and Australia and for the Pacific Islands Forum. Ulufa'alu also 
appointed a competent economist, Manasseh Sogavare, as his Finance 
Minister (Solomon ,Star, 2 September, 15 October 1997).5 Sogavare's 
1998 assessment of the economy was extremely accurate. 
In 1978, the departing British left a series of deveiopment plans running to 
1989, After that the government, because ofseif-interest, discarded long term 
pianning and carne out with what was called programme production; nothing 
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was coordinated; everyone was doing whatever they wanted. They 
compartmentalized the economy into little sectors, No guidance, and people 
can do whatever they like. Leaders approached things with a desire for self gain, 
nepotism and all those things; development became taint ed ... (Keith -Reid 
1998e:31) . 
'The new government's job was never likely to be easy, and was made 
more difficult when in November 1997 a fire gutted part of the Finance 
Department, destroying many records. Honiara gossip suggested the 
previous government had arranged the fire to cover its tracks. What was 
certain, however, was that many millions of dollars of tax, duties and 
license revenues had been given up unnecessarily and inappropriately. 
Thus, 50gavare announced 
[w]e are carrying out tax investigations on politicians. I've adVised the 
commissioner to stmt investigations on all politicians and then we will rnove 
down to permanent secretaries and heads of statu tory Ol'ganizations and then to 
the public (Keith-Reid 1998e). 
When the I-louse sat in November 1997, the government successfully 
faced its first motion of no-confidence, brought by William Haomae, 
member for Small Malaita (Solomon Star, 25 November 1997), Despite 
the many setbacks, and forecasts of doom from Mamaloni, who predicted 
total economic collapse if the new economic policies were followed, the 
new government reduced the national debt by S$30 million within two 
months, and the Asian Development Bank had agreed that 70 pCI' cent 
of its 5$121 million loan could be used to refinance the remaining debt 
(lrlami\ Business, October 1998; Pacific News BulJetin, June 1998; Islands 
Business, April 1999). Ulufa' alu also reviewed the tax system and cut 
back on the tax concessions that: Marnaloni's government: had provided 
to political cronies. To accomplish this, he set up a Structural Reform 
Committee. which included representatives of the private sect:or through 
the Chamber of' Commerce, to reassess the ideal size of the public serv.ice 
and ways of increasing its efficiency. The 1D98 budget was postponed 
until March to allow the committee time to complete its investigations. 
The government also planned significant reforms for the timber 
industry, declaring a moratorium on new logging licenses; moving to 
centralise log sales at two locations; encouraging local landholders to 
participate in timber-processing; and reintroduc.ing the Timber Control 
Unit as the body responsible for surveillance and monitoring of logging 
(Gray 1997). 
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'The casinos that had sprung up during the 1990s and thrived on 
extracting the salaries of public servants, were also targeted by the new 
government. In April 1998, the new Minister for Horne Affairs, 
Reverend Leslie Boseto, announced that gambling casinos in Honiara 
would not have their licences renewed. Again, this directly attacked 
some deeply entrenched interests, including those of Solomon 
Mamaloni himself, who, alongside his stake in a logging company, held 
the keys to the prorrlinent casino, Club 88 (Keith-Reid 1998b). 
The defence budget was another problem, The nation had no 
conventional armed forces; only three aging patrol boats for coastal 
surveillance that had been donated by Australia in the 1970s and 
1980s. The Field Force of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, 
moreover, was the only land force in place to maintain law and order in 
difficult situations such as on the Solomon Islands-Papua New Guinea 
border (Kabutaulaka 1997). In February 1998, Ulufa'alu learned that 
his predecessor had placed a US$4 million order for US arms and 
ammunition, two small airplanes, and a helicopter gunship for use on 
the border with Papua New Guinea. This seems to have been related to 
the Bougainville rebellion, ongoing since 1989, and the PNG Defence 
Force's tendency to pursue rebels through the Solomon Islands' Western 
Province, indiscriminately killing Solomon Islanders on the way. But the 
cost of this development was prohibitive and escalation of border warfare 
with Papua New Guinea unthinkable, making the US involvement 
through its new ambassador, Arma Karaer. rather disturbing. Ulufa' alu 
asked Australia and New Zealand to help trace and impound the lethal 
goods, and all were stopped bar three boxes that reached Honiara. To 
divert attention from his own involvement, Mamaloni demanded that 
Prime Minister Ulufa' alu be charged with treason because he had 
involved neighbouring nations in the intercept of the consignment 
(Mandl' Business, March 1998), 
Morale among Solomon Islands police had also reached a low ebb, 
but began to recover when an English officer, Frank Short, was 
appointed police commissioner in July 1997, During the 1990s, cheap 
cars had flooded Honiara streets, causing such immense traffic jams that 
it became quicker to walk through the city than drive. Short returned 
police to point duty to direct traffic, an activity barely seen since white­
gloved police directed traffic across the narrow Chinatown bridge in the 
19705. Commissioner Short was a strict disciplinarian who worked hard 
to restore credibility to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. Overseas 
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officers were seconded to train a Rapid Response Unlt, and community 
policing was implemented. Faced with a demoralised and under­
equipped police force, Short claimed to have spent around A$35,000 of 
his own money to repaint the headquarters, re-equip the police 
marching band, and bring in second-hand uniforms from Singapore 
(Eremae 1997; ,Solomon Star, 4 November 1997; Wright and Charlton 
2000: SIBC, 18 June 20(1). 
Ulufa'alu's hold on government was tenuous and there were 
parliamentary and perhaps more nefarious attempts to remove him. 
According to Alfred Sasako, in late December 1997 there was an 
attempt to assassinate Ulufa'alu, his deputy Devesi, Police 
Commissioner Short and former Prime Minister Mamaloni. Sasako 
claimed that four gangs existed, each controlled by a prominent member 
of the political opposition, two of whom had lost their seats in the 
genera] election. Mama]oni wrote a report dated 29 December 1997, 
describing the gangs as trained by foreign mercenaries, and claimed the 
assassination was timed for 24 December. In 2003, Sasako published 
substanti.al details from Mamaloni's report, which left little doubt that 
Mamaloni thought he knew who was behind the operation. j'lowever, 
the general response was that the tale was unlikely and a product of 
Mamaloni's paranoia (Sasako 2003a). 
Ulufa' alu survived this 'threat', and by early 1998 had increased his 
majority to 26 seats against the Opposition's 23, with two or three 
members wavering but basically in support of Ulufa'alu. This did not 
stop the parliamentary attempts to remove the government, which 
survived three no-confidence motions early in its term. Danny Philip 
resigned as Opposition Leader in March following allegations that he 
had misused a small project fund and was replaced by Job Dudley 
Tausiga of New Georgia. In April 1998, the former Mamaloni government 
minister Victor Ngele tabled a no-confidence motion, but after a short 
debate Tausiga declined to support it and agreed to allow the Ulufa'alu 
government space to implement its policies (Keith-Reid 1998b). Clearly 
though, the destabilisation of Ulufa'alu's government was well underway 
by the end of 1998, when Mamaloni recovered lost ground and took 
over as Opposition Leader, a position he held until replaced by Manasseh 
Sogavare-who had earlier defected from the government. Police 
Commissioner Frank Short appears to have taken the December 1997 
threats seriously, and in December 1998 warned the government again 
of an increased militant threat. Police inteJligence had uncovered 'a 
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carefully planned militant strategy to force Malaitans out of Cuadalcanal, 
destabiJise the police services and attack mqjor economic targets', The 
government, he said, had not listened (Wright and Charlton 200()), 
There is a poUtical dimension to the whole situation and this must b(~ addressed 
in the short(~st possible tirne frame if we are not to see growing rnilitancy that 
could cause untold dmnage to national unity and intPr-island rel,rtions, let alone 
serious infringements of the crirninallaw (Short 2002(1), 
Ulufa' alu's brave new economic vision could have been a new 
beginning for the Solomon Islands, By 2000, for example, the nation's 
external debt had been further reduced, although it still stood at S$54 
million, S$21 million of which was interest repayments (SIBC, 15 May 
2(00), However, those who had benefited most under t11(' Mamaloni 
regime could see that their lucrative tax concessions would diminish, 
their receipt of bribes from foreign companies would be curtailed, and 
there was every possibility that their past rarts would be exposed, With 
their perks under threat, many of the foreign logging companies 
suspended their operations, and forces started moving against the 
hapless Ulufa' alu government (Keith-Reid 1998b), 
The Isatabu Freedom Movement and the expulsion 
of the Malaitans 
Describing the specific characteristics of the inhabitants of different 
islands in the Solomons is not always productive, but broad differences 
between the peoples of Malaita and Cuada1canal are reasonably clear 
and apposite to understanding the crisis that developed between the two 
islands, As briefly noted earlier, Cuale mostly have a matrilineal system 
of kinship and land inheritance, but Malaitans mostly have a cognatic 
system---allowing kinship links to be traced through any combination of 
men and women···-···-and a patrilineal bias in their land inheritance 
system, Under this system, those with a direct patrilineal link to the 
land's founders have a stronger right to land, but those with cognatic oJ' 
matrilineal links also have rights, and some, by long-term resiclence on 
that land, become primary residents with basically the equivalent of 
primary rights, These differences are important in relation to how 
Malaitans see their rights to land on Cuadalcanal: they have lived there 
for decades, some have married Cuale women, and many have gone 
through customary and government procedures to buy land, Malaitans 
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also have a reputation for being assertive, whereas Guale are more easy­
going and wiDing to compromise. 
Malaitans, the Guale and other Solomon Islanders hold proudly to 
their traditional customs, and to kastom, the changing, dynamic cultural 
forces of the last fifty years, 'Pay back' for grievances and compensation 
payments used to operate at an individual or family level but has been 
extended to provincial and national level, and is now an every-day 
occurrence. On Malaita before pacification there were warriors called 
ramo (warriors, assassins and bounty-hunters) who would perform 
murders for a reward, Vengeance was similarly a feature of life on 
Guadalcanal and the Guale's reputation for plm and veil' sorcery was 
respected all through the Solomon Islands (Hogbin 1964, 1938, J937­
38), While no one would deny there were violent elements within the 
lvlalaitan community on Guadalcanal, some of the murders during the 
1980s and 1990s were performed by lvlalaitans hired by Guale to 
perform 'pay back' killings amongst their own people. In 1988, when 
Alebua was Prime Minister, Guadalcanal people had voiced their 
discontent over four murders at Mt Austin, just inland from Honiara, 
calling for more provincial autonomy, state government, the return of 
alienated lanel and cornpensation for the murders. The murders as a result 
became a focus for general harassment of lvlalaitans over many years, 
During the Second World War, Honiara, once a humble coconut 
plantation, became a wartime battle zone and later an instant town with 
a port and airport. After the war. the British Protectorate government, 
without consulting the locals, relocated the national capital from devastated 
Tulagi, which had limited potential for expansion, to Honiara, Honiara 
grew into a city of around 70,000 people, dominated by Malaitans, This 
was reinforced by the establishment of a large and successful oil-palm 
estate on the Guadalcanal plains in the 1970s, When the Gold Ridge 
mine just east of Honiara was opened, the arrangement was carefully 
negotiated over severai years by the national govel'llment in the 1990s, 
but landowner resentment grew and combined with other local Guale 
grievances. A large number of the senior staff at the mine-engineers, 
chernists, and so forth---were Malaitans, reinforcing Guadalcanal leaders' 
perceptions that they were being rnarginalised on their own island. The 
lvlalaitans were industrious and successful, and they intermarried with 
the Guadalcanal people, creating links to customary land, which they 
began to alienate, They also managed to manipulate the Lands and Titles 
Act to gain lands that should have been kept for government purposes. 
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Of all the accumulated discontents, however, it was claims of 
Malaitan violence that precipitated their eviction fronl Guadalcanal. The 
Guale have a far more peaceful reputation than the Malaitans, and 
Guadalcanal leaders claimed that between 40-60 (depending whose 
claims are t.o be believed) of their people had been murdered by 
Malaitans (l\1ands Business, June 1999). 
Discontent brewed from the late 1980s onwards but really began to 
boil in 1998 after the Guadalcanal provincial government failed in 1997 
to persuade the Ulufa'alu government to give it the 20 per cent of 
Solomon Islands Plantation Ltd (SIPL) shares t.hat were sold to the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). In early 1998, 
accumulated frustrations prompted a decision to force all Malaitans off 
Guadalcanal and restore Guale ownership and control over the province. 
Sworn evidence by a police officer suggests that the initial decision was 
made on 14 March 1998 at Visale village at a meeting attended by 
Alebua and John Gatu. head of operations for the Police and National 
Security, and about 200 Guale. 6 The evidence suggests that Alebua was 
the mastermind behind the action (Taloi 2000). On 24 March 1998. 
Guadalcanal Province petitioned the Solomon Islands government to 
introduce state governments within a federal system, which would allow 
the provinces more freedom from national government control. 
In early April 1998, after provincial elections, Ezekiel Alebua took over 
from Siriako Usa as premier (Solomon News, 20 March 1998: Kabutaulaka 
1999b). Alebua was an experienced politician from an island with 
significant grievances against the national government he had headed as 
prime minister in 1986····89. His inability to redress the perceived wrongs 
clone to the province at that time was a source of Widespread criticism 
during his campaign for the provincial premiership; he knew that he had 
failed his people as prime minister and that his people expected action 
this time. He and other Guale leaders were Willing to inflame Guale 
emotions, but presumably thought they could quench them again using 
the disciplinary power of the state when necessary. In this, they severely 
misjudged their own people and the powerlessness of the state. 
The situation deteriorated in May 1998, when t.wo Malaitan girls at 
Ruavatu Secondary School on Guadalcanal claimed to have been raped. 
There was no suspect, no arrest and no trial. Compensation claims were 
made. The school and Guadalcanal provincial government refused to 
pay, but the national government eventually paid S$16,000 and 
eJeeJuctc"cl the amount f!'Om the provincial grant, despite the lack of any 
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legal process. Then, in mid July the Guadalcanal provincial government 
resubmitt.ed its 1988 petition for compensation for long-term alienation 
of land, substantial rent for Honiara and for SIPL land, and from 
squatters on customary land. The petition was refused. 
July 1998 also saw armed conflict begin on Guadalcanal, when Guale 
'militants', initially known as the Cuadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) , 
but soon identified as the Isatabu Freedom Fighters (IFF) and later the 
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) , began the campaign decided at 
Visale on 14 March-to intimidate the mainly Malaitan settlers on the 
island into retreat to their own island. The nallle change from GF<.A to 
IFM was probably made to move away frorn the stress on 'revolutionary' 
and 'army', which sounded too much like the Bougainville 
I<.evolutionary Army, and to harness the ancestral connotations of 
'lsatabu', a traditional name of the island of Guadalcanal. 
Another important meeting took place at f<'uavatu on 23 August 
1998, attended by about 600 Guale from around the district, at which 
Premier Alebua was the only speaker. Once more, the sworn evidence 
suggests that he incited people to intimidate and expel Malaitans (Taloi 
2000). As the conniet grew, it became increasingly difficult to 
determine exactly who the Guale militants were and whom they actually 
represented, How many were profiteering criminals, and how many had 
genuine grievances? Did they really represent the way most Guale people 
felt, and how much were they a revolutionary arm of the Guadalcanal 
provincial government? The IFM initiaJly seemed to have only around 
50 active members, but numbers grew rapidly as events unfolded. 
Late in 1998, isolated attacks began on Malaitan homes and cars, 
and Tavanipupu Tourist Resort at Avu Avu was ransacked. In November 
1998, Premier Alebua demanded that people from other islands who 
lived on Guadalcanal respect the indigenous owners, and early in 
December announced on SIBC radio that the province wanted a 
payment of S$50 for every non·Guale person in Honiara, and a further 
compensation payment of S$100,000 each for twenty-five Guale people 
killed 101' no reason' since independence. It is interesting, and perhaps 
indicative of Alebua's opportunism, that he had not dealt with similar 
issues when he was Prime Minister (Field 199%). 
Although some of the IFM leaders, such as Harold Keke, were SSEC­
adherents, the majority were of Roman Catholic origin or members 01' 
offspring of the Moro Movement. Anglicans rnainly stayed away, 
although there was some mobilisation of non-Catholics. Many of the 
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IFM fighters wore kabalato (Join cloths) and a traditional 'magic' string 
around their necks, as was done in the Moro Movement. They also used 
various forms of magic to protect themselves from danger, but this was 
also done by members of the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) , who similarly 
called on their ancestors to protect them from bullets.? 
'The IFM used email and an electronic newsletter to present its 
message, 8 publishing In 2000 a letter to the government from 'the sons 
of Isatabu'. outlining the militants' motivations. 
Look, Mr Government, when we give our land for your benefit and that of the
 
nation-stat.e, you call us generous.
 
When we ask why we have not benefited, you ignom us.
 
When we started shouting, wanting to be heard, you callus trouble makers.
 
Whc[J wc take up anns to ask [or what rightfully belongs t.o us, you callus
 
militants.
 
When we become angry because you trampled on us. you call us hot-headed
 
youths.
 
Those are names you use to justify your disregard for us.
 
Soon, you may call us guerrillas or terrorists.
 
That, however, will not get rid o[us.
 
'Tell us this; 'who legitimized your authority?'
 
We did [Jot construct you, Mr Government.
 
We can refuse your authority, dte'spite how coercive you may be.
 
We can slowly eat you away like f1eas of a dog.
 
'I'hat will he 'the war ofthe nea' (1satabu DlVU/i. 24 February 2000).
 
In a later issue, the qUietly spoken IFM Commander Andrew Te'e 
described the land of Isatabu as his mother and lamented those who 
'plunder her riches' 
." the tr('es arc slowly being cut down. 'The land is slowly being dug up.l'he 
waters destroyed. animals, fish, birds and insects killed and people suffer. The 
end of 'living' and the beginning of 'survival' is creeping in on us (Isatabu 
7:1)/([/1, 2 March 2000). 
In his twenties, with a postgraduate education from Australia, 'Ie'e 
was part of a new generation of Guale who were no longer Willing to put 
up with what they saw as 50 years of exploitative development by the 
British and the Solomon Islands' own nationai government. The Guale's 
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prime protest was the unfair distribution of resources by the national 
government. They focused their animosity on the Malaitans, but 
extended it even to other Guale, particularly disadvantaged people from 
the Weathercoast, who had migrated to the vicinity of Honiara and 
settled in places like Titiqe, Gilbert Camp and Kakabona, Intimidation 
of Malaitans on the oil-palm plantations on Guadalcanal plains 
increased and caused hundreds of Malaitans to march through IIoniara 
on 15 December 1998, from the headquarters of the Guadalcanal 
provincial guvernment near the main market to police headquarters at 
Rove, to meet with Police Commissioner Frank Short, Malaitan Premier 
David Oeta and Guadalcanal Premier Alebua. Two days later, national 
Minister for Provincial Government Japhet Waipora convened a special 
Premier's Conference (which included the chairman of the Honiara 
Town Council) to discuss the tensions that had developed, 
Attendees considered the demands made by Guada1canal Province in 
relation to the murders of Guadalcanal people around Honiara, and 
claims for compensation for the excision of Honiara from the province. 
The national government promised to investigate the murder claims and 
agreed an acceptable annual rental would be negotiated for the site of 
IIoniara. For its part, Guadalcanal province promised to ensure all 
militant activities stopped. 9 
Four main IFM leaders eventually emerged from this process: Andrew 
'Ie' e, George Grey, Harold Keke and his younger cousin Joseph Sangu. 
GuadaJcanal militants had begun to stockpile homemade and Second 
World War vintage weapons as early as 1996, but gained their tIrst large 
cache of modern weapons on 9 December 1. 998 when armed Guale men 
raided the police post at Yandina on Mbanika Island in the Russell 
Group (50 kilometres northwest of Guada1canaJ) and looted the 
armoury. Some of the weapons were recovered in a shoot-out on 3D 
December 1998 when police were tipped off that the raider's boat had 
broken down at Bungana Island in the Nggela Group. 'T'he 
confrontation left Ishmael Panda dead and Harold Keke wounded, and 
Keke, Joseph Sangu and two others were traIlSported to Honiara under 
arrest, where Keke, according to Police Commissioner Short, admitted 
that 'Alebua told us to do this' (Nori 2002a; Short 2002b; Mandr 
Business, February 19(9), The arrested men faced charges of attempted 
murder and armed robbery, but were released by Honiara's Chief 
Magistrate on bail provided by Alebua and a Catholic priest, whereupon 
they absconded to a remote area of the Weathercoast and were not 
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recaptured. In January 1999, two senior New Zealand police were 
brought to Honiara to investigate Panda's death. It was claimed that he 
was the first Solomon Islander to have been shot by the police since 
independence, and a suspended police officer was eventually charged 
with his murder (O'Callaghan 1999c: Kabutaulaka 2003a: 15; islands 
Business, February 1999, June 1999). 
The national government used its emergency powers to ban reported 
groupS of insurgents. Then, on 2 February 1999, Alebua's GuadaIcanal 
provincial government submitted a document, 'Bona Ficle Demands of the 
Indigenous People of Guadakanal', to the national govr.rnment, reinforcing 
their demand for compensation as a precondition to reconciliation 
(Kabutaulaka 2003a: 15). T'he document raised several issues 
the need for state government 
the need for a review of the constitution to enhance 'protection of 
properties, protection to life, freedom from fear, freedom of 
movement and freedom of expression' 
review of the Landr and Tilles Act to 'encompass our diverse norms, 
customs and cultural practices' and rcstrict citizens from onc provincc 
from owning land in perpetuity in another 
the transfer of perpetual estate tltlcs 
rental payments to Guadalcanal Province and customary landowners 
for the use of IIoniara 
the transfer of national government shares in the Solomon Islands 
Plantation Ltd to the Guadalcanal provincial government and 
landowners 
the payment of 50 per cent of all revenues generated through 
national government investments in Guadalcanal to the provincial 
government 
relocation of the national capital 
the introduction of legislation to better manage internal migration 
amendment of the Election Act to prohibit people from one province 
voting and contesting elections in another 
the proper acquisition by the national government of the reefs in 
front of Honiara, 10 
It was of course an ambit clairn, and an impossible dream when it 
came to relocating the capital city, contradictory and self-defeating, but 
nevcrtheless a serious challenge to the free movernent of citizens and the 
power of the national government. The claim was primarily 
socioeconomic not et.hnic, and had ramifications for t.he whole nat.ion, 
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not just Guadalcanal and Malaita. Land alienation was a central issue. 
Except at Marau Sound (because of the people's common ancestry with 
'Are 'are Malaitans who had a similar style of social organisation), 
Guadalcanal inheritance was matrilineal, but much of the land sold to 
the settlers was handled through the male line. The land alienation had 
not recognised traditional mechanisms, and Guale felt dissatisfied with 
the procedure and with the sale of their birthright. 
Late in April 1999, Ulufa'alu's government tried to defuse the tense 
situation by suspending the S$45,000 reward for capture of the IPM 
mernbers who had vanished after their release on bail in Honiara. When 
UJufa'alu claimed that the tensions were politically motivated, 
Commissioner Short called on him to establish an independent 
commission to investigate the presence of militant groups within 
Guadalcanal province (Pacific islands Monthly, May 1997). On Sunday 
23 May 1999, a kastom feast ceremony was held in Honiara, with an 
exchange of traditional gifts to try to reconcile the militants and the 
settlers. None of the militants attended. The large-scale eviction of the 
Malaitans, brewing since the rniddle of the previous year, was about to 
begin. Discontent first showed itself at Tavanipupu on the Weathercoast 
when, on 4 June, a group of armed men raided the tourist resort for the 
second time that year, and on 7 June Guale villagers at the west of 
Honiara blocked the main road with logs and coconut palm trunks. 
National headquarters police used a helicopter to watch as Guada1canal 
police defused the situation (Solomon Star, 8 June 1999). 
Throughout June and July 1999, about 20,000 Malaitans and 
workers from other islands..·......about 15 pel' cent of the population of 
Guadalcanal, many born on the island·--were displaced from their 
homes. They left their houses and gardens, mostly around the SIPL oil­
palm plantations, and returned to their horne islands because of IFM 
intimidation. Rumours began to spread of 117M threats to poison the 
Honiara water supply, and on 12-13 June 1999 around 300 117M 
members marched to the oil-palm plantations and attacked the 
settlement known as CDC Stage 5, killing three Malaitans, including an 
elderly man and a two-year old boy, and iqjuring others before three 
police trucks and a helicopter arrived to try to restore order. Horrific 
stories emerged of innocent people shot and kllled, houses burnt and 
looted. In a short period the IFM killed 28 Malaitans and committed 
other atrocities in a process of forced ethnic clearance. I"lowever, when 
Connnissioner Short used the Police Field Force to restore order he was 
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criticised, not least by his deputy Morton Siriheti, who favoured a more 
conciliatory approach. Short's defence of his men was that 
[t] he police patrols sent to investigate the many incidents came under armed 
attack from gunmen concealed in the surrounding bush and it became high.1y 
dangerous to respond to reports when the officers had no protective clothing 
and were traveling in open, unprotected vehicles. Given such dire 
circumstances, I gave permission for the policemen sent on those missions to 
carry arms, but I also insisted on the weapons being concealed and used only in 
self-defense ... (Short 2002a). 
The predominantly Malaitan settler families fled initially to Honiara 
(PacifJc Islands Monthlv, July 1999, September 1(99). The IFM adopted 
a pincer movement strategy, moving towards Honiara from east and west 
and rapidly creating a sense of total siege as refugees poured into the 
town ahead of the militants. The national government could do little to 
restore law and order, and faced a huge refugee problem. Malaitans set 
up roadblocks around Honiara to safeguard their families, 
demonstrations broke out in Honiara, many shops and schools closed, a 
four-day alcohol ban was imposed and the Queen's Birthday public 
holiday was cancelled (O'Callaghan 1999b). Militants reached the hills 
above \Nhite River settlement and cleared settlers and squatters off 
GuadaJcanal land, much of which had been legally purchased. Prime 
Minister Ulufa' alu called an emergency Cabinet meeting and appealed 
for calm. SIBC radio reported that an extra million dollars had been 
allocated to the special police operations by the already cash-strapped 
government, and the PNG government was said to have offered S$2 
million in irnrncdiate assistance. Australia considered, but ultimately 
r~jected, a request to supply rIot shields, flack Jackets and batons to 
assist the police, and openly worried that the coastal patrol boats that 
they had given to the Solomon ISlands would be used against the rebels 
(O'Callaghan 1999a). All foreign diplomatic missions took moves to 
ensure tbe safety of their nationals. 
On 14 June 1999, Cabinet passed an Emergency Powers (Islands of 
Guadalcanal) Regulation (further amendecl on 28 June) which declared 
a four-month State of Emergency and gave the police special powers to 
use violent retaliation in the course of their cluties if they acted 'in good 
faith'. It also inclucled a ban on foreign media reporting the situation. 
This regulation was signed by Governor-General Sir Moses Pitakaka tbe 
next day and remained in place until 14 October 1999. 
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Opinion was divided on how to proceed (Solomon Star, 1(3 June 
1999). Many thought that mobilising the Malaitan-doTTlinated police 
was not the best way to restore order. Some of the Guale militants wore 
camouflage outfits and had modern weapons, but the majority were only 
equipped with old Second World War .303s or handmade guns, and rnany 
proudly wore only their kabjJato and carried magical items for protection-­
obViously no match for the better-equipped para-military Police Field 
Force. Guadalcanal militants continued to attack Malaitans employed 
on the Guadalcanal plains, prompting Malaitans to complain that the 
government was doing little to protect them from 'rape, indignities, 
torture, arson, abuse, swearing, murder and attempted murder' 
(Solomon Star, 12 February 2001), Many atrocities occurred, such as 
when Guale militants raped a Malaitan man's wife and daughter in front 
of him. ll Malaitans qUickly retaliated: Guale were beaten up in I··Ioniara, 
and tense situations broke out at. some schools where Malaitan children 
had been threatened when families retaliated against other students and 
teachers, Law-abiding Guale were also frightened of their militant kin 
and left: their villages to hide in t.he bush. Guada1canal, and specifically 
the environs and hinterland of lIoniara, had become a war zone. 
Mediation and peace negotiations 
Although the government initiaHy saw itself as the primary controller 
and orchest.rator of peace negotiat.ions, civil society began to play an 
important role. Church leaders, such as the Council of the Bishops of 
the Church of Melanesia, offered to mediate reconciliation between the 
settlers and the Guadalcanal people, and one church leader collaborat.ed 
with Amnesty International, which prepared files on atrocities. The way 
forward was obviously through national government collaboration with 
other agencies, but the government showed little skill in dealing with 
the complex problem. It decided initially to use international negotiators, 
and, in conjunction with the Commonwealth of Nations, requested 
1987 Fiji coup leader and fonner Prime Minister General Sitiveni 
Rabuka to become a Special Envoy to try to broker peace. His arrival on 
20 June ] 999 was not welcomed by all, given his role in the 1987 Fiji 
coups, and he was accused by some of partiality towards the militants. 
Under great difficulty, alternately ineptly and bravely, he negotiated 
with the 'Zero Zero Group' of the IFM (Canberra Times, 23 June 
1999), By the end of June 1999 his diplomacy had convinced the now 
very large numbers of IFM militants to join the negotiations for the 
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Honiara Peace Accord on 28 June, conditional on further talks between the 
IFM, Guadalcanal Province and the national government. Rabuka was 
joined by another Commonwealth negotiator, Ade Adefuye from Nigeria 
(ex-High Comnlissioner to London), and a gaggle of journalists, most of 
whom lacked experience with life in the Pacific (Daley 1999a; Field 1999a). 
The Honiara Accord and the August Panatina Agreement did not accept 
the IFM demand for amnesty, but the national government agreed to 
other concessions, including a 5$2.5 million compensation payment. It 
also agreed to provide substantial funds to develop Malaita, with the hope 
that the island's population could be persuaded to stay at horne. All of 
this raised cries from the other provinces that the national government 
had tried to solve the problem by favouring the two main islands, 
ignoring development needs elsewhere (lflandf Business, August 1999). 
Participants in the 28 June I-Ioniara Peace Accord brokered by 
Rabuka promisc"d that they would not use violence, would cooperate 
Table 4.1 Government and institutional peace negotiations and 
forums. 1998-200 I 
17 Decembet' 1998 
23 May 1999 
10June 1999 
28 June 1999 
15 july 1999 
12 August 1999 
5 December 1999 
March 2000 
5 May 2000 
12 May 2000 
22 May 2000 
3 June 2000 
7 july 2000 
13 july 2000 
July 2000 
2 August 2000 
(in force 5 AlJgust) 
23 August 2000 
25-27 August 2000 
5-13 September 2000 
15 October 2000 
19-20 October 2000 
27 October 2000 
7 February 200 I 
16-18 May 200 I 
Communique on Provincial Premiet"s Special Meeting 
K(Jstorn Feast Ceremony, Honiara Cultural Centre 
Memorandum of Understanding between Solomon Islands 
Government and the Guadalcanal Provincial Government 
Honiara Peace Accord 
Marau Communique 
Panatina Agreement 
Aruligho Resolution 
Memorandum of Understanding between Solomon Islands 
Govel'l1ment and the Guadalcanal Provincial Government 
Buala Peace Communique 
Auki Communique 
Pre,ceasefire Guidelines 
Conditions for Ceaseflre 
Tobruk Peace Signing 
Peace Plan 
USP Peace and After: Reconciliation, Reconstt'uction and Unity Public 
FOt'um 
Tobruk Ceasefire Agreement 
USP State Govel'l1ment and Decentralisation Wot'kshop 
National Peace Conference Communique 
Te K(Jh(J Peace Talks 
Townsville Peace Agreement 
National Peace Celebrations 
Ngalimbiu Club Custom Feast 
Marau Sound Peace Agreement 
Honiara Peace FOt'um 
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with Rabuka and recognised that the Ulufa' alu government was doing 
everything possible to deal with the crisis. The document acknowledged 
the long·term issues involved, and the demands of the Guadalcanal 
militants were clearly stated. It discussed issues of land alienation and 
noted the Guale's request that all alienated land around Honiara be 
returned to them. Compensation was sought for murders by Malaitans, 
and for the recent disruptions that had led to the eviction of innocent 
people from their homes and livelihoods. The Guale also detailed their 
demands for more autonomous state government that would enable 
them to control the island's wealth and migration to the island from 
other provinces. Payment of S$2.5 million into the Reconciliation 'I1'ust 
Account was to be made available to Guadalcanal Province as 
cornpensation for housing the capital and consequent social disruptions 
(Pacilic Islands Monthly, August 1999). 
The Panatina Agreement, Signed on 12 August 1999, concentrated on 
ways to reestablish law and order, and had at its core restoration of trust 
in the neutrality of the police. The militants refused to surrender their 
weapons unless they were given an amnesty, and demanded that the state 
of emergency be rescinded. 'The major weakness of the Accord was that, 
despite the wide array of people who did sign the document, it was never 
signed by the Guadalcanal militants, even though they had attended the 
two-day negotiation between Malaitan and Guadalcanal authorities 
(Solomon .')tar, 28 June 1999).12 And the S$2.5 million payment did not 
stop the militants' attempts to remove Malaitans from Guadalcanal. In 
short, the 28 June Accord was a good foundation but achieved little. 
The repatriation process continued through June-·October 1999, 
organised by the Solomon Islands Red Cross, the Cabinet's 
Rehabilitation Committee and the Department of Horne and Cultural 
Affairs' Hurnanitarian Task Force, with advice from a UN Humanitarian 
Assessment Team. By 25 June 1999, the Solomon Islands Red Cross had 
registered 19,007 people displaced from Guaclalcanal, about 5,000 of 
whom had already been repatriated to Malaita. Over 15,000 of the 
displaced people had lived in 26 Malaitan settlements within the 
boundaries of Honiara and its immediate Vicinity, but a further 81 
Malaitan settlements and 10 Guale settlements outside 1-10niara were 
also affected by the dispute. By the end of June 1999, 6,071 people 
from 1,389 families were living in the 11 evacuation centres. Schools 
and all available halls were pressed into service to cope with the 
Malaitan refugees who remained (Roughan 1999a). 13 Most of the 
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repatriation costs were met by the Taiwanese government. Amnesty 
International visited Guadalcanal and Malaita to prepare a report on the 
complexity of the refugee issue, and found that the IFM was not one 
coordinated body but a coalition of militant factions. Some had grievances 
that went back decades, while others had acted independently in 
reaction to SIPCs expansion, the mine and the encroachment of Honiara's 
urban sprawl onto customary lands, Another minority were criminal 
gangs who took advantage of the chaotic situation, Communication of 
the terms laid down by the peace accords had been inadequate, which 
meant that some IFM militants were unaware of the details (Amnesty 
International 2000b: lrlandr JJwines~, November 1999). 
After the loss of 1, 200 workers, more than half of whom were 
Malaitans, and the death from neglect of 600 hectares of young oil 
palms, the economic viability and the security of the oil-palm 
plantations was so damaged that SIPL announced a temporary closure in 
July 1999. The Gold Ridge mine had also closed and subsequently was 
totally ransacked, its explosives, weapons and 40 vehicles commandeered 
by the IFM (Keith-Reid 1999b). GuadalcanaJ's three main coastal 
tourist resorts, Tambea, Vulelua and 'T'avanipupu had been attacked and 
closed. Thirty per cent of Honiara's pre-emergency population of 
70,000 had fled. 
By late 1999, the economic squeeze and social disruption had 
seriously affected Honiara, Logging revenues were already in decline, 
retail outlets in Honiara had suffered, and produce became more 
expensive at Honiara's Central, Rove and Kukum markets because 
supplies were no longer being brought in from around Guadalcanal, 
particularly from the plains. Blockades to stop food and medicines 
reaching the Guale militants had an unfair effect on rural people, and 
innocent Guale were frightened to enter Honiara, which hac! become a 
totally Malaitan enclave. 
Many of Honiara's taxis and buses, along with a large number of stolen 
vehicles, were shipped to Malaita (which at least eased the perpetual 
traffic Jams), Thousands flooded to Malaita, some for the first time in 
their lives, on ships overloaded with people and possessions, placing great 
strain on local food and shelter supplies. In the mainly Malaitan 
settlements in the hills behind Honiara's Kola Ridge, residents dismantled 
their permanent houses and transported them back to their home islands. 14 
On Malaita, the three doctors with limited drug supplies at Kilu' ufi 
hospital were unable to cope, water was rationed in AUki, and there were 
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real fears that epidemic disease could break out because sanitation 
services were pushed to the limit in the town's maSSively overcrowded 
residential areas. Bishop Terry Brown described the situation in his 
1999 Christrnas message. 
Malaita, including the Diocese, has sustained anel aided the resettlement oft.he 
thousands of Malaitans returning to their traditional lands from Guada1canaJ, 
some never having been to Malaita before. Everyone has been hosting 
'displaced people' in their homes (the Bishop's House included). the Mother's 
Union has been [lutting in gardens and helping with the distribution of the 
reHef (they are less corruptible than the men) and the churches anel pl'Ovincial 
govemrnenl have been preaching forgiveness and reconciliation rather than 
retaliation. There has been remarkably little of the latter. despite Malaita's 
reputation for aggreSSiveness and violence. The majority ufthe 20,000 have 
passed through (and are still passing through) Auld, a town of only 7.OCJO, so 
we have had busy times (Brown 1999). 
At the same time, many Guale clearly felt the exodus would provide 
them with a more secure future; and some Malaitans could also see the 
long-term good of the forced exodus, which would lead to new 
economic development at Auki and other Malaitan urban centers. The 
rest of the country, however, was worried by the way resources had been 
concentrated on Malaita and Guadalcanal in an attempt to fix the crisis. 
Displaced families were given S$l,OOO per head and the government 
chartered boats to transport the people and their building materials. 
Greater questions were also debated. IF the inhabitants of one island 
could dictate to fellow citizens who came and went from its shores, what 
was the future of free movement between all islands? Solomon Islanders 
not from Guaclalcanal or Malaita were very conscious of the need to 
include all Solomon Islanders in the discussions and felt that the 
government was not doing this. If the ownership of Honiara was 
negotiable, then what about Auld, Gizo or Buala? There were calls for 
squatters (mainly from Malaita) to be removed from around Munda and 
Noro, site of the fish cannery (Solomon Star, 17 June 1999). What role 
would the Christian churches and Christian forgiveness········always a 
strong influence in the nation-play .in the future? Church leaders 
needed to be involved in consultation, arbitration and counselling. 
What formal and informal procedures could be used to ensure 
reconciliation occurred? Could the Reverend Leslie Boseto, Minister for 
Home Affairs, achieve this reconciliation? 
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Reports multiplied of IFM militants' persistent breaches of the peace 
accords. They behaved like thugs and demanded compensation 
payments for incidents they had provoked. Pertinent questions were 
asked. Were l<-'lSkolf (criminals) posing as militants? Was the IFM really a 
series of celts with no central coordination; and how much was the 
Guale operation under one commander? The IFM was a more shadowy 
organisation than the MEF""it had no clear leader or spokesperson, and 
did not openly represent anyone. As a consequence, normal Guale were 
probably just as scared by the events as the Malaitans who were evicted. 
Media and the conflict 
The role of the media was also questioned. Initially, international media 
representatives treated Rabuka's negotiations like a 'boys' adventure story', 
and were lucky not to get hurt by the Guale militants. At the same 
time, it must be said that the IFM had little media savvy and did not 
present the organisation in a good light. The animosity shown by the 
IFM for the Malaitans was overwhelming and the media lapped it up. 
George Grey, former banker and then Secretary of the IFM, was typical. 
They are all in town. 'rhey are living behind a fence. It: is very easy to wipe 
them out. We are t1ghting a holy war. The trees are t1ghting, the stones are 
fighting. and the women and children are fighting (Pacific islands Month/Y, 
August 1999). 
We are willing to attack Honiara if this fails. From here we can mount an attack 
on Honiara and kill all the Malaitans, wipe them out, injust three hours. It will 
take us just three hours to do that (Daley 1999d). 
Many of the foreign media's reports relied on the cliche of a primitive 
tribal conflict, and were not culturally sensitive. Inexperienced 
journalists, faced by Guale dressed in kabiJato and carrying bows and 
arrows, axes and bush knives, did not know what to do (Daley 1999c). 
Some overseas reports published a particularly disreputable description 
of Malaitans that understandably infuriated Malaltans and strengthened 
their resolve to form the MEF. The Times in London and the CanbelTa 
Times carried false reports that Rabuka had been kidnapped by the IFM 
(C"'anbena Times, 25 June 1999), and an article in Newsweek estimated 
that the IFM comprised 5,000 guerillas organised from bases in the 
jungles of the Weathercoast. They were simplistically likened to China's 
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Maoist fighters, but without the Communism. Newsweek somewhat 
misleadingly reported that the IFM's philosophy was influenced by the 
teachings of Chief Mora. While not entirely incorrect-·--·-the IFM was 
poorly equipped, there was an element of Mora Movement revival, and 
they did use magic-the article was a classic piece of sensationalism, 
ignorant of the complexity of the situation. Without understanding, 
they tried to describe vele magic, by which Guale believe they can travel 
fast and invisibly. 
Their arsenal is a grab bag ofspears, crossbows, vintage gUllS ilnL! tribal magic. 
Most militants use either .22s, which are popular for hunting small game, or 
.303-cilliber rifles from World Will' II. 'They mine munitions dumps for old 
bullets, which they pry open and clouse with alcohol, so the old gunpowder 
will fire. Then they reassemble the buLlets. TCl warcl off incoming fire, rebels 
trust in 'magic' walking sticks or al nulets or seashells strung on threads of bark. 
They also claim to ride magic 'bush motorbikes' that can fly across the island in 
seconds. By the roadside, a rebel in sunglasses eases behind a cormade and 
gently takes his rif1e. 'We arc invisible', he explains. 'We can steal guns from the 
arms of the police and thpy would never notice ... ' (Wehrfitz 199D:n.p.). 
As noted earlier, the local media were limited, comprising two 
newspapers and four radio networks, the government's SIBC medium 
and short wave and Wantok FM services, ZFM, and Paoa FM (linked to 
the Solomon Star), as well as Solomon Telekom's limited Australia 
Television service, which operated from March 2001. The two local 
newspapers, the Solomon Star and the ,.)olomon Voice, were majority 
owned by Malaitans and were rapidly criticised for a perceived Malaitan 
bias. l5 At SIBC, the general manager, johnson Honirnae, was also 
Malaitan, while another Malaitan was news editor. The declaration of 
the State of Emergency curtailed reporting and some thought that the 
media had not given fair representation to both sides. 
Policing, aid and desperation 
Police actions during the tense sitUdtion became the next issue. 
CornlTlissioner Short questioned Rabuka's impartiality and rejected his 
view that the militants were political1y-motivated and not just common 
criminals. In return, Rabuka was angered by the police refusal to 
withdraw from their field positions while he was negotiating (Daley 
1999a; Canberra TImes, 28 june 1999; Solomon Star, 23 and 25 june 
1999)). Short, a British policeman appointed straight fram South 
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Africa, had armed his police and proceeded in a style thElt was foreign to 
the history of the force. A month Elftel' Rabuka arrived, the police were 
involved in il shoot-out on 30 July 1999 at Mt Austin near Honiara, in 
which three IFM members died, The 12 August Panatina Agreement 
upheld the H.oniara Accord, and recommended that militants must lay 
down t.heir arms, t.hat police activities on GuadalcanaJ should be scaled 
down, and that. community pOlicing be increased. Once again the Guale 
rnilit.ilnts did not. sign,16 In early August., the police killed anot.her four 
rFM members, prompting renewed crit.icism of the heavy-handed tactics 
of t.he Rapid Response Unit and of Malaitan dominance of the police 
force, Guale militants blamed Commissioner Short for police st.rong-ann 
tactics, While the police had int.imidated innocent Guale in t.heir quest 
t.o capture militant.s, Short had lril"d his best t.o restore law and order. 
Fairly obViously out. of his dept.h in the Solomon Islands, Short did not. 
t.ry t.o renew his contract. when it expired in July 1999, and the 
government signalled t.hat the Unit would be disbanded. Short's deputy, 
Morton SirIheti, took over until Rangi Rangihika, Auckland's police 
commander and New Zealand's most senior Maori police officer, arrived 
to take over as Commissioner (Field 1999c; The Australian, 7 July 1999). 
But Rangihika also proved incapable of managing the situation, was 
despised by the MEF, and soon disappeared on permanent sick leave. 
The IFM was slow to hand in its weapons and the early-September 
1999 deadline came and went, extended by a week with little result. 
Church leElders were put in charge of weapons-collection centers, but 
had limited success. Prime Minister Ulufa'alu called for militants to 
return all stolen weapons, vehicles and outboard motors, and pleaded 
with Guale villagers to come out of hiding and return to their homes. 
I-Ie promised that Elny ethnic group that chose to take the law into its 
own hands would be dealt with severely (Office of the Prime Minister 
1999). More attacks occL1!'red, now concentrated on the Marau Sound 
area colonised by 'Are'are Malaitans for at least the last 400 years, Four 
thousand people were reported to have abandoned their homes there, 
and to have resettled on small islands off the coast to escape the IFM, 
The Marau militants 'loot.ed ships, bashed up innocents, molestecl 
women' and generated 'unjustified compensation claims' (Radio 
Australia, 13 November 1999; Roughan 1999b), At the end of 
September 1999, at Avu Avu on Guadalcanal, where the Cat.holic 
church was celebrating a century since it.s arrival in the Solomons in the 
presence of Archbishop Adrian Smith, a drunken Guale militant 
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disrupted proceedings when he shot a gun into the air and forced the 
crowd to f1ee. After the archbishop protested, the traditional leaders of 
the Weathercoast ordered the IFM to pay compensation, 
The need for an international peace-keeping force, which would 
include troops and paramilitary units from Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu 
and Fiji, was widely discussed. This came to fruition in October 1999, 
when Solomon Islands police joined with a small Multinational Police 
Peace Monitoring Group (MPPMG), funded by Australia, the United 
Kingdorn and New Zealand and initially staffed by unarmed officers 
from Fiji and Vanuatu, to supervise the implementat.ion of the 
negot.iated peace and t.o collect. weapons. Twenty-five Fiji police officers 
arrived on 17 Oct.ober and a furt.her 25 from Vanuatu arrived lat.er in 
tfH~ mont.h (Radio Australia, 6 October 1999), Two Australians, 
Wolfgang and Joanne Meiners, who had lived illegally in the SolonlOns 
for 12 years and had connect.ions with the 1FM, were deported, and 
Ron Thomas, a British national, was arrested for harbouring them 
(Radio Australia, 30 Sept.ember 1999). The milit.ants were loath to give 
up t.heir weapons, which had become symbols of their st.at.us and 
aut.horit.y, and were unlikely to cooperat.e unless some alt.ernative form of 
power was provided. 
Papua New Guinea offered help at. various times, and Vanuatu and 
Fiji provided police as peace monitors. Aust.ralia's total aid package t.o 
the Solomon Islands averaged A$13.3 million per year between 1991 
and 1998, which ranked behind aid given to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
Kiribat.i and Vanuatu, and oft.en close t.o t.he level of aid to Samoa. By 
the time the civil war began in 1998, Aust.ralia's aid to the Solomon 
Islands had fallen by about A$3 million a year, in part because it had 
deducted around A$2.2 million to punish t.he Solomons government for 
not. implementing logging cont.rols effectively. Aust.ralian aid increased 
t.o A$13.2 million in 1998-99, A$18.7 million in 1999"-2000 and 
A$20.4 million in 2000"01, with the largest .increase coming in 
humanitarian a.id. Australia prov.ided A$710,000 in humanitarian relief 
between 1998 and 2000 (AusAID 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b; 
Howard 2000), 
New Zealand also increased its involvement by assisting with the 
disarmament of the militants, provided tarpaulins for refugee shelters, 
and distributing a.id through the churches for resettlement of Malaitan 
refugees from Guadalcanal (SolomoJ1 Star, 26 June 1999), At the end of 
1999, New Zealand's new Labour government increased its level of 
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assistance to the Solomons Islands, raising its funding to A$5,7 million 
over the 1999··2000 financial year·······the fourth largest donor behind 
Australia, Japan and Taiwan. It also provided logistical support to the 
peace process and cooperated with Australia on many issues. Together, 
these countries have as a consequence become the major international 
players in subsequent events in Solomon Islands. 
***** 
As the end of the millennium approached, Solomon Islanders all 
wondered what was in store for them in the new year. Malaitans have a 
reputation for swiftly repaying slights against their kinsmen or wantoks, 
but had by-and-large shown admirable restraint over their forced mass 
exodus from Guadalcanal and had endured great insult to their dignities 
and customs. Frustrated by the lack of compensation for their 
displacement, Malaitans marched on parliament in October 1999 and 
presented Prime Minister Ulufa'alu with a petition. Malaitan vigilante 
groups in Honiara became increasingly active, an omen of the Malaita 
Eagle Force to come. 
The people of Guadalcanal have legitimate reason to be clisgruntled 
at the treatment they received during the years of the British 
Protectorate and since independence in 1978, although there can be no 
justification for their expulsion of 20,000 fellow citizens in 1998-99. 
The forced exodus occurred during the reformist government of 
Ulufa'alu, who was unlucky to have inherited difficult circumstances but 
also did not handle the developments well. The situation was extreme, 
with two antagonistic militias on Guadalcanal, a government without 
funds or the ability to cope, the police force totally entangled with the 
MEF'~ and shadowy forces intent on removing Ulufa'alu by any means 
possible. The peace negotiations dragged on and customary 
compensation payments beca.me mere bribes. Ulufa' alu, a Malaitan, was 
removed from power by rival Malaitans backed by a Malaitan militia, 
who installed a prime minister from Choiseul Island. 
Notes 
An interesting analysis of the reasons for the crisis can be found in Gina (2003:86, 269). 
'rhe Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Asia Pacific 'Television commenced 
broadcasts in ZOO 1 and operated for a few years. There is also satellite television. 
Important sludies of the Weathercoast district. were made in the 1970s, including 
Chapman (Hl72); Bennett (1974); Chapman and Pirie (1974). 
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Alfred Sasako gave differenL figures in OeLober 1997 when he claimed that the national 
debt was S$7DO million, with Joan repayments of S$1 0 1 million a year ~Si)!ofllo[J Star, 22 
October HI9?). 
The other members of cabinet were F':nele Kwanairara (Commerce &. 'Tourism), .rackson 
I)ias; (Lands &. Housing), Steve Sanga (Agriculture &. Fisheries), Lester Saomasi (Police 
&. National Security), Walton Naezon (Mines, Energy &. Minerals), j']ilda Kari (Forests 
&. Conservation), Honnie Mannie (Education &. 'Ii'aining) , Robin Mesepitu (Culture. 
Women &. Sports), 
Andrew Nori claimed that the first GRA/IFM meeting took place aL Tambea Resortjust 
outside Honiara, attended by Guadalcanal leaders, including Alebua, and Sethuel Kelly, 
and younger dIsgruntled Guale, inchlding Alebua's relaUws. Harold Keke and Josepb 
Sangu. He is probably referring to the meeting at nearby Visale viJIage of 14 March 
1998 (Noli 2002a), 
I am indebted to Bishop Terry Brown, AUki, Malaita. for his advice on religious groups. 
Personal communication, 22 September 2003, 
Copy of an IFM circular email advising Malaitans to leave Honiara, 10 May 20DO. The 
ihreatening email was circulated widely and contributed to the fear that IIoniara was 
about to be attacked. 
Six month later, on 10.rurte 1999, a memorandum of understallding WaS signed 
establishing a ReconciLiation 'I1'ust Fund of S$2.5 milJ.ion in recognition of the social 
costs being borne by the indigenous people of Guada1canal as a result of the national 
capital being located at IIoniam (Provincial Premiers 1999; Solomon Islands 
Government and Guadalcanal PrOVincial Government 1999). 
I (] 'These claims an~ summarised in Naitoro et a1. (l 999), 
11 This rape was also reported to me by Malaitan friends. 
1% Among those who signed the document were I~abuka, Prime Minister Ulufa'alu, and the 
premiers of Guada1canal and Malaita. It was witnessed by the Leader of the Opposition,
 
Solomon Mamaloni, Leader of the Independent Group, 'Tommy Chan, and Mark
 
Kemakeza and Joini 'I1Jtua, Premier and Deputy Premier of Choiseul Province,
 
Roughan (HJ99a), quoting UN Humanitarian Assessment Team report,
 
ITTS!3@usp.ac..('j ['accessed 5 July 1999].
 
Reports by John Roughan 18 July and Julian Treadaway, ] 9 July 1999, ITTSB@usp,ac.fj
 
faccessed 19 September 1999],
 
1[,	 Solomon NJ:amaloni was said to have had a 5 per cent holding in the 5i)!oI!Jo[J S/flr. See 
also SlBC. 23 March 200!. 
16	 
'J'he document was signed by the Commonwealth Special Envoy Sitiveni Rabuka, 
Minister for ['oliee and National Security ]~obert Mescpitu, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Patteson Oli, GuadaJcanal Province Ezekiel Alebua, and Deputy Commissioner of 
PoLice Morton Siriheti, 
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The Eagle has landed 
The Malaita Eagle Force
 
January-June 2000
 
2000 was not a good year for the Solomon Islands. It began with the 
death of long-serving politician Solomon Mamaloni and saw the rise to 
power of the Malaita Eagle Force, a paramilitary organisation opposed to 
the Guada1canal Isatabu Freedom Movement. In June, a coup removed 
the elected government of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, and 
after a month of turmoil Ulufa' alu's government was replaced by that of 
Manasseh Sogavare. 
The death of Solomon Mamaloni 
The death of' Solomon Mamaloni from liver failure on 11 January 2000 
cleared the political stage of its most enduring actor, One can only 
speculate about what would have occurred had he survived longer and 
!wen part of the game-plan when Prime Minister Ulufa'alu was removed 
from office a few months later. Solomon Islanders of all persuasions paid 
public tribute to his memory. He was admired as a great nationalist, a 
major political leader since the 1970s, and above all as a man of the 
people who lived simply and was always approachable by the grassroots 
people. He had turned down offers of a knighthood and honours and 
remained Simply 'Solo' to everyone. ObViously ill for some time, he had 
not sought to pull strings to get overseas medical assistance and 
preferred to die in the public ward at 'Numba 9' rather than a private 
room. Many stories emerged of the number of times he had welcomed 
ordinary Villagers into his home or office to talk, how he never turned 
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them away. A modern Bigman of the Solomon Islands, his body was 
displayed at the parliament, where thousands came to show their last 
respects before he received a full st.ate funeral at St Barnabas Cathedral 
in Honiara on 13 january 2000. But lflands Business paid him little 
respect in a 'good riddance' style obituary 
...He flaunted his power and his abuse of it. 
He was very bad for the Sojomon ISlands. The trouble was that he was so 
outrageously bad that he was fascinating ...Mamaloni was an astute politician 
who knew how to exp]oit the weakness of local politicians, who mostly were far 
less cunning than him. He used that talent to the full and the Solomon Islands 
suffered because of it. His legacy will hold the country back for years. 
Is there anything good to say about Solomon Mamaloni? Very little. He was a 
character, indisputably a colourful one, but also a bad one. Did he take 
anything seriously? Probably very little except for the matter of his own gain. 
He was a rogue and got away with it. He was the kind of political leader every 
Pacific Islands country can do without (lslandl' Bllline.l:r, February 2000:9). 
The birth of the Malaita Eagle Force 
Rumours emerged at this time of armed Kwaio men--ex-workers from 
the Guadalcanal plantations····_··organising tllemselves into groups to fight 
against the Guale rFMl 'rhen, six days after Mamaloni's death, news 
began to circulate of an early morning robbery at Auki Police 
Headquarters on Malaita. The 13 attackers had knocked out the 
telephone exchange, overpowered three pollce officers and a number of 
special constables and ransacked the armoury, making off with 34 mainly 
high-powered rifles, a grenade launcher, and ammunition. They escaped 
in a stolen speedboat that was later found on the beach at Tenaru, just 
outside 1Ioniara. 2 Andrew Nori, a former national politician, leading 
Honiara lawyer, and Chairman of the Malaita Conference':; revealed he 
had had communications with a group called the Malaita Eagle Force 
(MEF) , which claimed to have undertaken the raid, code-named 'Spirit 
of Ramos'. It was, they claimed, retaliation for the eviction of Malaitans 
from Guadalcanal, the failure of the IFM to lay down their anns, illegal 
Guale occupation of property abandoned by fleeing Malaitans, and the 
national government's failure to pay compensation for loss of life and 
property, as laid down in the terms of the IIoniara Peace Accord. Nori 
forwarded the information to the police and the Solomon Star, and 
124 
Th€ Malalta Eagle Forc€ 
added that he believed that the group had no intention of 'causing any 
damage or using the weapons in an offensive manner', but did hint that 
the situation could escalate viciously. Meanwhile, Commonwealth Special 
Envoy Rabuka had arrived back in Honiara to continue negotiations. 
Malaitans wanted the compensation issues finalised quickly and demanded 
information on 19 Malaitans who had gone missing during the IFM's 
1998-99 'cleansing'. Adrian Smith, Catholic Archbishop of the 
Solomon Islands, was appointed chairman of a committee to investigate 
their fate. Of course, now they were opposed by armed Malaitans, the 
IFM were less likely than ever to lay clown their arms (Agence-France 
Presse, 17 January 2000; Radio Australia, 20, 26, 27 January 2000). 
Looking back, it is interesting to see how meekly the Malaitans had 
left Honiara in 1998-99: it was as though they sensed it was not their 
land and that, faced with a similar incursion on Malaita, they would do 
the same as the GuaJe had done. But the Guale militants went too far 
and transgressed basic cultural codes. Use of compensation payments is 
a deeply embedded cultural practice in Pacific societies, primarily as a 
mechanism to restore social equilibrium after a dispute or wrong action. 
The insults and disruption to the Malaitans were a serious cultural 
offence that had to be compensated, and the government had failed in 
its duty to compensate the refugees for their eviction from their legally­
obtained lands on Guadalcanal. Motivated by this perceived slight, and 
their elders' inaction, young Malaitans looked to join the group thai: had 
undertaken the 'Spirit of Ramos' raid, a group that soon came to be 
J<nown as the MalaHa Eagle Force (MEF). One week after the raid, Nori 
prepared a 16-page submission on behalf of the Malaita Displaced 
People's Committee, and this was forwarded to the Office of the Prime 
Minister on about 24 January 2000. The MEF called for immediate 
discussions and suggested a formula for resolution of the compensation 
claims. The timing was far from propitious, however, because the IFM 
was beginning to disarm by this stage. The renewed Malaitan claims for 
S$70-150 million in compensation, and the emergence of an aggressive 
armed Malaitan group could only revive the dispute and increase 
tensions (OlIice of the Prime Minister 2000; Bohane 2000a), 
Divisions within the Eagles 
Exactly who the members of the MEF were and what motivated them 
was not immediately apparent. Some were young Malaitan men angry 
over the expulsion from Guadalcanal, others were disaffected youths who 
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Map 5.1 Malaita Island and its language areas 
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126 
The Malaita Eagle Force 
wanted adventure, and there were also criminal elements who aimed to 
profit from the disruptions. Malaitan youths were also tempted by easy 
money gained through criminal activities. Some were proud Malaitan 
nationalists who knew that what had occurred on Guadalcanal was 
wrong, others were frustrated by the lack of development on Malaita 
and the failure of post-independence governments to make any 
improvement to the lives of the people. There was also annoyRnce at the 
general administrative incompetence and growth in corruption. 
The MEF was largely drawn from the Kwara'ae, Fataleka, To'ambaita. 
Lau and to a lesser extent Kwaio districts of Malait:a Province, along with 
a few members from Marau (Guadalcanal), 'Temotu and Western 
Provinces. Initially, there were five named groups: Tiger (Kwara' ae), Iron 
Eagle (east Fataleka): Hunter (west and central Fataleka), Rat (Kwaio), 
Lion (north Malaita, mainly To'ambaita) and White Eagle (Sikaina and 
Lord Howe, Polynesian outliers included in Malaita Province), A few 
more totemic groups were formed later, including Crocodile for Baegu. 
The supreme military commander was Jeremy Rua from Fataleka. 
Most of the MEF were members of the South Sea Evangelical Church 
(SSEC) , home to 40 per cent of all Christians on Malaita, as well as 
Seventh Day Adventists (SDAs), Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses, along 
with a few Anglicans and Catholics. Some were kastom men, who 
emulated the Moro Movement's followers in giving up Christianity for 
customary ways. The Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal were 
predominantly SSEC followers, Anglicans and Seventh Day Adventists 
from the centre and north of the island, not Catholics, who usually 
come from the centre and south. The MEF leaders were mainly 
Malaitans displaced from Guadalcanal, and thus more likely to be 
SSEC, AnglicRIlS or Seventh Day Adventists. The evangelical churches 
are stricter observers of social prohibitions than the Anglicans and 
Roman Catholics,4 which may have led to young men being 
'unchurched' and hence more easily susceptible to criminal activity and 
other inf1uences. J(astom inf1uences also played a role in the MEF5 
There was a loose division within the MEF based on Malaitan 
language areas········Fataleka, Kwara'ae, Kwaio and so forth, each of which 
had their own commander·--·-and these groups varied considerably in 
their activities and aims, and especially in their commitment to peace 
negotiations and in their brutality, In this respect, the To'ambaita group 
came to be the most extreme and brutal. There are photos of MEF men 
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holding the severed heads of IFM men, and at least one extremely 
graphic and violent video of one MEF group's activities. 
Peace negotiations between the MEF and IFM 
In February 2000, the IFM began to publish lsatabu Tuvuli, an Internet 
newsletter which sought to explain their actions and also constantly 
complained about the thuggish behaviour of the police, who were 
accused of unprovoked raids on innocent Cuale vilJagers.G In retaliation, 
the Ulufa' alu government published articles in the Honiara newspapers 
naming people it considered responsible for the unrest on Guadalcanal 
(ABC News Online, 25 February 2000). A lengthy press release, called 
'Beneath Guadalcanal', heaped blame on the power vacuum left by the 
British legacy, the Mama10ni legacy, the 1997 election process and 
continued destabilisation by the Opposition, and long-term ethnic 
tensions. Part of the document was an assessment of the danger that 
Cuadalcanal demands posed to the future stability of the nation, and 
the realisation of this power by two former prime ministers, the late 
Marnaloni, and Ezekiel Alebua, the current Premier of Guadalcanal 
(Office of the Prime Minister 2000). 
In early March 2000"the government declared the IFM and the 
MEF illegal, but this did nothing to control the ongoing skirmishes or 
limit the death toll. Only hours after the declaration, a shoot-out 
between the IFM and MEF on the outskirts of Honiara left one man 
dead and another iruured, and on 9 March a Special Constable was 
killed during an IFM attack. The police, however, were implicated when 
the MEl' killed a youth and burned down three houses at Koqulai 
Village west of I-Ioniara. Rumours abounded of an imminent direct 
attack on Honiara, and once again of IFM plans to poison or cut off the 
water supply. Cuale women refused to bring produce to the Honiara 
market, and on 11 March Malaitans pelted the Cuadalcanal provincial 
offices with stones. In April 2000, the MEF threatened to blow up a 
local ship servicing the Marau district of Guadalcanal.·/ The government 
seemed to have no control, the churches' pleas for peace went unheeded, 
and violence and crime were commonplace. Honiara residents could no 
longer visit the beaches, rivers and tourist resorts at the edge or the town 
(Roughan 2000b). Ezekiel Alebua, who narrowly escaped kidnap by the 
MEl" from his house at Kakabona, castigated the police force for their 
connivance with the MEF. 
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Criminal activit.ies within the boundilry ofHoniara, relating to the ethnic 
tension, have shown il greater degree of corporate collaboration between the 
police and members of the Malaita Eagle Force. 
He accused police of ignoring many instances of violence, of being 
partial to the MEF, and of collaborating with them. 
Police involvement in the MEF has becorne public knowledge and we need an 
independent force to deal with the ethnic tension. Villagers ofGuadalcanal no 
longer trust the Police and the only resolution is t.he force to be cleaned up 
(lmtabu llJvu!i, 15 March 2000). 
The IFM recommended as a step towards introduction of a federal 
system the establishment of Constituency Governing Councils to replace 
Provincial Assemblies and the abolition of Area Councils, and demanded 
that Guadalcanal receive 50 per cent of all revenues generated through 
investment and taxes on the island, Andrew Nori, spokesman for the 
MEF, answered 'Beneath Guadalcanal' in the Solomon Star, and the IFM 
also decisively deflated what they portrayed as the government's 
misguided 'Opposition conspiracy thesis' as presented in 'Beneath 
GuadaIcanal', The IFM claimed that much of the government's 
argument was based on a poor understanding of history and that there 
was no evidence of IFM collusion with the Opposition, It further argued 
that the government's view was utterly divorced from the real 
socioeconomic and political basis of the crisis, which had been clearly 
enunciated by the GuadaIcanal prOVincial government, and noted that the 
government had ignored Widespread and longstanding calls for a federal 
system (Radio Australia, 2 March 2000: lsatabu ]£/Vu]i, 2 March 20(0), 
As hostilities continued, other Pacific nations were keeping close 
watch on the deteriorating situation, Late in March 2000, false reports 
suggested that two military helicopters and a fixed wing aircraft had 
arrived in the Solomon Islands, presumed to be the military equipment 
purchased by Mamaloni and prevented from entering the country by 
Uluafa' alu in February 1998. New Zealand's Foreign Minister visited 
Honiara in March, and in April Greg Urwin, Head of the Pacific 
Division of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs ancl "Irade also 
arrived to hold talks with the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and provincial leaders from Malaita and Guadalcanal. More 
Australian officials visited in April and Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer suggested that the Solomon Islands might need to 
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alter its constitution to appease the militants. Downer was criticised for 
'preaching' without listening and thus reinforcing the Australian High 
Commission's reputation for being aloof, judgmental and threatening. 
New Zealand officials were regarded as less heavy-handed and more 
willing to listen. 8 
On 8 April 2000, Commonwealth Peace Negotiator Sitiveni Rabuka 
returned to Honiara, while at the same time a plan was formed-­
initiated by New Zealand and backed by Australia····to fly militants to a 
neutral venue to hold peace talks, the method used to broker peace 
between Bougainville rebels and the PNG government. On 11 April, 
Rabuka announced that around SO delegates were to attend the next 
peace summit at Buala in Isabel Province. and a week later that 
Cornmonwealth police groups from Vanuatu and Fiji would be enlarged, 
financed by A$SOO,OOO from the Australian government. After Prime 
Minister Ulufa'alu's visit to Europe in 2000, the Solomon Islands 
Embassy in Brussels arranged for Joeli Kalou, a representative of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP-EU), to visit the 
islands. The European Union offered S$3 rnillion to provide 
rehabilitation supplies to Guadalcanal families, and another mission was 
arranged for late Mayor early June. 
This did little to stern the deterioration. On 14 April 2000, the 
MEF was reported to have attacked the IFM at a Guale village in the 
Kakabona area OTl Honiara's outskirts in a several-hour-Iong shoot-out 
that left one man dead (Radio Australia, 14 April 2000). 
Prime Minister Ulufa'alu won few friends at this time when he 
suggested that Cuba should be approached for assistance. Opposition 
Leader Manasseh Sogavare accused him of forming his bodyguards, mostly 
drawn from Langa Langa Lagoon on Malaita, into the Seagull Force 
under the command of Henry Bata to counteract theMEF and destroy 
its leaders. He further alleged that Ulufa' alu wanted to use the Seagull 
Force to gather sensitive information and that he funded them with 
government money. Another source noted that the 'Seagulls seem to be 
a criminal gang, the PM's private security force'9 but they remain very 
mysterious and their importance has probably been much exaggerated. 
'T'he initial plan for the Buala negotiaUons, which eventually began 
when 100 delegates met on 4 May, was that rebel groups were not to be 
represented separately but as mernbers of their respective proVincial 
delegations. Although the IFM accepted the invitation, the MEF 
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refused to take part because Buala was not neutral territory, and the 
prime minister refused to lift the 1999 ban on the IFM and MEF, or 
give them immunity from prosecution. Eventually, five IFM and three 
MEF representatives agreed to attend, but not the commanders, and 
New Zealand appeared to have been alienated from the process, which 
was run by Australia, Rabuka and his deputy Ade Adefuye. In the end, 
Malaita Province refused to send delegates out of concern for their safety, 
and the IFM delegates also refused to attend, rendering the 
communique that emerged worthless. Peace talks continued in Auki 
during the following week. lO 
May 2000 was the most crucial month ..--··the death toll had risen to 
about. 55 and Honiara was on the brink of total collapse. On the night 
the BuaJa t.alks ended, a middle-aged non-IFM 'Guale' man was killed 
and his headless corpse dumped in Honiara market with a note attached 
stating t.hat Guadalc:anal Premier Alebua would be the next vlct.im. l ] Tn 
retaliation, the IFM pushed their frontline from Foxwood to Tenaru, 
about ten kilomet.res from t.he center of I..Ioniara, causing the evacuat.ion 
of St Joseph's Cat.holic National Secondary School at. Tenaru. A few days 
later King George VI School also closed early for t.he mid-year break. 
Flghting broke out. at Gold Ridge, near Dodo Creek Agricultural St.ation 
east. of Honiara and near Henderson airfield, with shoot-out.s at. t.he end 
of t.he runway. One Guale was killed and two iqjured; t.he head of a 
Malaitan MEF member was presented t.o members of the Multinational 
Police Assist.ance Group (MPAG) during one of their pat.rols at Tenaru, 
in obvious retaliation for the headless 'Guale' corpse. His body was 
found hanging nearby. One report said that. 1,000 IFM members had 
massed east of Honiara, although t.he Australian High Commission 
estimat.ed closer to 100. The IFM wrote to Police Sommissioner Rangi 
Rangihika announcing t.hat they lntended t.o prot.ect. the people of 
Guadaleanal and attack t.he ME~ but: would not try to take over 
Honiara. Premier Alebua pleaded with t.he IFM not to attack the town 
(Radio Australia, 6, 9, 10 May 2000: SIBC, 12 May 20(0). 
***** 
Honiara had once been a wonderfully slow, friendly town. where shy 
smiles dominat.ed everyday life and greetings. Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 
The Australian's Pacific correspondent: ls married to a Solomon Islands' 
politician, has lived t.here for t.en years, and knows Honiara's charms. 
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It's a town that, in its dusty, ramshackle way, had offered a quality of ii1{~ most 
people in the s(lCss-driven First World wouldn't even be abie to conceive of. It's 
hard to get run over ifyou walk faster (han most of the vehic:ies on the road ...A 
woman like Inc could get a flat tyre alone a( 11 0' clock at night and not be 
ali'aid. I would simply have (0 get out of my car and wait for some oj' the young 
guys lounging under the streetlights to change it for me, giggling at the plight 
of this poor 'missus' (O'Callaghan 2000c). 
A briefing note issued by the Australian High Commission on 9 May 
2000 shows how much Honiara had changed 
The Police HQ have developed contingency plans if miiitants try to corne 
through the road biocks, and there is a back-up unit at Rove. They have 
bolstered numbers of units such as the Rapid Response Squad. 2 GuaJe police 
officers have been appointed as negotiators to the IFM, along with MPAG 
members. 'They have been successfuily talking direct to IFM re: Buaia 
Communique and urging constraint and calm. '"rhere was also a problem at 
Gold Ridge when some Weather Coast militants passed by. The Police fired 
shots which otJendecl the militants. It resulted in Gold Ridge being eHectively 
isolated. This has of COlll'Se been a cause for concern and focus. The 2 Guale 
negotiators talked to Anclrew Tn ITl)e) (IFM leader) and n~ached agreement 
with him to allow Goid Ridge personnel to pass through. To date there is no 
information if this has been tested. The Operations Crossroads Commander is 
now stationed at the check point. The police are attempting to communicate! 
openly with rPM & MEF: They ilre not illtacking, but trying to express 
concern and defuse situations. This morning a Prison Officer was shot in the 
stomilch atlct.ere Poiice Station-possibly in an ilt!ernpt to obtain weilpolls. 
The officer is now in hospital. The group were not aware of the Buala 
Communique, and subsequently tbe Police negotiators have talked to Andrew 
Tii ['Ic'e] who has issued an apology. Also this morning, the manager of the 
Chinatown branch of DBSI, a Guale, WilS attacked and badly beaten. He is 
rQcoVl'ring in hospital. Police are investigating. There arc continuing reports of 
odd shots at Tetere. A crowd of approx. 50 people gathered at the National 
Referral Hospital today. We need to be aware that there could be the potential 
for a riot when crowds gather. 12 
***** 
The Australian government was not receptive to pleas for police 
reinforcements and feared being dragged into another Bougainvil!e-like 
situation. While New Zealand 111gh Commissioner Nick 1 Iurley was 
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reported as saying that violence was out of control, Australian officials in 
Honiara we['e more optimistic that the nation was not heading for civil 
war (Daley 2000a). 
Negotiations continued. Following two days of peace talks on 
MaJaita, the Auki Communique of 12 May agreed to an immediate 
suspension of the order outlawing the IFM and MEF (lifted by the 
Governor-General on 16 May). This aUowed consultations with the aim 
of securing a ceasefire. The conference was told that 5,265 families had 
been registered with the Committee of Lost and Abandoned Properties: 
4,000 from Malaita, 890 from GuadaIc:anal, 120 from Temotu, 80 from 
ChoiseuJ and Western Provinces, GO from Central Province, 50 from 
Isabel Province, 45 from Makira-Ulawa Province, and 20 from Rennell­
Bellona Province (SIBC, 12 May 2000). 
As violence escalated, Guale families began to evacuate Honiara. 
Henderson airfield was put under 24-hour police surveillance (Radio 
Australia, 12 May 2000), and on 16 Maya stand-off began at Alligator 
Creek bridge east of Honiara: the IFM guarded one end and MEF 
guarded the Honiara side. The MEF conducted checks of all vehicles 
traveling past }--Ienderson airfield, including those of the police 
monitors. Access to Gold Ridge mine remained blocked, and a 
helicopter was used to ferry crucial staff in and out. The government was 
unable to pay fUlly staff or students at the Solomon Islands College of 
Higher Education, which closed early, but did payout more than 
A$100,000 to individuals involved in the special police operations. 
some of whom were identified fictitiously as 'Wan', 'None', 'Lion', 
'Fish', 'Smoke' and 'Bonito'. The government was accused on air by 
SIBC of paying A$44,000 to the Seagull Force. A partial liquor ban in 
Honiara between 15-27 May calmed tensions, except of course that 
kWiJSO homebrew was readily available, as was marljuana which was otlen 
consumed in copious amounts (SIBC, 16, 17, 19 May 2000; Radio 
Australia, 18 May 2000). 
Sir George Lepping, representing the 500 delegates (including 200 
foreign delegates) at the Commonwealth Youth Ministers Meeting in 
Honiara from 21 May, convinced only himself with claims in the media 
that the situation on Guadalcanal was calm and that there had been no 
violence in Honiara. Opposition Leader Manasseh Sogavare reiterated 
his earlier call for the prime minister to resign, placing particular stress 
Ulufa'alu's connection to the Seagull Force, which he claimed had 
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existed since 1997, Ulufa' alu responded by asserting that 'Seagull' was a 
police operation code-name and not a group, but no one believed him, 
Cabinet was also briefed on negotiations with the Cuban government-­
prompted by Foreign Minister Patteson OtJ's April 2000 visit to an 
economic summit in Havana-to provide aid in exchange for diplomatic 
recogni lion and possible joint mining ventures, which deeply alarmed 
Australians and some Solomon Islanders (Daley 2000b; SIRC, 23 May 
2000) . 
The women of the Solomon Islands realised that their men were 
incapable of controlling their own aggression, and became a force in 
their own right in the conflict:. Hilda Kari, Minister for Women, Youth 
and Sport, called for the safety of women and children living in floniara, 
and the diplomatic missions encouraged participation of women in 
peace negotiations, A women's conference was held on 19 May, with 
speakers including Agnes Akwai, Hilda Kari and representatives of the 
Red Cross and the Solomon Islands Christian Association, and agreed on 
21 points to promote peace and harmony (SIBC, 13, 18, 23 May 2(00). 
On 19 May 2000, a distraction had occurred when armed masked 
men took over the Fiji Parliament and held the prime minister and other 
members of the Labour-led coalition government hostage, No one 
realised this was an omen of things soon to come in the Solomon 
Islands, and would indirectly in/]uence the final moves to overthrow the 
Solomon Islands government. At the end of the month, Solomon Islands 
students at the University of the South Pacific in Suva were sent back to 
Honiara. Francis Saemala, who had helped negotiate peace in 
Bougalnvillp, suggested that Rabuka be relieved of his Solomon Islands 
duties, Rabuka's role as the Chairman of the Fijian Great Council of 
ChIefs soon overwhelmed his Solomon Islands activities and on 24 May 
he was replaced by Commonwealth envoy Ade Adefuye, who was based 
permanently in lIoniara until the end of December 2000. On 25 May, 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon aITived back in 
Honiara after consulting with Rabuka in Suva (SIRC, 18, 22, 23, 24, 
29 May 2000), 
DUring the last week of May, the government opened peace 
coordinating offices in l·Ioniara, Auld and Giza, and the MEF undertook 
to observe a 14 -day period of restraint, This meant no offensive 
operations into areas east of Aliigator Creek, and no discharge of firearms 
unless provoked by the IFM, although no counter··agreement came from 
the IFM. The agreement only lasted until mid-week, however, when 
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MEF members harassed fellow Malaitans at the Kukum Supreme Club 
Casino and took two away for interrogation. Guadalcanal and Malaita 
provinces were each given S$5 million by the national government to be 
used to compensate people for incidents in which chiefs had been shown 
disrespect or sworn at (a major insult). The money was to be handed 
over within thirty days, but the customary leaders never received any of 
the money. The Guadalcanal money was not accounted for by Premier 
Alebua (one reason why Harold Keke tried to have him killed) and the 
Malaita money was seized by the rvLEF and never reached the provincial 
bank accounts. 13 
l'he Australian ABC television network screened a program on 23 
May about the Solomon Islands on its' Foreign Correspondent' 
program, which for the first time gave outsiders access to the views of 
leaders in the escalating conflict. The program included a plea from 
Prime Minister Ulufa'alu for outside intervention, acknowledging that 
his government had lost control (SIBC, 23, 25 May 2000). 
'T'he ceasefire·-never accepted by the IFM or the Guadalcanal 
provincial government anyway-was set to expire on 5 June 2000, and 
Honiara in the first days of that month went quiet in anticipation of the 
next move. That, of course, came to be the day of the coup that removed 
Ulufa'alu and installed Opposition Leader Sogavare as the new prime 
minister. Despite doubts about the legitimacy of the operation, 
Solomon Islanders hoped that the change of government would improve 
the tense chaotic situation. They were to be disappointed. It had been a 
tumultuous half year and there was no solution to the violence and 
anarchy on Guadalcanal. 
Notes 
Information from Bishop 'Terry Brown. 4 May 2004. 
Some repOl'ts also mention two women. but this seems unlikely. 
i\ Malaita-wide meeting called toget.her after t.he forced exodus from Guadalcanal. 
'rhus. the evangelicaLs proscrihe smoking tobacco or miH'Uuana, drinking alcohol, 
cheWing bel'cl nut, eating pork, and paying bridewealt'h or compensation. 
FOl example, the leader of 'Only You', a phallus-worshipping cult prominent in 
Honiara in the 1980.1, joined the MEF. ] mn indebted to Bishop 'T()ITY Brown for his 
comment.s on religion (Personal communication, 22 September 2(03). 
lratabu TavuJi: The IsatalJ1J Freedom A1owmeot Newsletter. Vol. ], No. 1., ] [) February, 
Vol. 1. No.2, 18 FebrwlIy, Vol. 1. No.3, 2fJ February 2000. 
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Wantok Press- Pasifik Nius press release,S April 2000.
 
I have chosen her'e not to name the source of my information.
 
S"e, for example, Radio Australia (22 March, 9, 11, 15. 18, 1929 Aprii. 10 May
 
2000): Age, 24 March 2000; Daily Post. 17 April 2000; Solomon Star, 27 April 2000:
 
O'Callaghan (2000b); Canan (2000); Brown (2000a); Sogavare (ZOOO), I have
 
dr~cidr'd not to name the source of my quotation and some of my information,
 
10	 See Agence-France Pressc (30 April 2000); Radio Australia (29 April. 3 May 2000); 
ABC News (5 May 2(00); O'Callaghan (ZO[)Oa), 
11	 RAMS]'s investigation suggests that this man was from 'Are'arc Malaita, but married to 
a Cuale woman, 
Internal report by Australian J-Jigh Commission to its staff. 9 MilY 200(]. Ju,!Vli-Nao, 
pcr Duran Angild, See also Radio Australia, 10 May 2000, and Wanlok Press/Pasifik 
Nius, 11 May 2000. 
1:1	 The MEF Commanders. including Leslie Kwaigil and [-(oland Timo, arrived in Auki on 
18 August. The next morning tlH~ MEF surrounded the Provincial Assembly room 
while tile commanders met with the members, 'The Premier announced that the tv1 EF 
was taking the money, Most of the 5$5 million IVas still in a term deposit with the 
Central Bank and could not be redeemed until October 2000, but some cash seems 
nonetheless to have been handed over. The Provincial Secretary said that he had been 
threatened with death unless the money was handed over. It is believed that the money 
was handed over when it was released by the Central Bank, ]~AMSI is investigating the 
matter (Brown 2D03b), 
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Manasseh Sogavare' 5 government,
 
June 2000-December 2001
 
Did Manasseh Sogavare know about plans for the June coup before it 
occurred? It has been alleged, but not proved, that the MEF leadership 
promised to secure him the prime ministership if he provided S$200 
million for damages caused to Malaitans in Guadalcanal (Sasako 2003a). 
Manasseh Damukana Sogavare. born on 17 January 1955, is a 
Seventh Day Adventist from eastern Choiseu1. He left High School in 
1974 to become a clerk in the 1'{oniara Consumers' Cooperative shop, 
but soon moved on to another clerical position in the Inland Revenue 
Division of the Ministry of Finance. He rose through the ranks to 
become Commissioner for Inland Revenue in 1991 and permanent 
secretary in the Ministry of Finance in 1993, Sidelined by the 
Mamaloni government in 1994 when he disagreed with their shoddy 
practices, he resigned and went to study accounting and economics at 
the University of the South Pacific in Suva, from which he graduated in 
1997. His parliamentary career began when he won a Choiseul seat in 
the 1997 elections and became Minister for Finance in the Ulufa'alu 
government, bu t in 1999 he was sacked and promptly became Leader of 
the Opposition and completed a distance-education Mastel's degree in 
Management Studies at Waikato University.l When he took over from 
Ulufa'alu in late June 2000, many Solomon Islanders had hopes of a 
new beginning. Unfortunately, the forces accumulating against the 
Sogavare government were even greater than those that had undone the 
reformist lImy (1993-94) and Ulufa' alu (1997-2000) governments, 
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and the Sogavare government accentuated some of the worst elements of 
past maladministration. The period from June 2000 to December 2001 
was a time of despair for ordinary Solomon Islanders. Despite his 
promise to form a coalition for National Unity, Reconciliation and 
Peace, most of Sogavare's 20-·mernber Cabinet came from the former 
Opposition, and several were tainted by earlit~r corruption scandals. 
Michael Maina, known as 'Mr Ten Percent' for his previous relationship 
with the logging industry, was handed the Finance portfolio lIntil he 
was replaced by the equally dubious Snyder Rini. Paul Tovua became 
Speaker the House, Charles Dausahea, chairman of the government 
caucus, Sam Alasia was appointed as special advisor to the prime 
minister, and several ex-Ulufa'alu government members joined the new 
governrnent. 2 The Ulufa'alu government's structural reforms were put on 
hold while the government tried to address the 'ethnic tension' and 
Sogavare shuffled heads of government statutory authorities and 
departrnental permanent secretaries and his ministry.3 Sogavare kept a 
lower profile than any other prime minister, issuing press releases but 
leaving his deputy prime minister and l'v1inister for National Unity, 
Reconciliation and Peace Allan Kemakeza to be the public face of the 
government. Opposition spokesmen were not heard from at all for 
several months, except for Alfred Sasako who battled on despite 
acclIsations that he had received over S$700.000 of duty remissions on 
imported beer and cigarettes. 4 
MEF andlFM conflict after the change of 
government 
The IFM-MEF conflict continued. The Malaita Eagle Force was 
effectively the government's alternative power base. Its security 
operations in Honiara were supposedly run in collaboration with the 
police, but were actually linked to compliant individual Malaitan 
1Twmbers of the constabulary. The same occurred in Auki where Simon 
IVlani became the commander: if the police were called, no one ever 
knew if the MEF or the real police, or both, would turn up. By all 
indices of good government, the Solomon Islands were on a downwards 
spiral. The IFM and MEF continued to operate with impunity. Within 
weeks of the coup, MEF members caused havoc in AUki, to such an 
extent that Langa Langa and Chinese-owned stores in Auki closed 
whenever MY Ramos II or MY Ramos III arrived with another load of 
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gun-toting MEF militants drunk on kwaJ'o (home brew). The two ships 
had become MEF troop ships, with MEF members and their cargo 
(including stolen vehicles) travelling free, at considerable loss to the 
company. The MEF also successfully harassed the premier of Malaita 
into giving them the province's compensation money (Brown 2000a), 
and demanded a further S$50 million compensation from the national 
government. In Honiara, many of the MEF were now just opportunist 
cl'iminals, strutting thuggishly around the streets armed with their 
stolen guns, able to rob at will. 
Once the ceasefires began, members of the MEF were freer to return 
to Malaita, further contributing to law and order problems there, 
Bishop 1erry Brown of the Church of Melanesia Diocese of Malaita 
wrote to Andrew Nori in August 2000, and asked if he could help 
regulate the behaviour of the MEF in Auki: 
... rII he Police seem to be frightened to act in any case involving an Eagle, even 
if them has been clear criminal act.ivity. There have been several incident.s up 
,md down the north road of drunken and reckless driving and of harassment 
and t.hreat.ening vHlages and individuals. These incident.s are giving the MEF a 
bad name. Perhaps MEF members being sent back to Malait.a need to have 
some direction, orient.ation or supervision. 
'The Auld Police Commander (who is sympathetic to the MEF) claims that the 
Auld security sit.uation is good but it simply is not t.he case. People are 
frightened. When you call the Police and they send the Eagles, you do not 
know if they are real or imitation Eagles. The situation is particularly serious on 
the afternoolls of the arrival ofthe MV Ramoswhellup t.o 40 MEF members 
arrive, many drunk on kwaso. They sometimes fight with each other (last 
Friday an MIG carne out) and t.hre81en t.he general population. People are now 
frightened to go out at night in Auk!. As more and more Eagles come back to 
Auki, I fear the situation will worsen (Brown 2000b). 
John Roughan, long-time Honiara resident. and advisor to the 
Solomon Islands Development II'ust, described the situation on 
Guadalcanal as 'pocket.s of normalcy surrounded by act.s of violence' 
(Roughan 2000d). Businesses were harassed for money and products 
reqUisitioned, vehicle theft. and house break-ins were a daily occurrence, 
and government propert.y was loot.ed regularly. Four-wheel drive cars, 
particularly t.hose of the diplomatic corps, were keenly sought after for 
'road testing' on Malaita. The MEF (and MEF look-allkes) also 
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discovered a new source of income~taxing robbers as they passed 
through roadblocks with their loot. Roughan rightly noted that Honiara 
was the only MEF-dominated area on Guadalcanal, and they needed to 
justify their existence as law enforcers in order to keep their weapons. 
The media praised them when they drove women betel nut sellers from 
the streets (betel nuts are an important source of income for poor 
families), the newspapers printed photos of the MEF bulldozer-tank in 
action, but the July 2000 MEF theft of 60 chainsaws and 24 outboard 
motors from UMW company went unreported, as did a serious incident 
involving the Leader of the Opposition (SIBC 2000; Roughan 2000cl). 
As Bishop Terry Brown noted in late August 2000, 
Honiara is cant inuing to experience mi\jor law pl'Oblems. Today a large group 
robbed the Honiara Casino of $100.000 in cash. I must say, anyone robbing 
the Honiara Casino has a certain Robin Hood character as the casino has done 
much harm to the general population. I-Iowever, reputable stores are also being 
robbed daily, It is hard to know who is doing the robbery~genuine Malatta 
Eagles, fake Malaita Eagles or someone totally different (they all dress alike and 
they are mostly all from Malaita) . As all Honiara security remains in the handS 
of the Eagles, the police can do nothing. Auld also has a small crime wave. Last 
week, a group of seven Eagles robbed a local fish and chip shop at gun point 
and stole seven bags of fish and chips (they were hungry as they had not been 
paid) (Brown 2000c). 
Ulufa'alu, who continued to protest that he had been removed by 
force, was now 'Caretaker' Leader of the Opposition. He ned from 
Honiara to Malaita, but not before paying more than A$2,000 
compensation to the MEF'~ who abducted and interrogated him, then 
beat him up and tllreatened to kill him because he had insulted them 
(Angiki 2000a). The MEF signalled its support for the new government, 
but the rFM and Guadalcanal provincial government refused to accept 
or deal with it because the change had occurred under duress and six 
MPs, including the former deputy prime minister and two other 
ministers, had been prevented from attending the meeting of parliament 
by the MEF.J Fighting also escalated around Marau, Upper Tasahe, the 
NPF housing estate and Alligator Creek, where the buIldozcr"tank was 
used to cut into rFM territory. Women and church leaders continued to 
try to mediate the situation. 
Honiara residents knew that the MEF operated a 'panel beating 
shop'····meaning a place where captured rFM militants were 
140 
The incredible sinking nation: Manasseh $ogavare's government 
interrogated and beaten to death. If men suspected of being ex-IFM 
were found on Malaita, where they had fled to their Malaitan wives' 
families, they were brought back to Honiara and killed at one of the 
MEF camps. The IFM was just as bad in its use of violence and torture. 
Reports circulated in the overseas press of houses burnt down at Rifle 
Range Valley on the edge of Honiara, and of a Malaitan youth captured 
by the IFM and dragged behind a four-wheel drive vehicle (Skehan 
20(JOb). Both sides of the conflict were reported by reliable sources to 
be torturing and beheading captured members of the opposing group, 
whether or not they were active combatants (Brown 2000a). Horror and 
despair in Honiara reached a peak of sorts on 11 July, when three masked 
gunmen broke into the locked surgical ward of the National Referral 
Hospital and shot dead two IFM patients in their beds. The MEF denied 
responsibility, and the government immediately paid out S$200,000 in 
compensation to prevent the peace negotiations being derailed. Two 
weeks into the new government, the SIDC reported that 109 people, 
mostly children, had been taken hostage at Marau. The 'Are'are-speaking 
Marau people had fled to small offshore islands and the Mbirao people 
had escaped to the mountains. Through all of this, the government 
pretended that the situation was normal (Treadway 2000a; Roughan 
2000b; Jo]omoIl Star, 5 July 2000; SIDC, 11, 12, 15 July 2(00). 
On 19 July, the SIDC matter-of-factly announced that 
rt1 hejoint paramilitary Malaita Eagle Force is planning more operations in areas 
east and west of Honiara. And the joint Commander is asking civilians to move 
out of meas between Alligator Creek and Gold Ridge cast of Honiara, and 
between Kakabona ,md Mamara, west. of the capital. 
The MEF was treated as part of the law and order apparatus of the 
state, and seerns to have become alr-nost a military ann of the 
governrnent. Violence, theft and intimidation continued to wear down 
110niara residents. Camp commanders were supposedly controlled by 
the MEF Supreme Council, but they had in fact degenerated into local 
criminal warlords with personal territories. Prime Minister Sogavare's 
position was thus unenviable····-··his government had no revenue and no 
control over law and order. 
The national picture in June-December 2000 was characterised as a 
struggle between militants from Guadalcanal and Malaita, but this 
notion erroneously presumes that the MEF and IFM were coherent 
movements. The central IFM had little control over rogue elements, 
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such as the group who remained with I-Iarold Keke, and the MEF was 
itself far from a united harmonious group. All of Malaita, particularly 
the north, suffered deprivations by the MEF, ex-militants, or criminals 
pretending to be MEF. Auld was generally much calmer than Honiara, 
but there too the situation was sometirnes quite explosive. 
Late in May 2000, the Auld police, led by former MEF commander 
Moses Su' u, mounted an operation to arrest two former MEF members, 
James Tatau and Moses Ako, vvho had claimed S$2,5 rnilJion compensation 
from Jonathan Malaii for logging profits and land destruction. On the 
evening of 30 May, there was gunfire from one end of Auki to the other 
as the police chased Tatau, shooting at his Hilux. The following day, 
some of their relatives, who had been taken into 'protective custody', 
were released only after they paid S$5,000 compensation to the ex-MEF 
because Tatau had sworn at the police. Extortion continued for several 
days, with threats to burn down houses, countered by payment of 
tafiJij'ae (shell wealth) and more cash. Bishop Brown also faced a 
demand for S$5,000 in compensation because of il letter he had 
published in Solomon Star, complaining about the behaviour of the 
Police Special Force/Special Constable mission (Brown 2000a). 
Peace negotiations before the Townsville peace talks 
In fact, the IFM and the MEF were not the military arms of their 
respective provincial governments despite some close alliances, 
particularly between Alebua, Guadalcanal Province and the IFM. On 
some occasions, Guadalcanal Premier Alebua acted as the direct 
representative of the IFM. The MEF on the other hand were always 
represented by Andrew Nori, and, although they frequently consulted 
with him, Malaita Province Premier Oeta was wary of Nori and the 
MEF Moreover, the Guadalcanal and Malaita provincial governments 
never really benefited from the huge compensation payments from the 
national governrnent, because the payments were stolen. 
On 13 July 2000, the national government issued a peace plan to end 
the social unrest, revive economic growth and stability, and ensure a 
more equitable distribution of resources. Many of the provisions centred 
on increased provincial-level economic development, but the plan also 
included the establishment of a Defence Force and Air Surveillance Unit. 
The plan's objective was to absorb the militants into the new force and 
reintegrate them into society, and to create a defence force that could 
combat any future coup. Critics pointed out that there was little point 
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in making the militants more efficient robbers and killers: why not 
spend the money on business projects that could retrain the militants to 
re-enter civil society?fj 
Further peace talks, including negotiations on a draft ceasefire 
agreement, were planned for HMAS Tbbruk in late July, The Sogavare 
government considered granting an amnesty to all militants, something 
the Ulufa'alu government had always refused to countenance, On 17 
July, Deputy Prime Minister Kemakeza met with Guadalcanal Premier 
Alebua at Tetere Beach east of Honiara to discuss the planned ceasefire, 
The Security Council convened on 20 July to ratify the plan, and the 
Attorney-GeneraJ's office began drafting an Amnesty Bill, The HMAS 
Tbbruk talks began at the same time, chaired by parliamentary Speaker 
Paul Tovua and Ombudsman Sir Peter Kenilorea, based on details given 
to the warring groups on 19 July. Those in attendance included IFM 
and MEl' commanders, the two provincial premiers, and representatives 
of the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA), NGOs, the 
Chamber of Commerce, women's organisations, and the Chinese and 
Gilhertese communities·······a much more inclusive group than at any 
previous negotiations. The MEF was represented by Andrew Nori, four 
officials and 11 commanders, The west Guadalcanal IFM was 
represented by Sethuel Kelly and five commanders, with Henry Tobani 
as leader of the eastern rFM's nine commanders, The SIBC reported that 
t.he two militant groups sat glowering at each other, but their 
willingness to attend was a good omen, Alt.hough three consecutive clays 
of talks were originally planned, the meeting was delayed after the first 
day because the MEl' protested that. three import.ant Il'M 
commanders--Harold Keke, Joseph Sangu and George Grey--had not 
signed the IFM ceasefire proposal or attended the talks, The MEl' 
subsequently promised them safe passage to reach I··IMAS lobruk. 
Meanwhile, fighting continued outside Honiara, Most of the city's 
water supply was shut down when the IFM damaged the Kongulai 
water supply eqUipment.. On 25 July, a renegade MEl' group burnt 
down a number of homes in Independence Valley in west Honiara. 
Nonetheless, despite several breaJ<s in negotiations, a ceasefire was finally 
signed on Tuesday 1 August, and a Ceasefire Monitoring Council 
(CFMC) established to supervise the agreement, investigate breaches of 
the ceasefire and make recommendations, and engage local or overseas 
parties to pnforce and monitor the agreement? Militants promised to 
refrain from provocat.ive behaviour and defensive or offensive activities 
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within restricted zones, and to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing 
weapons or equipment of war. The MEF was confined to an area of 
influence from the east side of Bonege River to the west: of Ngalimiu 
River, including the city area, but maintenance of law and order was to 
be handed back to the regular police (SIBC, 19, 20, 25 July and 2,3 
August 2000).8 All bona fide members of the MEF were required to 
register and also to stop committing illegal activities under MEF 
auspices. The IFM's sphere covered the remainder of Guada1canal, 
excluding Marau Sound. 'The government also intended to appoint 
Morton Siribeti, formerly a Deputy Commissioner, as commissioner of a 
reconstituted Royal Solomon Islands Police Force,9 
'The Ceasefire Agreement, hastily negotiated and imperfectly 
observed, was intended to last 90 days, with provision for an extension. 
During this time, looting continued, although the looters were now not 
always IFM or MEl' militants. Looting also became a profitable industry 
as fibreglass water tanks, roofing iron and solar hot water systems were 
'redistributed', particularly by associates of the MEF their trucks 
marked by fluttering red ribbons. The pararnilitary roadblocks and 
curfew remained in place. Only a week into the ceasefire, Il'M members 
killed an MEl' militant, prompting Andrew Nori to announce the 
reactivation of Operation Eagle Storm and the NIEF to launch an 
offensive into the Doma and Visale areas of west Guadalcanal. IFM 
spokesman Henry 'Tobani asked the Sogavare government to declare the 
area east of the Ngalimbiu River a disaster area. Despite platitudes in 
support of peace, and assurances by the government that everything was 
under control, neither side surrendered its weapons because neither 
trusted the other (SIBC, 8, 10, 11 August 2000). 'The CFMC 
established four monitoring posts, each with nine monitors, but the 
militants took no notice of the ceasefire and soon resumed bunker-too. 
bunker fighting at Alligator Creek (SIBC, 21 August 2000). 
HMAS .TrJbru]( departed and was replaced late in August by HMNZS 
Ie Kaha as the floating neutral venue. IIMNZS Ie Kaha was the venue 
on 25-27 August for a broadly-based ISO-delegate National Peace 
Conference funded by New Zealand and organised by the Civil Society 
Network. Participants included SICA, Women for Peace, the Chamber of 
Commerce and the NGOs Peace Committee. 10 More talks were held 
between the MEl' and Il'M from 2729 August, and Deputy Prime 
Minister Kemakeza Illet separately with MEl' and Il'M leaders to 
schedule joint talks for early September. The complex conununique that 
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resulted from the August National Peace Conference admitted that there 
were genuine grievances on both sides, and recommended that a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, similar to that in South Africa, be 
established to achieve peace and harmony, Grants of amnesty were to be 
conditional on testimony before the commission, The plan was that 
provinces should share the burden of compensation payments, and all 
stakeholders had to be involved in rehabilitation, The cornrnunique also 
noted that systems of governance needed to be reassessed, and issues of 
land migration and education had to be resolved. The MEF was 
dissatisfied with the communique because the inclusion of Civil Society 
Network institutions partly removed the peace agenda from their 
control (National Peace Conference 2000).11 
Peace talks originally scheduled to begin on the Te Kaha on 5 
September were postponed for two days, and continued from then until 
13 September, A forum at the USP Centre on granting amnesty was also 
postponed. The atmosphere at the talks was a little more relaxed than 
that at the ceasefire negotiations-Guadalcanal and Ma1aita provincial 
leaders for the first time asked the nation for forgiveness, and 
acknowledged that, even though there were legitimate grievances, the 
wrongs done in retaliation were unacceptable. IFM spokesman Henry 
Tobani stressed the root causes of the Guale unrest and their bona fide 
case, and Andrew Nori, accompanied by eighteen MEF commanders, 
signalled a desire to achieve peace (SIBC, 7 September 2000). 
'This, however, was shaken 48 hours later by events that amply 
demonstrated the IFM centre's lack of control over its fringes. IFM 
commander Harold Keke hijacked a Solornon Airlines plane at 
Mbambanakira airstrip, taking the pilot--Eric Rove from Roviana 
Lagoon-hostage and demanding S$2 million ransom for the plane. 
Keke made no threats against Rove, but insisted that he would only 
negotiate through the Melanesian BJ'Otherhooc!, which prompted the 
government to send them to intercede, Rove was finally released on 5 
October. 12 
The government hac! attempted to censor the media when tensions 
began in 1998, and renewed their efforts in mid September 2000 when 
it required all media organisations to submit all non-government media 
releases to the Office of the Prime Minister for vetting before release. It 
was unclear initialJy if this was intended only for government 
departments, or also included NGOs and the commercial media, but 
the move seemed to have been motivated by journalist Duran Angiki's 
145 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
articles attacking Andew Nori and Nori's counter-accusation that Angiki 
was a security risk. Angiki alleged that Nori had made a threatening 
phone call to him in Giza on 27 September·,·,'·,a charge which Nori 
absolutely denied-and that Angiki and his family had been physically 
threatened, causing them to flee. l3 Angiki was very frank, declaring that 
what had happened to him could happen to anyone who confronted 
political corruption in the Solomon Islands: 
.' .firstly, yOIl will receive harassments and death threats in some form: secondly 
your opponents wj]] Ibe] out to physically harm you; thirdly but not the least 
your opponents will resort to black magic to eliminate you (Angiki 2002a:n.p.), 
Angiki was not the only local journalist frightened by intimidation 
after publishing critical stories. 
As crime in l-1oniara climbed to previously unimaginable heights, all 
of Solomons Telekom expatriate staff left the country. The 2August 
ceasefire agreement had left the Marau issue (the fate of the 'Are'are­
speaking people and the Mbirao people of Marau Sound) to be settled 
by Guadalcanal Province. The issue looked likely to be resolved just 
before the next peace conference in Australia, but the emergence of a 
solution in fact took months longer (SIDC, 25 September 2(00). The 
main upshot of the September talks was that Australia would host peace 
talks in Townsville in mid October predominantly among militant 
groups rather than civil society. Some 130 delegates attended, including 
Nori, who led the MEF representatives, and 'T'arcisius 'Tara Kabutaulaka 
leading the IFM team with the assistance of Brisbane lawyer Leo White. 
Several important IFM leaders were also absent, most notilbly Harold 
Keke, who denounced the talks as a propaganda strategy by the MEE 
the government, and people from the Mar-au area (Angild 2000c). 
Despite its critics, the Townsville Peace Agreement was hailed as an 
important step in providing the blueprint for the peace process on 
several key issues. First, police who had joined the militants previously 
could now return to the police force without punishment. Second, the 
parliament was asked to pass an Amnesty Act to absolve militants from 
criminal prosecutions. Perhaps most importantly, all weapons and 
ammunition were to be surrendered within 30 days, under supervision 
of an u1J(lrmed International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). A Peace 
Monitoring Council was to be established with powers to monitor and 
enforce the agreement. Plans to repatriate mi1itants to their villages 
(each MEF man who returned home was to receive S$1,8(0) and to 
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counsel and rehabilitate them were already underway, Donor funds 
would be used to compensate all who had suffered loss of property, The 
two big failures were not reaching any agreement over the Marau region 
of Guadalcanal, and the absorption of excessive numbers of ex-MEF 
militants into the police as Special Constables,14 
Peace postTownsville 
The leaders returned from Townsville (each group of militants and their 
respective provincial leaders on separate airforce Hercules aircraft) with 
renewed optimism for the future, Nori announced that MEF bunkers 
and camps would be dismantled. Weapons and ammunition were to be 
surrendered and Kemakeza was confident that the plan could be 
implemented by the IPMT. IFM commander Andrew Te'e and MEF 
commander Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea gave rare interviews to the SlBC. 
Beginning on Friday 20 October and continuing over the weekend, 
Honiara residents witnessed a rare sight: smiling west and east IFM and 
MEF members parading from Kakabona through the city to Alligator 
Creek, their stolen Hilux trucks decked with peace banners and 
placards. Music and sirens fiJled the streets as a fire engine covered in 
flowers and youths paraded along, aided by police cars. Pedestrians 
joined in the processions, shaking hands with the militants. At Alligator 
Creek, the opposing forces left their bunkers, crossed into no-man's-land 
and hugged each other. The MEl' and IFM commands met separately to 
discuss implementation of the peace plans as parties and celebrations 
were held throughout the nation (SIBC, 20 October 2000; O'Callaghan 
2000e) . 
As the euphoria wore off, feelings of disquiet rapidly emerged, 
Solomon Islanders from other provinces who read the peace agreement 
closely noted that it had singled out Malaita and Guadalcanal for special 
treatment, particularly in relation to autonomy and the devolution of 
government powers, and that the rest of the nation had been ignored. 
Other provinces that had also suffered, such as Isabel and Western 
provinces, were ignored. The subsequent explanation was that the 
conference had aimed only to resolve tension between the two islands, 
not the enUre nation. As the government formed six sub-committees to 
carry out the various tasks from the 'Townsville Peace Agreement,15 
several questions emerged. Were the 500 high-powered weapons out in 
the community reaDy going to be returned? Could the police force be 
resuscitated and disentangled from the MEF? Would policemen who 
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had been involved with the militants return with any sense of discipline? 
Who would pay for aLi the looming compensation claims? And how 
could the economy be restarted? 
Repatriation of ex-militants soon turned into a scam. Sorne of those 
who participated received their money and went horne for a short 
holiday only to return later at considerable cost to the government. Others 
were appointed as special constables in the police force in effecting the 
proposals that emerged from the Townsville talks, By the end of 2001. 
over 2,000 speCial constables had been appointed, mainly from Malaita. 
Their intended role was to aid in the restoration of law and order, but 
the positions became more akin to a 'dole' payment to keep ex-militants 
away from a life of crime and basically institutionalised previous 
relations between the police and the MEF, adding little to the efficiency 
of the police at the cost of S$300,000 each week. Sogavare's plans to 
establish a defence force, which would have separated defence from 
policing and also absorbed many of the militants, never eventuated. 
The Marau Peace Talks, which had begun before the Townsville talks, 
were still ongoing during the last week of November, with no resolution 
in sight. In Honiara, the half-ruined GuadaJcanal provincial 
headquarters building, whlch the MEF had taken over, mysteriously 
burnt down at the same time. MEF leader Alex Bartlett condemned the 
action, but Alby Ham, who spoke on behalf of the Marau section of the 
MEr'~warned against building the new headquarters at Marau. Jeremy 
Rua, Supreme Commander of the MEF, advised that the Marau talks be 
speeded up if there was to be any chance of arms being surrendered, 
One of the talk sessions was moved to Vanuatu, with financial support 
from the New Zealand government, but there was still no outcome early 
in 2001. HMAS Thbruk was used as a venue in January 2001 and 
becarne the site of the eventual signing of another peace agreement on 7 
February 2001, under which the national constitution would be 
amended to include a separate Marau constituency with separate wards 
within the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly, and a development 
committee would be established to oversee socioeconomic advances. The 
last obstacle preventing disarmament had apparently been removed 
(SIBC, 20, 21 November 2000, 2, 15 January, 7 February 2001). 
Andrew Nori carne under scrutiny in February 2001 when the 
Registrar of the High Court initially refused to renew his practising 
certificates because of his involvement in coup-related activities. Nori 
was supported by the Bar Association, which argued that he had not 
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been found guilty of any misconduct relating to his profession. When 
Nori's law office building was burnt down by a disgruntled MEF 
member, who ol:(jected to the fees Nods firm had made from its 
negotiations on behalf of the MEF (rank-and-file MEF received very 
little compensation), the suspect was caught by the police and beaten to 
death in his cell. 16 
Meanwhile, Ezekiel Alebua was fast losing favour with the people of 
Guada1c:anal. }-·le was criticised publicly-something that would never 
have happened earlier-for purchasing a 300-horsepower speedboat. In 
March 2001, seven of Alebua's ten Guadalcanal Cabinet members 
resigned in protest against his leadership style and management of 
provincial funds, leading to reports that there would soon be an election 
for a new premier. The status quo was restored, however, when the 
Deputy Premier and the Education Minister resigned and the others 
withdrew their resignations (SIRC, 3 February, 5, 22 March 2001). 
'No more guns': peace monitors and return of 
weapons 
By 2000, it was evident. that the people of the Solomon Islands were 
united in t.heir campaign for the return of weapons. 'No more guns' 
stickers were plastered on vehicles, homes, and businesses as part. of the 
ensuing campaign. By the end of 2000, tension between the IFM and 
the MEF had clearly eased, although the Marau, Weathercoast and 
Guada1c:anal plains areas were still on edge. Areas in nort.h Malaita and 
around Auld remained chaot.ic but large areas of central and south 
Malaita experienced little conflict. Even so, the task of regaining custody 
of firearms, and distingUishing between real and imitation guns was 
prOVing to be difficult. In response, the government amended the 
Fireann5 and Ammunition Act to prohibit t.he possession, importation or 
manufacture of imitation firearms (SIRC, 21 November, 7 December 
2(00). The International Peace Monitoring Team (IPM'I") taskforce, 
comprising 14 New Zealanders and 35 Australians, arrived in early 
November 2000 and was split into five groups covering two provinces 
(SIBC, 2 November 2000). The team was initially headed by David 
l-'Iegarty-Australian academic and Department of Foreign Affairs' South 
Pacific expert (Hegarty 2001 a, 2001 b)-with New Zealand's Sarah 
Craig acting as deputy, The IPMT's task was to act as an unarmed 
observer of a process in the hands of the former militants and Sir Peter 
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Kenilorea's Peace Monitoring Council and its observers. The IPMT was 
taken as a sign that some resolution of the conflict was possible, its sheer 
presence calming, and the early groups were sensitive to the local 
situation. As time progressed, however, the organisation grew Jess 
effective. 
Despite support from both MEF and IFM leaders, the 30-day 
deadline for the surrender of weapons came and went in mid November 
2000 and was extended until mid December. The government offered 
further incentive to the leaders by promising to pass an Amnesty Act if 
weapons were returned, prompting 200 MEF members to surrender 
their weapons to the IPMT at Auki on 15 December 2000. 'rhe first 
major IFM surrender of weapons occurred in January 2001, when 43 
guns were handed over to the newly--appointed IPMT head Simon 
Merrifield. By March 2001, some 850 weapons had been surrendered. 
Unfortunately, many were homemade or of Second World War vintage, 
and 500 weapons, including high-powered self-loading rifles and 50­
calibre machine guns and grenade launchers, were thought to be still in 
the community (Dinnen 2002:292-93: C)'Callaghan 200 la: SIDC, 2 
January 2001). Solomon Islanders earlier possessed very few high­
powered weapons, Although a small number of rifles and shotguns were 
used by villagers to shoot pigeons, their use did not playa major role in 
criminal activities until the arrival of the militants, The attitude of the 
youth c1langed when they realised that it was easy to extort money and 
goods with a lethal weapon. Consequently, the willingness to perpetrate 
crimes increased while respect for elders decreased. As authority had 
corne to lie in the possession of illegal weapons, people were reluctant 
and slow to relinquish them. Deep down, neither side in the connict 
was willing to trust the other and disarm. 
Frorn about January 2001, there was a welcome change in the 
nomenclature used by the media and a return to freer speech. Militants 
were now described as 'fonner militants' and criminals were no longer 
able to hide behind the rhetoric of being freedom fighters, although the 
media was still careful to supress names. 'rhe IPMT had failed to 
convince the militants to return their weapons, but tried a new tack, 
which was against the letter of the 'Townsville Peace Agreement and 
against the wishes of Kenilorea and his Peace Monitoring Council. The 
IPMT suggested that the IFM and the MEF place the weapons in 
locked compartments in an armoury instead of totally surrendering 
them. The government held to its latest deadline for the return of 
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weapons and stolen property, 31 May 2001, which passed without 
much change (O'Callaghan 2001b; Post-Courier, 27 May 2000). 
The Townsville Peace Agreement was reviewed in August/September 
20rn and, although the peace had been far from perfectly observed, by 
any ot::>jective measure the situation had improved dramatically. The 
IFM increasingly faced factional fighting as Harold Keke and his 
followers broke away from the main movement to become maverick 
outlaws, Keke, now opposed by his former IFM ally Andrew Te'e, 
became a cult-like figure-the 'Scarlet Pimpernel' of Guadalcanal-and 
was at one stage hunted by a joint force of rival IFM and MEF 
militants. Keke demanded details of how GuadaIcanal PrOvince had 
divided up the S$2.5 million paid as compensation by the former 
Ulufa' alu government. 
Early in 2001, the government used the patrol boat Lata-crewed by 
a motley collection of regulars, paramilitary police, MEF men ancl 
special constables-in several clandestine missions to the Weathercoast 
to attack Keke and his followers. The Lata's crew strafed Villages with the 
boat's 50·calibre machine gun before .Ianding to set fire to houses (SIBC, 
15 March, 3 April 2001; O'Callaghan 2001c). The Lata operations did 
nothing to aid the peace process as up to 2,000 Weathercoast people 
were said to be hiding in the bush. 
Keke continued to behave unstably, and was counselled to take a 
softer, less violent path when he met with Deputy Prime Minister 
Kemakeza and in a phone conference with his family member Til1'cisius 
Tara Kabutaulaka. In June 2001, he and his cousin Joseph Sangu, 
fonner Supreme Commander of the IFM western region, were 
implicated in a plot to assassinate Premier Alebua, during which the 
Premier was wounded. Part of the reason for the attack was to gain the 
S$200,000 compensation payment supposedly in Alebua's possession 
(SIBC, 22 March 2001; Pacnews, 1 June 2001; Courier-Mail, 2 June 
2001; Pacific Magazine, July 2001; SIBC, 15 March, 12 April, 5 12 
June 2001). In November 2001, Keke dismissed claims that he 
intended to disrupt the national elections, and denied that he had 
tortured and killed several people in the preceding months. Other 
reports suggested that he had promised to kill anyone who voted against 
his favoured candidates (SIBC, 22 July, 7, 8 November 2001). 
From its inception, the peace truce operated on fragile grounds. 
When six masked men destroyed the Malaitan premier's car at the 
central police station in Auki in September 2001 it was perfectly clear 
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that criminals were in control, not the MEF or the police (Courier-Mail, 
27 September 2001; SlBC, 27, 17 October 2001), In September 2002, 
a uniformed senior policeman, in full view of the deputy prime minister 
and cheered on by other police, physically attacked a civil society leader. 
Far more serious, however, was the murder in that month of former IFM 
commander Selwyn Saki, who was found in the Japanese Peace 
Memorial at Mt Austin, throat cut and body mutilated, Despite police 
assurances of a through investigation, no one was arrested or charged 
over the killing until the RAMSI intervention in 2003 (Kabutaulaka 
2002a; Solomon Star, 22 October 2003). 
Civil society 
The most important changes in this period came from within the Civil 
Society Network, in recognition of the fact that the participation of the 
churches, women's groups, and other NGOs would be essential if the 
crisis was to be solved, The Civil Society Network empowered women to 
achieve peace and sustainable development during the peace negotiations, 
despite the traditional male domination of political and development 
processes in the Solomon Islands (Leslie 2002; Barns 2000; Waiiace 2000: 
Liloqula 2000; Pollard 2000: Paina 2000), The Solomon Islands 
Christian Association (SICA), representative of the nation's five main 
Christian denominations, also increased its role, Fundamentally, it was 
the Catholic Sisters and the Anglican Melanesian Brothers and Sisters 
who brought a sense of normality to the two feuding militant groups 
(Weir 2000). 
The clergy were thus on the frontline of the conflict, as Catholic 
Father Augustine Geve discovered when he was kidnapped at Marau for 
a few days in early July 2001 by militants, Two weeks later, Archbishop 
Adrian Smith was turned back at an MEF roadblock on his way to 
investigate the deaths of two people after the Catholic Clinic at Visale, 
west of Honiara, carne under arrned attack, Because the .majority of the 
Guadalcanal people were Catholic, the church faced MEF allegations of 
bias towards the IFM, Nori claJmed that the archbishop was 
hypocritical and the church was not neutral. Similar allegations were 
made against the Melanesian Brotherhood although the 'Tasiu' Brothers 
were regarded affectionately by both sides and at the same time fcared 
on the strength of their mana (spiritual power). The Bmthers continually 
risked their lives over several months, moving between the MEF ane! 
IFM bunkers and sleeping in the militants' camps to urge peace. 
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Four religious communities had their headquarters in rural 
Guadalcanal. In the west were the Melanesian Bothers at Taballa, the 
Sisters of Melanesia at Verana' aso, and the Society of St. Francis at 
IIautambu, whilst the Sisters of the Church at Tetete nl Kolivuti resided 
in the east. All four also had significant bases in 1Ioniara. initially providing 
places of refuge but later acting as negotiators between the feuding groups. 
The Melanesian Brothers and members of the Anglican Franciscans also 
worked to maintain peace around Auki, and by travelling on MV Ramos 
II and MV Ramos III They also provided secmity for individual homes 
and companies around Honiara and Auki, and participated in the work 
of the Peace Monitoring Council (SIBC, 6 November 2000; Brown 
2000b, 2003a). The Malaita Diocese of the Anglican Church of 
Melanesia cooperated with the Catholic, SSEC, SDA and smaller 
churches in north Malaita to set up ecumenical parish peace committees, 
which worked with returning militants, their families, and victims of 
violence and theft, to build relationships and trust with the police. 
The first ever ecumenical conference of chiefs from north Malalta was 
held at Malu'u from 7-10 December 2000, comprising 150 official 
delegates and 50 observers. This was followed by a Central Region chief's 
conference in June 2001 held at Dala in west Kwara'ae. The churches 
cooperated better than they ever had before, Even the Seventh-day 
Adventist (SDA) church, which traditionally separates itself from the other 
major Christian denominations, joined in to deal with the crisis. Its 
members had been on the frontline of fighting at Betikarna (near Honiara's 
Henderson airport), the site of a SDA secondary school, and then the 
headquarters of the Western Pacific Union Mission (SIBC, 15, 19, 20 July, 
3, 5 August 2000; Brown 2000d: Northern Region Chiefs' Conference 
2000; Expanded Central and Keava Regions Chiefs' Conference 2001),17 
N GOs, linked since the mid 1980s under the Development Services 
Exchange (DSE) , acted in unison (SIBC, 3J May 2001). The DSE moved 
in mid 2000 to set up offices in the provinces to coordinate programs 
aimed at village-level development (Roughan 2000e: SIBC, 10, J9 July 
2000; Radio Australia, 13 July 2000). The Civil Society Network also 
began operating in Gizo in mid 2000 as a loose connection of concerned 
citizens, many of whom had f1ed home from Honiara. A Community 
Watch began, and a police radio program was established on 'RadiO 
IIapi Lagoon'. In April 2001 similar groups were also formed at Munda 
and at Buala on Isabel as a result of greater government efforts to combat 
the increase in violence and lawlessness. IS 
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Increasingly, overseas donors channelled aid through civil society 
organisations, particularly the Civil Society Network and individual 
Christian denominations, rather than the malfunctioning government. 
Church and other NCO leaders also published articles in the local press, 
to provide guidance for the 'grassroots' population caught up in the 
violent political storm. 19 It was evident that any reform needed as its 
base the churches, trade unions, youth and women's groups, businesses, 
community leaders and NCOs. 
Tension remained between elements of civil society, militants, and 
the government over who would control the peace agenda. In September 
2000. Honiara's USP Centre was advised not to hold a planned forum 
on the government's proposed amnesty offer after the MEF threatened 
to burn down the centre if it went ahead. The Centre's director, .Julian 
'Ij'eadaway, was threatened and forced to flee to remote 'Tikopia. Similarly, 
civil society activist and SICA representative Matthew Wale had his 
home raided by 30 heavily armed north Malaitan men. After taking 
around S$200,000 of the family's property, the MEF sent an extortion 
message the next day asking S$10,000 for the property's return (SIBC, 
GSeptember 2000; Amnesty International 2000a; Wale 2(00). 
The national government had wanted to keep control of donor 
funding. They were critical of the lack of NGO accountability, and 
noted that NCO priorities did not correspond to those of the state. For 
this reason, the government seemed fearful of losing its authority and 
began to criticise groups such as SICA for their 'misgUided' involvement 
in politics. Prime Minister Sogavare went as far as to call SICA 'immoral' 
and 'un-Christian' (Huni'ehu 2001:n.p.). He even found an ally in 
Jeremy Rua, former MEF Supreme Commander, who condemned CSN 
for being 'irrational, insensitive and most arrogant' and as being 'the 
biggest enemy of the current peace initiatives' (Rua 2001). However, 
supporters such as John Roughan argued that the contribution from 
civil society was important and vital to finding a feasible solution: 
... unless village life is significantly upgraded with better access to water, food 
and preventative health strategies. e.g. treated mosquito nets. tinnily toilets, 
primary health care, then the quality of life will continue to drop. Young 
militants returning to village life had better tlnd a better scene than the one 
they abandoned during their war days. If not, then thl:' heavy-duty weapons 
which many still have access to will once more corne into use. 
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Civil society's church groups, women's organizations and NGOs could act as the 
organizalional underpinnings of this reachout to the village, It would be difficult 
to find a villag(~ that docs not interact with one or more of these organizational 
networks. These organizations would be well placed to carry out the investment 
of I\mds needed to raise the quality of village life (Roughan 2000a:5), 
Early in February 2001, Honiara's CSN groups began to meet once a 
week to map out strategies to get the nation back on track (Roughan 
2001b, 2001c). One of the most innovative CSN projects was the 
People First Network (PFnet), the website of the UNDP-sponsored 
Solomon Islands Development Administration and Participatory 
Planning Programme (SIDAPP). Although the website was initially a 
marketing tool, it soon became an information hub, linking people in 
Honiara and the provinces to the rest of the world, Internet cafes were 
soon established (without coffee, but with low charges), with the aim of 
achieving a network of 26 rural email stations through the nine 
provinces, linking all urban centres, The user rate was remarkable­
individuals kept in touch, students used the network for research, and 
public servants used the system to get information and transfer it to the 
provinces. SIDAPP also developed other community-based projects, 
which identified 6,000 families in 500 villages for direct small project 
assistance (Tugiri 2001: SIBC, 2 January 2(01). 
CSN groups also opposed the government's plans to delay the 
national elections. In an embarrassing event on 18 April 2001, the 
prime minister's special advisor, Edward I-Iuni' ehu, and government 
consultant, Francis Saemala, were shouted down by a audience of 500 
when they tried to justity delaying the election (SIBC, 19 April 2001: 
Roughan 2001h, 2001g), The Solomon Star of 4. May carried a cartoon 
of a playground see-saw with the many members of the CSN on one end 
and a perplexed and humiliated Huni'ehu representing the government, 
way up in the air and out of control, at the other. The government had 
never met such concerted public opposition, and since there were no 
opinion polls this came as a shock. Defeat of the move to extend the 
parliament was heralded as a triumph for civil society and helped restore 
some confidence in the democratic process. Another success followed in 
May 2001 when a peace conference was convened by four national icons­
Sir David Kausimae, Sir Lloyd Maepeza Gina, Sir Gideon Zoloveke and 
Bishop Norman Palmer (Public Forum of the Peace Process 2001). 
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In providing a voice for women in the predominantly male world of 
Solomon Islands' politics, the CSN exemplified what 'people power' can 
achieve, After its victory over the election postponement, the movement 
turned its focus to import duty remissions. On 18 July 2001, the 
Solomon Star published a list of individuals, companies and institutions 
closely connected to the government that had received more than S$16 
ml1lion in exemptions. The government was reluctant to comment on 
the matter, claiming only that the Finance Minister had been forced to 
sign many of the remissions at gunpoint. Another S$1.4 million in tax 
exemptions and remissions were authorised during September 2001 
(Roughan 2001g: SIBC, 14 August, 15 November 2(01). 
***** 
Decentralisation 
In 1899, the British Protectorate government expanded its territory to 
include all islands from Isabel north to a border between Bougainville 
and the Shortlands and thus mapped the boundaries of the modern 
Solomon Islands. The post-independence nation inherited a centraLisl,d 
power structure, but had the flexibility to accommodate greater regional 
autonomy. As a result, a quasi-federal system emerged, where power was 
distributed between the national and provincial governments. 
This structure was investigated in several reviews. Spurred by the 
Kausimae Committee investigations in 1977. Western Province's 
attempts to break away from the nation, and Guadalcanal Province's 
petitions for a revision of the systern, the Mamaloni government passed 
the Provincial Government Act 1981. Under this Act, each province had 
plenary legislative power and control over traditional government 
responsibilities, such as education, public works and agriculture. Most 
financial matters, however, remained the responSibility of the national 
government. An annual premiers' conference was also established. Two 
new provinces·········Choiseul and Central Islands·--were created when the 
original provincial structure was found to be unwieldy. 
In 1987, a Constitutional Review Committee had been established 
to examine the relationship between the central government and the 
regions, during which the premiers recommended adopting a federal 
system. In 1988, Guadalcanal Province again petitioned for increased 
autonomy, and in the same year the Alebua government began a review 
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to institutionalise the roies of traditionai chiefs, These pians coliapsed, 
however, when MarnaJoni was returned to government in 1989, 
In 1996, Mamaloni introduced a new Provincial Government Act, 
whleh restructured the system into two tiers of government, The 
provincial Councils were to be replaced by Provincial Assemblies whilst 
Area Assemblies replaced Area Councils, Chairpersons of Area 
Assemblies were automatically members of the Provincial Councils, and 
the premiers became presidents. The aim of the strategy was to promote 
the involvement of local Bigmen in the provincial governments as 
representatives of the people, Guadalcanal Province challenged the 
constitutional validity of the Provincial Government Act 1996 in the 
High Court, which eventually held it to be unconstitutional, forcing the 
act to be repealed and subsumed by the 1981 Act. The distance 
between law in theory and in actual practice is vast, however, and a lack 
of funds has made local government moribund since the early 1990s 
(Kabutaulaka 1998:37--38; Nanau 2002), 
In 2000, the provinces renewed their calls for greater autonomy and 
independence from the national government. Immediately after Sogavare 
came to power, Makira--Ulawa Province voiced its wish to become an 
independent nation, and Western Province claimed that it had not 
received government finance and began calling itself a state. Temotu 
Province declared itself self-governing from 8 August 2000, with the 
intention of becoming an independent nation within twelve months. 
The Santa Cruz Group claimed that it was not part of the original 1893 
Protectorate, and wished to revert to its status as an independent nation. 
It banned the national Minister for Provincial Affairs from visiting the 
province because a S$400,000 refugee displacement grant had not been 
paid. Temotu had already negotiated separate trade and shipping 
arrangements with its neighbour Vanuatu, demanded that the current 
Provincial Government Act be repealed, and threatened to break away as 
an independent state (SIBC, 10 August, 14 November 2000, 9 August 
2001). Choiseul Province, created in 1992, had been talking to the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army in neighbouring Bougainville about 
the pOSSibility of forming a new nation. and was working on a new state 
constitution. Isabel Province cited .its history as part of German New 
Guinea until the late 1890s, expressing its desire to be a state, and drew 
up plans for a new state constitution. Malaita had already declared its 
desire to become a state within a federal system, and GuacialcanaJ 
Province certainly needed no urging to safeguard its own rights. Rennell 
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and Bellona Province, the main Polynesian outlier population, also 
prepared a state constitution (SIDC, 5 July 2001; Council of Bishops 
2001). The small Central Islands Province was ambivalent, and 
preferred simply to arrange more autonomous relations with the central 
government. By mid 2000, the provinces had all Signalled clearly their 
desire to renegotiate a more independent relationship under a national 
umbrella government (SIDC, 11 July, 8 August, 14 November 2000, 14 
April, 27 May 2001). 
***** 
The effectiveness of any federal system depends on cooperation 
between the provinces and the centre to ensure allocative and productive 
efficiency within and amongst the provinces. This was the root of many 
problems in the Solomon Islands as the distribution of funding was not 
always equitable and resources were wasted when the provinces and centre 
duplicated functions. Although no study has been made of the costs of 
devolution of government structures in the Solomon Islands, tIle case of 
Papua New Guinea, which abolished its provincial governments in 1995, 
suggests that inefficient provincial governments can generate huge costs. 
In many provinces, staff were recruited mainly from the government 
rather than from the local areas, and were thus inefficient because they 
lacked local knowledge. There were also questions of duplication of 
functions, effiCiency and inequality of size. Solomon Islands had fifty 
national parliarnentarians and 20 Cabinet ministers. and more than 100 
proVincial parliamentarians and 135 An'a Councils representing just 
500,000 citizens, which clearly left too much scope for costly duplication. 
It was clear also that the small Central Islands (Savo, Florida and 
Russell), Rennell and Bellona, and Temotu Provinces were floundering 
economically, and required substantial subsidies in order to survive. 
Nonetheless. advocates of increased regional autonomy would seldom 
admit that provincial governments were often even less competent than 
the central government (which itself is frequently astonishingly 
incompetent). In fact, the provinces are no more 'natural' to the islands 
than the unity imposed by the British as a protectorate in the 1890s-­
the 'nation' is thus a collection of villages, descent groups and language 
groups, all of which have thoroughly local agendas. 
In late August 2000, the USP Centre held a workshop on slate 
government and decentralisation attended by 70 people, which 
concluded that the existing system of provinces was basically the same as 
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state government. 'Two major issues, however, needed to be addressed, 
First, the inequitable allocation of resources between the central and 
provincial governments needed to be resolved. Second, the provinces' 
status had to be guaranteed in the Constitution, instead of being sut~ject 
to the whim of a central government that could create or disband 
provinces as it saw fit. 
A peace conference in August 2002 addressed similar issues of 
governance, arguing that many of the problems stemmed from the 
present Westminster system of government, with the centralised system 
of resource ownership, distribution, management, and decision-making 
all contributing. It fairly concluded that decentralisation was the best 
option to foster regional development and reduce migration between 
provinces (Treadaway 2000a; SIBC, 29 August, 1, 14 November 2000). 
In November 2000, a conference of provincial premiers also discussed 
the future structure of government and the evolution of a more 
autonomous state system. They declared that the nation should be 
renamed the 'United Nations of Solomon Islands'. Three provinces, 
Makira-lJlawa, Temotu and Rennell-Bellona signalled their desire to 
secede, and were supported by Guadalcanal Premier Alebua, although 
he did not think fragmentation of the nation offered a long-term 
solution ((YCallaghan 2000f; SIBC, 20 November 2000). 
l[enry Okole, in his writing on provincial governments in Papua 
New Guinea, questioned whether the system was in fact unworkable, or 
whether public servants and politicians were themselves the source of 
the problems. 
For a highly fragmented country like Papua New Guinea. it would seem 
unwise to even consider giving more autonomy to provinces, let alone suggest 
the adoption of a federal system. However, it makes for a sound argument, too, 
to say that provinces restricted within a unitary system can breed a double­
pronged problem of dependency on and resentment against the national 
government.. In line with the latter, some provinces are being seen as liabilities 
and that is a potential flashpoint too (Okole 2003:65). 
Solomon Islanders wanted an increased degree of regional autonomy, 
which they explained in terms of statehood or quasi-statehood. They saw 
the dismembering of their nation as a possible solution to the crisis, 
taking power away from the central government and vesting it more 
with the provinces. But this strategy was largely fuelled by frustration 
rather than clear thinking. At the very least, Solomon Islanders wanted 
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assurance that the central government would not continue to have 
legislative power, and hence total control, over proVincial govermnent in 
the future. The rights of the provinces would have to be safeguarded by 
the Constitution. 
Compensation 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the mechanism of compensation between 
aggrieved groups is an integral part of Solomon Islands' traditional society. 
Traditionally, individuals and communities engaged in peace negotiations 
and restored relationships through compensation payments of traditional 
wealth items. After the coup, however, these long-standing customs took 
an interesting turn and became a cornrnercialised growth industry. Third-· 
party interventions to buy peace with modern currency have corrupted 
the traditional principles, especially when the money used to 
compensate individuals, provinces and militant groups has been borrowed 
from the Central Bank or comes from overseas aid funds. In these instances. 
the cultural significance is missing: the process becomes a placatory 
bribe, with no binding long-term significance. Compensation payments 
by I:he national government did not follow the prescriptions of 
customary or modern law. These payments were institutionalised as early 
as 1978, when the Westem Province received money over the 'Ode to 
the West Wind'. The trend strengthened from ] 989 when the Cabinet 
authorised a payment of S$200,000 to Malaita Province after a disturbance 
in Honiara between the Malaitans and Polynesians from Rennell and 
Bellona (Akin 1999). In 1998, S$16,000 was deducted from Guadalcanal 
ProVince's estimates for the alleged rape of two Malaitan girls. The 
central government's refusal in that year to countenance Guadalcanal 
Province's claims for compensation-···..··in essence, a resubmission of its 
1988 claims-contributed further to the sense of aggrievement in the 
province. Under Sogavare, the government had regularly paid 
compensation payments, which in many cases were just extortion. While 
kastol11 is a dynamic and changing force, this does not justify the total 
corruption of the cornpensation concept (Foukona 2002). 
On Friday 7 July 2000, a S$lO million compensation ceremony took 
place between the premiers of Guadalcanal and Malaita, broadcast live 
on SIDC radio. Diplomats and members of Cabinet were present, but 
MEF and IFM representatives did not attend. 2o The government had 
taken upon itself the obligation to make cash payments in a modernisation 
of custom that prOVided benefits for a few but largely ignored citizens 
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from other provinces who had also been detrimentally affected by the 
events, Most of the S$10 million was stolen or misappropriated, which 
certainly cannot be justified as part of the dynamic evolution of kastom. 
The government also paid compensation when a Papua New Guinean 
I-lighlander man was beheaded by the MEF at Kakabona, west of 
Honiara. The man's relatives demanded nearly S$800,OOO as compensation 
and were eventually paid S$150,000.21 The fear of reprisals from PNG 
l'Iighlanders was so real that 20 Solomon Island students and their 
families were evacuated from the University of Goroka as a precaution. 
PNG I'!igh Commissioner Ponabe Yuwa plaintively begged for the head 
bad, so that the whole body could be returned to Goroka. When a part­
Malaitan was killed by Papua New Guineans in Giza, a counter-claim 
was made for S$750,OOO as well as ten Malaitan talulj'ae shell-wealth 
and ten bakia, Western Province's traditional shell-wealth. 
Some compensation demands were closer to extortion. North 
Malaitan MP Enele Kwanairara was forced to part with his constituency's 
S$20,000 share of the peace compensation money after MEF elements 
accused him of disrespect over a minor radio news report. In early 
August 2000, the government paid S$200,000 compensation for the lives 
of two Malaitan men who were kidnapped and killed by the IFM. Sam 
Alasia explained that the pr.ice of S$l 00,000 per man was paid because 
of precedents already set, despite the fact that the unfortunate deaths 
occurred before the ceasefire. Yet no mention was made that the MEF or 
the IFM should be responsible for compensating for the deaths and 
mischief they caused (SIBC, 18, 19, 26 July, 8, 12, 14 August 20(0). 
Compensation was intimately bound up with the June 2000 coup. 
As noted. the MEF stated that Sogavare had promised to pay them 
S$200 million in compensation if he was elected prime minister, which 
indicates that he may well have known about the coup plans (Dinnen 
2002:290). Faced with an empty treasury and groWing demands for 
compensation, his government had to rely on the Taiwanese to bankroll 
the operation. 'T'he GuadaIcanal Province received S$1.7 million, including 
S$200,000 for the deaths of two men at Visale in July 2000, deaths that 
sparked a retributive attack on the village of Allan Kemakeza, then 
Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, in which his 
brothel' was kidnapped for 10 days (SIRC, 25 August, 1 September 20(0). 
Fraudulent property claims were compensated abundantly, while 
smallholders who had lost everything often received nothing. Some 
prominent urban families found this such a profitable industry that they 
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were able to eat at restaurants every night. Little criticism emerged over 
this perversion of custo.m··_·--on the Iu·-Mi-Nao network, for example, the 
most vocal critics were the naturalised, rather than indigenous, citizens. 
The August 2000 peace talks acknowledged that compensation had 
been commercialised and no longer representc"d traditional practices 
(SIBC, 28 August 2000). 
After the Townsville Peace Agreement, the government needed money 
to pay compensation and negotiated a large loan from a Taiwanese bank. 
This was followed by numerous payments, the most notorious of which 
went to Deputy Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza as a result of the events 
on Savo. In the last week of August 2000, Guadalcanal IFM militants 
under the command of Harold Keke had burnt down homes belonging 
to four of Kamekeza's extended family (SIBC, 23 August 2000), When 
compensation money became available in July 2001, Kemakeza paid 
himself S$800,000, ahead of hundreds of other smaller long-standing 
claims. His Permanent Secretary, Lucian Ki'i, allocated himself 
S$700,000. Both men were removed from office after an investigation 
ordered by Prime Minister Sogavare found them guilty of misleading 
the Cabinet and misappropriating funds. Around this time, the acting 
Auditor··General estimated that 50 per cent of all compensation claims 
were fraudulent (SIBC, 11 and 26 July 2001). 
The compensation saga took an interesting turn in 2000. The 
government offered to pay for the lawyers acting for the MEF and IFM, 
Andrew NOd's firm, Bridge Lawyers, was paid S$447,000 for services to 
the MEF, which many considered to be too high, despite Nod's claims 
that it was a fair payment for professional services. Nori's detractors 
believed that he was not merely acting as instructed by the MEr,: but 
was in fact their voice and leader. Nori conSistently denied that he had 
been paid millions of dollars and in 2002 claimed to have received only 
S$113,000. This was contradicted by a statement in 2003 putting the 
amount at S$430,000 (S$370,000 after tax), plus another S$80,000 
that had not been paid,zz On another tack, the IFM militants, who had 
looted and destroyed most of the Gold Ridge mine site, without a hint 
of irony asked the company to compensate them for guarding the mine 
from destruction (Anglki 20UOb; SIBC, 14 September, 2 October, 23 
Novembc"r 2000). 
The government paid out mll1ions of dollars to former members of 
the militant groups. A leaked list of compensation payments made 
between October 2000 and May 2001 by the Ministry of National Unity, 
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Reconciliation and Peace showed 270 payments were made totalling 
S$18,82 rniUion. Some went to militants, such as the S$123,840 paid 
to IFM commander Andew Te'e as a 'disarmament allowance', while 
other payments went to politicians, such as S$50,000 to Sethuel Kelly 
For 'being attacked' and S$150,000 to ].0. Tausinga for 'educational 
assistance' (Pacilic Magazine, September 2001:29; SIBC, 28 February 
2001). 
Aid donors and diplomacy 
Aid donors were uncertain how to handle the civil war, The only notable 
absentee was the United Kingdom, which felt little residual 
responsibility from its Protectorate years (1893-·,1978) beyond offering 
platitudes of support for peace and the restoration of full democracy, 
The only substantial British support came through the London .. based 
VSO and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (SIBC, 2 and 9 
January 2001). The main donors were 'Taiwan, Japan, the European 
Union (EU) , Australia and New Zealand. 
At the time of the coup, the European parliament warned that the 
European Union's development assistance program to the Solomon 
Islands-worth S$300 million-could be cut off if democracy, peace 
and stability were not restored. Nonetheless, it became the largest aid 
donor when in Nove,mber 2000 it announced an aid package worth 
US$200 million (Pacnews, 14 November 2000). Core support also came 
From the Australian and New Zealand governments, which indicated 
they would do as much as possible to stabilise the nation if peace were 
restored. Australia offered to set up an office for the Ceasefire Monitoring 
Council and hosted a meeting with the World Bank for donors to the 
Solomon Islands, followed by a visiting mission in October 2000. 
Australia had steadily increased its support for the Solomon Islands 
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2003:47; O'Connor 2003:26). 
The relationship between Solomon Islands and the RepublIc of 
China (ROC, Taiwan) verges on that of a client state and its patron. The 
Solomon Islands agreed to recognise the legality of Taiwan and received 
cash in return. Under the agreement, 'Taiwan expects the Solomon 
Islands to advocate its cause in UN forums, and pays for the Solomon 
Islands' diplomatic missions accordingly. Thus, Taiwan offered S$10 
million in assistance for the Peace and Reconciliation Program, S$7.5 
million towards the Rural Community Development Fund, and S$1.6 
million as a final payment for technical rehabilitation of SIBC 
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equipment. ROC and the Solomon Islands' government refuted claims 
t.hat the Sogavare government was playing Taiwan off against rnainland 
China by asking ROC for US$150 million in exchange for preserving 
diplomatic relations. 
Prime Minister Sogavare and Foreign Minister Rini visited Tapei in 
October 2000 in an atternpt to appease the ROC government after the 
previous Soiomon Islands Foreign Minister Danny Philip had 'flirted' 
with mainland China. 23 They calculated that Taiwan would be willing 
to provide greater amounts of aid and loans if the Solomon Islands 
damped down its flirtation with Comrnunist China. ROC President 
Chen Shui-bian received a Star of the Solomon Islands medal for his 
troubles. More funding negotiations took place in February 2001, with 
the government unsuccessfully seeking a loan and grant package of 
S$300 million (Pad1Jc Magazine, September 2001; SIDC, 9 July 20(1). 
After the Townsville peace talks, Japan also offered to help Australia 
and New Zealand implement the peace resoiutions. It had already 
provided nearly S$690 million in grants and technical assistance since 
1978, and funded the upgrading of Henderson International Airport, 
the Honiara water supply and the Lungga power developrnent. High-· 
level talks were held with the World Bank and the IMF to secure further 
assistance from international donors. An eight-member African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States Fact Finding Mission--led by 
Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister Sir John Kaputin-arrived in late 
August 2001 to investigate and report back to the European Union on 
necessary economic assistance. A mission fr0111 the Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid began an extensive provincial tour to ascertain what help 
was needed, and the European Union was ready to distribute S$3 
million through World Vision (SIDC, 21 August, G September 2000). 
Financial measures and declining government services 
John Roughan argued that there were three notable concurrent conf1icts 
on the islands. Basically, these resolved to the conf1ic:t between the IFM 
and the MEF; that between 'thieves. thugs and opportunists' and the 
almost non-existent police force; and the battle against government 
mismanagement and maladministration (Roughan 2000a). In 
Roughan's analysis, the leaders operated as if the 'government purse, 
national resource base and the country's wealth belongs primarily to 
thern, their families and their cronies' (Roughan 2000a:4). The issue of 
governance had been the catch-cry of aid donors to Pacific nations in the 
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1990s. They came to appreciate that there was a disjunction between 
the way government processes were set up at independence and the way 
they had been administered since. l'he Solomon Islands, undeniably a 
failing state amongst the new Pacific islands nations, exhibited all of the 
worst features. Ulufa'alu's government had recognised the malignant 
cancer that was destroying the Solomon Islands' state apparatus and 
tried to bring accountability back into public life to get the nation back 
on track. This was to no avail, since self-serving politicians and those 
who stood to lose the most moved to ensure an environment of 
instability. This, when combined with the mismanagement of resource 
and infrastructure development, made a return to good governance 
practices almost impossible. 
Eight new permanent secretaries of departments were appOinted early 
in September 2000, joining 12 similar officials who had served the 
Ulufa'alu government. SICI·m and most schools on Guadalcanal were 
scheduled to restart classes at the end of August 2000. 'Numba 9' (the 
National Referral Hospital) operated with a shortage of staff and 
equipment, and in some instances patients had to provide their own 
syringes and food. There was no money to send students back to the 
University of the South PaCific in Suva, so their return was delayed until 
2001. In the interim they were trained as Peace and Development 
Volunteers. SICHE, owed millions of dollars by the government, had to 
suspend many of its programs, unable to continue on intermittent 
week-by-week grants. Yet the government nonetheless had enough 
money to send a delegation to the 55th session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, which was quite frivolous for a nat.ion that could 
not even finance its health and education systems. However, the New 
York trip went via Taiwan and probably had more to do with gaining 
significant levels of ROC funding. Each public servant sent on unpaid 
leave was given S$2,000 and a passage home (SIBC, 12, 15, 18 August, 
4 and 7 September 2000). 
The Sogavare governnwnt began in an impecunious state that only 
got worse. International aid, the only significant inflow to the Treasury 
during 2000-01, was spent at a prodigious speed. While tuna tinning 
slowly began again early in 2001, and there was some logging in Western 
Province, there was Little other economy activity. The Commodities 
Export Marketing Authority was broke and relinquished its role as the 
sole buyer of copra (SIBC, 16 February 2001). Revenue fell 14 per cent 
through 2000, with that from manufacturing sectors nose-diving, fisheries 
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falling 42 per cent, construction 31 per cent, and energy 30 per cent. 
Similarly, agricultural revenue dropped 25 per cent and oil"palrn exports 
fell 93 per cent between 1998 and 2000. By early 2001, government 
debt had risen to S$1 billion; the unemployment rate rose 15 per cent 
as many waged workers were sacked or sent on unpaid leave. 24 
The National Provident Fund was left without an income source as 
its investments in lelekom and the Malaita Shipping company yielded 
no returns. In the harsh economic conditions, neither Telekom, Malaita 
Shipping nor many other companies could turn in profits and repay 
their loans. This, along with excessive withdrawals because of increased 
redundancies, meant that its liabilities exceeded its assets (SIBC, 4 
December 2000, 12 January, 5 March, 18 November 2001). 
Government revenue collected in 2000 was only S$252 million, against 
a budgeted figure of S$471 million. In mid January 2001, the Central 
Bank warned the government that it had exceeded the ceiling provided 
under the Centrill Bank Act by S$I3. 5 million, and that continuous 
borrowing overseas would lead to inflation and a drop in the value of the 
Solomon dollar. Ric I-Iou, Governor of the Central Bank, warned that 
the nation had approximately six weeks of external reserves left, after 
which there would bG no money to import fuel, medicine or food. On 
26 February 2001, an Economic Summit was held when all major aid 
donors were told of the impending total economic collapse (Roughan 
ZOOId). A budgetary support grant from the 'Taiwanese government 
never eventuated, although a bank loan was arranged. The provinces 
were left begging. 
The national budget was due to be presented in March 2001. The 
government expected to raise S$189.5 rnillion through revenue, but 
needed another S$273.5 just to cover recurrent expenditure. A further 
S$563.6 million aiel was sought from overseas donors to finance the 
programs to restore law and order and maintain social services and 
economic reform (SIBC, 26 February 2001). 
Prime Minster Sogavare addressed the nation on 16 March 2001, 
describing the dire economic: problems of his 'sinking nation' and 
indicating for the first time that he was listening to the advice of the 
civil society groups. 
As our economy tail spins further into deeper recession the fear of a collapsed 
security market is now more eminent, and the worst is yet to corne, if we do not 
t.ake appropriat.e steps now (Sogavare 20tH). 
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Sogavare announced a rescue plan that included greater prudential 
controls on borrowing from the Central Bank, further reductions in the 
size of the public service and control of government overseas travel, as 
well as sides of government vehicles and other assets. He admitted that 
there was a need for tax reforms, and that local rnanufacturers needed 
greater protection. On a positive note, he announced that Solomon 
Taiyo was set to reopen that April with Western Province as a new 
shareholder, and talks were in progress between Delta Gold and the 
Gold Ridge landowners to reopen the mine. Compensation claims 
would still be considered, but false and bogus claims (of which the 
prime minister admitted there were many) would be handed to the 
police for prosecution. The speech raised the possibility that the 
national election due at the end of the year would be postponed, and 
ended: 'May God continue to give us wisdom and together as a people, 
and one nation, salvage this sinking nation' (Sogavare 2001). 
When parliament met on 23 March I'or the first session of 2001, five 
bills were tabled: the 2001 National Budget, the Essential Services Bill, 
the Amnesty Bill and two bills to amend the constitution. The first 
constitutional amendment related to the Amnesty Bill and the seroncJ 
aimed to extend the parliamentary term. The total budget figure was 
S$675 million, the recurrent budget stood at S$450 mUlion and the 
development component at S$225 million. Some S$264 million of the 
recurrent budget was to be covered from revenue, leaving a 5$185 mil lion 
shortJall. The development budget was financed by various sources---S$87 
million in donor grants, S$42 million from the European Development 
Fund, and S$108 million in loans from the Asian Development Bank, 
the World Bank, OPEC and Kuwait. The ROC supplied the largest 
loan, totalling S$54 mUlion (SIBC, 22, 27 March, 11 April 2001). 
The Amnesty Bill was passed but remained on hold until the 
constitution was revised to alter the powers of the Director of Public 
Prosecution and the Police and Prison Services Commissioners. All 
provincial premiers and the mayor of Honiara immediately opposed an 
extension of the parliament's term from four to five years. The 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon echoed the roncerns 
of the general public in this regard. When Australia, New Zealand, 
'raiwan, Japan and the European Union offered to pay the cost of the 
election, the last argument for postponement disappeared and the prime 
minister withdrew the bill knowing it faced certain defeat (SIBC, 
20 March, 19 April 2001), 
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In August 2001, the Solomon Islands' treasury building was locked 
and Finance Minister Snyder Rini admitted that the government could 
no longer meet its domestic or international financial obligations. 
Officers in the Treasury Division walked off the job because they had 
not been paid, but, interestingly, the government continued to spend 
money on compensation payments. The special constables absorbed 
S$l1 million in wages during the first half of 2001, and the government 
continued to give 100 per cent duty remissions to cronies. Pyramid and 
get-rich-quick schemes abounded among the general public, and the 
government found its own versions. A mernorandum of understanding 
was signed between the government and Yugoslavian-based ACC 
AMCO Pty. Ltd, which claimed to be interested in buying part of the 
National Bank and possibly the Development Bank, in addition to 
investing in other sectors of the economy. Nothing had eventuated by 
April 2002, however, leaving the government embarrassed by the 
publicity that had surrounded the plan. The company's Australian 
agent, Nick Banicevic, said that the prime minister's special advisor 
Edward Huni' ehu had exaggerated the level of interest. Other reports 
suggested that Banicevic was in debt (O'Callaghan 2001d; SlBC, 29 
March, 6, 7, 8, 15, 25 August 2001; Solomon Star, 23 April 2002). 
The Taiwanese fishing boats that had left during Ulufa'alu's term in 
government because of higher licence fees were now returning after 
negotiating bargain prices for access to Solomon Islands' waters.2~1 In the 
twelve months from August 2000, the government granted 
approxima,tely S$140 million in duty remissions, many of them to 
former MEF commanders who had gone into business. In excess of 300 
vehicles were brought into the country duty-free, and millions of dollars 
of national revenue disappeared in remissions on beer and cigarette 
imports (SIBC, 18 July 2001). SICHE remained closed throughout 
2001 due to insufficient funds, and public servants often went a whole 
month without pay. Commerce was in absolute doldrums and business 
confidence had sunk to a new low as more companies collapsed, unable 
to access currency from Central Bank and hence pay bills or buy new 
stock. In February 2001, all three commercial banks and the Central 
Bank closed for a day to protest against harassment of their employees 
(O'Callaghan 2001e; SIBC, 2 February 2001). 
Honiara was in a parlous state. Residents were advised to boil all 
drinking water as no chlorination was taking place. 'Numba 9' hospital 
announced in March 2001 that it was scaling down its activities. In mid 
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2001, the City Council was owed more than S$100,000 in government 
grants, and health and education in the provinces was .in serious 
disarray. The Public Employees' Union claimed a danger-money 
allowance back-dated to the coup, and when this was not paid went on 
strike in April 2001. Other trade unions threatened nationwide strikes if 
their members were not paid, and most rural area teachers were living 
almost completely on the produce of their own gardens (SIRC, 27, 28 
November 2000, 15 March, 13 April 2001). 
Early in 2001, the central government was six months behind in 
paying health grants to Temotu Province, and Isabel Province's 
government began borrowing from local businesses to sustain its services 
(SIBC, 22 March 2001: Pacnews, 14 February 2001), Malaita faced 
severe problems reintegrating the tens of thousands of people who had 
fled Guadalcanal back to their home island. 
Services were deteriorating fast. In February 2001, Premier Daniel 
Nahusu announced that aU health and medical facilities in Makira had 
been closed, and patients and nurses were discharged until more funds 
were al10cated by the national government (SIRC, 13 February 2001). 
IIealth services ceased operating at Marau in March 2001 (SIRC, 21, 23 
August 2000, 5 March 2001). In Gizo, the daily produce markets were 
functioning but prices were high·······cans of Solomon Taiyo fish, produced 
in the same province, were exorbitantly priced, and the hospital only 
functioned at a basic level, short of power and drugs, ilnd had to be 
supplemented by a Rotary International project. Guadalcanal's Premier 
Alebua came to Gizo for medical attention because he did not dare use 
the I--Ioniara hospital. 
'The Bougainville Revolutionary Army returned at this time, and 
reestablished themselves at Longga Island just out of Gizo harbour. The 
relationship between the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (or ilt least 
its former members) and the Western Province government was not 
clear, but there was suspIcion that they had been paid by the province 
to keep the MEF away. 26 
Malaita Province leaders held a conference in August 2001. to resolve 
law and order issues, and worked on a customary land management 
system, encouraging owners to register their land to help cope with the 
thousands of new Malaitans. There was also frIction between the Langa 
Langa people, who were allied to Ulufa'alu and his SeaguJ] Force, and 
the MEF (SIRC, 18, 21 August 2000). The Honiara headquarters of 
Guacla1canal Province were taken over by the MEF, forcing a shift to a 
169 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
temporary base at Mbalasuna on the Guadalcanal plains. The province 
was working on a rehabilitation program to involve fonner IFM 
members in infrastructure projects such as the construction of bridges, 
roads and clinics, and also hatched plans to establish a new 
administrative headquarters outside Honiara, at Marau. 
Despite the financial mess, the government announced its desire to 
spend a large amount of money to establish a new Ministry for Defence 
and Security. The rationale was that, with a defence force, the government 
would be able to deal with any future civil disturbance and that the ex­
militants could profitably be absorbed into the force and rehabilitated 
in the process. Tarcisius 'Tara Kabutaulaka condemned the government 
for its woolly reasoning. From his experience in Fiji, Kabutaulaka 
observed that the existence of a defence force does not prevent coups. 
From his knowledge of the troubles on Guadalcanal, moreover, he 
concluded that the crisis would still have arisen even if a defence force 
had existed, and it was quite clear that the Solomon Islands did not have 
the economic capacity to establish and maintain such a force. 
The country needs good leadership. strong socio-ewnomic development that 
will provide people with hope, sustainable employment. and access to 
education and health services ...The enemy of the Solomon Islands, therefore. is 
not militaristic in nature. The enemies are poverty. iIlitenlcy, poor health, 
economic decline. poor leadership. corruption. and poor policies. The war 
against these does not require military forces and arms. It: needs ethical 
leadership, good governance, and rational social-economic planning 
(Kabutaulaka 2001a:5). 
His solution was to suggest a redundancy plan for the entin~ police 
force, which needed to be rebuilt based on a new culture of service and 
discipline. 
Other than restraining Guadalcanal and Malaita provinces from all-­
out civil war through a series of peace agreements, Sogavare's 
governrnent failed to impress. If there was a coherent econornic policy it 
was only to play 'Taiwan off against Communist China, and to attract as 
much donor aid as possible from any source. Sogavare was as reticent as 
Solomon Mamaloni had been to tread the international stage. Four 
important international meetings were due in the second half of 2001­
the Melanesian Spearhead meeting in Noumea in July, the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Brisbane, the Pacific 
Islands Forum meeting in Nauru, and the UN General Assembly 
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meeting in New York, He excused himself from attending the first three, 
and made only the vis.it to the United NaUons. 27 
Sogavare depended largely on Kemakeza (whom he sacked in August 
200 J for improper personal use of public funds), Government Whip 
(the Chairman of the Government Caucus) Charles Dausabea, and 
Edward Huni'ehu his special troubleshooter. Finance Minister Snyder 
Rini continued to grant duty remissions and supervise the almost empty 
treasury, propped up by donor aid, Most of the Sogavare Cabinet stayed 
in their portfolios. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Danny Philip 
resigned in June 2001, and his portfolio was offered to former Ulufa' alu 
government minister Patteson Oti, who embarrassed Sogavare by rejecting 
the offer because of the upcoming challenge to the legality of the 
government (SIBC, 2 and 26 June, 5 July 2001). Bartholornew 
Ulufa' alu, styled as the 'Caretaker' Leader of the Opposition, did little to 
oppose the Sogavare government other than challenging its 
constitutional legality in the l1igh Court in October-November 2001. 
Churlishly, Sogavare questioned the legality of Ulufa' alu's Queen's 
Counsel John Greenwood entering the country, but was informed that 
the lawyer was a member of the Bar Association. 'The case was dismissed 
on 9 November 2001 (SIBC, 15,17 October, 9 November 2001). 
'The Sogavare government had survived by giving away money to 
anyone who threatened its stability. Governor-General Sir John Ini Lapli 
felt the need to address the nation on 10 September 2001. Careful not 
to mention the current government, Sir John stated that he was stunned 
by the level of economic mismanagement, demanded an end to duty 
remissions, and pleaded with citizens to choose wisely in the coming 
elections (SIBC, 10 September 2001). lIis demands went unheard. In 
November 2001, during the build-up to the 5 December election. the 
government paid out more than S$15 million to ex-militants, police and 
politicians, using 'Taiwanese money to compensate displaced people, It 
was clear that large sums of money had been appropriated to powerful 
friends of the government, while the small claimants remained unpaid 
(CYCallaghan 200lf).28 
On parliament's final sitting day before the election, the government 
distributed S$l million to its 50 members, supposedly to encourage 
them to tour their electorates to encourage peace. Every year, each· 
parJiarnentarian receives S$20,000 as an electorate touring allowance, 
but the Sogavare government saw fit to double this amount in spite of 
the treasury's already desperate situation (Roughan 200 la), 
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The December 2001 national election 
The December 2001 election was contested by the People's Alliance 
Party (PAP), the People's Progress (also Progressive) Party (PPP), the 
National Party, the New Solomons Party and the Liberal Party, The SO 
available seats were contested by 328 candidates, There were 287,921 
voters on the rolls, and a 72-person international team from the United 
Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum observed the election. The voters 
knew they needed a change of government. Even most of the East Kwaio 
electorate-which had boycotted the last two national elections­
decided to vote, against the wishes of the Fadanga leaders, who were 
claiming S$SSO,OOO compensation for a massacre by police and the 
Protectorate's European residents in 1927 (The Nationa/, IS November 
2001: 5'%mofl Star, 15 November 2001; Post-Courier, 29 November 
20()l: SIBC, 22 November 2001), 
With police security provided at all polJing places, the elections 
proceeded unimpeded by violence (Post-Courier, 6 December 2001), 
Vote-buying, however, proceeded as usuaJ--Japanese-born businessman 
Yukio Sato, for example, supposedly paid the owners of r--roniara's water 
source to settle the city's water supply bill. He remained anonymous, 
but, strangely, everyone knew who had paid the bill and rnost people 
were very grateful. Many were asking themselves the same questions as 
the Solomon Star posed in its editorial. 
Are you going to vote for a candidate who has ruined Solomon Islands by 
pursuing millions of dollars of public money? Are you going to vote for a 
candidate who is giving you now at the last minute a bag of rice, money, 
chickens or building a road for you? Are you going to vote for a person who has 
been to prison? Are you going t.o vote for people who st.ill holel on to the guns? 
Arc you going to vote for a candidate who cannot even run a small canteen? 
Who are you thinking ofvoting for to get Solomon Islands back on it.s feet? 
This count ry is broke financially. No more exports. No more essential services. 
No more schools ilnd payment of salaries. Many leaders are corrupt. They tell 
lies and give sweet talks on the streets. We must: now think seriously who to 
vote for to help govern Solomon Islands (Post-Courier, 5 December 2001, 
quoting the Solomon !JIm). 
International observers were divided over the fairness of the elect.ions: 
one man was killed in a clash with police at Choiseul: there was a 
shooting and looting at Sisiaka village in Central Islands Province: and 
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observers were alarmed by the election to parliament of several former 
militants who were known to have practiced intimidation in their 
election campaigns (The National, 11 December 2001; Post-Courier, 12, 
13 December 2001). Only 18 sitting members were returned, so many 
prominent politicians were voted out. Sogavare retained his Choiseul 
seat, but hls People's Progressive Party lost 10 seats and any hope of 
retaining power. Ulufa' alu, attracting three times as many votes as his 
nearest rival, was returned in his Auki/Langa Langa seat in Malaita. 
I-lilda Karai, the only woman in parliament since independence in 
1978, lost her East-Central Guadalcanal seat, as did Government Whip 
Charles Dausabea, and Agriculture and Primary Industries Minister 
Moon Pin Kwan. Snyder Rini was nominated prime minister by a group 
of indepencJents, as was Gordon LHo, a prominent leader from Western 
Province, but neither stood a chance. The Solomon Islands Alliance for 
Change Group (SIAC) won 12 seats and nominated Ulufa'alu as their 
candidate for prime minister, but its resolve weakened when rumours 
spread that this would cause another coup, They then nominated 
Patteson Oti, prompting Ulufa'alu's Liberal Party to withdraw its six 
members of parliament from the coalition. This ensured that the 
National Coalition, with 20 members of parliament, was the victor, The 
rumoured going rate to lure a parliamentarian to the new government 
was S$50,000, provided by Tommy Chan. Chan also proVided free 
accommodation at his .Honiara Hotel, and then took the entire 
prospective government group to a resort on his ship, which arrived back 
in Honiara just in time for the parliaruentary vote. Rumours also 
circulated that the ex-MEF commanders were trying to pressure the 
National Coalition to install Alex Bartlett as prime minister. The 
National Coalition eventually secured 29 seats, Kemakeza was 
nominated as prime minister and Snyder Rini became his deputy. 
Bartlett received the foreign affairs portfolio as his consolation prize. 
Radio Australia reported that 
It] here was a less than enthusiilslic reaction from the crowd thilt had gal hef'(~d 
outside the Parliament to hear the results, Nobody cheered when the 
Governor-General made the announcement. 29 
It is fair to say that the nation was still hoping for a new beginning, 
but was stunned by the result (The National, 7, 14, 17 December 
2001; Post-CowieI', 14, 17 December 20(H). 
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Notes 
My thanks to Sam Alasia for helping gather these biographical details, 
Alasia was repiaced in October by Edward }[uni'ehu, and transferred to the Policy 
Evaluation Unit (SIBC, 19 October 2000), Ulufa'alu claimed that the members of his 
government who joined the Sogavare team had been offered cash bribes, overseas trips 
and lucrative government positions (Byrne 2001), 
The new Cabinet was Sogavare as pdrne minister, Allan Kemakeza as deputy prime 
minister and Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation &. Peace, David l-[olisivi 
(}lome &. Ecclesiastical Affairs), Synder Rini (Finance), Danny Philip (Foreign Affairs); 
[,aurie Chan (Forestry, Environment &. Conservation), Alfredl\!Iaetia (Commerce, 
Employment &. lI'ade), Michael Maina (National Planning &. Human Resources 
Development), Moon Pinl<'wan (Agriculture &. Primary Industries), Johnson Koli 
(Culture, Tourism &. Aviation), Nathaniel VI/aena (Provincial Covernment &. I~ural 
Development and Minister Assisting t.he Prime Minister), Allan Paul (Health &. IVledical 
Services), .loses Saueha (Transport, Works &. CommunicatiorJ), George Luilamo 
(Fisheries &. Marine Resources) and William Haomae (Police &. Justice), A few days 
lat.er William Gigini became Minister for Education, Albert Lome took over I:hc 
port.folio of Women, Yout.h &. Sports, and Hilda Kari became Minister for Lands, 
Victor Ngele became Minister for Economic Eei'orm &. Structural Adjustment in 
January 2001 (SIBC, 2, 7, 11, 13 July 2000, 2 January 2001; Skehan 2000a), 
Francis Wale made the accusation, and Sas"ko did not deny it. (SIBC, 18 July 2(01), 
lFM Press St.at.ement, 2 July 2000, Jakson Piasi (former Lands lvlinister), Nelson Boso, 
Walton Naeson (former Minerals &. Energy Minist.er), Sir R"ddeley Devesi (fonner 
Deputy PM ,md Minister for Works), Hilda Karl (former Minister' for Women, Yout.h 
&. Sports), and I-Iudson Reava, MP for Ternotu were prevented from attending, 
See Solomon Islands Government (2000a); SIBC, 13 July, 8 December 2000, 
The Council's members were Sir Peter Kenilorea and Paul Tovua as co-chairmen, Rev, 
Lesley Roseto, lirank Porara, Joy Ker'e, Hilda Kil, Sir Fredrick Soaki and t.he 
Commissioner of Police (Solomon Islands Government 2000b; SIBC, 3 August 2000), 
'The main signing was completed in lloniara, and the agreement w"s sent to west 
Cuadalcanal IFM commanders Harold Keke, Joseph Sangu and George Crey to Sign, 
'fhe previous commissioner, New Zealander Rangi Rangihik", had retreated overseas for 
medical t.reatment. and not returned (SIBC, 2G July. 3, 21 August 2000), 
!O	 Report on t.he National Peace Conference, HMNZS n, Kaha, 25,,27 August 2000, 
11 See also PacjfjclVews Bulletin (August 2000:45), which published excerpts from t.he 
resolutions passed at the conference, 
12	 Harold [(eke was rumoured to have received S$500,000 from the government, for 
release of the pilot and plane, but, although he released the pilot., he blew up t.he plane 
(SIBC, 19 September 2000, 29 March 2001), 
174 
The incredible sinking nation: Manasseh $ogavare's government 
1:1	 Nod received international condemnation, particularly from Amnesty International. 
Angiki provided a detailed and convincing account of the incident and his subsequent 
phone cal! to Nori on fu-l'v'li-Nao, :1 iJnd 5, 17 October 2000, See also SrBC, ] 8 
September, 2, :1 October ZOOO, Nori said 'f never rung Duran iJt. any time in ZOOO or 
2001. I never knew where he lived at the time, In fact it was him who rung me from a 
telephone in either Gizo or Munda, asking me about some threads [threatsl made 
against him, I did express my serious concerns about his false reporting and explained to 
him what my side of the story was (which he never published afterwards), J also asked 
him why he did not ring me for comments on the issue as any sensible and qualified 
journalist should do, In a subsequent. interview wilh tlw SIBC on the issue, he was 
evasive, vague and inarticulate' (Nori 2002b), 
1-1	 The Townsville Peace Agreement, 15 October 2000; Kabuti1ulaka (2000a:4-5); 
Tllhanuku (2001), In mid September, S$51 0,000 was provided for MEF repatriation 
(SIBC, 12, 25 September, 9·] 5 October 2000; PINA Nius Online, 1GOctober 20(0), 
I"	 nw committees and their heads were Peace & [-«('conciliation (Guadalcanal Premier 
Alebua), I\chabilHat.ion (Fn'd Ganate, Permanent Secn~ti1ry, N<1tional Unity, 
Reconciliation & Peace), Peace Monitoring Council (Sir Peter Kenilorea), 
Implementation (Attorney-General ['rima Afeau), Lost and Llamaged Property (Lesley 
'reama) (STnC, 23 October 20(0), 
I h	 RAMSI was investigating the death and has charged sorne senior policc~ officers (SIBe, 
Hi February 20(1), 
11 The SDA Western Union He<1dquarlcrs has now been moved to Fiji, partly because they 
found themselves Oil the frontline of the crisis, 
I H A History of Gizo Civil Society Movement' provided by Sue Randell, 17 JUly 2001. 
j[1 !"or in,tallee, sec f3rown (ZOOI), 
11) Mal<1ililJl Premier David (Jeta received a cheque for S$5 million for slurs levelled at his 
province al the 23 May 1999 Cultural Centre peace talks, and another S$1.8 million in 
compensatioll for deaths over the previous 20 months, Guadalcanal Acting Premier 
Stephan George received S$:1 million in compensation. The money was advanced from 
the Central Bank, wmsening the government's already parlous financial position 
(J~ollghan ZOOOe; SIBe, 11 July 20(0), 
21	 The money was later refunded by the PNG government, minus S$4,OOO for funeral 
expenses, 'rhe man had been involved in illegal activity, and the two governments made 
an agreement not to prOVide compensation for nationals killed in each other's nations 
(SIBC, 20 Marcil ZOOI), 
22	 'rhe first figure is based on an SlnC repon that they had obtained a document which 
revealed tlw fee-for-servlce amounts p<lid to Nod's legal firm and to olher leading 
l'igures-Attorney-General Primo Afeau received S$lOO,OOO in legal fees and allowilrlccS, 
and Legal Draftsman !\.anj it Hewagama was paid S$ 100,000 in legal fees and salary 
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(SIBC, 20 JUly 20001; Nori 2002b, 2002a; see also O'Callaghan 2002b), The debate 
was extended on the Lit113uS website in 2003: http://www.lit11aus.com/sasako/koivo/nori 
[accessed [) March 2004]. 
1:1	 In early October 2000, Foreign Minister Danny Philip, who was supposed to open the 
new embassy in ''[iliwan, ended up in BeUing, Prime Minister Sogavare initially claimed 
to be unaware of the trip to mainland China, which caused a diplomatic rift with ROC, 
but then admitted Philip was shopping for aid money (SIBC, 13,25 JUly, 8, 11, 15,29 
August, 18, 21 September, 4, I, 11, 13,23, 30 OctoiJer, 1 November 2000; Islands 
Business, November/December 2000). 
11 [;'igures presented in the Central Bank's ZOOO Annual Report (SIBC, 24 May ZOO 1). See 
also Byrne (2001). 
2(; The ori.ginal price for licences was US$150,OOO a boat, which was reduced to US$8,OOO 
a boat (O'Cal1aghan ZOOOg; STBC, 28 September 20(0). 
1(;	 My thanks to Sue Randell for this report. 
17	 CIIUCM was delayed untilZ002 (SIBC, 15 August, Z5 September, 7, 12 November 
ZOOl), 
'. H	 Various members of the MEF SUfJreme Command made claims, Alex Bartlett iodged a 
claim for S$Z50,OOO and received S$70,OOO, Roland TJmo claimed S$1 ,8 million "nd 
received S$800,OOO, Nori justified these claims as based on legitimate loss of property 
(SIBC, 9 November ZOO]), 
,')	 Quoted in Pacifir NCIVl' Bulletin, December ZOO] ;3. 
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Rescuing a failing state
 
The government of 
Sir Allan Kemakeza, 2001-04 
Now the country is among the poorest in the Pacific. Most of the people live 
below the poverty line, ,ldult and youth unemployment is at a record high, the 
economy continues its free fall, the Solomon dollar is almost useless overseas, 
and the people's loss of confidence in the pol itical and social institutions is at a 
record high. 
John Roughan (2002a: 10) 
Soiomon Islands is in a perilous state ... The government is bankrupt, 
development has stalled, investment has ceased and the economy is at an all­
Lime low..Lawlessness is rife on the streets of Honiara where 'order' is 
maintained through the barrel of a gun. The police force is incapable and 
unwilling to maintain law and order. Solomon Islands is a faned state. Its future 
is bieak. 
Mark Otter (2003b: 1) 
The Kemakeza government 
John Roughan, Solomon Islands' leading social commentator, made this 
assessment of his nation in February 2002 just after t.he Kemakeza 
government took oft1ce. Mark Otter, the editor of the UNDP Solomon 
.MandsHuman Development Report 2002, made his similar assessment In 
May 2003, just months before the Australian int.ervention. Some 
commentators preferred 'weak' or 'failing' to 'failed' as a less emotive and 
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offensive word, but whatever the name, Solomon Islands had sunk into a 
desperate situation. Sir Allan Kemakeza's government inherited a 
situation so grave that it never really had a chance to rehabilitate the 
nation without substantial outside assistance. 
The most remarkable thing about the government was that it 
survived. Starting from near complete bankruptcy, and despite its 
shortcomings, it survived and was bolstered in mid 2003 by the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) force, When 
the Kemakeza government began, observers were concerned that it 
contained too many remnants of the Sogavare government, plus an 
alarming number of former militants, 'T'here was no attempt at 
austerity-20 ministers and 28 permanent secretaries were appointed, 
as usual mostly from among the ruling coalition parties' ranks. Amongst 
its powerbrokers were Alex Bartlett, former Secretary-General of the 
MEF Supreme Council, who was appointee! Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
and Daniel Fa'afunua, closely associated with MEF groups in north 
Malaita, who was ilppointed Minister for Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment:. Benjamin Una, a Kwara'ae ex-commander of the 
patrol boat that shelled Guada1canal Villages and the IFM in June 2000, 
was appointed Minister for Police, National Security and Justice. 
Bartlett had won his Small Malaita seat by a slim margin, partly 
obtained by hiring MY Ramos to transport supporters from Honiara to 
vote (a common strategy in Solomons' elections). Other key members of 
the Cabinet included Michael Maina, a minister in previous 
governments, known as 'Mr Ten Percent' since his days as Trade and 
Finance Minister in the early 1990s, and Snyder Rini, appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Planning, who had 
been responsible for awarding around S$130 million worth of tax 
exemptions for imports of cars, beer and tobacco while Finance Minister 
under Sogavare. It was hardly a line-up to bolster confidence that good 
governance had finally come to Solomon Islands. 
In an attempt to achieve a national balance, five ministers were from 
GuadaJcanal, five from Malaita, three from Western ProVince, two from 
Isabel, and one each from Temotu and the Central Islands. The prime 
minister appointed a 'One Dollar Advisor', Robert Goh, a Chinese 
businessman with extensive business interests in Solomon Islands (but 
Australian permanent residency), who offered his services for S$l a year 
plus expenses, as special advisor and head of the 'Think Tank Taskforce'.1 
The alliance of political parties that made up the government was 
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financially backed by other leading citizens of Chinese origin, businessman 
Tommy Chan and his politician son LmlI'ie, who had derived considerable 
benefit from the duty remissions. 'T'he international and regional 
reaction to the new government was understandably cautious. 
Several upsets and resl1ufJles occurred during the government's term. 
In December 2002, Snyder Rini became Finance Minister after Laurie 
Chan resigned, a move which certainly did not restore confidence in the 
economy. Chan was given the Foreign Affairs portfolio, but was nearly 
sacked in January 2003 for seeking to oust Kemakeza, In January 2003, 
five ministers resigned .Just before a motion of no-confidence in the 
government, then returned and offered their support, presumably 
having figured out that the motion had been lost. They regained their 
portfolios, seemingly irrespective of their lack of loyalty. One, Education 
Minister Mathias Taro, even after being reinstated continued to call for 
the dispatch of Sir Allan, thus precipitating his own replacement in 
March 2003 by Francis Zama. 
Alex Bartlett was also demoted to Tourism and Aviation, although he 
fought against the transfer (SIBC, 3 March 2003; Pareti 2003).2 Bartlett 
became something of a liability as Foreign Minister when the United 
States refused to issue him a transit visa because the MEF was on a list 
of terrorist organisations. When Bartlett was sacked from the Ministry in 
August, 'One Dollar Advisor' Robert Goh tried to intervene, issuing a 
press statement on behalf of the Prime Minister's Office which said that 
the sacking had been an error and had been rescinded. Apparently Bartlett 
had never received a letter advising him of the change of ministry. 
Alongside Nolan Levi's move from Provincial Govemment to Foreign 
Affairs, Stephen Paeni moved from Agriculture and Livestock to Mines 
and Energy, Edward Huni'ehu replaced Paeni in Agriculture and 
Livestock, Walton Naezon left Mines and Energy for Provincial 
Government, and Augustine Taneko, formerly Minister for Health and 
Med.ical Serv.ices exchanged portfolios with Benjamin Una, taking up his 
role as Minister for Police, Justice and National Security. An incident in 
which Una is alleged to have threatened a service station attendant who 
would not serve him ahead of other customers and allegedly ordered 
police to arrest the man may have influenced the change (ABC News, 
22 July 2002; .Solomon 5'tar, 29 July 2003), 
The new prime minister, Allan Kemakeza, born in 1951 in Panueli 
village, Savo Island, was unusual amongst modern Solomon Islands 
politicians in having only a primary school education. In 1972, he 
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joined the Royal Solomon Islands Constabulary, and was trained within 
the force and in short courses in the United Kingdom and Australia 
between 1977 and 1984. }--Ie became aide-dc-camp to the governor­
general, then Head of the Criminal Investigation Division, Senior Staff 
Officer to the Commissioner of Police, and Operational Officer at 
Central Police Station in Honiara. After resigning from the police in 
1984, he developed cash crops on Savo before being elected to the 
Russell/Savo seat in 1989. In the 1989--93 Mamaloni government, 
Kemakeza was Minister for Police and justice, and in the 1994···97 
Mamaloni government he was Minister for Forests, Environment and 
Conservation. Under Sogavare he was deputy prime minister and 
Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace until he was 
sacked for improper use of compensation funds. AmaZingly, in the same 
year he was knighted for his services in aiding reconciliation. 
The new Opposition Leader was the mostly invisible Patteson Oti. 
He was content to leave press announcements to ex-journalist Alfred 
Sasako, the Opposition Spokesrnan on Foreign Affairs and MembE~r for 
East Kwaio. Oti resigned as Leader of the Opposition in May 2003, and 
was replaced by john Martin Garo, member for West Kwaio (SIBC, 14, 
23 May 2003). 
From weak to failing state? 
During 2002, Sir Allan Kemakeza's government had the unenviable task 
of trying to manage the Solomon Islands economy without the necessary 
resources. The circumstances that had dogged earlier government., 
continued: revenue was insufficient to pay costs, without foreign aid 
there was no functioning financial system, and there were not enough 
dedicated and trained pubic servants to run the country. Government 
debt reached A$430 million early in 2002, of which about A$280 was 
to foreign creditors, and only A$60 million remained in the reserves. 
The debt was eqUivalent to about 300 per cent of the country's GNP, 
and inflation was running at around 14 per cent per year. The World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank threatened to terminate all 
funding projects if arrears were not paid. Solomon Islands students were 
back at the University of tbe South Pacific, but the administration 
threatened to send them home again unless half of the nation's F$13.6 
million debt to the institution was paid before December 2002 (Pacific 
News Bulletin, january 2002, April 2002; ?acme VlkeJdy Rcview, October 
2002: Callick 2003). 
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To add to the woes, a cyclone swung east past the outlying Solomon 
Islands in late December 2003, causing devastation on Tikopia and 
Anuta. The one million dollars needed for rehabilitation further 
decreased the nation's finances, and the refusal of police to take part in a 
rescue mission unless they each received S$1,250 special duties 
allowances showed how low police morale and discipline had sunk 
(Courier-Mail, 4 January 2003; The Australian, 3 January 2003). 
Nevertheless, duty remissions remained in place as the elite 
plundered the public purse. In the first week of January 2002 the new 
government waived more than A$7 million in duty on beer and 
cigarettes (Post-Courier, 10 January 2002). Stringent currency controls 
were also in place, but could be subverted by those with money. The 
government pretended to govern, but in fact the situation was beyond 
control. The state had become totally bankrupt with no chance of 
regaining control without large-scale overseas assistance. Rick Hou, 
Governor of the Central Bank, continued to be the voice of economic 
sanity for the nation, but was ignored as usual. Ominously, Finance 
Minister Michael Maina announced that a review was needed to clear 
up any ambiguity over the independence of the bank (Na.tional Express, 
1 February 2002). 'The militia groups had disintegrated into armed 
gangs run by warlords in control of tracts of territory, immune from 
police action. 
The Solomon Islands' five overseas diplomatic missions were 
downgraded because they were too expensive to operate. Taiwan had to 
rescue the Solomon Islands' Ambassador to the United Nations when he 
was about to be evicted for non-payment of rent (SIBC, 29 February 
2003). Government employees still with jobs had become used to non­
payment, or at best spasmodic payment, of their wages. A Public: Sector 
Employees' Redundancy Taskforce was established to reduce the size of 
the public: service further, with the aim of cutting 1,300 more positions. 
In January 2002, civil aviation workers went on strike over the non­
receipt of harassment allowances. Port workers helel a 28-elay strike in 
May 2002, and large-scale strikes brol<e out in July, when 2,000 public 
servants threatened to stop work unless the government paid their 
previous month's salary and the National Teachers' Association called a 
nationwide action. In August, air traffic controllers and customs and 
immigration officials went on strike again. 
At this tirne, students stlldying overseas had not been given their 
allowances, and all non-essential government phones and faxes were cut 
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once again for non-payment of biils, Only politicians, police and the 
special constables had any chance of being paid on time, this last group 
because they had a tendency to launch armed confrontations with 
Treasury staff if they missed a payment, Medical facilities were 
collapsing, schools were either closed or their staff not paid, and armed 
men roamed at will. The National Referral Hospital announced that it 
was only able to treat life-threatening ailments and that syringes were 
being re-used, Australia provided direct aid to purchase 
pharmaceuticals, The commercial banks (the National Bank of Solomon 
Islands and Australia's ANZ and Westpac) closed again for a few days in 
May in protest over threats to their staff, iargeiy caused by customers 
demanding payment from the 'Family Charity Fund', The ANZ flew its 
management team out of Honiara because of threats to their lives (SIBC, 
12 May 2003), 
SICHE reopened in April 2002, but only for students who could 
afford to pay their own fees, and even then classes were delayed because 
there was not enough money to pay statT, It only became fully 
operational again after the European Union provided S$4 million 
funding, Honiara's drinking water was no longer being treated, 
municipal maintenance, including rubbish collection had almost ceased, 
and in May 2003 the government had its electricity cut off for not. 
paying a S$8 million power biil, which included electricity to run the 
Honiara water supply (S%mon Star, 9, 16, 24 April, 6, 9 May 2002; 
S18C, 9 July 2002, 6 May 2003: The Australian, 27 July, 15 August 
2002, 10-11 May 2003), 
During the budget speech on 26 March 2002, Finance Minister' 
Michael Maina caused consternation when he announced that. the 
currency was to be devalued by 25 per cent:. Cabinet had not been 
consulted and several of it.s members, including Deputy Prime Minister 
Snyder Rini, walked out of the chamber. The Central Bank supported 
the devaluation and Maina refused to back down, was sacked, and 
replaced by the more compliant Laurie Chan, who reversed the 
devaluation plan, Nonetheless, the incident renewed instability and 
t.hreat.s and intimidation against members of parliament. The prime 
minister accused Opposition Leader Oti of using former militants to 
threaten government ministers from GuadalcanaL Facing a motion of 
nO'-confidence, Sir Allan's government tottered, and Rick Hou, Governor 
of the Central Bank, despondently but straightforwardly announced 
that the natioIl was about to fall owr an economic cliff. The budget, 
182 
Rescuing a failing state: the government of Sir Allan Kemakeza 
however, passed on 11 Milrch 2002 and the no-confidence motion was 
put and lost on 16 April. The Opposition failed in its move to have the 
motion decided by secret ballot. 3 
Early in May, the prime minister ancl his 'One Do]]ar Advisor' 
Robert Goh headed off to Taipai for an official visit, accompanied by the 
usual rumours that the Solomons Islands had once more been 
diplomatically flirting with mainland China, Ironically, Kemakeza had 
earlier been sacked from the Sogavare government for paying himself 
from a Taiwanese aid funcl (Solomon Star, 29 April, 2 May 2002; Post­
Courier, 1 May 2002; The National, 7 May 2002). In June 2002, the 
Cabinet authorised a National Economic Recovery Plan," and the 
government took the radical action of erecting razor··wire barricades 
outside the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office, to 
escape direct contact with protestors. Finance Minister Laurie Chan also 
hurried off to Taipei, hoping to transfer the last installment of a loan the 
Export-Import Bank had offered. 
No wonder many Solomon Islanders lost faith in their government 
and called for foreign intervention on humanitarian grounds. The 
government-sponsored amnesty to return weapons expired in May, and 
late in 2002 questions were raised when the government terminated the 
Peace Monitoring Council established under the terms of the Townsville 
Peace Agreement. After a five-month recess, parliament reconvened in 
December 2002 for the budget session. Rumours circulated in Honiara 
that Kernakeza was about to be dumped as prime minister, with Snyder 
Rini poised to take the top job, and Opposition Leader Patteson Oti 
threatened another vote of no-confidence, even though he had nothing 
like the necessary numbers in the I-Iouse (Pareti 2002a). 
The Kemakeza government searched desperately for new sources of 
income. In late January 2003, the prime minister made a secretive two" 
week trip to South Korea to arrange bilateral assistance and strengthen 
his links with the Unification Church ('Moonies'). Although supposedly 
an Anglican, his links with the Moonies were well known (SIBC, 31 
January 2003). Attempts were made to revive tourism, with serious 
suggestions of making the Solomon Islands a honeymoon destination 
like Vanuatu: but who would visit a country paralysed by a law and 
order crisis? The sale to AMCO of the government's 80 per cent of the 
Development: Bank of Solomon Islands (the other 20 per cent was 
owned by the Central Bank) had been mooted since 2001, but was 
finally abandoned in April 2002 (Solomon Star, 23 April 2002; Kabini 
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2002), There were also rumours that Solomon Airlines was about to be 
sold, or that a Taiwanese airline would begin operations in the islands 
(SlBC, 13 February, 14 March 2003), 
A welcome new 10-year treaty was negotiated with US pursesciner 
fishing boats in mid 2003, but most of the financial news was less 
encouraging (R1Ci11C News Bulletin, June 2003; SIBC, 7 Junc 2003), The 
government asked for a three-year hiatus on a Melanesian Spearhead 
Group free trade pact that dated back to 1993 (Solomon Seal, 29 April 
2002; 10k Blong PaJiJlk, Summer 2002), and early in 2002 backed a 
proposal, originated under the Sogavare government, to dump three 
million tones of sewage sludge waste material from Taiwan, rumoured to 
be contaminated by heavy metals, in Makil'a Province (SIBC, 11 
February 2002), Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Fred Iro Ganate 
had signed an agreement in June 2001 with Primeval Forests Co, Ltd, a 
Taiwaneoe company, with the agreement of Haura Devc"lopment 
Investment Holdings Import and Export of Makira·-originally a 
landowner-based association representing the Haununu and Ravo 
districts on the south coast, but by 2003 a Honiara..baoed agency, The 
governmen1 became very defensive and Minister for Education and 
member for West Makil'a Mathias Taro threatened to take a 
conservationist, a lawyer and the Makira Director of Agricultural 
Quarantine to court in Honiara for their opposition to the plan. In May 
2002, Cabinpt approved a licence, Agriculture Minister Steven Paeni 
claiming the deal was worth US$20(J million to the government, with 
another US$35 million due with every shipment. 'l'he minister declared 
the sclwrne safe, but the public outcry was so huge tbat the government 
had to back away from the deal. The licence was eventually cancelled, 
but the incident showed just how desperate the government had 
become (Ilarai 2002; Kohaia 2002; Aimaniuhu 2002; Suri 2002; 
Solomon StaI, 7 and 10 May 2002, Post"C'oulier, 9 and 10 May 2002; 
The NaUonal, 10 May 2002), 
Almost everything was for sale. Cabinet discussed selling passports as 
a way of making money for the government (which, in reality, would 
rnerely have formalised an existing undercover racket thought to involve 
prominent individuals) and suggested the establishment of a Flag of 
Convenience shipping register, as had operated in Vanuatu and 'Tonga, 
Even the name of ]']enderson International Airport (a US name from the 
war) was negotiable, with Japan receiving renaming rights on the basis 
that it had paid for the latest upgrade, 5 
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Financial tricksters preyed on the desperate government. In January 
2003, a new 'Cargo Cult' was exposed, which made the government 
look totally irresponsible and left saner Solomon Islanders rolling their 
eyes in disbelief. The so-called Royal Assembly of Nations and 
Kingdoms, chased out of Papua New Guinea for fraud, offered the 
government a gift of S$2.6 billion, supposed to be financed by interest 
on gold bars captured on Bougainville by the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army and then invested overseas (SIBC, 14 January 
2003). Its representative, Bougainvillian Noah Musingku, claimed that 
the organisation operated as an alternative to the United Nations. Rin! 
and Kemakeza had signed the agreement on behalf of the government 
late in December 2002, and Sir George Lepping, fonner governor·· 
general and l-Iead of the National Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Unit, voiced his support on the grounds that the government needed 
the money. Their reason was that there was always a vague chance that 
the offer might actually be genUine, but Rick I·Iou and fonner Prime 
Minister Sogavare warned Kemakeza to reject it. By late January 2003 
the deal was off, causing the People's Alliance Party, the major party in 
the ruling coalition, to announce that the refusal might have offended 
the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. The 'Family Charitable Fund' 
(also known as the 'Lady Diana Fund-Royal Family'), an investment 
scam doing the rounds of Honiara, was also declared a fraud and its 
directors, Jean Betty Maeniua Hebala, Mike Hora and Baddley Au, were 
arrested, found guilty and imprisoned (Solomon Star, 2 May, 6 
September 2002; SIBC, 15, 17,21,27 January, 7 February, 13, 14 
May 2003; Pareti 2003). 
Legitimate companies also profited from the impossible situation in 
which the government found itself. Solomon Telekom negotiated for a 
25-year renewal of its monopoly over telecommunications in Solomon 
Islands, despite the dynamic changes that were likely in the industry 
over that time, and eventually got a fifteen-year renewal (Internet 
SOCiety-Pacific Islands 2002; Solomon Star, 18 November 2(03).6 
***** 
The most vociferous, constant and courageous critic of the 
government was John Roughan, who had first come to the islands as a 
Catholic priest in 1958, and was a naturalised citizen married to a 
Malaitan woman. Founder and still advisor to the Solomon Islands 
Development Trust, Roughan has been a thorn in the side of every 
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government in recent years, cleverly using local and international media 
to air his views, pulling no punches and talking sense. In April 2002, he 
described the current politics of self-interest. 
In our present clirnate··-·_·a weak anc! wmkening central government·-not a few 
of our official leaders are more than willing to bend the ruies to ensure their 
pDcket'.S remain lined. In past years the politics of self-interest could satisfy itself 
by IDoting the national treasury and/or donor monies. Preselltly this has 
become almost impossihle since the government's r['venue collections are . 
severely weak and donors are more and more reluctClnt to hand over their tax 
payers' monies only to sec these disappear (Roughan 2002b). 
Parliament rarely sat, and in April 2003 Prime Minister Kemakeza 
announced that the House's only session for the year would be in 
November, to deal with the 2003-04 Budget. According to the prime 
minister, there was no urgent business until the Bill for introducing a 
federal system had been thoroughly discussed at community and 
provincial levels. He successfully argued, against the Opposition's 
protests, that the acute financial problems made calling a session of the 
I louse too expensive (SIBC, 28 April, 5 May 20(3). 
Continuing conflict 
The civil war and street violence between the MEF and IFM seemed to 
be over, but tensions remained. Waeta Ben Tabusasi had replaced Ezekiel 
Alebua as Guadalcanal Premier, and Reuben Tori Moli became Malaita's 
new premier, changes that reduced tensions and partly cleared away old 
animosities. Another problem emerged: no longer facing a common 
enemy in the IFM, the MEF was spl.it by intra-Malaitan conflicts that 
often got out of control. Andrew NOri, a central figure in the coup, 
apologised to members of the Ulafa' alu government that he had 
removed, and presented shell money and a pig at a reconciliation feast: in 
February 2002. Given that he was such a key figure, his recantation of 
earlier actions is worth recording. 
I accept that no apology, no amount of money, no amount of pigs will ever be 
sufficient to put yom minds at peace. Because ofthis I am not asking for your 
forg.iveness. Ijust ask for your time. I do not deserve anything else. 
By accepting the role I played during the period in question I knowingly 
decided to forgo and cast aside the valuable friendship I had with lllany of you, 
both at t.he personal and po.litical1evels. I acted as a mediator, negotiator ilnd 
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legal advisor to the members of the Malaita Eagle Force and t.he Paramilitary 
Joint Operation. This association, professional as it might seem, .r. consider a 
serious mistake. I compromised my position as a nat.ionalist who has a lot of 
respect from the Solomon Islands State (O'Callaghan 2002c). 
QUite clearly, Nori realised that the coup was a mist.ake that had cost 
him his personal standing, damaged the nat.ion, and left Malaitan 
criminals in control, He left for a few months to complete the residential 
part of a Master degree in New Zealand. Alex Bartlett also made an 
apology to parliament on behalf of former MEF members (Solomon Star, 
25 April 2002). 
Sir Peter Kenilorea and Paul 'T'ovua, co~Chairmen of the Peace 
Monitoring Council, were constant voices of stability. Both used their 
well~honed political skills to encourage people to give up weapons and 
return to peaceful ways. At: the end of April 2002, a 'Gun Free' 
campaign was begun. The first declarations carne from several 
parliamentarians who announced their families had surrendered all 
weapons, yielding another 128 guns. The Guns and Stolen Property 
Amnesty expired and was extended until 31 May. A few thousand 
weapons had been collected, several hundred in the months 
immediately after the Townsville Peace Agreement in October 2000, and 
another 2,000 during the remainder of the amnesty. Most of the 
weapons surrendered, however, were home-made or antiquated. and 500 
high~powerecl weapons remained in the community, untroubled because 
of police inaction (PFnet News, 21, 25 June 2002: O'Callaghan 
2002d). The Cabinet, feeling there was no further use for the 
International Peace Monitoring Team, phased it out by June 2002 
(Solomon Star, 16, 29 April, 2 May 2002: Solomon Star, 3 May 2002: 
Post~Courjer, 24 May 2002). 
A new National Peace Council to represent all provinces and 
Honiara-chaired by Paul 'T'ovua from Guadalcanal, with Dennis Lulei 
from Isabel as his deputy-was announced in January 2003 to replace 
I:he Peace Monitoring Council, By February 2003, the demobUisation of 
the special constables was well under way, much to their dismay. The 
Marau Peace Agreement also expired around this time, raising fears that 
violence would begin again (SIBC, 14 and 17 January, 5 and 7 February 
2003) . 
Nori repeated MEF" allegations that Guadalcanal Premier Alebua had 
imported weapons from Bougainville in January-February 2001. well 
after the Townsville Peace Agreement had been signed, and it was known 
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that I"Iarold Keke had possession of 12 high-powered weapons, stolen 
from the Cold Ridge Mine and from police posts around Cuac1alcanal. 
Nmi had been in discussions with former MEF leaders about their 
weapons and was told that they had met with Prime Minister Kemakeza 
on 28 May 2002, and were advised not to hand in their weapons while 
Keke refused to surrender his weapons. In October 2003, MEF rebels 
placed an advertisement in the newspapers, claiming there would be a 
security risk if they were forced to disarm (Nori 2002d; The Australian, 
4 October 2002). 
The continuation of conflict was partly fuelled by alcohol from illegal 
stills and marijuana, which had become freely available during the 
1990s. Kwaso blighted the community, and, when a still was raided and 
destroyed near the west Honiara suburb of White River, polin; noted 
the relief this brought to the community. Public confidence in thE' 
police was still low, although community-policing schemes were 
introduced in some areas of Honiara and around Auki on Malaita (Post­
Courier, 7 January 2002; National Expms, 1 January 2(02)" 
Outbreaks of violence 
The worst days of the violence seemed to have passed, but tensions 
simmered just below the surface. When former Malaitan militants 
attacked Honiara's Malaitan Fishing Village community in April 2002, 
the violence closed the rnain road connecting Honiara to the airport 
(Post-Courier, 29 April 2002).7 
Violence was not usually directed at foreigners, although no car or 
home was safe from break-ins, but physical attacks on foreigners were 
always reported in the overseas press with exaggerated detail. The most 
reliable journalism came from Mary-Louise O'Callaghan. Her articles in 
the national Australian daily newspaper, The Australian, were accurate 
and informed. In March 2002, she described the 'blatant corruption, 
lawlessness and an almost complete lack of government' as 'grinding this 
young state to new levels of poverty' (O'Callaghan 2002e). Her analysis 
was based on long experience; and usually it was her work that apprised 
the world of attacks on locals. She reported in late February 2002 that a 
rogue element from the BRA had executed two MEF men near Noro. 
The MEF retaliated by destroying property and pack-raping a 14-year 
olel girl. Western Province paid S$100,000 in compensation to each of 
the Malaitan's families and S$50,000 to each of the MEF platoons 
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involved, but Malaita Province never paid the S$100,000 requested by 
Western Province to compensate for the mayhem t.he two men had caused 
before the BRA killed them. The dispute spread to Honiara, where 
frighl:ened Western Province residents stayed off the streets or rapidly 
returned horne to the west, and Malaitans in Gizo felt unwelcome and 
left. In Western Province, the flow of refugees out of Bougainville during 
t.he 1990s reversed as people scattered to take shelter with their wantoks 
over the PNG border (Post-Courier, 17 April 2002). 
Several New Zealanders were robbed of their cash and cars early in 
2002, and 28-year old Kevin O'Brien, married to a local, was stabbed to 
death by a Malaitan for swearing abusively at him. The process of 
investigating the crime and arresting the perpetrator was slow, 
apparently because the Malait.an was Police Minister Una's nephew (New 
Zealand Herald, 11 February 2002; The National, 20 May 2(02). The 
diplomatic scene was rocked in March 2002, when New Zealand 
Deputy High Commissioner Bridget Nichols died from knife wounds 
inside the High Commission compound in Honiara. Exaggerated st.ories 
circulat.ed that she was killed because of her work on a plan t.o introduce 
New Zealand and Australian police, that it was a lovers' tiff, or that it 
was the work of the MEF. A thorough investigation concluded she 
tripped and fell on a knife she had been carrying in her bag. Sad though 
the incident was, it showed that }--Ioniara was still on edge, how readily 
rumours spread, and how quickly people were ready to believe the worst 
(O'Callaghan 2002f; SIBC, 4 July 2001; Post-Courier, 16 May 2002; 
The National, 17 May 2(02).8 
On 14 May 2003, another deat.h occurred that equally horrified 
Solomon Islanders and t.he outside world. An Australian SDA 
missionary, Lance Gersbach, was beheaded at the SDA Ato'ifi Hospital 
in the Kwaio area of east Malaita. Two men were eventually charged over 
t.he murder and appeared in the Honiara magistrate's court in early 
August 2003, but were released by the High Court in April 2004 
because a witness failed to give evidence 9 The incident was horrific and 
the Australian media conjured up images of heathen savage headhunters 
rather than a single deranged individual. The media also dragged up a 
similar incident from 1966 that had occurred at the sarne hospital, 
when Brian Dunn, a medical rnissionary, had been speared, probably 
over a land disput.e involving the hospital. The media in their ignorance 
played up the image of irrational behaviour, and lamented the lack of 
law and order in Solomon Islands (The Australian, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24­
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25, 27 May 2003: Pikacha 2003). The reports of the beheaded 
Australian missionary certainly influenced public opinion to support 
Australian intervention a few months later, and may weB have 
strengthened the resolve of Australia's Foreign Minister Downer and 
Prime Minister Howard that they needed to end the lawlessness. 
Of course, locals suffered far more violence than the foreign 
contingent. On 24 August 2002, for example, Father Augustine Ceve, 
Minister for Youth, Sport and Women was assassinated. Harold Keke 
claimed to have ordered the killing, supposedly because of misuse of 
funds from his Weathercoast electorate, but Prime Minister Kemakeza 
claimed that it was the result of a 'family dispute'. Regardless, this was 
the first assassination of a Minister of the Crown and another sign that 
the Solomon Islands had become a 'failing state' where crime was 
rampant and unpunished. 
A re-escalation of violence threatened. In December 2002, 
parliament was suspended when shots were fired at the prime minister's 
residence. The police had become so corrupt that the special constables 
demanded 'special allowances' and held the Finance Minister and the 
Prime Minister at gunpoint. Finance Minister Chan resigned as a 
consequence and sent his wife and child out of the country for safety, 
but as already noted he was soon back as Minister for Foreign Affairs. At 
about the same time two New Zealand advisers, Lloyd Powell and Rob 
Solomon, were also evacuated after threats, (although Powell soon 
returned), and Robert Goh, the prime minister's 'One Dollar Advisor', 
was shot and almost killed. In February 2003, Police Minister Augustine 
Taneko was stoned by constables unhappy at the way the government 
had handled their claims. 
Tikopian Sir Fredrick Soaki, the much-respected first local Police 
Commissioner (l982~96) and member of the National Peace Council, 
was assassinated on February 2003, probably because of his role in 
demobiJising the special constables and the Cabinet decision to appoint 
him deputy police commissioner to assist Williarn Morrel\. It seems the 
initial plan had been to kidnap him in lIoniara, but the fall·back plan 
was to kill him in Auki instead. He was shot by a masked gunman while 
in the dining room of Auki Motel, situated opposite the Auki police 
station. Police Sergeant: Edmond Sae was questioned and reports surfaced 
of his terrorising Auki by indiscrimateJy firing his SR88 rifle, but no 
arrest was made until mid March 2003. A patrol boat was sent to bring 
Sae back to Honiara, but did not, its Malaitan captain dying, reportedly 
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from poisoning, on the return trip. Sae was eventually arrested and 
flown back to Honiara, but by mid April had managed to escape from 
Rove Central Prison. He sWiftly returned to Auld, killed a man while 
being questioned at the police station, and escaped into the bush 
((YCallaghan 2003b, 2003c; Keith-Reid 2003a; Pareti 2003). 
'The de facto leader of the Opposition, AHi'ed Sasako, suggested that 
the Solomon Islands commit special constables to the world coalition in 
support of the US invasion of Iraq. The move would certainly have cut 
the government wages bill, but whether it would have helped peace in 
the Middle East was doubtful (SIBC, 28 February, 6, 20, 29 March, 23 
April 2003). 
Direct tensions between Malaitans and Guale declined, although 
there were still 'no-go' areas just outside l-Ioniara. In early September 
2002, a girl was shot dead, and a further five people, including children, 
were killed east of Honiara later in the month when police stopped a 
stolen police truck (Reuters, 5 September 2002). Further intra-Malaitan 
disputes continued, particularly between Langa Langa and northern 
areas. On 9 September, Auld town at the top of Langa Langa Lagoon was 
trashed by 150 men from the north, and tensions spread to Honiara 
where ships were seized and rumours spread about mutilated bodies 
being found (Radio New Zealand, 10 September 2002), 
The problem of Harold Keke and the Weathercoast 
The problem of IJarold Keke did not go away. He became an independent 
'warlord' on the Weathercoast and leader of the Guadalcanal Liberation 
Front. l·Iis maverick actions were not covered by the amnesty offered 
under the Townsville Peace Agreement, A Guale in his early thirties, but 
with a New Ireland grandmother, Keke was brought up a Roman 
Catholic but had more recently become an SSEC adherent. lIe was a 
high schoo! drop-out from Honiara with a long involvement in Guale 
militant activity. He had attended the July 1998 meeting at Visale, 
which supposedly set the IFM on its path, and took part in the raid on 
the Yandina armoury in December the same year. He was arrested at 
that time, but Premier Alebua and a Catholic priest offered bail, 
whereupon he promptly absconded to the Weathercoast. In September 
2000, he captured a Solomon Airlines plane and held the pilot for 
ransom. In early 2001, he managed to evade capture when a patrol boat 
strafed his village. He was also involved in the attempted assassination of 
Alebua in June 2001. There were some who thought that Keke had 
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become a 'bogey man' for a weak government, but his cumulative 
rnisdeeds were undeniable. Keke claimed responsibility for, but was 
never charged with, the assassination of Cabinet minister and Roman 
Catholic Priest Augustine Geve in August 2002. 
In June 2002, reports circulated on the 'coconut radio' that ten east 
Kwaio Malaitan men and one from Bougainville had launched an 
expedition to the Weathercoast, with a speedboat borrowed from MEF 
commander Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea, to try to capture Keke. The boat ran 
out of fuel at Tangarare on 8 June, forcing the Kwaio men to shore, 
where they were engaged in battle and killed. Police Minister Una 
denied that the expedition had been launched with government 
support, claiming that it had been motivated by financial reward. Kel<e 
had been negotiating with parliamentarian Yukio Sato and invited 
Andrew Nod to take part in further negotiations after the incident. 
'Bigmen' from Malaita were accused of organising the expedition, and 
the sole survivor reportedly identified Kwaio parliamentarians Alfred 
Sasako and John Martin Gam as being among the organisers. 1U Sasako 
strenuously denied any involvement, initiating libel proceedings against 
the prime minister and the Minister for Rural Development and calling 
for a Commission of InqUiry. The resulting police investigation visited 
Keke but failed to arrest him (Nori 2002b; Pareti 2002b; Solomon Star, 
24 November 2003). 
Another police-sponsored group failed to capture Keke in October, 
resulting in the deaths of six Keke supporters and one of the police 
party. But attempts to capture him merely generated allegations that 
police were brutalising villagers in his area and destroying their property 
(PacjfJc Vlkek,y Revlew, 4·10 November 2002; Island5 Bushle,f.5, 
Novernber 2002; Pacif1c News BulleUn, March 2003; Island5 Bushless, 
March 2(03). In early November 2002, not long before he resigned in 
frustration, Police Commissioner Morton Siriheti claimed that Keke and 
his supporters had denied 3,000 people access to their traditional food 
gardens, Keke's men uprooted gardens and insisted that on Mondays 
and Fridays the villagers were not allowed to garden, fish, make l'ires or 
work; they were only allowed to pray (O'Callaghan 2002g). 
Conditions on the Weathercoast deteriorated so far that the 
government considered declaring a State of Emergency, although the 
police commissioner opposed the move. Reports continued to emerge 
that Keke and his associates had kidnapped or murdered people, and the 
SIBC reportecl in April 2003 that his group had already killed 23 
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people that year. Late in April 2003, Keke's supporters kidnapped six 
Melanesian Brothers who had set out from Honiara to the Weathercoast 
to ascertaIn the fate of another Brother, Nathaniel Sado, feared murdered 
by Keke's group. When they did not return, a further seven Brothers 
followed in June 2003 and also disappeared. When he eventually 
surrendered, Keke admitted that the first six Brothers had been killed 
(SIBC, 20, 25, 28 April, 2 May 2003; O'Callaghan 2003d).ll 
Almost 1,000 Weathercoast villagers had fled to camps for displaced 
persons outside Honiara. There were reports that Marasa village on the 
Weathercoast, home to 500 people, had been burnt down and two men 
stripped, paraded in front of villagers, and had bones broken before 
being beheaded. The parish priest Father Lionel Longarata was also 
kidnapped, beaten and almost killed by KekeY This was a last ditch 
stand for Keke-he had been losing credibility since late 2002, and 
many of his supporters had deserted. In April 2003, Papua New GUinea 
offered to send a crack unit to unseat him, and in July of that year 
Australia prepared to send small drone spy-aircraft with the RAMSI 
troops. Keke knew his reign of terror had ended, He began to negotiate 
surrender, signed a ceasefire agreement just before the RAMSI force 
arrived, and surrendered along with his key commanders, Ronny Kaua 
and Samson Leketo, and seven others on 13 August 2003 (McPhedran 
2003a; Pryor 2003; O'Callaghan 2003e, 2003f, 2003g; Post-Courier, 8 
July 2003; lrlandl' BusIness, July 2003). 
Statehood and a new constitution 
Early in 2002, the parliament formalised the necessary provisions to 
implement a federal government system that would allow the provinces 
more autonomy, but the Cabinet insisted on more consultation before 
impleml?nting it. A State Government Report was tabled in the first 
session of parliament in 2002, and plans were underway to revise the 
national constitution. A mandate to prepare the new constitution was 
given to the Constitutional Review Taskforce, headed by John Tuhaika, a 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Provincial Government and 
Rural Development. The Taskforce delegation went to Canberra in May 
2002 to discuss the proposed federal system with academics at The 
Australian NaUonal University and intended to tour the provinces but 
was inhibited from cornpleting its tasks by lack of funds (Solomon Star, 
26 April, 2 May 2002). By August 2002, Malaita Province had passed a 
Provincial Autonomy Bill that was expected to be presented to the 
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national government during the next month, and other provinces 
followed. The drafting instructions for the new legislation were 
presented in early April 2003, and a wide round of community 
consultations was agreed, but Sogavare saw this as a delaying tactic and 
called for a Bm to be drafted and presented to parliament (SIBC, 21 
August 2002, 4, 11, 12, 17 April 2003). 
Provincial affairs were almost moribund: proVincial services barely 
existed and provincial governments persistently stone·walled the 
national government. Early in 2003, Guadalcanal Province announced 
that there would be no attempts to regenerate major industries on the 
island until the national government adopted the new federal systern, 
and in May 2003 Western Province announced a halt to all exports 
unless the national government agreed to a 30170 split in government 
revenue. Some provincial employees, however, had not been paid for 
months, and amid calls for provincial autonomy there were also calls for 
total disbandment of the provincial system (SIBC, 14 January, 28 
February, 14 May 2(03). 
Civil society 
One very significant change in Solomon Islands was the prominence of 
the Civil Society Network (CSN). Women were important players in 
this movement, and had won grudging acknowledgment from their 
men-folk. In Gizo, the CSN had operated since June 2000, starting with 
about 40 volunteers·······fed by wornen's groups, churches and some 
businesses-who patrolled business and residential areas, armed only 
with whistles, torches and walkie-talkies supplied by the New Zealand 
government. Regular weekly meetings comprising loose alliances of 
businesses, NGOs, churches and community-based groups began in 
May 2001, facilitated by Sir Lloyd Maepeza Gina and Ashley Wickham. 
CSN groups from Honiara and the provinces met in Munda in August 
2002 to discuss reconciliation, restoration of law and order, the 
economic crisis and constitutional reform. In April 2003, the Gizo CSN 
asked to be able to inspect the financial affairs of the Western Province 
governrnent over the previous four years, based on reports of 
misappropriation and corruption (Pacific News Bulletin, March 2002, 
August 2002; SIBC, 11 April 2003). 
The CSN unsuccessfully called for a halt to illegal compensation 
payments and duty remissions. They made no headway with the 
government, or with Foreign Ministers Downer and Goff, of Australia 
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and New Zealand respectively, when they visited early in January 2002, 
The CSN also used every opportunity to issue press releases about 
important events, such as when Sir Fredrick Soaki was assassinated, and 
constantly lobbied the police commissioner to improve law and order, 
Events such as International Women's Day were used to publicise the 
plight of women during the crisis, In March 2002, Honiara's 
International Women's Day march was well attended-lO,OOO people, 
about one-fifth of J--Ioniara's population, joined a 'Wokabaot for Pis', The 
National Council of Women, the Mothers' Union and church groups 
also held workshops on human rights, democracy, reducing violence and 
poverty, and ways to spread awareness of women's rights (SIBC, 7 
January 2002; Civil Society Network 2002; Solomon Star, lEi, 19, 23 
April 2002), The CSN also opposed the various pyramid-selling and 
scam companies that had invaded the islands, and a branch of 
Transparency International, a non-political organisation dedicated to 
opposing corruption and promoting good governance, was established in 
Honiara (SIBC, 14 February, 6, 26 March 2003), 
The CSN campaigned to have parliament recalled before the budget 
session in November 2003 and later gave total support to the RAMSI 
intervention (SIBC, 23 May, 7 June 2003; O'Caliaghan 2003h), If 
Solomon Islands governments learned one lesson from the crisis it was 
that they had to listen to civil society and had to encomage this wider 
participation in governance and planning, There was always tension 
between the CSN and the governments, Kemakeza was furious at their 
calls for the parliament to sit and became very personal in his reaction, 
International donors certainly heard the message and joined with NGOs 
and other CSN institutions to deliver aid, The European Commission's 
Cotonou Agreement was an important step in recognising that non­
government agencies had to be involved in national planning and 
development, and be involved in the implementation of donor projects, 
In mid 2003, moreover, the Red Cross re-established a permanent 
presence In the islands (Sololllon Star, 25 April 2003), 
The international community continued to provide assistance, but. 
the level of aid was seriously reduced because donors were no longer 
willing to support the corrupt regime, Taiwan provided huge amounts 
in loans and grants, mainly because it valued Solomon Islands' 
diplomatic recognition, but responsibility for on-the-ground assistance 
was increasingly shouldered by Australia and New Zealand, The United 
Nations Development Programme (liNDP) offered the government. S$8 
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million, 5$2.8 million for constitutional reform, 5$760,000 for 
industry rehabilitation, and more than 5$3.7 million for demobilisation 
of the 1,380 special constables (known by the long-suffering population 
of Honiara as 'special criminals'). The European Union agreed to fund 
government-sponsored students in various institutions, and funded the 
appointment of William Morrell from Manchester, who had earlier been 
head of police in Kosovo, as the new police commissioner. I-Ie arrived 
early in 2003, committE'd to overhauling the Royal Solomon Islands 
PoLice Force, but faced opposition from the remaining special constables 
and many senior officers who had been implicated in corrupt practices, 
such as violently threatening members of Cabinet. By March 2003, G40 
special constables had been de mobilised in Guada1canal, and another 
740 remained (SIBC, 10 February 2003; Islands Bllsine.~~, December 
2002, February 2003, March 2003; Pacific News Bulletin, July 20(3). 
Australian-led intervention 
In the 1980s, the mC\jor aid donors to Solomon Islands were Australia, 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States; in the 
1990s, they were Japan, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the European 
Union, Australia and New Zealand. Taiwan had promised to lend the 
Solomon Islands government US$25 miilion, of which US$20 miiiion 
had been advanced by August 2002. 
In the early 1970s, the United Kingdom was the only substantial aid 
donor to Solomon Islands. In the lead up to self-government (1971­
76), however, Australia provided A$1.35 mIlLion in bilateral aid for 
projects, technicai assistance, food aid and education, and another 
A$6.9 million up until 1979.. At the time, Australian aid to Pacific 
nations was focused more on developing regional organlsatibns and 
preserving culture. Of particular note was a prqject to introduce beef 
cattle herds, although it was never successful (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1977, 1989).13 Cumulatively, Australia has given most and 
had the most effect on the islands since independence. 
An Australian diplomatic m.ission was established in 1978, and 
Australia's policy largely followed a centralised 'modernisation' 
developnlent paradigm, to increase econom.ic prosperity and in the long·· 
term ensure the stability of Australia's neighbourhood. Australian private 
investment and exports from, and imports to, the Solomon Islands were 
low. In the first decade after independence, the United Kingdom and 
Australia mainly proVided small loans to the government and staff for 
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government departments to provide short-term expert assistance until 
Solomon Islanders could be trained to run their own bureaucracy.J4 This 
often failed when the foreign experts withdrew before their local 
replacements were sufficiently trained. Australian aid to Solomon Islands 
during 1984-89 averaged A$7.5 million per annum. Australia and New 
Zealand provided secondary and tertiary education for a small but regular 
number of Solomon Islands students. Within the islands, Australia 
developed natural resources, principally in agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
cash crops suitable for smallholder farming, plus human resources, mainly 
education and health, and provided infrastructure development including 
bridges, roads and schools. As always with aid donorship, much of the 
financial benefit went to Australian and New Zealand companies and 
personnel (Commonwealth of Australia 1989:58: Otter 2003b). 
Australia already had a substantial connection with the Solomon 
Islands. Between 1871 and 1904, 17,756 indenture contracts brought 
Solomon Islanders to work in maritime, pastoral and agricultural industries 
in colonial Queensland. Although large numbers of these workers were 
deported cluring the 1900s, a substantial Solomon Islander community 
remains in coastal Queensland and northern New South Wales, which 
reestablished strong links with its islands of origin in the 1970s.15 Some 
Solomon Islanders migrated to Australia during the 1970s and 1980s, 
with 410 new arrivals in the 1980s. By 200 1, Australia was horne to 
1,339 recent immigrant Solomon Islanders, some of whom were students 
and others permanent residents. They included two members of the 
current Solomon Islands parliament, Alfred Sasako and Simeon Bouro. lii 
Australian policy towards the Pacific began to change under Labor's 
Gordon Bilney, Australia's first ever minister with responsibility for 
Pacific Islands Affairs. U The South Pacific Forum meeting in Brisbane in 
1994 was themed 'Managing our Resources', and concentrated on 
human and natural resources. The next year, Australia reneged on part of 
its aid package to Solomon Islands in objection to unsustainable timber 
harvesting rates, driven by the Mamaloni government in contradiction 
of advice given by the Timber Control Unit of its own Ministry of 
Forestry. Australia suspended A$2.2 million of its total aid flow to 
Solomon Islands in 1995·96. The full program was reinstated a year 
later, with an Australian forester appointed as Commissioner for Forests 
and enactment of the Timber Act 1996, designed to regulate the 
exploitation of forests (Committee to Review the Australian Aid Program 
1997:111: Otter 200%). 
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Australian aid to the Solomon Islands increased steadily in the late 
1990s, from A$ll.O million in 1997·98, to A$13.3 million in 1998· 
99 and A$18.7 miJIion in 1999-2000, when it represented around 20 
per cent of all aid received by the Solomon Islands (AusAID 1998: 139). 
Two ..way trade between Australia and Solomon Islands fell from A$96 
million per annum in 1997 to A$64 in 2001 (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 2002). The 2000 coup led Australia to suspend the 
Defence Cooperation Program, which had helped train (obviously with 
little impact) the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, and had provided 
many of the high-powered weapons that were stolen, as well as the 
patrol boat that strafed villages on Guadalcanal in the coup's aftermath. 
Together with New Zealand, Australia provided a series of warships to 
act as neutral venues for peace talks, as well as hosting the Townsville 
peace talks of October 2000. Vanuatu and Fiji joined these two regional 
powers to proVide unarmed soldiers and police as part of the 
International Peace Monitoring Team that oversavv the surrender of 
weapons. In the months before the 2000 coup, Australia refused Prime 
Mi nister Ulafa' alu's requests for direct military or police assistance and, 
when the crisis peaked with the coup that removed the government, 
simply evacuated its citizens and other expatriates. 
The nature of aid donors to the Solomon Islands changed after the 
coup. The social instability and poor economic and fiscal management 
led to a substantial reduction in international aid to Solomon Islands, 
from US$75 million in 1998 to U5$28 million in 2001 (Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2002). Loans and aid packages frorn Taiwan 
and Australia became increasingly important. The Australian 
government substantially increased aid to the Solomon Islands in various 
forms during the 2000s, from A$35.1 million in 2000·2001 to A$40.6 
million in 2001-2002, A$36.2 million 2002-03, A$37.4 million in 
2003··04. 'rhe projected figure of $165.1 million for 2004·05 indicates 
the RAMSI commitment (Commonwealth of Australia 2004: 139). 
Australian NGOs (partly funded by the government) spent A$2.4 
million in 2001 alone. Over 80 per cent of Australian aid was to strengthen 
social infrastructure, the police force and justice sectors, to help fund the 
national election and support the health sectors. During the 2000s, aid 
was increaSingly passed directly to needy sectors, by-passing the 
ineffectual Solomon Islands central government......·such was the case with 
a health trust to maintain basic medical services, and a Community 
Peace and Restoration Fund that directly funded village-level health, 
education and water supply projects to disadvantaged communities. 18 
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New Zealand's approach to foreign policy was very different to that 
of Australia. An Australian diplomat and now Secretary of the Pacific 
Islands Forum, Greg Urwin, wrote in late 2003 that 
Nr;w Zealand is, in a general and ultimately unquantifiable way, 'closer' to the 
South Pacific. and that closeness is increasing ... there is an Australian perception 
that New Zealand's relations with at least parts of the region are evolving in 
ways that Australia's are not (Urwin 2003: 11). 
New Zealand has always had a proportionally larger indigenous 
population than Australia, and one closely connected by kinship with 
the Polynesian territories of the South Paclfic. Long negotiations 
between Maori and Pakeha have proceeded differently from Australia's 
less engaged negotiations with its indigenous cornmunity, and there is a 
growing Pacific Islander presence in New Zealand that is not matched in 
Australia (Fairbairn-Dunlop and Makisi 2003). New Zealand also 
earned Melanesian credit when it ably played a constructive role-­
arguably more effective than Australia's-in the reestablishnlent of peace 
in Bougainville. Although New Zealand has more limited donor funds 
available, its involvement with Pacific nations generally and with 
'trouble spots' in particular has been commendable (Goff 2000a: Upton 
2000: McGhie 2002; McLean 2001). 
New Zealand increased its aid commitments to Solomon Islands 
from NZ$5.8 million in H198-99 to a peak of NZ$9.2 million in 
2000-01. It then reduced its aid to NZ$7.2 million in 2001-02 and 
further to NZ$4,8 million in 2002-03, before increasing it again to 
NZ$14 million in 200304 (NZAID 2003a, 2003b). New Zeal<md 
aid primarily went to promote good governance practices and education. 
Despite providing substantial amounts of aid, both Australia and New 
Zealand remained cautious of intervention. Throughout 1998-2003, 
the official Australian line was that the way forward lay in the hands of 
the Solomon Islands people and that solutions had to be developed 
within the country, not imposed from outside. 
Australia spent more than A$30 miJIion on the post-1999 peace 
negotiations, but two years on from the Townsville Peace Agreement the 
process could hardly be claimed as a success. Australia and New Zealand 
continued to monitor the situation, and in October 2002 sent a high­
level team to both Vanuatu and Solomon Islands (The Ausl.raUan, 2 
October 2002). Alexander Downer and Phil Goff, Foreign Ministers for 
Australia and New Zealand, visIted l..-Ioniara together early in January 
2002, offering a cautious welcome to the new government. One product 
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of this trip was the secondment of Perry llead, a senior Australian 
diplomat brought in from Vanuatu to assist the government with 
reconstruction, Alex Bartlett, the new Foreign Minister and former 
Malaita Eagles leader, showed no diplomatic skills when he presented 
his counterparts with carvings of eilgles, the symbol of Malaita (The 
Australian, 9 January 2002; The National, 8 January 2002, Post-Courier, 
11 January 2002), At the time of the January 2002 visit, the Solomon 
Islands' government requested S$115 million to run education, health and 
other basic services, but Kemal<eza was embarrassed when local radio 
announced another S$7.3 million of tax concessions just before the 
Foreign Ministers arrived, bringing the total of tax remissions over the 
previous year to around S$100 million. Goff was blunt when he explained 
the circumstances under which his government would offer assistance, 
saying 'New Zealand taxpayers' money won't be wasted by giving aid to 
Solomon Islands that will just be stolen' (Keith-Reid 2002:18). Downer 
and Goff became regular visitors during 2002-03 as they battled to 
come to grips with what could be done to turn the Solomon Islands 
around. Downer was back again in December 2002, at a time when 
shots had been fired at the prirne minister's residence. Kernakeza feared 
for his own life and was being bullied by criminals who were special 
constables on the government payroll (O'Callaghan 2002h). Australian 
goodwill was obvious, but it was not easy to find acceptable solutions. 
IIowever, it was not until mid 2003 that Australia and New Zealand 
rnade a major change in policy direction. In Australia this was brought 
about by a new attitude within Prime Minister John Howard's Liberal­
National Party coalition towards the Pacific island nations, which began 
with intervention in the Solomon Islands, extended to strengthen 
regional peace-keeping, took a more active role in the Pacific Islands 
Forum, and bolstered governrnent practices in Papua New GUinea, The 
sudden turn ..around and dramatic change in policy from the Howard 
government, which had previously treated the Pacific island nations 
indifferently, was perhaps the most dramatic about-face in Australian 
policy since the 180 degree turn to support Indonesian acquisition of 
West New Guinea in 19G3. Prime Minister IIoward until this point 
had showed little interest in the Pacific islands ancl had not attended the 
two previous Pacific Islands Formn meetings. 
1'lw sudden change in attitude to the Pacific island nations is 
striking, It is difficult to understand why the Australian government 
allowed the situation in the Solomon Islands to go on for so many years 
200 
Rescuing a failing state: the government of Sir Allan Kemakeza 
before intervening, when two previous Solomon Islands prime ministers, 
Ulufa' alu in 1999-2000 and Sogavare in 2000--2001, had already 
unsuccessfully pleaded with Australia to intervene. Just before he was 
deposed in June 2000, Prime Minister Ulufa'alu said 
[w]hy won't you help us? It is not a question ofAustralla corning in and 
invading. It is a question ofeverybody in the countTy-the premiers, the 
church leaders. the trade unions, even the warring parties·-··all have concurred 
to a neutral body coming in (Wright 2003a). 
Rather than congratulating Australia on its 2003 intervention, we 
must ask why did it not intervene in 20007 What caused the dramatic 
change in policy in mid 2003, when Australia sent in 2,000 troops, 
police and administrative staff and committed itself to possibly A$2 
billion in assistance over the next decade? 
A number of factors combined to provoke this response. Certainly it 
was not in ilnswer to a request by the Solomon Islands government. 
Kemakeza 'v\lrote to John Howard on 22 April 2003 and was summoned 
to Canberra on an Australian Air Force jet on 5 june, to be told of 
Australia's decision. Australia supposedly wanted bipartisan Solomon 
Islands' acceptance and had also invited OppositIon Leader john Martin 
Garo to come to Canberra with Kernakeza, but Garo was not told of the 
invitation until after the prime minister was already on his way. Why 
did the High Commission in Honiara not ensure Garo knew? 
If one key player can be pinpointed it was Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer. As far as can be ascertained, intervention was his 
initiative, not that of his department officials or diplomatic staff, or even 
john Howard. Australia's Foreign Minister came late to his understanding 
of what was necessary. International circumstances had changed in the 
preceding year and all governments had been forced to rethink 
established foreign policies. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 and the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002, Australia had become 
more worried about its vulnerability. A study of the Bali incident by the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) drew the attention of the 
Australian government to the weakness of its Pacific neighbours. 
Three of our dosest neighbours--····Papua New Guinea (PNG) , the Solomon 
Islands. ilml Vanuatu" are in different ways struggling (0 survive as 
functioning nations and societies. The Solomon Islands is the furthest down 
(he road to state fallure. but PNG and Vanuatu also face serious 
problems ... 'These countries are also potential havens for terrorist groups. 'fhey 
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could serve as bases for groups planning attacks in Australia, and their weak 
security infrastructure means th(lt such groups could [lot onlyslip in to these 
countries unnoticed, but could also use these states as points of entry to 
Australia (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2002:28). 
Downer and his NZ counterpart Goff had demonstrated their good 
will to Solomon Islands, but also quite clearly did not know how to 
proceed. Prior to 2003, their departments had advised them to avoid 
any allegations of neocolonial behaviour and not to even hint at direct 
intervention. Yet they bravely convinced their respective prime ministers 
and Cabinet colleagues to back them in a radical policy change. It seems 
probable that a series of factors outside government ranks influenced 
their judgment. Church and CSN leaders in the Solomon Islands put 
forward strong arguments, as did Australian media and academics. 
Often quoted is ABC Radio Australia journalist Graeme Dobell's essay 
'Policy Taboos, Popular Amnesia', written in February 2003 for the 
Menzies Research Centre Lecture Series on Australian Security in the 
twenty-first century, a shorter version of which Vias published in 
(Juadrant in May and also submitted to the 2003 Senate review of 
Australia's relationship with Papua New Guinea and the Pacific (Dobel] 
2(03). Dobell called on the government to 'embrace our responsibility', 
and argued that Australians could have no exit strategy fi'om the South 
Pacific because they lived there as well. Engagement was the only real 
option. Academic Marl, Otter of the University of Queensland, 
facilitator of the Solomon Islands Human Development Report, 2002, 
also called for Australian military intervention in several papers written 
eluring 2002-03. He told the Senate InqUiry that 
Solomon Islands is in very rea] danger of coJ]apsing as a state and becomingjust 
one more basket case. Australia alone, or in association with New Zealand and 
other PaCific states, has the capability to restore order to the Solomons (Otter 
2003a:2) . 
Speaking at a July 2002 Pacific Update conference in Canberra and 
on ABC radio, Otter raised questions about the basic similarities 
between the situation in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Both 
countries were Australia's neighbours, both were small, underdeveloped, 
and had long historical ties with Australia. 
In recent years, both countries have also been racked by violence between 
warring militias ofyoung unemployed macho thugs acting Ollt Rambo scenes, 
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riding in the backs of trucks with stolen guns, terrorising the population and 
killing. In both countries, large numbers of the population have been displaced 
as a result of the violence. There is no longer any point in saying to the 
Solomon Islands' government that they must restore law and order-they 
sirnply cannot (Otter 2002:n.p.) 
Helen I-Iughes, a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Independent 
Studies, and an expert on economic development, was another 
influential voice. Hughes' important paper 'Aid Has Falled the Pacific' was 
published in Issues Analysis in May 2003 and presented to the Senate 
inquiry, while her 'Helping the Islands to Help Themselves' was published 
in the July-August edition of Quadrant (Hughes 2003a, 2003b). 
In the Solomon Islands, the most influential views carne from social 
commentator John Roughan, whose critical writing on many aspects of 
the Solomon Islands was widely syndicated. Another articulate analysis 
came from Terry Brown, the Church of Melanesia (Anglican) Bishop of 
Malaita. His excellent and Widely-circulated 'Ten Ways Australia and 
New Zealand Can IIelp the Solomon Islands' was written in July 2003 
(Brown 2003c), but through 1998-2003 Bishop Brown (and presumably 
other leaders of the mainstream churches) was quietly influencing his 
Australian and New Zealand counterparts, who in turn lobbied politicians 
like Downer (Downer 2003). Journalist Mary-Louise C)'Caliaghan also 
had some influence through her many articles in The Australian and her 
role as a contributor to the ASPI report Our FajJjng Neighbour: Australia 
and the future of Solomon IsJandr, published in early June 2003. 
'The report's main author, Elsina Wainwright, a policy analyst with 
ASPl, had collated a range of opinions and argued persuasively that only 
direct intervention could protect the Sol01110ns from complete anarchy 
(Kerin 2004). Her report urged the establishment of a multinational 
agency to take control of Solomon Islands, deploying 150 international 
police with the support of the Solomon Islands government (The 
Australian, 11 June 2003). Our Failing Neighbour estimated that this 
phase would take ilbout one year, and woukl be followed by about 1() 
years of international support to rebulld the Solomon Islilnds' capacity 
for effective government. The cost of the operation was estimated at 
approXimately A$850 million, with Australia footing about half of the bill, 
which would represent a significant increase in Australian ilid to the Pacific. 
Hugh White, then director of ASPl, and former foreign policy advisor 
to Prime Minister Bob l-Iawke and ex-Deputy Secretary of the 
Departrnent of Defence, .is an influential figure in Canberra. Drafts of 
203 
Happy Isles in Crisis 
the ASPI report were distributed around Canberra late in 2002 and to 
Milner Tozaka, Solornon Islands High Commissioner to Australia, who 
provided copies to his prime minister, Governor-General Sir John lni 
Lapli, and Speaker of Parliament Sir Peter Kenilorea, Thus, although not 
an official Australian government statement, the ASPI report was 
extremely influential in alerting both the Australian and Solomon 
Islands' governments to the possibility of some form of intervention 
(0 'Callaghan 2003i). 
The report stressed a security theme, which exaggerated the terrorist 
and security dangers of the failing state, but nonetheless became the 
official justification for Australia's increased aid to, and direct 
intervention in, Solomon Islands. When Kemakeza requested assistance 
from Australia in his letter of 22 April 2003, Howard was just back 
from Washington, where Australia was declared the United States' 
'deputy sheriff' in the Pacific region. The Australian rhetoric sounded 
logical"--a smooth follow-on from Australian military commitments in 
Afghanistan, Bougainville, East Timor and Iraq, The ASPI report argued 
that a 'failed state' in Solomon Islands would allow terrorists, 
gunrunners, drug-lords and refugees easy access to Australia from across 
the Cora] Sea. The ASPl provided the government with is rationale and 
justification, stating that 
."without an effective government upholding the rule oflaw and controlling 
its borders, Solomon Islands risks becoming-and has 10 some extent already 
become······· a petri dish in which transnational and non"state security threats can 
develop and breed. Despite its poverty, thefe is wealth in Solomon Islands for 
those with the will to ext.ract it.: golel, timber and fish. If the state canna I 
provide security and a legal framework in which such extraction can occur, 
others will. And t.heir methods will be f~lr li'om attractive (Australian Strat.egic 
Policy Institute 2003: 13). 
Wainwright's analysis exaggerated the potential wealth, and ignored 
the fact that anarchy in Solomon Islands was largely confined to 
Honiara, spilling over to Auk! in Malaita, and thus had little relevance 
to the 84 per cent of the population who live in rural areas. OutSiders 
are always rather obvious in the Solomons and easily observed; yet there 
was an element of truth in the ASPI and Australian government 
reasoning. The arrival of several men in Floniara, presumed to be from 
Pakistan, as well as the flourishing pyramid schemes, motivated this 
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thinking. The Australian government chose to pin its public statements 
on the security explanation, striking the correct note with the Australian 
public. Privately, however, the government had much more complex 
reasons for intervention. 
There were allegations that Australia had intervened in the Solornon 
Islands to capture for itself the future economic benefits. As Chapter 
Three makes clear, however, little economic gain is likely. Despite the 
fabled wealth of King Solomon's islands, the limited amounts of gold 
and industrial diamonds found so far are certainly not worth the trouble 
of rnilitary occupation or neocolonial administration of haif a million 
people, making avarice an unlikely motivation for Australian 
intervention. The cost to AustraIia--estimated at A$2 billion over the 
next ten years .. ····is vastly more than Australia is ever likely to recoup in 
company taxes or indirect benefits. 
The international context "vas also muddled by the involvement of 
France, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. France (through New 
Caledonia) offered to contribute immediately to any intervention, a 
reasonable offer from a neighbouring country, but one the Howard 
government refused outright (Kerin and Walters 2003). 
Australia's decision was also influenced by events in Papua New 
Guinea. Alarmed by the deterioration in conditions in its neighbour, 
Papua New Guinea had been considering taking action of its own since 
early April 2003, particularly to se.ize Harold Keke, and had sent 
officials to Honiara to talk to the government there. After I·Toward met 
with PNG Prime Minister Somare in Japan in June 2003, the PNG 
Defence Force was instructed to prepare for a trip to Guadalcanal 
(Hriehwazi 2003). 
Another motivation was undoubtedly the request by the desperate 
Kemakeza government for Indonesian <lssistance. At the April 2003 
summit of Asia Pacific Foreign Ministers in Bali after the terrorist outrage, 
Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Laurie Chan passed a letter from 
Kemakeza to the Indonesian govel'l1ment, requesting <lssistance. Alfred 
Sasako believes that the Australian government obtained a copy of this 
letter and reacted to it (Sasako 2003b). Official confirmation of the letter 
was provided by Milner Tozaka, Solomon Islands' High Commissioner 
in Canberra, when he was interviewed on Australia's SBS television 
service. He confirmed that 'Indonesia was considering sending its troops 
to address the problem' and that Australia was aware of the Bali 
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discussions (SIBC, 30 August 2003). Kemakeza wrote to Indonesia and 
Austraiia at ilJmost the same time, Just two weeks before Kemakeza was 
called to Canberra to discuss matters with John Howilrd, Indonesiil's 
Ambassador to Solomon Islands (based in Port Moresby) visited Honiara 
from 20··.. 25 May to present his credentials (SIBC, 21 May, 30 August 
20(3). While experts on Indonesia doubt that its miiitary forces have 
the capacity, or the will, to intervene in the Solomon Islands, there is no 
doubt thilt an approach was made by the Solomons. The only official 
outcome was the ambassador's visit and iln agreement for technical 
cooperation (SIBC, 14 July 20(3). After the Indonesian anny's campaign 
of violence in the run-up to independence in East Timor and continuing 
military atrocities in its Papua Provinces (the new name of Irian Jaya 
PrOVince), an Indonesian presence would not have been welcomed in the 
Pacific by Australiil or Papua New Guinea. The request for Indonesian 
intervention was surely involved in the timing of Austraiia intervention. 
Why did Australia decide to act in May 2003, when it should and 
could have done so any time over the previous three years? 
In a sense, the Australiiln government gave in to the inevitable. If the 
situation deteriorated further in the Solomon Islands, the world's leaders 
would have expected Australia-the United States' 'deputy sheriff' in 
the PaciJic.. ··to deal with the matter, After all, the islands are on 
Austmliil's doorstep. The Melanesian nations ilCroSS the Coml Sea from 
Australiil have a population of dose to seven million. The potential 
collilpse of a nation, after coups in the Solomon Islands ilnd Fiji, 
instability in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, economic col1apse in 
Nauru, and econornic mismanagement and poor governance throughout 
the region, would become Australia's problem. There was a strong 
argument that it was better to try to fix the problems before they 
became worse. Intervention also sent a message to other Pacific nations 
that Australia (and New Zealand) were wi11ing to deal directly with 
problems in the neighbourhood, The United Nations was fairly 
ineffectual, although UN Secretary-General Kor'i Annan supported the 
intervention, but there was no reason to bother seeking the support of 
the UN Security Council because mainland China, in response to 
Solomon Islands' diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, would immediately 
veto any proposals to support the country (SIBC, 6 August 2003). 
A nation with a government too frightened, incompetent and corrupt 
to govern was a worst-case scenario, but imminent. Downer and GolI 
had nightmares of finding a Pacific version of Rwanda on their doorstep. 
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The Solomon Islands' provinces were manoeuvring towards increased 
autonomy, but the disintegration of the Solomon Islands into several 
separate island states was cont.rary to all the principles of the post-war 
decolonisation process. State fragmentation in the region, particularly in 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, also represents the fulfilment of 
Australia's worst foreign policy fears, John Howard's rationale, however, 
was more pragmatic and appealed to his chosen electoral platforms as a 
strongman leader. As IIoward said in August 2003, 
[t] he international community looks to Australia to playa leading role in the 
South Pacinc, Our leadership oft.he regional assistance mission to the Solomon 
Islands reHects both a national interest and an international expectation. A 
failed state would not only devastate t.he lives of the peoples ofthe Solomon 
Islands but could also pose a significant risk for the whole region. Failed states 
can aU too easily become safe-havens for transnational criminals and even 
terrorist.s. Poor governance and endemic corruption proVide the conditions that 
support criminal activities (Howard 2003a:n.p.). 
When the Solomon Islands fell apart in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Australia was involved in East Timor, Bougainville, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, which absorbed a huge amount of government funds, 
Although Australia is a large nation compared with its Pacific 
neighbours, overseas defence involvements and the extraordinary policy 
of relocating refugees in nearby island states such as Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea had been expensive, Australian ejectors saw the Sout.h 
Pacific as a holiday destination, not a potential threat, and did not 
understand the mismanagement of nations such as the Solomon Islands, 
Howard was a slow learner as a Pacific statesman, but was ruthless in 
his exploitation of issues. The Tampa refugees incident and the 'children 
overboard' scandal, when refugees were falsely accused of throwing their 
children into the ocean, had been exploited shamelessly by l-Ioward to 
win a national election in 2001. Solomon Islands intervention and the 
'Pacific solution' have to be seen in the context of US demands that 
Australia police the South Pacific region, and Howarcl's dornestic 
election campaigns. 
The Australian government knew that, if they did not take action, 
the s.!tuation could deteriorate into unthinkable chaos, but exactly how 
Downer convinced Howard we will probably never know. In June 2000, 
Downer told the Australian parliament that 'ethnic conflict' was the 
root cause of the connict (Downer 2000). When the Solomon Islands 
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Opposition moved a vote of no-confidence in December 2002, 
Australian diplomats in Honiara signalled that Australia was not in 
favour of a change of government. Up until May 2003, Australia made 
quite clear that it was opposed to any outside intervention and preferred 
the stability of Kernakeza and his tainted Cabinet to an unknown new 
power group. No one listened to journalist Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, 
who was always forthright in her call that Kemakeza must go. 
Mr Downer has described Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza as 'a good man' 
doing a 'goodjob'. Leaving diplomatic niceties aside, for an Australian foreign 
minister to describe Mr Kemakeza this way raises serious questions about how 
fully the Australian government understands the true naturc' ot'the problems 
here, Mr Kemakeza, who was sacked as deputy prime minister over corruption 
Jastyear, has received further controversial payments this year. After 10 months 
in otllce, he has demonstrated neither the capacity for leadership nor the skills 
to govern.l1:e has failed to tackle militant activity, the non-performance of the 
police or the corrupt dealings of half his cabinet (O'Callaghan 2002i). 
The Australian government made a decision to support Kemakeza's 
government, not to remove it, despite its shortcomings, As Downer told 
a reporter that at the time of Kemakeza's letter to Howard in April 2003, 
[tjlw bottom line is that wejust couldn't leave Solomons to wither on the vine 
and become a failed state, We did a great job in East Timor, we did a greatjob 
in Afghanistan and in Iraq; wc~ couldn't have people saying: 'How corne you did 
absolutely nothing in Solomons?' So when the Prime Minister asked me about 
Kemakeza's letter, I told him: 'Look, the situ,ltion isjust dire, I think we should 
take this very seriously and have a look at what we can do' (O'Callaghan 2003i). 
Downer had certainly become more knowledgable about Solomon 
Islands between 1998 and 2003, and stronger in his resolve (0 
recommend intervention, but in the end it was up to Prime Minister 
Floward. 
Howard is a manipulative politician, Central to the decision to 
intervene was Howard's own reputation. When he began as Prime 
Minister, Howard was not confident in foreign policy, but he had clone 
renlilrkably well in his overseas ventures, and in this stage of his 
incumbency he wanted to 'cut a dash' that would leave him 
remembered for more than the introduction of the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) and persecuting refugees. The time was right and it suited 
the statesman role he increasingly wanted t.o playas prime minister. 
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Having made a large commitment in the Solomon Islands, Howard was 
able to refuse increased troop numbers in Iraq, Also, involvement in the 
Solomon Islands diverted some attention away from the embarrassing 
lies told by his government about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 
In mid 2003, Bush and Blair were in serious political trouble because of 
their exaggerations, and Howard was allied to them. But John Howard 
is a political survivor, and his decision to intervene with mllitary force in 
2003 was predominantly for domestic consumption and to please the 
United States, not because of any sincere change of attitude towards 
Australia's Pacific neighbours. In this respect, the policy was extremely 
successful: the intervention proved popular with Australian voters, with 
opinion polls indIcating 75 per cent support for Howard's decision to 
send troops to I-Ioniara (Shanahan 2003). 
Intervention in failed states·---since similar operations in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, East Timor, some African nations and the Solomon Islands, 
and a bureaucratic intervention in Papua New Guinea···· while not: 
withoLlt risk, had worked and was seen internationally as a practical 
move rather than neocolonialism or an unwelcome invasion of national 
sovereignty. In the six months after intervention, the Australian 
government took on a more active role in the South Pacific, a new phase 
after almost 30 years of a hands·off approach to uneven, periodic unrest 
in the islands. Calls for pooled regional governance in the Pacific were 
Followed by a package of reforms. After the Solomon Islands 
intervention, Australia secured its nominee, diplomat Greg Irwin, as the 
next Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum, suggested the 
adoption of a common currency by Pacific islands nations and a free 
trade bloc, and announced finance for a Regional Police Training College 
in Fiji. Australia then offered 300 police and 200 public servants to 
bolster good governance and administration of Papua New Guinea. The 
Solomon Islands intervention was far too lat.e, and probably over­
extended Australia's global peace-keeping and interventionist 
commitments, but when 2,000 soldiers and police, accompanied by 
experts in governance procedures, landed at Honiara, Solomon Islanders 
collectively breathed a sigh of relief (Lewis 2003: Walters 2003) .19 
Notes 
The Guadalcanal Ministers were Stephen Pafmi (Agr'iculture &. Livestock). NQllen Lenl 
(Provincial Government &.. Rural Development), Father Augustine Geve (Youth, Sports 
&. Women), Siriako Usa (Lands &. Survey). and Walton Naezon (Mines &.. Energy). 
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Other members of the new Cabinet were Nathaniel Waena (Nalional Unity, 
Rcconciliiltion &. Peilce), Edward Hun;' ehu (Commerce, E:rnployment &. 'li'ade) , 
Augustine Tenako (Health &. Medicill Services), Synder Rini (National Planning), 
Benjamin Una (Police, National Security &. Justice), Nelson Kile (Fisheries &. Marine 
Resources), 'Irevor Olavae (Tourism and Aviation), Clement Rojumaml (Horne Affairs), 
Alex Bartlett (Foreign Affairs), Bernard Giro (Transport, Works &. Communications), 
Daniel Fa'afunua (Economic Reform &. Structural Adjustment), Michael Maina 
(Finance &. External Affairs), and Mathias Taro (Education &. 'I"Dining) (The AustraliaIJ, 
20 December 2001; Post-CourieJ', 21 December 2001; SlBC, 7 January 2002), 
Bartlett w"s sacked from Cabinet on 2 August 2002 beciluse he refused to accept the 
'l\Jurism &. Aviation portfolio, which for a short time went to Paul Maenu, Bartlett 
remained in the Cabinet until he was arresteel in Septembel' 2004 (Kemakeza 2002: 
SI He, 3 August 20(2), 
See O'Callughan 20CJ2a, 2002b; Solomon Star, 8 April 2002: Post-Courier, 12 and 15 
April 20CJ2; Tilt'National, 15 Apri120CJ2, 
l<epo!'t on [mplcrnentation of the Solomon Islands GOV8['Jlment National Economic 
Recovery Plan, 5 August 2002, Iu-Mi-Nao. 
Records produced for the Citizenship Commission showed that of 358 applications 
granted over the previous 10 years, 229 were Chinese (mainly from mainland China, but 
some from 'I'aiwan and Southeast Asian nations), 23 !I'om Papua New Guinea, 19 from 
F\i i, 17 from Kiribati, 12 from Australia, 11 from Britain, 9 from Korea, and 7 from 
Vanuatu, The need for 1CJ years' residence in Solomon Islands had often been waived, 
and money was knowo to have changed hands for the favoLlr (Post-Courier, 24 April, ] 3 
May 2002; SIBC, 1 March, 22 May 20(3), 
The company is owned by Solomon Islands Provident Fund (51 per cent), Cable &. 
Wireless of London (4 UJ per cent) and the Investment Corporation of the SololTlon 
Islands (7.1 per cent). 
See aiso ABC Four Corners TV Program 'Tl-anscript 'Guns and Money', 20 May 2002 
http://wwvdabc.net.au/4corners/stories/s559713.htlTl [accessed 28 May 2002], 
Nichols had preViously been a Deputy Director in the Ministry of Foreign AHairs' 
Development Co-operation Division managing New Zealand's Overseas Development 
Assistance program in the Solomon Islands and other Pacific countries, 
Information from anonomous sources, July 2003 and September 2004, The men charged 
were Silas Laefilamo and Naasusu'Tome (The National, 3\ July 2003: SIBC, 3D July 
2003; nwAus/rallan, 5April 2(04), 
10 Unsigoed letter said to have been sent by Harold Keke to Prime Minister Kemakeza, 1fi 
June 2002, copy published in IJJands 13mlnesl', August 2002:35, 
II The Brothers were Robin Lindsay, Francis Tofi, Alfred Hilly, Ini Illi Parlabatu, Patteson 
Gatll and 'Tony Sirihi (Carter 2(03), Joe Foukona of S1 CNs '[i'uth ~nd Reconciliation 
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Committee thought the Z3 figure was exaggerated, but even his figure of 13 is extreme
 
(SIBC, G May Z003).
 
These reports came from a mall of impeccable credentials, Augustine Mauakako, the
 
nation's first Permanent Secretal'y I'm [[ome Affairs after independence (Tile National, 3,
 
7 .July Z003: Post,Collrier, 3, 7 .lull' 2(03).
 
Ll	 In 1971 Australia announced a $Z50,OOO five'year program for the preservation and 
development of Pacific cultures. 
In 1973-71, Australians only had A$1 G,OOO invested in Solomon Islands, although this 
increased rapidly to A$8, 1Gil,000 by 197G (Commonwealth of Australia 1978: 19, 17­
48, 52, 55, 57, 1989:35). 
1\	 In the nineteent.h century, this circular labour movmnent involved around 50,000 mainly 
males on GZ,OOO indenture contracts to and from New Caledonia, New Hebrides, 
Solomon Islands, eastern PapwJ New GUinea and to a small extent 'Tllvalu and Kiribati. 
This labour trade was commonly known as 'Blackbirding', and initially involved a large 
degree of kidnapping and coercion, although illegality did not typify the process in the 
longer run. At Federation in I DO I, the Commonwealth of Australia ordered tlIe 
deportation of as many as possible of the remaining Islanders, who mainly lived in 
coastal QueellSland and northern New South Wales. Several thousand were clble to 
remain in Australia and their descendants now call themselves Australian South Sea 
Islanders. Intermarriage makes it hard to distingUish Solomon Islanders from t.he otber 
island groups, although Solomon Islanders were one.. thlrd of the original migration. 'lh, 
largest Solomons community is at Mackay. In the 1D70s, after a break of seventy years, 
the connection between the Australian Islanders and their families in the islands was 
rem'wed. Over the smne period, Australian South Sea Islanders campaigned to be 
recognised as a distinct ;mel disadvantaged ethnic group, a campaign fulfilled by 
recognition by the C0l11111Onwealth in 19% and Queensland governrnentin ZO[JO 
(Moore 1985, ZOOO, ZOO 1: see also COlTis 1973; Price and Bakel' J9711). 
1G	 SOll1e of the new arrivals were naturalised Solomon Islanders, particu_larly Chinese, but 
the rlliumity wcre indigenous (Commonwc"lth of Australia 1989:1Z7: Departm,'nt of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous AfFairs Z(03). 
17	 Bilncy was Minister 1'01' Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs. 
During 2002, I spent a week on Rmmell Island with CPRF coordinator Dyeil 
T(~ngemoana, and saw the prqject in act.ion. See also Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid (Z003) and AusAJD (20(]O. 2001b, 20(2). 
1n	 See also Binoy Kampmark (Z003), who argues that Australia is too over·extended in t.his 
new South Pacific policy. 
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Conclusion 
RAMSI: the aftermath 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) will no 
doubt generate several books. In tracing the collapse of the 'Happy Isles' 
into near-anarchy. I have chosen the initial RAMS1 intervention in late 
July 2003 as the best place to halt. Firearms began to be surrendered 
almost immediately and within a few weeks almost 2,500 weapons and 
300,DOO rounds of ammunition had been handed in, including SR88s 
anc! light machine guns, shotguns and revolvers. Most of the weapons 
carne from Honiara and Malaita, but 600 were handed in at Gizo. One 
parliamentarian, Alex Bartlett, former MEF leader and current Minister 
for Tourism, handed in several rifles, two revolvers and thousands of 
rounds of ammunition (SIBC, 20 August 2003). RAMS I, working with 
the PNG Defence Force, also pursued gun-runners working across the 
Shortland--Bougainville border between Solomon Islands and Papua 
New Guinea. Some of the illegal kwaso stills were closed down, 
criminals began to fear arrest and street life in the capital returned to 
normal. Honiara's residents felt a weight lifted off their shoulders. 
During 1998-2003, Honiara had been dominated by fear and 
hopelessness but it was now possible to move about freely and to enjoy 
recreational activities on the outskirts of town. After the troops and 
police arrived, smiles replaced downcast glances and there was a renewed 
feeling of optimism. Honiara's economy began to pick up, although 
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retail business was still sluggish and the only immediate improvement 
was in businesses that supplied government or aid donor organisaUons, 
for which money flowed steadily. After RAMSI arrived, many of the less 
savoury beneficiaries of corrupt and illegal largesse left Honiara, taking 
their money with them, in hopes they could avoid detection. The 
military and police presence has stimulated tourism, particularly in 
Western Province, where Honiara-based RAMSI staff like to take 
holidays, and is good for artifact sales. Some other industries have also 
slowly picked up. Duty remissions will have to run their legal course 
before being removed. but they will disappear. A sign of the times is a 
new casino license, awarded to the prominent Chan family of Honiara 
Hotel. 
By December 2003, more than half of the troops were withdrawn, 
and more left in February~March 2004, leaving a policing rather than a 
military operation (Kerin 2003; The National, 30 July 2003: Post­
Courier, 31 July 20(3). By mid July, one year after RAMSI began 
operations, 3,500 weapons had been handed to authorities in a totally 
bloodless operation that has been praised by all sides as a successful 
strategy. The RAMSI intervention was carefully presented as the actions 
of good neighbours to a friend, clearly avoiding any criticism of a 
colonial hangover. RAMSI successfully restored law and order, but will 
the cairn remain when the troops and police withdraw, and what is 
being clone to ensure that deeper structural problems are solved? Has 
Ri\MSI just applied an expensive band-aid to the nation's wounds, 
which in the long term will not heal? An intervention that only restores 
law and order will fail. Has any real conflict resolution taken place, and 
has the underlying cause of the conf1ict been addressed'! Will the 
corrupt culture of the public service and the police be repaired? 
In mid 2004 business was clearly picking up pace, public servants 
were being paid and government revenues increasing. The only survey of 
public opinion carried out in the islands is by the Solomon Islands 
Development 'I1'ust (SID'n, which has conducted regular surveys of 
town and village people for several years. The survey preceding RAMSI 
showed that in the four survey categories ....·.. health, education, resource 
assistance, and availability of money-not one area scored more than 42 
per cent satisfaction rates. The people signalled that they had given up 
expecting anything from their government. A new survey in February 
2004 (of 2,341 town and village respondents) gave RAMSI high marks 
(88 per cent) for restoring security, and a slightly lower score (74 per 
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cent) for the success in restoring the justice system. IIowever, RAMSI 
only scored 66 per cent for service delivery (education, clinics, transport, 
jobs and so forth) and 64 per cent for restoration of the national 
economy. John r~oughan commented on the 2004 survey: 
[tl he Justice System Working, for instancr, drew lower results than security 
partly from the nature ofthejustice system. Collecting guns, jailing warllll'ds, 
and restoring basic peace produced quick, dramatic results. Justice syst(~m 
procedures·······police investigations, court processes, sentencing andjailing········are 
a much more drawn out affair and work at a slower pace. But people are not 
shy to observe that few senior politicians havE' yet to feel the full sting orthe 
law and their rightful place in a Eove cell. Crooked politiriilns, unsavoury 
business men, coup plotters and their cronies have yet to sec the inside of a 
court house and until they do, then the nation as a whole continues to be the 
big loser! (Eoughan 2004b:n.p.) 
It is very telling that in August 2004 Malaita's only civil airport, 
second in passenger traffic to Henderson airport: in I Ioniara, was closed 
due to a dispute with the landowners, and Cuadalcanal's only three 
rural airports-at Avu Avu, Babanikira and Marau-are still closed after 
13 rnonths of RAMSI's presence. Essential rural roads, such as Malaita's 
road across the central mountains to the east coast, are still impassable 
due to lack of maintenance. Honaira's suburban feeder roads are in a 
shocking state, and rubbish collection services ceased three years ago 
(Roughan 2004c), Essential services are still in disarray, reducing 
people's confidence in RAMSI and the government. 
Part of RAMSI's brief was to investigate corruption, Some prominent 
leaders 'were arrested and, by November 2003, 30 police had been 
charged. These included Manasseh Maelanga, a senior police officer who 
had acted as operational commander for the June 2000 coup, charged 
with .1.1 offences, including rape, abduction, larceny and intimidation, 
Deputy Police Commissioners Wilfred Akao and John Homelo were 
charged on multiple counts, Minister for Communications, Aviation and 
Meteorology Daniel Fa'afunua was charged with assault while police 
were investigating another charge of demanding money with menaces 
from the Solomon Star newspaper. Charles Dausabea, prominent 
Honiara businessman and former leading politician, was charged in July 
2004, and Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries Alex Bartlett was 
charged in September 2004 (Solomon Star, 9 July 2004, 3 September 
2004). Nevertheless, Solomon Islanders have been disappointed that so 
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few senior politicians, police and public servants known to be corrupt 
have been detained in the now escape-proof Rove Central Prison. The 
prime minister and other members of Cabinet have also been under 
investigation, without result, but some commanders and senior officials 
of both militant groups are now either in jail or facing criminal charges, 
with more to be investigated (O'Callaghan 2003a, 2003n, 2004; 
Solomon Star, 19, 20 November 2003). 
Also, to their creelit, RAMSI has been successful in settling the 
situation on the Weathercoast, and has begun a drive to recruit new 
police, but there has not been an equivalent program to recruit good 
public servants. Many new university graduates are still unemployed 
while incompetent or unmotivated time-serving officers remain 
employed. RAMSI also needs to intl'Oduce major electoral reforms before 
the next election. Voting lists need to be updated, and measures taken 
to prevent registration in llluitiple constituencies and by non-resident 
candidates, but this will probably be opposed by sitting members. 
RAMSI also needs to work more on restoring the coJiapsed 
infrastructure, particularly rural roads. Funds and expertise need to be 
concentrated at the village level, not only in urban areas. 
The constant turnover of RAMSI personnel is causing problems 
through under-staffing, lack of ability with PijiIl, and lack of cultural 
awareness. And there is little point in any of their activities if at the 
same time they are not training competent local staff. The situation is 
rather like many Pacific colonies in the final decade before they achieved 
independence, and in their first decade as independent nations. Unless 
local understudies are cultivated, and unless training and localisation are 
prime aims, Solomon Isl andel'S will have been 're-apprenticed', th is time 
to Australia rather than to Britain, still with no long-term ability to 
govern themselves. When RAMSI leaves, will it be replaced by 
competent Solomon Islanders? 
Eighteen months after RAMSI arrived there is no sign that the 
Solomon Islands' politicians or public servants are back running the 
nation, or being prepared to resume control. It is still a RAMSI 
operation, and this does not bode well for the future. 
Reconciliation and conflict resolution 
Som8 dreadful atrocities occurred during 1998-2003. Communities 
and individuals have to rid themselves of the demons that will stop 
them forgiving. I took a taxi ride with a Malaitan driver in Honiara 
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during mid 2002. He was from the clan Into which I have been 
adopted, and he knew me although I did not know him. I had heard 
rumours about a video that showed the MEF beheading GuaJe IFM 
fighters and asked hirn if it was true. It was hardly the usual 
conversation between a passenger and a driver, but he said yes and quite 
proudly Invited me home to watch it. I declined, Soon after, I had 
another matter-of-fact conversation with a former Malaitan Eagle about 
beheading, in which we discussed the difficulties of cutting off a human 
head. 
Rapes and murders, executions and mutilations OCCUlTed on both 
sides. Men were held and made to watch their wives and daughters 
being pack-raped. Innocent people became involved just because they 
were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Innocent Solomon Islanders 
have been threatened and hurt, had their property destroyed and 
received no compensation, while at the same time they have seen 
politicians and criminal thugs rorting the system. Millions of dollars are 
missing, Ordinary people on Guadalcanal felt and still feel hopeless, 
deceived and deserted. Communities have suffered from extortion by 
thugs who are still roaming free. 
After 1998, and through the 2000 coup, the Malaitan and 
Guadalcanal leaders unleashed forces of violence, coercion and 
corruption that they could not control or contain. Solomon Islanders 
recognise complex symbolic links between human relationships, lands, 
gardens, music, dance, everyday thoughts, speech, their ancestors, and 
now Christianity, but this cosmological balance is fragile and rather like 
living cornfortably in the vortex of a cyclone. Malevolent spirits circulate 
in the winds, and constantly try to get in. During the last five years, the 
cairn has been broken by unwelcome forces everyone knew were always 
circuhlting but which remained contained by other factors. RAMSI 
chased out the malevolent spirits, but this was hardly a cosmological 
solution. What is needed is a large-scale prograrn of restorative or 
transformative justice, in which all involved in injustice are given an 
opportunity to join discussions about the consequences of the aberrant 
actions and how the situation can be put right. Former militants need to 
confess their terrible acts before they can reo-enter their communities, 
even if they feel their actions had legitimate causes. Criminals need to 
apologise for the sorrow and hurt they have caused, for their own sakes 
as much as those of their victims. Pacific societies have long-established 
methods of resolving disputes, methods that existed long before books 
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were written on the topic. As Sinclair Dinnen notes in his introd uction 
to A Kind of Mending; which deals with restorative and transformative 
justice in the Pacific islands, negotiations involve a complex knowledge 
of kinship, status and social relations, and there is no concept of a final 
fixed acUudicatioI\·····deals can be renegotiated when the circumstances 
change. The result may not restore society to the position before the 
dispute began; the aim instead should be to transform and move 
forward (Dinnen 2003a; see also Rumsey 2003). At the National Peace 
Conference in August 2000, delegates suggested that a system like the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ought to be put in 
place, to allow Solomon Islands to confess and to forgive. 'I'he same 
concepts to establish peace, justice and reconciliation were suggested in 
north Malaita in December 2000 during the first ever ecumenical 
conference of chiefs (Northern Region Chiefs' Conference 2000). 
In 2002, the acting Chief Justice also called for a similar commission 
to be established, as did ex-Police Commissioner Frank Short in February 
and July 2003. Such a commission would enable Solomon Islanders to 
establish the truth of what happened between 1998 and the present, 
particularly the lead-up to the June 2000 coup and the turmoil that 
followed. The Solomon Islands' Christian Association has developed and 
fine-tuned a process based on the South African model, which can be used 
in the islands. The Christian churches [laVe been leaders in holding 
reconciliation services-the Melanesian Brothers' reconciliation service with 
the police in April 2002 was a good example of what needs to be done. 
Ethnic communities have also held reconciliation ceremonies, such as that 
between Filipinos and Kwaio Malaitans in Honiara, and in April 2003 the 
Solomon Islands Christian Association held a dialogue on truth and 
reconciliation at Mbita village on the Weathercoast (Solomon Star, 25 April, 
10 May 2002; SIBC, 27 February, 22 April, 21 July 2003). Some political 
and militia leaders, particularly Andrew Nod and Alex Bartlett, have 
apologised, but as Gary Fa'aitoa noted in the Solomon Star in April 2002, 
[a] blanket apology by any person or organisation without specifically 
addressing the fears. hurts, scars ill1d sufferings oftbe people victimised in the 
conflict will cia little to help people recover from their traurnatic ordeals 
(Fa'ilitoa 2002: 4). 
Tarcislus Tara Kabutaulaka advocates dealing with the years of 
turmoil through the proper aclministration of the formal justice system 
and the notion of restorative justice. 
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As a nation we cannot continue to pretend that it is proper to forcefully 
overthrow a civilian government. 'To do so would be to set a dangerous 
prer:edent. It implies if one disagrees with political pl'Ocesses and outcomes all 
one needs to do is put a gun to the Prime Minister's head and force his 
government out uf office (Kabutaulaka 2002a:5). 
What follows from this is also Kabutaulaka's blind spot: he is on public 
record as accepting that the Guale were justified in driving their fellow 
citizens off Guadalcanal. The Guale's action set a dangerous precedent. 
as did the MEF counteraction. '['he criminality of Ifarold Keke. Jimmy 
Rasta Lusibaea, or any of the other thugs who ruled through terror 
tactics also needs to be dealt with by the formal justice system. 
Kabutaulaka is more perceptive when he deals with restorative justice. 
'This involves a reconciliation pJ'Ocess that encourages the restoration of 
relationships between filfnilies, communities and our nation. The process must 
provide an opportunity for those who did wrong to adnLit their faults and be 
held accountable for it. Furthermore, those who were wronged must be 
apo]ogised to and be given the opportunity to forgive and come to terms with 
their luss. Reconciliation must invulve restoring relationships amongst people at 
alllevds of society (Kabutaul<lka 2002a:5). 
Reconciliation is not about revenge. It involves cleansing the national 
soul to enable people to move on to a path of normality and unity. 
Solomon Islanders are generally a very Christian people who understand 
concepts of forgiveness and the cathartic experience of confession. Some 
national leaders have called for this process to be implemented. The 
military nature of the first year of the RAMSI occupation does not 
suggest an awareness that cultural precedents and kastom need to be 
acknowledged before the nation can move forward. On the other hand, 
the Civil Society Network (CSN) , owing to its substantial base in the 
Christian denominations and unparalleled closeness to the people, is 
well aware of the role that kastom must play in any lasting solution. In 
the Solomon Islands over the last six years, civil society has emerged as a 
maJor social voice and conscience of the nation. While aid donors have 
swung towards financial support delivered through NGOs and other 
CSN groups, this has not filtered through as far as it should. If the 
elpcted government will not admit its incompetence, RAMSI should 
take action and encourage civil society to cleanse Solomon's temple. 
Pacific islands' value systems are quite different from those of the 
West or Asia. Direct confrontation is usually avoidecl, but when it OCCllI'S 
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there needs to be a final ceremonial compensation and forgiveness to re­
establish societal equilibrium. This process now includes modern 
monetary exchanges, and modern goods and possessions, whereas 
traditionally it only involved items such as shell and feather wealth, pigs 
and taro. HUmi1I1 exchanges also occurred, and women were often 
exchanged to bind descent groups together. These processes restored a 
cosmological balance that involved the present generations as well as 
ancestors. Over thousands of years, Solomon Islanders have effectively 
altered customary ways to cope with changes as new groups migrated 
within and through their islands, and interacted through trade, 
territorial disputes and wars. They also have hundreds of years' 
experience of dealing with encroachment by the outside world into their 
islands. Today's peace and reconcilIation involves customary ways in 
cornbination with Christian faith and Western-educated leadership, but 
the old balances still need to be achieved. Solomon Islands' leaders 
understand how to proceed, by combining half-modern, half-traditional 
ways. But compensat.ion has been t.aken to ludicrous extremes in recent 
years. The large abuses of t.he compensation processes that have seen 
millions of dollars pass hands-·····in realit.y, just bribes and blackmail ....·.. 
cannot be justified. Cultural reconciliation should not depend on large 
amounts of donor money; instead, it must involve village, communit.y, 
provincial and national levels, and people who act. for themselves. It 
must be an indigenous process. Sweeping t.he past under the mat. will 
never aid healing. 
Leadership 
Sir Allan Kemakeza has survived as prime minister during t.he RAMSI 
intervention, despite calls for his resignation and legal action instituted 
by the then leader of the Opposition, John Martin Garo (The National, 
5 August 2(03). In early August 2003, under pressure to stamp out. 
corruption, the prime minister removed eight department heads and 
swapped two portfolios, Finance, held by Deputy Prime Minister 
Snyder Rini, and Education, held by Francis Zama. Michael Maina 
became the new Police Minister. Experts from Australia and New 
Zealand were placed in key department.s such as 'Treasury and Finance, 
t.o try to improve the administration (Post-Courier, 6 August 20(3). 
A few key political and bureaucratic transfers will not reform corrupt 
and incompetent governance practices that have become ingrainecl. The 
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culture of politics in contemporary Solomon Islands has been self­
serving and based on personal aggrandisernent rather than political 
ideology or attempts to serve the citizens of the nation. The biggest 
challenge to the Solomon Islands elite is to create a nationwide sense of 
loyalty to the state and then to find a compromise between the demands 
of modern Bigman politics and the needs of the nation. Successful 
kastom leaders have to accumulate wealth and then distribute it to their 
kin. In a modern political scene, however, there is no way that elected 
political leaders can legally accumulate enough wealth through their 
salaries and business dealings to enable them to remain in positions of 
power in both elected and kastom authority for any length of time. The 
Solomons must either separate political leadership from kastom, or 
reinvent a constitutional marriage between democracy (good governance) 
and kastom. Neither path seems likely in the post-RAMSI reconstruction. 
At the same time, many politicians and their cronies have 
demonstrated extreme avarice and no longer bother distributing wealth 
in a traditional manner-those with access to government largesse, 
usually already well-off, are getting richer at the expense of the 
'grassroots' masses. blands Business pulled no punches when it described 
the plight of Solomon Islands in August 2003, and it is extremely 
optimistic to think this scenario will change after RAMSI. 
Reliant on the limited experience of a few educated administrators, democracy 
was swamped, stunted, throttled and ultimately raped by politicians who 
applied Melanesian tactics to drain the national coffer dry Virtually free, and 
latterly completely so. They have been free of any serious risk of'intercession by 
what has been passed in the Solomon Islands as western-style law and order. 
Some government ministers and their lieutenants are in daily collusion with the 
brazen armed rnostly semi-literate bandits who reign in the capital, Honiara. 
The national management ofthe Solomon Islands has been a disgrace for years. 
'fhe present elected government is clearly incapable of stopping the rot by 
itself; certainly if its members actively foster it (Island\' BusIness. August 
2003;10). 
The use of electoral development funds to be distributed at the whim 
of each politician, now institutionalised practice in Papua New Guinea 
and the Solomon Islands, is a prime way in which largesse is distributed 
to electors, who as often as not are also extended kin of the politicians, 
Although these funds encourage corrupt distribution practices, they are 
probably a better method than to deny politicians kaslom esteem, and 
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force them to use corrupt means to gain the funds they need to satisfy 
kastom redistribution. Cleansing politics of criminal corruption and 
rorting is by comparison an easier task. The other extreme is to continue 
down the path of large-scale political corruption such as exists in Asia 
and Africa. 
After RAMSI, the Solomons Islands need to make politicians and 
public servants accountable and dissuade them from rarting the system 
for their own advantage. Major offenders need to be prosecuted. 
Solomon Islanders will judge the success of RAMSI by how effectively it 
tackles corruption. Thus far, however, the policy seems to be to preserve 
the political status quo and let the ejectors make the final decisions in 
early 2006. 
Governance 
The ten-year contract of Rick I-[ou, Governor of the Solomon Islands 
Central Bank, ended in mid August 2003. Hou was persuaded to remain 
in the post. If he had left, RAMSI would have appointed an expatriate 
to the important position. Hou has been competent and constant in his 
warnings of looming economic catastrophe and remonstrations about 
bad governance practices over many years, even if they were seldom 
heeded. The Central Bank and the Asian Development Bank also 
warned that no credible economic analysis was possible because the 
government's moribund statistics office had no ability to measure the 
condition of the economy (Calliel< 2003; SIBC, 4 May 2003).1 
Getting the economy baek on track will be a slow and difficult 
process. Many Solomon Islanders are deeply disturbed by western-model 
government processes based on a centralised Westminster system and 
capitalism, rather than a system based on local cultural norms. 2 The 
British left behind a governance system based on their colonial 
experience around the world, not one developed specifically for Solomon 
Islands. The British also over-centralised the administration and 
economy and presumed that Solomon Islanders would eventually adapt 
to the imposed system. Development was historically focused on 
Honiara and aimed to generate income for the national treasury, without 
much thought to 'ownership' of the development by the 84 per cent of 
Solomon Islanders who live a semi·-subsistence style in rural areas, often 
with inadequate transport and communication systems. The poor 
management of resources and high levels of corruption created what 
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Mark Otter dubbed 'immature' governance. Too few Solomon Islanders 
are capable of running the public service, a consequence of the colonial 
power's insufficient planning and desire to leave quickly, but also the 
fault of successive governments since 1978. To strengthen and rebuild 
the governance apparatus is a crucial task For the post-RAMSI period 
(Otter 2003b). 
Civil society 
Government at all levels has to listen to civil society. While final 
responsibility rests with elected leaders and the legal system, the Civil 
Society Network and churches have proved themselves a worthy part of 
the social and political process. Participation in civil society is the easiest 
way for women to have their say in decision-making, given they are 
barely represented in the formal political system and are sparsely 
represented in senior levels of the public service. The Christian 
denominations are one of the main sources of sensible advice and 
practical help in all communities, particularly in rural areas. Christian 
leaders are trusted, listened to, and have shown their dedication to the 
nation more than any other group in the Solomon Islands. Churches 
and NGOs have become central to leadership and planning. John 
Roughan's words of ten years ago remain true. 
Some national leaders balk at the thOllght ofNGOs haVing assumed certain 
public leadership roles, once thought to be those of elected officials. 
Development Is a government prerogative, contends conventional wisdom. 
Governments are installed by a public, more or less democratic selection 
process, for which everyone understands the rules. Who gives the NGO its 
authority to be working in this vital field? SholJld not a properly elected 
government official be worried about the idea that NGOs are and ought to be 
moving into a more central role in prOViding public leadership? (Roughan 
1994: 150) 
Wf:lile recent prime ministers have bridled at what they saw as 
interference, after the crisis years they must now acknowledge that, 
while government services crumbled away, churches ilnd NGOs 
remained strong and held the nation together. NGOs and other 
elements of civil society have a critical role to play in providing 
information and feedback to public servants-they can communicate 
effectively with the village sector and can introduce new ideas and 
monitor their implementation at the local level. Civil society institutions 
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are better able to empower the vast majority of Solomon Islanders who 
still live in outer islands and rural villages. The leadership that will 
emerge from the national election in early 2006 has a chance to lead the 
nation in a new and different way and must pay more heed to the voice 
of the people. Governments react to opinion polls, but these do not exist 
in Solomon Islands, except the rudimentary attempts by the Solomon 
Islands Development ll'ust. Civil society generally, and the Civil Society 
Network in particular, can provide this missing voice. 
Land 
Modernisation theorists tend to argue that the solution to 
underdevelopment is to remove traditional social forms that limit 
development. Many would suggest that communal landownership is a 
barrier to achieving sustained rural development. Some theorists suggest 
that, rather than total change, the best policy is to introduce land 
registration as an acceptable alternative to private land tenure, although 
where this has occurred elsewhere it has often led in the long term to 
land ending up under the control of a male elite. 
Solomon Islanders insist that the existing land tenure system is 
integral to maintaining kwtoJl1. Yet, in some ways modern communal 
land tenure is, like kastom. an adaptation arrived at over the last 
hundred years. The way the communal land system operates today .is 
actually far removed from that of the mid-nineteenth century before 
there was any outside interference. Leadership at village level has also 
altered, and like it communal land tenure operates in a different semi­
modern manner. Decisions over land use now seldom contain any 
element of ancestral control and the need to propitiate spirits. 
The modern naUon-state fails to confront the basic issue of resource 
ownership, which should rest with local communities, not an imposed 
structure of governance. Elected leaders at national and provincial leve1s 
do not have as extensive power bases as do local area traditional chiefs 
and Bigmen, elected paramount chiefs, male and female elders, and 
church leaders. Until Solomon Islands' governments at the national and 
provincial level become ser.ious about inclusion of resource owners in 
negotiations for economic development begun by the governments or 
private companies, there will always be dissat:.isfaction and resentment. 
The land debate often mixes up several problems: the need to safeguard 
communal ownersh.ip, the desire for pl'Ovinces to become independent 
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states that control their land, the desire for competent government in 
the regions, and frustrations over poor infrastructure development, 
which many, perhaps misguidedly, presume will be improved with 
devolved governance. 
Reconstruction on Guadalcanal, and to a lesser extent, Malaita, 
should not force a national reconstruction on all the provinces, islands 
and landownership groups of the Solomon Islands. National change is 
not necessary to provide Malaita Province with sufficient infrastructure 
development to persuade its population that there is a good future in 
staying horne, although the other provinces have a right to worry that 
diversion of resources to solve problems on Guadaicanal and Malaita 
deprives them of their share of economic development. 
There are many questions about the future of land tenure, both 
general and specific. How should Guale grievances over squatter 
settlements on the fringes of Honiara be handled? When will legitimate 
landowners, who lost their property and possessions during the civil war, 
be compensated? How can commerce expand onto customary land 
where multiple landowners have rights? The future of customary land 
tenure is at stake. How can the modern rnarket economy on Guadalcanal, 
and elsewhere, mix with the old land tenure system? Would it be better 
to abandon customary land tenure and register all land, or is there an 
intermediate path? 'This would prevent half-customary remedies being 
applied, and remove all barriers to the investment of capital and private 
investment. Adopting this path, however, would signal an admission 
that there was no accommodation possible between the two systems, 
and that a choice had been made to adopt a system that would not 
incorporate traditional and cultural influences. Is it possible for the 
Solomon Islands to have different land tenure for village communities, 
designated commercial land-use zones, a national capital district, or tax­
free zones on Guadalcanal, but not other islands? 
Law and order and the public service 
No single section of the community can be allowed to dominate the 
police force. The return of law and order to the community will go a 
long way to restoring normality, but much deeper problems exist within 
the administration of government. Many public servants have 
insufficient training to perform their duties, and have no work ethic or 
belief in the importance of the duties they carry out. Nepotism and 
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wantok-ism are cultural phenomena that run deep. While these cultural 
characteristics can be used to advantage. they can be, and are, just as 
easily abused, Rehabilitation of the public service and entrenchment of a 
leadership code of ethics with checks and balances are as important as 
stabilising law and order. 
The economy 
RAMSI's intervention will have been pointless without economic 
rehabilitation, The Solomon Islands' economic problems arise from 
uncoordinated development strategies and poor government practices 
that have created a large inefficient public service involved in too many 
things that could be left to private industry, The islands have rich 
nat.ural resources on land and sea, and can survive without. donor aid to 
the national budget. The previous economic culture encouraged a 
handout-oriented and corrupt mentality. Balanced timber export.s and 
exploitation of fish stocks. along with material inl'rastructure development 
spread through rural areas. and adequate social infrastructure 
development for schools and health services, will encourage more even 
development. and rerllove one of the main grievances between 
Guadalcanal and Malaita, Changes seem to have begun. Rick Hou 
announced in May 2004 that the economy had grown by six per cent 
during 2003, and t.hat the changes had actually begun in 2002, This 
economic upswing was mainly in the rural sector, where village people 
put effort into cash-crop and other small-scale production, They seem to 
have given up waiting for the government to get itself organised and 
gone on with their lives (Roughan 2004a). 
On 20 July 2004, the Australian government launched its long-term 
policy for rebuilding the Solomon Islands economy, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Alexander Downer and the authors of the report place a great deal 
of stress on the need for land tenure reforms and on persuading private 
business to develop the nation. The Solomon Islands' government will 
be assisted to meet its obligations to its own employees, to contribute to 
the Nat.ional Provident Fund, and to service its overseas debts, while also 
developing infrastructure, particularly health and education, Over 
2U04-09, the government will be assisted to re-establish 'fiscal 
responsibility' by 'removing the raft of barriers to income-earning 
activities and employment, These include a host of regulatory barriers, 
unreliable or high cost infrastructure services and expensive or absent 
credit facUities' (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004: 134), 
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The message is that inefficient and poorly managed state-owned 
enterprises should be handed over to private enterprise and the 
government should concentrate on running core activities. The days of 
'ghost' and non-performing employees on the government payroll, and 
unauthorised and corrupt expenditure, are also over. This is exactly what 
the Ulufa'alu government proposed when it was elected in June 1997, 
and was in part the reason for its downfall. RAMSI too wil1 have to deal 
with the personal greed of leaders who have prospered as their nation fell 
apart, but the mood of the people has changed since 1997 and 
hopefully this time economic reform will succeed. 
Nationalism 
Solomon Mamaloni was fond of saying that the Solomon Islands 'has 
never been a nation and will never become one'. Nation-builders have 
tried to promote a national identity, but the events of 1998-2003 
ripped apart what little progress had been made. Negotiations over 
provincial autonomy and break-away movements have not been followed 
by policy changes. Building blocks are in place--the education systern, 
Pijin English as a common language, and popular culture-··which will 
eventually lead to a national identity. But island regionalism is strong. 
and basic aJJegiances are still to extended farnilies and clans rather than 
the nation. There is no external focus, such as exists in the French and 
American Pacific territories, which could unite the nation. RAMSI must 
plan to depart long before resentment at the foreign presence wells up 
against it. Creating a national identity will be slow. The chances of the 
Western Solomons breaking away and joining an independent 
Bougainville are now remote. 
Australia and the Pacific islands 
The RAMSI intervention in Solomon Islands was the first sign of a 
radical change in Australian policy towards its Pacific island neighbours. 
Paul Kelly, international analyst for The Australian. surnrned up this 
change at the time of the RAMSI intervention. 
A paradigm shift has taken place in the Howard Government's foreign policy as 
it accepts the idea ofAustralia as ametropolitan power prepared to intervene to 
assist and save blUing nations in the neighbourhood. This decision, already 
taken in essence, is a threshold step for Australia and its Pacific region. It has the 
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potential to be our most important decision for this region since Papua N(~w 
Guinea's independence 30 years ago, It is driven by the recognition that the 
prime source of instability today is the failed state and that only Australia can 
exercise the leadership role in the Pacific (Kelly 2003), 
Australia has indeed begun a new policy of what Alexander Downer 
named 'cooperative intervention'. The chaotic situation in Solomon 
Islands drove Australia to assume a role it had always avoided, driven 
perhaps by the world order after the terrorist acts in New York and Bali, 
and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Solomon Islands have 
become a crucial component of Australia's new role in the region, 
The way forward 
The Solomon Islands will once more return to stability and peace. even 
though the six years from 1998 to 2003 dragged the nation to its lmees. 
The RAMSI intervention will force the necessary rehabilitation. 
Solomon Islands as im economic unit is large enough to survive and be 
self-sufficient, and there are enough citizens educated in traditional and 
modern ways to guide the nation's future planning. Consolidation of the 
post-RAMS I 'new deal' will take at least ten years, and the RAMSI 
'honeymoon' period is now well and truly over. Their presence 
inevitably will cause some discontent, as will frustration at their lack of 
ability to bring permanent change to Solomon Islands, The first real 
post-RAMSI test will come in the 2006 national election when the 
crippling elements of incompetence and corruption must be removed, A 
new generation of Solomon Islander leaders is waiting and able. Let us 
hope that they have learnt salutary lessons from the events of recent 
years and do not follow the old track. To use a typically Solomon Islands 
image, the old track is so overgrown that it is barely worth following; it 
is better to use sharp bush knives to cut a new path through the 
undergrowth, combining western steel blades and indigenous 
knowledge and experience to find the best path, Solomon Islanders have 
the skills to recognise tambu markers that must be heeded, and sacred 
sites that must be avoided, but they also know the path must lead to 
peace, prosperity and unity, 
The title of this book refers to a Solomon Islands crisis in 1998··· 
2004. Much of the first three chapters and this final chapter discussed 
how national government and economic structures developed, and 
future changes that are needed for the whole nation. As pointed out at 
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the start of the book, however, it would often be more accurate to refer 
to a Guadalcanal and Malaita crisis. The crisis was centred on 
Guadaicanal and flowed substantially on to Malaita, particularly when 
MEF-IFM tensions decreasecl and Malaitan militant groups took to 
bickering arnong themselves, unsettling large areas of their own island. 
The crisis involved relations between the peoples of the two major 
islands of the nation, but necessarily it also involved the national 
government which is based in Honiara on Guadalcanal, and all of the 
provinces. It is thus a tale of two neighbouring islands and their 
relationship with the surrounding archipelago that is the independent 
Solomon Islands nation. 
Notes 
In mid 2003 the Cent.ral Bank est.imated that the inflation rate was running at about 
11.4 per cent and t.hat the government owed S$l. '7 billion (A$31'7 million), '70 per cent 
of which was to overseas credit.ors. 'l'he situation rernained ext.remely precarious. 
'rhe best. expressioll of the need for underst.anding and harnessing indigenous 
epistemology comes from Cegeo and Watson-Gegeo (200)) and Gegeo (1998). See also 
H.uffer alld Qalo (20()4). 
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